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The main concern of this research is to study the influence 
of class power, culture and ideologies on educational 
policies, access and practices in the context of the changing 
political, economic and social policies of Egypt during the 
modern period. 
In order to study that, the thesis works on two levels, 
theoretical and empirical. 
The theoretical level presents the historical, methodological 
and theoretical broad context for the empirical study. This 
includes the study of the following: 
1.- The economic and political situation in Egypt, 
2.- State power and social class formation, and 
3.- The system and policies of education in Egypt. 
The empirical study is concerned with study of the following 
subjects: 
1.- Cultural and ideological perspectives of members from 
different class positions, 
2.- Class perspectives on general educational issues, 
3.- The ways in which 1 and 2 influence the distribution of 
educational opportunities for members from different class 
positions, and 
4.- Differences between and within social classes concerning 
the above points. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Egypt is well known to the world as one of the ancient nations 
that made a great contribution both to the world and to 
civilization. That contribution includes areas of science, 
art, and human knowledge in general. Alexandria was one of the 
world's capitals of education and knowledge. 
In spite of this, Egypt today is among the underdeveloped 
countries that look forward to the achievement Of socio-
economic and cultural development. A short history of Egypt 
is necessary in order to identify the main concern of this 
research, which is the influence of class power, cultures and 
ideologies on education policies, access and practices in the 
context of changing political, economic and social policies 
of Egypt during the modern period. These policies aimed at the 
achievement of socio-economic and cultural progress. Such 
socio-economic and cultural progress in modern times can be 
traced back to the period of Muhammad Aly Pasha, who ruled 
Egypt from 1805 to 1845. Muhammad Aly established a modern 
state in Egypt; he introduced modern industry, transportation 
and improved agriculture by digging canals for irrigation.2  
Muhammad Aly understood that building a modern state required 
a qualified labour force, prepared on a new basis and with 
specializations which would be different from the traditional 
religious elite.2 Consequently, he introduced a modern 
educational system which included such specializations as 
medicine, engineering, and military study, and he sent 
students to study abroad, especially in France. 
Muhammad Aly's educational policy was not for mass education, 
access to modern education was only available to the upper and 
middle classes, and the masses were still educated in the 
traditional religious institutions such as mosques and 
kuttabs.3 Muhammad Aly's modernization programme did not 
continue for very long, because he was threatened by the 
European powers, and not long after Egypt came under British 
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occupation (1882-1923).4  
Egypt became part of the British Empire. The Egyptian economy 
was integrated into the world capitalist market after the 
Second World War. Egypt's industry was destroyed, and the 
economy came to depend on the production of cotton for British 
industry. The Egyptian state lost control over education. The 
British reduced student numbers, introduced fees for 
education, and gave only the minimum financial support to 
education.5  
In 1952 the Egyptian Revolution took place under the 
leadership of Nasser, who is considered the first indigenous 
Egyptian to have ruled modern Egypt. Nasser's Revolution is 
a turning point in the modern history of Egypt. Nasser 
influenced the political, economic and social structure of the 
country. He introduced a programme of industrialization, land 
reclamation, and agrarian reform. These changes had socio-
political consequences, particularly in terms of the social 
and political power which, before the Revolution, was left in 
the hands of the feudal landowners. 
Nasser introduced a programme of mass education, and health 
and social services which have had a major impact on raising 
the standard of living of the people. Nasser's programme of 
development was undermined by the defeat of 1967, which forced 
Egypt to devote most of her financial and human resources to 
the war effort. 
After Nasser's death in 1970, Sadat came to power. Once he had 
consolidated his power in the war of 1973, he introduced his 
"economic open-door" policy, which opened the Egyptian economy 
to western, and especially American, investment. This policy 
has had political, economic and social consequences. It led 
Egypt into political and economic dependency and widened the 
gap between Egypt's social classes. 
9 
In economic terms, Egypt is now faced by a growing economic 
problem, with a huge foreign deficit, estimated to be $40 
billion in 1988. Industrial and agricultural production are 
not keeping pace with the increase in population, which 
currently increases by 2.8 per cent annually. The general 
standard of living is low, and the per capita annual income 
was estimated at $390 in 1978, which put Egypt among the 
middle income group of Third World countries.' 
Education is suffering from many problems: drop-out from 
primary school in 1978/79 reached 5.2 per cent in the first 
six grades of primary education; enrolment in primary 
education increased to 93.9 per cent nationally. but there are 
great differences between urban and rural areas. Whereas in 
urban areas enrolment may reach 88.1 per cent, in rural areas 
it may only be 32.7 per cent. Illiteracy, according to the 
1976 Census, was 56.3 per cent of the total population over 
the age of ten. 
Within the national economic strategy education is expected 
to play a tremendously important role. From the figures above 
it is clear that the education system is not reaching large 
sections of the population, and this hinders any expected 
development. Education is very important in the preparation 
of specialized manpower, and the pursuit of full employment, 
which is the back bone for any programme of socio-economic, 
scientific and technological development. Education can also 
be influential in reshaping the attitudes, behaviour and 
mentality of the Egyptian people under the existing 
conditions. 
I. 	 The Problem 
The problem which the current study addresses is the influence 
of class political, cultural and ideological power in 
educational policies, access and practices. The present thesis 
discusses and analyses how members of different social classes 
in present day Egypt perceive, respond to, and evaluate 
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official educational policies in relation to their concrete 
social needs, in the context of the socio-economic and 
political changes during the period since the Egyptian 
Revolution in 1952 and also in the context of their 
perceptions of these changes for contemporary Egyptian 
society. 
Education in the existing political, socio-economic and 
cultural conditions has failed to live up to expectations 
which were held for it. Under Nasser there was a movement 
towards free university education, a massive quantitative 
growth in student numbers, from 2 million in 1952 to 6 million 
by the end of the sixties. New specializations were created 
and more stress was placed on equality of opportunity. 
However, education faced many difficulties; it suffered from 
lack of equipment and finance, and could not produce the 
qualified manpower needed to meet the economic plan. 
Quantitative growth was achieved at the expense of the quality 
of education and coherent policy development. 
Under Sadat, educational policy changed. There was an 
expansion of private fee-paying schools, which mainly teach 
subjects in a foreign language. The government has established 
so called government language schools, which are fee-paying 
and teach all subjects in a foreign language, folloewing the 
example of the missionary schools in Egypt. Besides these 
measures, basic education was introduced, which gave technical 
training to children in the age range 7 to 15. The number of 
university students was controlled. Under these policies, 
which have continued to the present day, education continues 
to suffer from problems of drop-out and low enrolment, 
illiteracy persists, and there is an ever widening gap between 
the different classes as far as their access to education is 
concerned. 
From this brief summary of the characteristics of policy under 
Nasser and Sadat (which will be more fully elaborated in 
Chapter Four), the thesis assumes that changes in policy 
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cannot be seen as a merely technical response designed to 
solve educational problems. Rather, they have to be perceived 
as being rooted more deeply in the changing politics of 
development policies and ideologies, and, as such, to changing 
class relations, class alliances, and class interests in the 
different periods. With this in mind, the research focuses on 
the influence of class cultures, ideologies and power 
relations on policies of education and on the provision of 
education for different social classes. 
This line of analysis accepts that the study of class is an 
important, even indispensible, element in social thought. 
Social classes have been seen as major social forces, that 
arise out of fundamental, structural features of society, are 
expressed in the processes of social relations, and have 
significant and wide ranging social and political 
consequences.' 
In order to address class influences on education, this study 
will work and integrate two 'levels': the level of empirical 
study and the level of theoretical analysis. The empirical 
study is concerned with the investigation of class cultures, 
ideologies and common sense of the parents in sixty families, 
which represent different class positions, by studying their 
perceptions of social, economic and educational matters as a 
basis for identifying: 
1. cultural and ideological perspectives of the members of 
different social classes, 
2. class perspectives on general educational issues, 
3. how 1 and 2 influence the distribution of educational 
opportunities for members of different social classes, 
and 
4. differences between and within social classes concerning 
the above points. 
At the theoretical level, the four main issues will be 
analysed, as will be made clear by the theoretical formulation 
of the problems, in the light of the following social factors: 
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1. the economic and political situation in Egypt, 
2. state power and class formation, and 
3. the system and policies of education in Egypt. 
The analysis of these factors will explore, in the context of 
education and culture, the multi-faceted crisis generic to 
Egyptian society. The main aspects of this crisis are: 
- the crisis in social issues, i.e. the inability of the 
system to achieve a more equal and just division of 
wealth, power, and life chances between people, 
- the crisis in political issues, i.e. the inability of the 
system to broaden the base of democracy, 
- the crisis in economic issues, i.e. the inability of the 
system to run and develop the economy, 
- the crisis in national issues, i.e. the inability of the 
system to retain its independence, and 
- the crisis in civilization issues, i.e. the inability of 
the system to answer the questions of authenticity and 
modernization of the culture. 
II. The place of this research in the field of social class  
studies and educational research  
In line with the subject of this research, two main issues 
will be dealt with. These are the study of social classes and 
the study of systems and policies of education in Egypt. 
Consequently, this research must identify its place in the two 
fields, in order to determine the points on which it will 
benefit from previous studies in the field, and to identify 
the differences between this research and other studies, in 
terms of the new ground and conceptualization which this 
research will introduce. The following is a critical analysis 
of studies and researches in the two fields of class analysis 
and education system and policies in Egypt, and will help to 
specify the terrain of the present study. 
(A) Social class studies in the Egyptian literature 
Before proceeding to the discussion of social class studies 
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in the Egyptian literature, it is necessary to give a brief 
overview of the sociological research in Egypt in general, to 
illustrate the beginnings of Egyptian sociology. This will be 
helpful for an understanding of the limits and problems which 
are faced in such studies. 
In its early developments, Egyptian sociology was deeply 
influenced by western schools of thought and approaches. This 
was one feature of the Egyptian cultural dependency upon the 
west. The introduction of western theories and western 
movements of thought into Egypt began early in the nineteenth 
century when Muhammad Aly sent his first mission to Europe to 
study modern science (1809), and has continued down to the 
late twentieth century under certain national and 
international socio-political circumstances, namely; 
- the increasing tendency towards secularism and the 
integration of Egypt into the world capitalist system 
after the Second World War, 
- the emergence of a new capitalist class in Egypt in the 
1920s which sought to replace the old feudal class, and 
- introduction of western modern liberal thought 
accompanied by the beginning of the liberal democratic 
movement in Egypt, which started with the 1923 
Constitution and the partial-independence of 1936.8  
Under these political, economic and cultural conditions, 
educational and sociological research has for a long time 
reflected western thought. For example, the functionalist 
theory has dominated this field of research for a long time. 
The influence of this and other theories was brought to the 
field by the first generation of sociologists and 
educationalists who were academically prepared in the west, 
notably in Britain and France. 
The first department of sociology was established in the 1920s 
at Cairo University. The first academic effort was primarily 
the translation of Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, and Max Weber. 
Thus became established the classical sociology of 
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functionalism which concentrates on consensus and social 
cohesion. That trend of English and French sociology was 
dominant until the 1950s, when other sociologists started to 
open the door for the Marxist school of thought. With this new 
school of thought, academic production shifted from being 
confined to the translation of western theories towards 
empirical and applied research. These empirical research 
studies have introduced the problems of Egyptian society, 
development, and the class structure into the literature.9 The 
following is an example of the studies which concentrate on 
the class structure and class formation of Egypt. 
A review of class studies in Egypt shows that most of the 
studies are still conducted by Egyptian Marxists. These 
studies mainly concentrate on the structural level of class 
analysis, and deal with class position on the economic level. 
One example of these works is Gamal Magdy Hasanein's study 
Class Structure in Egypt: 1952-1970." In this study he 
identifies the class structure of Egypt before and after the 
Revolution of 1952. He identifies the following classes after 
1952: 
1. the feudalist bourgeoisie, 
2. the middle bourgeoisie, 
3. the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, 
4. the petty bourgeoisie and poor farmers, and 
5. the proletariat and semi-proletariat. 
Some other studies go further than the mere identification of 
class formation. They analyze the nature of the state in terms 
of class conflict to control the state apparatus and in terms 
of the economic and political functions of the state. Some of 
these studies concentrate on one social class in particular, 
the new petty bourgeoisie. 
One example of the studies which concentrate on the political 
function of the state and the role of the new petty 
bourgeoisie is the work of Mahmoud Hussein, Class Conflict in 
Egypt. He discusses the class conflict in Egypt to control the 
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state apparatus, mainly concentrating upon the conflict 
between the traditional bourgeoisie and what he calls the 
state bourgeoisie, who run and control the state apparatus." 
The main point in Hussein's analysis is his critique of the 
new petty bourgeoisie as having no clear ideology about the 
way to develop Egypt. They adopted a mixed economy policy, 
with no clear choice between the capitalist or the socialist 
model of the economy. He also criticized them for not allowing 
for the development of the social and ideological power of the 
working class, and of oppressing the working class movement. 
The other study which concentrates on the new class in Egypt 
is Adel Ghoneim's study, The Issue of the New Class in Egypt.12 
In this study, Ghoneim concentrates on the factors which led 
to the development and increase of the number and political 
power of this class after the 1952 Revolution. He identifies 
this class as those who occupy senior positions in the 
government and public sector. This includes managers, 
bureaucrats, technocrats and military cadres. He analyzes the 
factors which led to the expansion of this class, which he 
sees as including the increase of industrialization, and the 
nationalization of the big projects which demanded new cadres 
and bureaucrats to run. He also notes the expansion of 
education, which resulted in the increase of professionals, 
bureaucrats and technicians. 
These two studies pay attention to the growing role and power 
of the new class in Egypt. Other class studies concentrated 
on the study of the economic function of the state and the 
political economy of Egypt. They refer to the issue of class 
from this perspective. 
Examples of such studies are Abdel Fadil's study of The 
Political Economy of Nasser,13 and Adel Ghoneim's study of The 
Egyptian Model of Dependency Capitalism." There will be more 
detailed reference to these studies, particularly because of 
the of use a neo-Marxist approach to the study of class, and 
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will therefore be helpful in setting out the approach to be 
used in this research. 
In Abdel Fadil's study he discusses Nasserist policies in the 
field of employment and income distribution. In order to study 
income distribution Abdel Fadil draws a class map of urban 
Egypt based on Poulantzas three economic, ideological and 
political criteria. The study of Egypt's class structure is 
not his main point, and it is not a variable for his analysis. 
His main focus was the study of and analysis of the state 
economic and policy functions. 
In spite of the fact that Abdel Fadil does not make class 
central to his study, and for this reason is prepared to leave 
some of the theoretical bases for his criteria unclear, his 
work is important in moving away from socio-economic scales 
which are based mainly on occupations. By suggesting criteria 
for classification, he introduces a critical element, and 
prepares some of the ground for the present research in terms 
of using Poulantzas' theory of class in analyzing the Egyptian 
class formation and in providing criteria for the field study 
based on a developed theory of class. 
In his Study of Sadat's economic policy Adel Ghoneim argues 
that Egypt under Sadat's open-door policy has moved away from 
a model of independent state capitalism towards a model of 
dependent state capitalism. He uses this framework to analyze 
the economic and class changes which took place in Egypt from 
1974 to 1982. He concentrates in his analysis on the economic 
function of the state, and the class implications of the 
economic policies. In doing this, he employed some of 
Poulantzas' concepts, particularly the concepts of class and 
of power. 
The concept of class is relevant to Adel Ghoneim's work 
because he studies the class implications of the economic 
policies, i.e. who benefits from and who is harmed by these 
policies. He conceptualizes class as being identified by the 
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three levels of economic, political and ideological. In this 
way his work covers relationship with the means of production, 
and the positions of the classes in political and ideological 
conflict. He uses this conception of class to criticize those 
researchers who, like Abdel Fadil, concentrate upon the 
economic level of class and use only socio-economic groups in 
their class analysis. Adel Ghoneim's analysis permits him to 
differentiate between the top bureaucrats in government and 
the merchants, whereas Abdel Fadil, by concentrating only on 
economic position, cannot. This is a point which will be 
elaborated in Chapter Five, where Abdel Fadil's model will be 
developed in detail. 
Adel Ghoneim follows Poulantzas in considering power to be 
constituted in the field of class practices, and that class 
relations are relations of power. He says that political and 
ideological power are not mere reflections of economic power, 
and that the class which dominates economically is not 
necessarily the one which dominates politically. 
Using this approach to power, he is able to criticize those 
researchers who, like Abdel Basett, consider that the class 
which dominates economically must also be that which dominates 
politically. In this way he is able to explain some of the 
phenomena in Egypt: that is, after the open door policy the 
emerging wealthy bourgeoisie, in spite of their economic 
power, could not take power politically. This will be taken 
up when the researcher discusses state power and class 
relations in Chapter Three. 
In his study Ghoneim has presented a concept of class, but he 
does not present any analysis of class formation within 
society, nor of the changes which took place during the period 
under investigation. Although he introduces the concept of 
class in the first chapter of his book, he does not carry on 
his analysis of economic change in terms of class and its 
content. He tends to concentrate on economic analysis rather 
than sociological analysis of class. In the last five chapters 
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of his book he gives a detailed account of the movement of 
pecuniary, commercial, and industrial capital, without giving 
much attention to the class implications of these 
developments. 
The review of social class studies shows that some aspects of 
class analysis have been neglected. This is notably the case 
for class culture, ideology and consciousness. These aspects 
have not received enough attention in sociological studies, 
in part because the history of these studies is very recent 
and more work is needed in this field. This consideration 
gives this research the opportunity to concentrate upon these 
points and contribute to the literature of class analysis and 
education in Egypt. These opportunity can be further clarified 
by noting a number of conclusions which can be taken from the 
literature of class formation in Egypt. 
I. 	 From the review of the previous studies it can be noticed 
that there is a tendency to use Poulantzas' neo-Marxist 
approach to the analysis of class structure and class 
formation, which takes into account the economic, cultural, 
ideological and political aspects of class. However, the 
studies concentrate upon the economic level. This research 
will try to avoid the limited economic approach. In 
particular, in the field study reference will be made to 
people's consciousness, ideologies and perspectives on social, 
economic and educational issues. This approach comes from 
adopting a concept of class which considers class not simply 
as a matter of economic wealth and occupation, but also as a 
matter of culture, consciousness and common sense. This 
conceptualization stresses aspects of culture and cultural 
power of classes as part of their political power. It also 
assumes that class does not exist only by the power of force 
and coercion, but also by the power of culture, ideology, 
common sense, consensus and hegemony. 
The neo-Marxist approach will provide a framework for the 
study of complicated interactions between economic, political 
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and ideological levels, and the implications of such 
interconnections for social change. This is different from 
functionalist theories, which tend to equate class with 
professional or occupational positions and status differences, 
and have diffuculty in accounting for social change. A more 
detailed discussion will be introduced in Chapter One. 
II As mentioned above, most of the previous studies have 
conceptualized class mainly at the economic level, and when 
they approach the superstructure they concentrate on the 
political aspects and on political power of the class. They 
neglect other aspects of class cultural and ideological power. 
This is supported by a recent survey by Abdel Basett Abdel 
Moatty concerning social class formation and social structure 
studies in Egypt." The survey found that most of the studies 
about the superstructure of Egyptian society have concentrated 
upon the study of the political aspect and on the role of 
different social classes and different power groups in society 
in the conflict for political power. The survey records no 
studies addressing class consciousness, ideologies or the 
cultural power of classes. This absence gives an opportunity 
to this research to break new ground by working on social 
class and education, and in particular on how class cultures 
and ideologies influence the education system. 
III The identification of the concept of class on neo-Marxist 
lines provides the theoretical background for considerning the 
following points: 
A the logic behind interviewing ordinary people and 
studying their perspectives, 
B the rationale for paying special regard to the new petty 
bourgeoisie, 
C the basis for choosing criteria to classify the sample 
of the field study. 
A 	 The design of the field study, to investigate the 
economic, social and educational perspectives of parents of 
sixty families of ordinary people coming from different class 
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positions, is based upon the consideration that ordinary 
people have their own views, even though they might not be 
professional or intellectual, or that they might not be able 
to express themselves in a sophisticated way. This belief was 
expressed by Gramsci: "All men are intellectuals, but not all 
have in society the function of intellectuals" .16 
Gramsci's view places stress upon the ability of human beings 
to perceive reality, and he says that, "Each man outside his 
professional activity carries on some form of intellectual 
activity, that is, he is a philosopher, an artist, a man of 
taste; he participates in a particular conception of the 
world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore 
contributes to sustain a conception of the world as to modify 
it to bring into being new modes of thought".17  
Building the field study on that principle implies that two 
important points have to be taken into account in the 
analysis. These are: 
- Considering people's perspectives does not mean that all 
people are equally or uniformly conscious and have a fully 
developed ability to perceive the surrounding reality. A range 
of perceptions and limitations to people's consciousness will 
be demonstrated. 
- The study of class based perceptions, ideologies and 
consciousness do not imply that members of the same class will 
express the same perceptions and interests. Rather, different 
perceptions and interests between and inside the one social 
class are expected. This comes from the fact that people's 
interests are not only influenced by sharing the same material 
positions at the economic structure, but also influenced by 
living in a complicated culture where economic, social, 
ideological and political factors come together to generate 
different patterns of thinking and perceptions. 
B 	 In terms of paying special attention in the field study 
on a particular class, the review of the previous Egyptian 
studies has shown that attention has been given to the 
21 
development and expansion of the new class or what this 
research calls the new petty bourgeoisie, and the increasing 
effective role it plays in developing society and the 
effective position it occupies in the state apparatus. This 
provides an indication for this research to concentrate on 
this class in the field study in order to throw more light 
upon the consciousness and ideologies of this growing social 
power. 
C 	 In terms of choosing the criteria for the classification 
of the sample of the field study, the research will follow 
previous studies which applied Poulantzas' criteria for 
classifying Egyptian Society, for example, the study of Abdel 
Fadil in which he draws a map of the class formation of Egypt. 
However, this research will be critical of some elements of 
Poulantzas' criteria, which are not suitable for the analysis 
of Egyptian class formation. This criticism required the 
research to look at the work of Erik Olin Wright who has 
attempted to resolve the contradictions of Poulantzas' 
criteria. 
(B) Educational Research 
If we move to the educational research, to give an overview 
of the beginning and development of educational research, it 
can be seen that that field is dominated by western theories 
in much the same way as the sociological field is. Egyptian 
educational research was greatly influenced by pragmatism, 
especially that of John Dewey, and by functionalism. 
Pragmatism was introduced into the educational field as "the 
OF 
philosophy" of education, not as "a philosophy"teducation.12  
In the field of educational reform in the 1920s, American and 
British were invited to share in the reform of Egyptian 
education, to write books for education students, and to give 
lectures. Western educational thought became institutionalized 
through the establishment of the Institute of Education in 
Cairo in 1929.19 The Marxist approach in educational research 
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was introduced in the late fifties and sixties by those who 
were educated in the USSR. However, this approach has not yet 
established itself to form a school of thought in education. 
Their main effort were directed towards the translation of the 
progressive works of Mao Tse Tung and Paulo Freire. 
The other main tradition which still exists alongside the 
liberal one is that of Islamic studies in the field of 
education. The movement of Islamic studies calls for the 
establishment of modern Islamic studies in science. Research 
which has followed this approach in education is mainly 
historical. It does not raise questions about existing 
problems in education, since the tradition does not have the 
tools for social analysis. 
Islamic studies in education do not introduce the socio-
political and economic context of the Islamic era they study. 
They represent Islamic society as if it were influenced only 
by one factor, which is the Islamic faith. They neglect the 
influence of other factors, like the thoughts of the Greeks, 
Indians, and Persians, which influenced the Islamic 
philosophy. 2° Islamic studies have failed to raise, or answer, 
the critical questions in the field of education, such as free 
education, equality and inequality, and other questions which 
have a sociological and political nature.21 
The following survey of educational research will only 
concentrate on the studies conducted as part of M.A. or Ph.D. 
research which deal with similar areas to this research, 
namely in the area of class and education, education policy 
and equal opportunities in education. 
A survey of M.A. and Ph.D. research which deals with similar 
areas to the present research indicates that research 
undertaken up to now can be divided into two groups: the first 
group deals with educational policy, and the second with 
equality and inequality in education. Within this, there is 
a lack of class based studies in education. Where class is 
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addressed, it is done in a particular way which tends to 
exclude and marginalize a consideration of cultural issues in 
the politics of education. Drawing selectively from the 
research, this will be illustrated by taking three main 
studies which deal with educational policy, and then those 
which deal with equality and inequality in educational 
opportunities. 
The first study, by Aly Mahmoud Raslan (1974), concentrates 
on the trends in educational policy from 1952 to 1970.22 The 
study introduces a historical analysis of the main 
characteristics and developments in educational policy. The 
historical period starts with the period of British occupation 
(1882-1922), and continues through the period of partial 
independence (1923-1952) into the period since the Revolution 
(1952-1970). The research represents a documentary study of 
educational policy, and uses a range of documentary sources, 
including formal policy announcements by politicians and 
educationalists, the Constitution, and educational laws. 
The researcher criticizes the policy of the Revolution for 
being too rapid, not being comprehensive, and for showing a 
lack of co-ordination between educational policy and other 
institutions such as the mass media. He also suggests that 
policies were applied without being adequately tested. The 
conclusion of the research is that policies were mainly 
affected by the personality and attitudes of the Ministers of 
Education, rather than by the state and general state policy. 
This is an almost inevitable conclusion, since the research 
presents changes in policy as matters of the personal choice 
of Ministers of Education, and neither the policies, nor the 
author's criticism of them, are given any social context in 
the descriptive analysis. 
The second study, by Fathy Hussein Moabeid (1980), is about 
the effect of the philosophy of the 1952 Revolution on 
educational thought." (This comes into the category of policy 
studies, because the author has concentrated more on policy 
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than on educational thought.) 
This study follows the same broad line of approach as the 
previous one, i.e. a historical analysis of the development 
of educational policy, and it deals with the same period 
(1952-1970). The researcher analysed educational policy and 
thought in the context of the political, economic, and social 
situation which prevailed in Egypt from the time of the First 
World War. The analysis of the political system does not 
introduce the notion of the state, and the social analysis 
makes no reference to the class structure of Egyptian society. 
The study is heavily dependant upon official documents like 
the Charter of 1961, the economic plan, and the educational 
plan. 
The conclusions of the study concentrate on educational policy 
rather than educational thought. The author criticizes 
educational policy on the grounds that: 
- it has concentrated on quantitative rather than 
qualitative aspects of education, 
- there were frequent changes of educational policy and the 
curriculum, and 
the educational plan did not work in harmony with the 
economic plan in terms of supplying sufficient people. 
The third study, by Shibl Badran, concentrates on educational 
policy in relation to the economic plan.24 The study follows 
the human capital theory, which stresses the importance and 
the significance of spending on education for economic growth. 
Badran studies the ability of the educational policy to meet 
the needs of the economic plan by providing certain numbers 
of trained, qualified, manpower in specific specializations. 
The study places this problem in the social, economic and 
political context of Egypt. In the political analysis, the 
author introduces the main political organizations under 
Nasser. Although he does describe the social class structure 
of Egypt in his social analysis, the researcher does not use 
class as a variable for the analysis. The study is only a 
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description of society, rather than an analysis of class 
relations. Since Badran restricted his research to the 
relationship between education and the development plan, and 
in particular to its economic aspect, and did not concern 
himself with studying class aspects involved in education and 
development, he depends upon a documentary analysis of 
educational policy, as set out in Ministry of Education 
documents, education laws, and the Constitution. It uses a 
statistical analysis of the number of workers demanded by the 
economic plan, compared with the number of qualified graduates 
in different specializations. The study comes to the 
conclusion that educational policy could not meet the needs 
of the economic plan in terms of qualified manpower. 
These three pieces of research are mainly documentary, 
descriptive, and historical in their analysis. The present 
research differs from these three in exploring educational 
policy in terms of class relations, and in viewing educational 
policy as biased towards certain classes. The state is crucial 
to these processes. 
The second group of studies discusses equality and inequality 
in education. They mainly concentrate on the study of the 
concept of equality as it appears in the state documents of 
educational policy, which is mainly concerned with access to 
education. 
The first study, by Elewah Ibrahim Elewah, discusses the 
principle of equal opportunity in general education." The aim 
of the study is to discuss the development of equal 
opportunity as a principle in the Egyptian educational system 
since 1952. It shows that the main efforts made by the 
Revolution to achieve equal opportunity took the form of 
generalization and unification of primary education, and the 
establishment of preparatory schools, and the extension of 
state control over education. The research refers to the 
problems hindering the achievement of equal opportunity: 
high illiteracy rates, 
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- low enrolment rates in primary education, 
- the low quality of teacher training and teacher 
qualifications, 
- overcrowded classrooms, and 
- the low percentage of girls in education compared with 
boys, 
It can be noticed that, although all these points have social 
class implications, the study does not mention or refer to the 
class structure of society, and does not use class as a 
variable for the analysis. 
The second study, by Abdel Azeem Taha Shaaban, discusses 
social justice and efficiency in Egyptian education.26 The 
study examines the basic assumptions of educational reform in 
Egypt since 1952, which have been intended to serve the 
principle of social justice. Social justice has been seen by 
the Revolution in distributive terms, i.e. the equal 
distribution of education services. In line with this, 
education fees were abolished and educational benefits were 
distributed according to the abilities and capacities of the 
student. Shaaban reached the conclusion that, although the 
Egyptian government has adopted equality of opportunity as a 
the aspiration for distributing social and economic goods, the 
education system is still dominated by educational elitism. 
The review of the previous studies in education presents the 
critical background and the framework for this research to 
study class influence on education. The following critical 
analysis of those previous studies will concentrate on the 
aspects which have been overlooked by those studies and on 
other dimensions of class, social relations and education 
which this research is going to develop. 
- In spite of discussing subjects which have clear relation 
with the class issue, previous studies tend either to ignore 
the class issue completely, or to mention the class formation 
of Egypt without integrating it into the analysis by making 
class the variable of the analysis. The neglect of concept of 
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class in educational research might be due the fact of the 
complexity of the concept and the lack of research on class, 
culture and ideologies which could provide solid ground for 
researchers in this field. Consequently, when those studies 
address an issue such as equality and inequality in education, 
they mainly concentrate on documentary study of education acts 
and laws. Since the aspect of class is neglected, this 
research is going to concentrate on the class issue and will 
study equality and inequality in a broad context of class 
influence and cultural power relations in education. 
The previous studies have limited theoretical approaches, 
where they mainly concentrate on the descriptive and 
historical approaches. Although these are to a certain extent 
useful, they cannot stand by themselves to provide a critical 
and comprehensive analysis of society and social class 
relations. Their limited approach appears in their 
concentration upon analyzing state documents and neglect of 
how the system works in reality. That is, they do not employ 
the methods of empirical studies which give an opportunity to 
link the abstract theoretical analysis and the complexity of 
social reality. Consequently, this research will depend on 
both the state documents, to study policy of education, and 
the practical level of how ordinary people themselves perceive 
and are conscious about different aspects of state policy. 
In addressing the problem of education and development, 
the study of Badran adopted the human capital theory, and 
following the theory he stressed the positive impact of 
investment on education as influencing development. At the 
same time he defined development as equivalent to economic 
growth and economic planning. This theory has its limits where 
it see development in a narrow perspective of economic growth 
and it sees educational expansion and growing expenditure on 
education as bringing equality and raising standards of 
living. However, experience of developing countries has shown 
that spending on education and the expansion of the system do 
not automatically bring equality, attack poverty or increase 
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income. This research will take another, broader and more 
dynamic approach which sees development and under-development 
in terms of international economic relations between the 
centre and the periphery. It will see development in its broad 
social dimension as influenced by class power relations, and 
the role of the state and the new class as essential in the 
process. 
In such an approach education will be conceptualized in terms 
of its role in reproducing the unequal class society, and will 
present the role of class cultural power in appropriating 
education opportunities as it appears for the new class in 
particular. 
- 	 Although previous studies have concentrated on the 
analysis of state documents, they have not addressed the state 
as problematic and have not paid any attention to the analysis 
of the nature of state. This research will study education and 
development in the context of the essential and central role 
of the state in Egyptian society. 
III. Methodological remarks: 
The discussion of previous studies in sociology and education 
has highlighted one important point; that is, the influence 
of Western thought in the two fields of sociology and 
education. However, illustrating that point does not mean that 
this research will avoid using concepts developed in the west. 
On the contrary, it is very difficult to analyze and to build 
an understanding of Egyptian society and its complexity in 
isolation from very important concepts such as development, 
class, ideology and hegemony. The point is that this research 
tries to develop these concepts in a way which permits their 
application to the Egyptian context, bearing in mind the 
difficulty of the task because of the differences in class 
formation and culture between Egypt and the Western countries 
where concepts developed. 
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IV. The Study Plan 
This thesis will be divided into two main sections: Part One: 
Historical, methodological and theoretical analyses which set 
the broad context for Part Two: The empirical study. 
Part One will be in four chapters 
Chapter One: Conceptual and Theoretical Discussion. This 
chapter discusses the main concepts and presents the 
theoretical framework for the study. This includes the 
conceptualization of development, concept of class and the 
study of education in the context of development, state and 
social class. 
Chapter Two: The Economic and Political Context of Egypt from 
1952 to the Present Day. The main subject of this chapter is 
the analysis of the economic and political context of Egypt 
and the different models of development adopted in different 
historical periods. This introduces the background for the 
study of the changing policies of education under different 
models of development. 
Chapter Three: State Power and Class Formation in Egypt. This 
chapter is a continuation of some themes in Chapter Two. It 
continues the study of the economic and political context, but 
goes beyond the subjects of Chapter Two to study the 
complexity of development in terms of mediation by class 
relations and the state. In that context the chapter 
concentrates upon investigating state power and social class, 
to see how much power the state has with regard to different 
social classes, which classes have the power to secure their 
own interests, and which classes are deprived of power. 
Chapter Four: Education Policy in Egypt: Historical Background 
and the Class Nature of the System. This chapter analyzes the 
class nature of the education system in the context of a 
critical analysis of policies of education from the time of 
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Muhammad Aly to the present day. The analysis in this chapter 
will answer some questions concerning the influence of 
colonial rule on the education system and the extent to which 
formal education in Egypt could attack poverty and illiteracy, 
and increase social opportunities. 
Part Two: The Empirical Study. 
Part Two presents the second level of the study of education 
and social class. In this part, the empirical study, designed 
to interview parents from sixty families with children in 
primary education in order to study their perspectives of 
different economic, political and educational matters, will 
be reported. 
Chapter Five: Tools and Procedures for the Field Study. 
This chapter discusses in detail the criteria which will be 
followed to classify the sample of the field study. This 
necessitates a discussion of the critical basis for different 
types of criteria. The chapter also includes a short 
explanation of the tool 'the guide for interview' used in the 
field study, and the procedures for conducting the interviews. 
The details of the field study procedures can be found in the 
appendicies. 
Chapter Six: Social Class Membership and Cultural and 
Ideological Perspectives. This chapter analyzes the part of 
the field study material concerned with illustrating people's 
consciousness and awareness of general social, economic and 
political issues. People's consciousness of their own class 
position and the image they have of the class formation of 
society will be a focus of attention. This will form a broad 
cultural context for the following two chapters which deal 
with specific educational issues. 
Chapter Seven: Class Perspectives on General Educational 
Issues. This chapter concentrates on people's perceptions of 
specific educational issues such as the evaluation of 
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educational policies under the Revolution, equality and 
inequality in education and the debate around free and fee-
paying education. The analysis of this chapter will throw 
light upon some theoretical issues about class consciousness, 
the nature of common sense and the role of class cultural 
power in debate about education. 
Chapter Eight: Class Provision and Appropriation of Education. 
This chapter is concerned with how education opportunities are 
distributed in reality, how members from different class 
positions evaluate their children's opportunities in the 
present and future and how they evaluate the quality of 
education that their children receive. This chapter will 
illustrate some theoretical issues such as the role of 
education in class reproduction and the power of class culture 
in appropriating educational opportunities for children. 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion. The conclusion will draw upon the 
main theoretical issues and problems raised by this research 
and will discuss the main findings of the field study and 
suggestions for its development. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
Introduction  
In this chapter the researcher intends to define the main 
concepts that constitute the theoretical framework of this 
study. As explained in the introduction, this research is 
concerned with the study of education and social class in 
urban Egypt. The study is not only concerned with the unequal 
distribution of educational opportunities between the 
different social classes but also with the cultural and 
ideological power of social classes in influencing access, 
control and demand on education and in the perspectives of 
members of social classes on education and society. 
The study of educational policy and popular perspectives, as 
explained in the introduction, will be analyzed in the light 
of the study of social, economic, political and cultural 
factors represented in the study of the economic and political 
situation in Egypt and the central role of the state in 
introducing economic, social and educational policies. 
In order to study these points at the theoretical level and 
at the empirical level, represented in the analysis of popular 
perspectives, a study of the main theories and concepts used 
in the analysis is needed. The main theoretical and conceptual 
points which this chapter deals with are: 
Firstly, The conceptualization of development and of 
developing countries. 
Since this research is concerned with the position of Egypt 
as one of the third world countries which is looking to 
develop and change her economic, social and political reality, 
it is important to identify the characteristics of the 
developing countries and the main problems and challenges they 
face on the internal and international levels. It is important 
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as well to introduce the different conceptualizations of 
development and underdevelopment through the discussion of the 
two main traditions in the field, the Marxist and the 
functionalist, which have both influenced the understanding 
of education in the developing countries. 
Secondly, the concept of state. 
The study of the concept of state adds another dimension to 
the previous point about underdeveloped countries. This 
dimension is represented in the role of the state in leading 
the development programmes in these countries, in particular 
after these countries got their independence from colonial 
rule and started to carry out economic, social, cultural and 
educational programmes of development. Consequently, it is 
essential to analyze the nature of the state in these 
countries in terms of the role it plays in development and how 
it is different from that in advanced capitalist countries, 
and in terms of the state power in relation to different 
social classes. This will lay the ground for the study of the 
economic and political policies in Egypt under Nasser and 
Sadat which will be presented in Chapter Two. It is important, 
also, in the study of class formation in Egypt in relation to 
state power which is the subject of Chapter Three, and the 
analysis of educational policy in Egypt as presented and 
influenced by state power and the power relations between the 
state and social classes which is the subject of Chapter Four. 
Thirdly, social class. 
There is a need to study the concept of class and to present 
the concept as it will be used at two levels. These are; 
first, at the level of the general theoretical analysis which 
will be guided by a conception of social classes as 
dialectically constituted at two levels; a) the level of the 
'objective' dynamics of economic relations, and b) the 
'subjective' relations of consciousness, ideology and common-
sense; and second, related to both a) and b) above, a more 
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specifically technical level of social classes as a system of 
categories for classifying respondents in the sample of the 
field study of this research. This implies using objective 
criteria to locate people at certain places. The discussion 
of the criteria will be fully presented in Chapter Five, while 
in this chapter the main focus will bo on the theoretical 
issues of objective and subjective relations. 
Fourthly, conceptualizing education in the context of 
development, state and social class. 
Education will be conceptualized in the context of development 
and developing countries, to show the challenges and 
contradictions which underdeveloped countries face in their 
policies of education and how theories of development and 
modernization have influenced the understanding of education 
in these countries. Education will be analyzed in relation to 
state and social classes, so that the analysis will present 
education as one of the ideological state apparatuses, working 
to reproduce the unequal class relations and to reproduce 
class cultural capital. 
I. Developing Countries: Main Characteristics and Theories 
There is no agreement on terminology for developing countries. 
Some authors refer to them as 'underdeveloped', 'poor', 
'backward', or as the 'third world'. As there is no agreement 
about the terms, it is very difficult to determine the main 
characteristics of the developing countries. There is no 
agreement about the nature or the number of socio-economic 
indicators necessary for a country to be included with a 
certain group.2 However, some general characteristics can be 
identified, bearing in mind that there are some exceptions and 
differences between individual countries.2  
Developing countries are compared with developed countries 
which are classified in this category because they have a 
relatively high per capita income, and significant degree of 
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industrialization, as well as their high levels of living, 
good standards of health, housing and welfare.' By definition, 
the developing countries lack most, if not all, of these 
characteristics. 
Developing countries have other characteristics, like a high 
rate of population growth, low levels of urbanization, low 
standards of health and education, poor housing and nutrition 
and limited social service provision.4 (See Appendix 1.) 
Until the 1950s and 1960s underdevelopment was usually seen 
as a socio-economic situation: developing countries lack 
industry, capital, technology and educated workers.s This view 
introduced a simple model of development for the third world 
countries. According to that model the underdeveloped 
countries have to acquire the missing elements, perhaps from 
the rich countries through the economic aids.' 
This model does not take into account the complexity of the 
economic, social, political and international relations of 
these countries. In reality, the nature of international 
relations of exploitation between the third world and the 
developed countries does not allow for equal relations and 
equal exchange, with the poor countries being permanently 
disadvantaged in the market place. 
This model of development was accepted inside the Third World 
countries, by the leaders and intellectuals, especially in the 
immediately post-colonial period, and is still accepted by 
many leaders who wish to maintain the status quo and existing 
inequalities.' 
It became increasingly obvious to these countries by the end 
of the sixties, with the limited results of this simple one 
dimensional model of development, that economic growth is only 
one aspect of development. Development is seen at the present 
as a comprehensive process which include social aspects i.e. 
the issues of equality in society, and political aspects i.e. 
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allowing for more popular participation. 
In fact there are different views about development, and 
whether it is the simple acquisition of the missing economic 
aspects or is a more complicated process of economic, 
political and social changes conducted in the context of 
international relations. These two views have their 
theoretical roots in two different theories, that is, the 
functionalist and the Marxist theories. Each has produced a 
theory of development, the "modernization" and the 
"dependency" theories. 
From a functionalist view point, social change is seen as 
increasing social differentiation of the social system, as a 
result of which the system is going to adapt to its 
environment.°  
The theory places stress upon equilibrium, harmony and 
integration, while conflict is seen as disfunction. This 
question of equilibrium has become the target of criticism. 
It is difficult to explain social change from this 
perspective, because it is mainly concerned to explain the 
status quo in society. 
This functionalist perspective of social change has become the 
base for one of the dominant development theories which is the 
modernization theory. The theory sees the path to modernity 
as one way, which is the western one, i.e. the replacement of 
traditional economic, social and political systems by western 
ones. If we look at the writings of some western writers, for 
example, Eisenstadt and Shils, they see modernity as the 
western model of economic development i.e. the capitalist 
system supported by its political system of liberal democracy 
and its modern technology.° In Shils' words "modern means 
being western without the onus of dependency on the west, the 
model of modernity is a picture of the west detached in some 
way from its geographical origins and locus" .1° Shils speaks 
of the western model of modernity as the only model possible 
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for the developing countries: he speaks of the independence 
of these countries, but he does not explain how countries 
which are part of an unequal capitalist system can be 
independent. 
In general the modernization theory gives the following image 
of political, economic and cultural systems which should be 
followed in the developing countries. 
In economic terms, these countries should make their industry 
grow, using capital intensive technology, concentrating their 
decision making, developing a high degree of specialization 
of the work force, and becoming integrated in the 
international capitalist market.11 
In fact, industrialization and integration in the 
international capitalist system do not necessarily lead to 
equality, raise standards of living, or provide jobs for the 
majority. In some cases, the rich get richer and the poor get 
poorer. Applying advanced technology may well create 
unemployment. 12  
In an analysis by World Bank officials, it was clear that the 
nature of the capitalist development in the Third World 
countries will only allow a relatively small sector of active 
population to be engaged in economic activity, while it 
marginalizes the rest and keeps them outside the capitalist 
sector as an industrial reserve army.13  
In political terms, the modernization model means the 
replacement of the traditional religious ethnic authority by 
a single secular national authority and the development of 
democracy. This image of the desirable political system can 
be criticized and argued against. The western democratic 
political system is not the only suitable system for 
developing countries, which might need one central party and 
firm state control in order to be able to face and tackle 
development issues without being distracted by the needs to 
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win votes." 
In cultural terms, modernization theory refers to the 
psychological aptitudes that individual members of modern 
societies are likely to have.15 The modernization theory builds 
the character of individuals on Parsons' functionalism which 
takes into account the modern economic, technological complex 
and its high degree of occupational specialization. According 
to these circumstances, the theory favours attitudes that are 
functionally specific, achievement-orientated, universalistic 
and effectively neutral." 
According to this view, the individual has to accept 
occupational and geographical mobility, meritocracy, tolerance 
of impersonal working conditions, a desire for a nuclear 
rather than extended family." 
In fact, the talk about changing behaviour and attitudes from 
traditional to modern as a part of moving toward modernity, 
is not simple and linear process as suggested by the 
modernization studies. One example of these studies is Inkeles 
and Smith who present a direct causal link between five sets 
of variables. These are: modern institutions, modern values, 
modern behaviour, modern society and economic development." 
They believe that these variables are connected in a chain, 
and that once you start one you reach the end, which is the 
economic development. 
In reality these relations are more complicated and vary from 
one society to another. And what may be considered a factor 
of backwardness, hindering development and modernization, in 
one society, may be seen as a positive factor in a different 
society and under different circumstances. In Japan, where a 
traditional commitment to the Emperor and family relations 
were among the factors which promoted economic growth, while 
in the west they were seen as obstacles." 
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Modernization theory has given a model of development based 
on copying the socio-economic structure of the west. The 
theory could not explain the backwardness of the periphery of 
the capitalist system, especially of those countries which 
followed a western model but were still underdeveloped. The 
theory does not show the exploitation of these countries by 
the west: that exploitation took the form of draining human 
and material resources from the underdeveloped countries to 
the centre of the system. 
These critiques have paved the way for another perspective 
which stemmed from the neo-Marxist approach, which presents 
an interpretation of Marx's original ideas and thoughts.2° An 
example of this approach in the field of development is 
dependency theory. The theory has its roots indirectly in 
Marx's thinking about colonialism and the stunting effect it 
sometimes has on development. However, Marx never extended his 
ideas to deal with underdevelopment.21 The theory was 
originally presented by Paul Baran,22 and has been further 
elaborated by Andre Gunder Frank.23 They explain the 
underdevelopment of the Third World in relation to the world 
capitalist system. 
Dependency theory has concentrated on the unequal economic, 
cultural and military relations between developed and 
underdeveloped countries. According to dependency theory, the 
world can be divided into the core and the peripheral 
countries. These countries are seen as part of a global system 
dominated by a capitalist economic network.24  
In this perspective, the global economy is conceived in terms 
of a hierarchy of economic centres, which, through military, 
political and trade arrangements, extract an economic surplus 
from subordinate, peripheral economies. So, the backwardness 
of the peripheral economies is a consequence of their 
dependence on various core economies and not only the effect 
of their poor resources, illiteracy, traditionalism or 
political instability.25 
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This theory has been criticized for concentrating on the 
factors external to these societies and neglecting their 
internal structure in relation to underdevelopment.26 This 
critique of dependency theory has some validity, because it 
concentrates on one side of the causes of underdevelopment 
which is the relations of exploitation, but it does not tell 
us very much about the internal aspects which might hinder 
development plans. Even so, this theory has opened the way for 
fresh dimensions and possibilities for a new style and 
direction for development, different from the capitalist 
model, that is, the independent model of development, which 
is based upon self-reliance, co-operation between developing 
countries and the satisfaction of the basic needs of the 
masses. 
This model does not reject all western analysis of the 
underdevelopment, but it shows how some elements of these 
western models might not be suitable for the circumstances of 
these countries. For example the proponents of this model 
argue that introducing the western model of family, behaviour 
and of life, which were presented as a coherent package by 
Inkeles and Smith, may not be a necessary element in 
development in culturally diverse countries. 
They start by attacking the belief that the developing 
countries can follow and repeat the model of the capitalist 
countries, which is based on the capitalist ownership of means 
of production, the free market and the profit motive as one 
of the most important incentives for progress, as well as on 
other cultural aspects of developed capitalist societies." 
The industrialized countries have been able to achieve their 
progress under certain privileged circumstances, which are not 
available for the Third World today. These are: 
the technological advancement which these countries could 
exploit for increasing their domination over the 
international market, 
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- 	 the exploitation of the resources of the third world 
countries, 
- 	 the exploitation of the working class at the beginning 
of the industrial revolution, and 
- 
	
	 the important factor of discovering new territories and 
using their resources, as in the case of Australia." 
These factors are not available for the Third World today 
which has to look for an alternative. That alternative, which 
is presented by the Third World itself, is based on the 
redistribution of wealth and national income, taking major 
procedures like nationalization, securing a minimum level of 
wages and providing the basic need in both education and 
health. All these elements are part of a socialist model which 
is based on two foundations; the collective ownership of the 
means of production and national planning.29  
This model presents some principles for the Third World to 
follow. Some of principles are political in nature, like 
popular participation in development through the broadening 
of democratic practices. Others are cultural in nature, like 
self-reliance, and the collective self-reliance between the 
developing countries and the economic principle of satisfying 
basic needs for the majority of poor population." 
The circumstances which traditional Marxist views suggest are 
necessary for the building of socialism in the Third World 
countries might not be available in these countries today. The 
traditional Marxist view addresses the possibility of building 
socialism in the advanced capitalist societies. However, in 
Third World countries today there is a strong tendency to 
argue that the political conditions in the periphery of the 
capitalist system of the present time are suitable for 
building socialism, because of the increasing oppression of 
the capitalist system to the masses of these countries. This 
presents a historical opportunity for these countries to 
mobilize the masses against that system which divides the 
world into a centre and periphery, where the centre dominates 
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the periphery and is still extracting surplus-value and 
preventing these countries from building their national, 
central economy.31  
Achieving this in reality is not an easy task for the 
developing countries, who have made some efforts previously 
to confront the capitalist world, asking for more equal 
relations. In 1955, they asked for the stabilization of 
international prices and demand for their primary exports.32  
In 1964 the Third World countries faced the capitalist world 
for the first time as a group in the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development. They demanded economic reforms, 
including price stabilization for primary products, market 
access for manufactured goods from developing countries and 
greater financial transfer from the rich to the poor." These 
demands were repeated and elaborated in the call for a new 
international economic order in 1974.34  
In spite of these international collective movements by the 
Third World countries, they are still under the pressure of 
their huge debts to the United States and the west, and 
conflicting internal class interests. In spite of the wealth 
of some Third World countries, like the oil countries, they 
tend to send their capital to be invested in the U.S.A and the 
west but not to the Third World. Independent development needs 
the continuation of the solidarity of the Third World 
countries, which itself is not easily established and 
maintained. 
The discussion of these different trends in development has 
two tasks: the first is a general task of setting a broad 
context for the particular Egyptian model of development. It 
will show how Egypt has moved from the independent model to 
the dependent model and establish the basis for understanding 
how it is difficult to get out of the trap of the foreign 
debt. This will be discussed further in Chapter Two. 
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The other task is to discuss different trends of development 
theory in order to aid the understanding of the central point 
of this research, which is the social, political and cultural 
aspects of education in contemporary Egypt. The link between 
development and education will be made clear later in this 
chapter, when the influence of different theories of 
development will be discussed. These theories include the 
Marxist and the functionalist approaches to the policy of 
education and the conceptualization of education in the 
developing countries. 
Later in the chapter it will be explained how human capital 
theory emphasizes the importance of investment in education 
as having a direct and significant impact on economic growth. 
It considers that the failure of many ex-colonial nations 
which achieved independence after second world war was related 
to the absence of mass education at the primary level and 
specialist education at the secondary level. The theory argues 
that education was a major source for economic growth in the 
west.35  
While modernization theory looks at education in its national 
setting, dependency theory look at education from an 
international perspective. It shows the influence of the 
colonial role in the educational systems of the ex-colonies 
and it sees education as a form of economic and political 
control.36 It also shows how the education system in the Third 
World helps to produce and reproduce patterns of cultural 
dependency on the West. This research will also show the 
effects of cultural diversity and differentiation associated 
with education. 
II. The Concept of State  
The study of the state contributes to our understanding of 
developing countries. For underdeveloped countries, the role 
of the state is essential in leading and carrying out the task 
of development. Consequently, the concept of the state will 
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be elaborated with an emphasis upon the state's role in 
development programmes. This role is different from the role 
of the state in advanced capitalist societies. 
This discussion will lead into a study of social class, and 
the class nature of the state in terms of its relative 
autonomy, and its role in satisfying or attacking the 
interests of certain classes. The specific analysis of the 
Egyptian state will lay the ground for the study of the 
economic, political and educational policies in Egypt, and the 
analysis of class formation in Egypt in relation to state 
power. 
(A) The History of the Egyptian State 
The state and the central government in Egypt both have a long 
history. According to Iliya Harik, "It is hard to think of any 
time in known history when Egypt did not have a central 
government of some sort or another"." This statement asserts 
the fact that Egypt has built one of the oldest civilizations 
in which the central government played an essential role. 
The central government in Egypt was always a natural 
necessity. That is to say, in order to organize the irrigation 
and for military reasons to defend the country against the 
threat of nomads. It is the geo-political vulnerability of 
Egypt which led to the building of both the central government 
and a strong army.38 Because of this geo-political position, 
Egypt had what is known as a bureaucratic military oligarchic 
state." This type of state has been present since Muhammad Aly 
(1805-1848) who established a large army, administration and 
civil service. The importance of the state, central government 
and the army have continued throughout the recent history of 
Egypt. 
(B) State Capitalism in Egypt 
After the 1952 Revolution the state and central government 
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have carried out economic, political and ideological 
functions. Since that date the role of the Egyptian state in 
these aspects became very obvious, especially after the 
establishment of the state sector in 1961. The state control 
over economic activities in Egypt has produced what can be 
described as "bureaucratic state capitalism". 
What the term "state capitalism" means is different in 
developed and underdeveloped countries. In developed countries 
it means, "the restriction and regulation of economic 
spontaneity stemming from the existence of private capital" .40 
State intervention in the underdeveloped countries has a 
different starting point and level from that in developed 
countries. The state in underdeveloped countries intervenes, 
"to liquidate economic underdevelopment, that is, to eliminate 
the factors hindering the rapid development of the productive 
forces".41 So the function of state capitalism in developed 
countries is to regulate the already highly developed 
productive forces, while in underdeveloped countries, "It must 
rather be aimed at creating the conditions for rapid growth 
of the hardly developed productive forces" .42  
In the case of Egypt bureaucratic state capitalism emerged in 
1956. It took the form of state intervention and the 
establishment of the state sector. Since 1956 state capitalism 
in Egypt has engaged in distinct economic activities. In the 
early period state capitalism established holding companies 
designed to compete with one another in production, sales and 
profits. By 1961 this type had been replaced by sectoral 
monopolies. Competition was eliminated. New goals appeared, 
such as job creation, planned production and planned prices, 
and guided industrial strategy with minimal support for the 
private sector.41 
In the early stages, Egyptian state capitalism was 
characterized by an increase in the number of bureaucrats who 
were needed to carry out the state programme." It was also 
characterized by the intervention of the military into 
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political and economic affairs, which resulted in tensions 
with the bureaucrats. This tension came from the military view 
that their coalition with the bureaucrats was to work mainly 
in the economic field, while political control should continue 
to rest entirely in their hands." 
The major change in the activities of state capitalism came 
in 1974 after the introduction of the open door policy. As 
will be explained in Chapter Two, the role of the public 
sector was at that time undermined, and the private sector and 
foreign capital were given opportunities. The implications for 
internal and external relations of this policy will be 
fully explored in Chapter Two." 
The movement and the change of state capitalism must be 
understood in terms of the internal socio-political situation, 
in the class power relations, in international relations, and 
in economic relations.47  
In the case of Egypt the change in state capitalism was 
influenced by internal and external factors. These, in brief, 
are the pressures of the long establised capitalists and top 
bureaucrats to weaken the state's hands on the economy, the 
conflict inside the military which led to the defeat of 1967, 
and the emergence of the oil wealth which changed the 
political and social map of the Arab World, where the 
conservative Arab states emerged as the key political power. 
(C) The Class Nature of the State 
As explained above, in underdeveloped countries the intended 
role of state capitalism is to remove obstacles to 
development. In doing that the state has to deal with private 
and foreign capital, either by supporting or restricting them. 
At that point, the class content of state capitalism appears, 
because by supporting or restricting capital the state may 
take a position which supports the interests of one class to 





absolute terms when the economic situation is improving, class 
conflicts may arise with regards to how those benefits are 
distributed relatively between classes, and the state cannot 
be regarded as neutral. 
For a full understanding of this class content of the state, 
and the relationship between state power and social classes 
which will be fully explained in Chapter Three it is 
necessary, first, to look at some general theoretical issues, 
before proceeding to the analysis of state power and class 
formation in Egypt. The theoretical focal point for the class 
content of the state is the issue of state relative autonomy. 
(D) State Relative Autonomy 
The idea of state relative autonomy has been clarified by 
Poulantzas, who tried to overcome the crudeness of the Marxist 
assertion that the state is always, simply and everywhere the 
instrument of the dominant class. Poulantzas explains that in 
capitalist society, "The state is supported by certain 
dominated class of the society, in that it presents itself, 
through a complex ideological process as their representative. 
It encourages them in various ways to work against the 
dominant class or classes, but to the political advantage of 
the latter. In this way it succeeds precisely in making the 
dominated classes accept a whole series of compromises which 
appear to be their political interests".'8 
 
It is clear from that statement that the state is usually 
supporting the capitalist interests and advantages against the 
dominated classes, but the state has to 'compromise' in 
conducting such a relation. This means that the state might 
occasionally sacrifice the interests of the dominant class. 
The state can fulfil this role so long as it enjoys "a 
relative autonomy in relation to one or another of its 
fractions or to one or another of its particular interests".49 
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It is clear that the relative autonomy of the state is 
associated with the existence of a dominant class or classes. 
For that reason, some writers, like Tlemcani, refuse to 
entertain the idea of relative state autonomy in the Third 
World, because they consider Poulantzas' discussion only 
relevant to advanced capitalist society, where there is a 
'functional' correlation between the state's relative autonomy 
and the existence of a hegemonic class. Tlemcani continues to 
argue that as far as the post-colonial state is concerned, 
such a relationship has never been established." 
In addition, he argues that the existence of the power of the 
army in many third world countries, and the structural 
heterogeneity of the army, has maintained a precarious balance 
of class forces. He suggests that the army has not been 
subordinated to the particular interests of the propertied 
classes because of the absence of an organic social class in 
third world countries. Hence the state, in his view, tends to 
appear as floating above society.si  
This view seems to attribute absolute power to the state. 
Tlemcani speaks, for example, of the state acting as a 
lawmaker, investor, planner, importer, exporter, manager, 
owner, judge and police officer. For him, the state in post-
colonial society is everything.52  
In fact this kind of view presents a simple picture of the 
state which does not help in making a sociological analysis 
of the role of the state. It makes it impossible to explain 
the evolution of the system in third world countries in terms 
of class and class struggle for economic, political and 
cultural domination. 
Following a similar line of argument, Waterbury supports the 
view of the autonomy of the state in third world countries in 
relation to social classes. In arguing the case for the 
autonomy of the state, Waterbury draws upon the support of 
Alfred Stepan and Kay Ellen Trimberger. Stepan discusses the 
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Latin American case. He explains state autonomy in cultural 
terms, and maintains that the Catholic Church exercises 
secular power, while the state should achieve the good of the 
whole society, independent of any of its constituent parts." 
Waterbury draws an analogy between this trend in the Catholic 
culture in Latin America and the Islamic culture, which in his 
view mirrored this value, where there are, "Muslim umma or 
community believers whose secular leaders God has charged with 
managing the collective interests of its members".54  
The case which Waterbury describes might have been the case 
of the Islamic World throughout the Muslim dynastic history, 
but at the present time the situation is different. Because 
we cannot speak of one unified Muslim Umma, sharing the same 
type of state, and the establishment of the state in Egypt has 
a different history. That is, at the present time we can speak 
of different types of state in the Arab World. For example, 
there is the type of the Imam - chief system or the alliance 
of chiefs and imams (Saudi Arabia), there is the traditional 
secular system, or the bureaucratic military system. So some 
countries might keep the old Islamic system, but this is not 
true for all Arab states." 
The other view which Waterbury presents to support his idea 
is that of Trimberger, who deals with the autonomy of some of 
the Third World countries, including Turkey, Egypt and Peru, 
which, by the fact of their military rule, represent 
"revolution from above"." Waterbury comments that it is not 
the case that military rule will necessarily create autonomy. 
Waterbury presents his own account of state autonomy in some 
developing countries, by arguing that these post-colonial 
states were already autonomous. The states in these societies 
were constructed by colonial powers, yet in spite of this some 
indigenous classes shared in ruling society, even though they 
remained dependent and did not constitute a hegemonic class." 
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In the case of Egypt, the discussion of state relative 
autonomy, especially after the 1952 Revolution, should take 
another direction, i.e. not whether the Egyptian state is 
relatively autonomous or not, but rather the extent of state 
power over political, economic and social decisions with 
respect to other social powers in society during different 
historical periods. 
In that sense, one has to agree with Fitzgerald, who argues 
that, for developing countries, in order to achieve capital 
accumulation in critical periods of development, such as the 
transition from agrarian- dominated, export based growth to 
that of an import substitution industry, the state, "... must 
possess a certain degree of autonomy relative to the dominant 
elite, particularly the traditional agrarian and financial 
groups on the one hand and foreign interests on the other, and 
seek support among other classes because in restructuring 
capital it must inevitably jeopardize the interests of those 
fractions of capital that benefit from the existing order of 
things, even though in the long run the effect is to allow 
capitalism to develop more effectively"." On this view, the 
state has relative autonomy, and determines its position from 
the national and foreign bourgeoisie, and may at times hit 
their interests while supporting them at others. The trend of 
relative autonomy depends upon internal and external 
circumstances. 
The most useful approach would seem to be that state relative 
autonomy in third world countries, taking into account that 
state power in respect of the political, economic and social 
issues, and in relation to social classes, differs from one 
period to another, i.e. the amount of relative autonomy that 
the state enjoys is not constant but changes over historical 
periods. 
The significance of state relative autonomy, i.e. the class 
content of the state, will be more fully identified in Chapter 
Two, where the political and economic policies of Egypt under 
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Nasser and Sadat will be discussed, along with the social 
consequences of these policies in terms of their effect on 
different social classes and class alliances. 
The degree of state relative autonomy in relation to different 
social classes will be the main point for the discussion of 
state power and class formation in Chapter Three. The 
discussion will reflect differences, in degree and amount, in 
the relative autonomy that the state enjoyed in different 
historical periods under Nasser, Sadat, and at the present 
time. 
This will be illustrated through the discussion of the main 
political and economic decisions taken in different historical 
periods. These decisions are expected to be in favour of some 
classes and against the interests of others. The discussion 
will show when and how the state enjoyed a great amount of 
autonomy, and when it became weak and threatened by the power 
of the bourgeoisie. 
III. The Concept of Class  
A central feature of this research is concerned with the study 
of social class and education, and so it is necessary to 
identify what is meant by class. The identification and 
conceptualization of class will be studied as a complex 
matter, where social class will be identified at two levels: 
A - The objective level of the dynamics of economic 
relations, and 
B - The subjective level of culture, ideology, consciousness 
and common sense. 
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(A) - 	 The objective level of the study of social class: 
The study of social class at its objective level will address 
some main points. The two main traditions for conceptualizing 
class are the Weberian and the Marxist approaches. The neo-
Marxist approach will be given special attention, in 
particular the work of Nicos Poulantzas in class analysis and 
the useful elements of his analysis to the understanding of 
the class structure of Egypt will be identified. There will 
be a reference, also, to the analysis of class as a category 
system, in order to classify the sample of the field study. 
However, the criteria of the classification will not be fully 
discussed in this chapter, since a full discussion will be 
presented in Chapter Five. 
(i) The Concept of Class in the Weberian and Marxist 
tradition: 
As a part of conceptualizing class, it is important to ask 
first what class is. Class has different meanings in different 
sociological approaches. In some views, like those of Warner, 
Parsons or Williams, classes refer to categories of people 
occupying common positions within a status hierarchy.59 Class 
may also be seen as conflict groups determined by their 
position within authority or powers structure; this view is 
adopted by Dahrendorf and Lanski." In the Weberian tradition, 
class is seen as a group of people with common market position 
in competition with each other, while the Marxists have 
defined class in terms of common structural positions within 
the social organization of production. 
The Weberian and the Marxist theories represent the two main 
traditions in the sociological study of class. Both theories 
have been used to look at class in the relational term i.e. 
they define classes by their structured social relationship 
to other classes. The difference between the two approaches 
is in the way that they conceptualize this relation.51 
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The Weberian analysis: 
The Weberian class analysis in terms of market relationships 
concentrates on the study of relations of exchange between 
sellers and buyers of various kinds." In defining class Weber 
says: "In our terminology, 'classes' are not communities, they 
merely represent possible and frequent bases for social 
action. We may speak of a 'class' when (1) a number of people 
have in common a specific causal component of their life 
chances, insofar as (2) the component is represented 
exclusively by economic interests in the possessing of goods 
and opportunities for income and (3) is represented under the 
conditions of the commodity or labour markets. This is 'class 
situation"." 
The Marxist Analysis 
The Marxist class analysis uses a different approach. As 
explained above, Weber sees classes as phenomena of the 
commercial life of society, while Marx sees them as phenomena 
of the organization of production, which in turn locates class 
conflict in the structure of production rather than in social 
exchange. 
In comparing Marxist and Weberian class analysis, there is an 
important tendency in sociological studies to see early Marx 
and Weber as having identified class on the same basis.64 That 
is to say that both of them identify class according to three 
dimensions; namely, private ownership, production and 
struggle. This view states that Weber has identified 
propertied and propertyless classes, and he allows for a 
similar differentiation of individuals into social strata 
within these groups according to different types of property, 
services and skills that people possess or control." 
Marshall, who defends this view of the similarity between Marx 
and Weber, explains that the analyses differ on one point, 
which is that for Weber class is identified in market 
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relations, and it is the chances distributed by the capitalist 
market which distinguish the various classes. In contrast with 
this, for Marx the crucial point is that because of the labour 
theory of value, the contract between capital and labour in 
the market is not an exchange of equals, and that symmetrical 
exchanges in the market are an illusion behind which surplus 
value is extracted from labour power in the process of 
production." 
According to the present writer, Marx clearly identified the 
principal difference between classes, that the owner of the 
means of production, and those who sell their labour power in 
the market, are completely different, and that the market 
favours one group to the disadvantage of the other. 
Marxist analysis is based on the fundamental assumption that 
economic relations play a basic role in structuring other 
relations, and that with economic relations the social 
relations of production structure both technical relations of 
production and the social relations of exchange.67 The 
classical Marxist analysis considers the economic level as the 
base which affects and determines other social relations. This 
view has been revised by neo-Marxists, who have moved to 
consider other aspects of the 'superstructure', such as 
culture and ideology, as having a role in both social change 
and class relations. 
This approach is represented in the 'base / superstructure' 
debate, where a number of Marxist theoreticians 
('culturalists') have rejected the classical ('structuralist') 
Marxist notion that, "the economic infrastructure determined 
in a kind of one to one correspondence all aspects of the so-
called superstructure, law, religion and ... arts"." In this 
approach the economic does not represent the determinant 
factor in structuring social relations and other aspects of 
culture and ideology. Ideological and cultural aspects also 
have aninfluential role in social transformation. 
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This debate about the relative role of base and superstructure 
has contributed to class analysis in terms of developing 
cultural analysis which gives an important role to the study 
of human consciousness, ideology and the role of human agency 
in changing social reality. Consequently, this move towards 
giving the political and ideological levels an effect on their 
own has political and theoretical implications, partly because 
it considers class consciousness as an important factor in 
social change. Traditional Marxism, on the other hand, 
considers that the economic level is dominant, and that 
changes in the mode of production lead to social change. 
This point in Marxist theory is problematic, since it raises 
the question of whether political changes are caused by active 
class struggle, or whether they are the effect of mechanical 
transformation from the dominance of one mode of production 
to the dominance of some other mode of production within a 
given social formation." 
The political consequence of this debate is that, if we 
consider that political change and revolution are caused by 
class struggle, this means that it is important to study class 
at its cultural level, i.e. to study class consciousness. If 
we consider that transformation happens at the level of the 
mode of production, this puts less stress on class 
consciousness and does not emphasize the cultural and 
ideological organization of the masses for social change. The 
implications of this debate to this research will be discussed 
later. 
The contribution of the neo-Marxist approach to the class 
analysis by their reconsideration of the relationship between 
base and superstructure will give this research the 
opportunity to carry out a complex class analysis in which 
social classes will be considered at the objective level of 
economic structure, and at the subjective level of class 
consciousness, common sense and ideology. 
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So, a neo-Marxist approach to class analysis will be adopted, 
in particular the work of Nicos Poulantzas because of its 
general contribution to Marxist class analysis. This will be 
discussed more fully below. Taking into account that 
Poulantzas did not only contribute to the general theoretical 
analysis of social class, but also presented criteria for 
classifying and locating people in certain class positions, 
it will play an important role in this research in classifying 
the sample of the field study. The criteria will be discussed 
in general terms in this chapter, and will be fully analyzed 
in Chapter Five. 
Moreover, Poulantzas' analysis has some applicability to this 
research because Poulantzas' approach to the study of class 
and of the criteria for class stratification has attracted the 
attention of a number of Egyptian researchers, who have 
adopted his approach in their analysis of the class structure 
of Egyptian society, as was explained earlier in the 
Introduction. A particular set of issues for Poulantzas, his 
Egyptian interpreters and this research revolves around the 
intermediate classes, the new middle classes. 
(ii) Poulantzas' Contribution to Class Analysis 
Poulantzas has identified classes as, "groupings of social 
agents defined principally but not exclusively by their place 
in the production process, i.e. in the economic sphere. The 
economic place of the social agents has a principal role in 
determining social classes. But from that we cannot conclude 
that this economic place is sufficient to determine social 
classes. Marxism states that the economic does indeed have the 
determinant role in a mode of production or a social 
formation; but the political and the ideological (the 
superstructure) also have a very important role"." 
Poulantzas' contribution, according to this definition, comes 
from his consideration of social classes not as mere 
reflections of the economic structure, but as determined by 
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a complex structure of three levels; the economic base, the 
political and legal structure, and social consciousness or 
ideology. This combination of three levels arises from the 
Marxist debate over base / superstructure, as discussed 
earlier. 
The debate about the relative role of base and superstructure 
led Poulantzas to reject the idea that only the economic base 
is determinant of social formations, and to introduce his 
notion of three linked levels into class analysis. He supposed 
that the political and ideological levels have relative 
autonomy, and have their own effects, while the economic level 
has determination in the last instance.71 In other words, class 
structure imposes limits on class formation, class 
consciousness and class struggle. However, this does not imply 
that these four sub-concepts within the general concept of 
class are definable indpendently of each other, or that they 
only have 'external' inter-relationships. This means that 
classes have structural existence which is irreducible to any 
of these aspects.72  
Related to the debate about base and superstructure and the 
place of class consciousness and ideologies in class analysis 
and the study of social change, Poulantzas was aware of the 
problem referred to earlier, of how social change occurs. That 
is, whether social change occurs at the level of the mode of 
production, at the level of class practice, struggle and 
consciousness, or as a result of some combination of these, 
where the influences are mutually interdependent. 
Poulantzas proposed a solution by differentiating between the 
analysis of the impact of class on the mode of production 
level (theoretical level) and its impact on social formation 
(the concrete level). 
This distinction has the important function of making it 
possible to say that in a concrete social formation, political 
practices have an effect on structural change." The 
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implication is that the abstract analysis of the mode of 
production cannot be a substitute for the study of concrete 
social formations. The study of social formations is very 
important because it is the only level at which we can study 
the class struggle and its role in social transformation." 
The debate concerning the role of social classes in social 
transformation, i.e. whether social changes are the cause or 
the effect of social change, has been more fully elaborated 
by Hindess and Hirst, who argue that, "the conditions of 
existence of the mode of produption,are secured, modified, or 
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transformed as the outcome of specific class strugglestof the 
economic, political and ideological levels of the social 
formation"." 
The consideration of political and ideological factors in 
class structure and social change has implications for this 
research, where it deals with class practices and 
consciousness. In this context, the place of the popular 
masses is very important, because, if men and women are 
determined by powers outside their control, there would appear 
to be little point in organizing for political action. On the 
other hand, if one adopts a theoretical position which 
suggests that class conflict can indeed change society, then 
it will be important to study class relations and class power 
in specific social formations, and the organization of the 
masses for political action. 
This point is important to the cultural analysis of this 
research, which will adopt a dialectical perspective in 
analyzing social classes and their practices and influence in 
education. This will be put into practice through the study 
of people's consciousness and experience in the empirical 
study. The research will not simply concentrate on that level 
of people's consciousness, however. It will consider the 
determinants which work outside people's consciousness also, 
for example, the influence of the state, economic and 
political structures, which are expected to have an influence 
62 
upon people's experience, and constitute significant 
structural centres for action. 
Poulantzas does not only contribute to the critical debate 
about the conceptualization of social class. He also defined 
criteria to identify different social classes. These criteria 
take into account the economic, political and ideological 
aspect, and can be used to differentiate four distinct social 
classes. These are: 
1. the bourgeoisie who own the means of production, 
2. the proletariat consisting of wage earners, productive 
workers who do non-supervisory work, 
3. the new petty bourgeoisie, including white collar 
employees, technicians, supervisors and civil servants, 
and 
4. the traditional petty bourgeoisie, like independent 
artisans and shopkeepers. 
Poulantzas' criteria help to draw the boundaries and to 
identify the relative size of each class. A major reason for 
interest in the relative size of social classes and the 
boundaries between them arises because in the case of Egypt 
the lack of distinction between the working class and the new 
petty bourgeoisie was masked for political reasons during the 
sixties. Even without this complication, identifying the 
boundary between these two classes is no simple task. This 
situation, which prevented the working class from playing 
their political role will be explained in Chapter Two. 
Beside Poulantzas' criteria for identifying social classes and 
drawing boundaries between the working class and the new petty 
bourgeoisie, he also undertook the task of identifying and 
defining classes to which insufficient attention had been 
given by other sociologists. This is developed in his theses 
on the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie, crucial as 
'intermediate classes'. 
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Poulantzas' differentiation between traditional and new petty 
bourgeoisie will be discussed in detail, since the 
identification of the latter class is essential because of the 
role and position it occupies in Egyptian society. This class 
is seen as the vehicle for economic, social and political 
modernization because of its technical capacities and modern 
education. 
How the new petty bourgeoisie emerged: 
Poulantzas explains that the new petty bourgeoisie has emerged 
from the development of capitalism which led to the increasing 
number of non-productive wage earners. An example of this 
group is commercial and bank employees, those who are called 
"white collar".76  
The identification of the class position of this group is 
problematic. In the views of some, they are classified as part 
of the bourgeoisie. This is based on the consideration of the 
kind of work they do, since in modern industry they do the 
supervising and the managing of the work that the bourgeoisie 
used to do for themselves.77  
Another view is that this group belongs to the working class, 
on the grounds that they are wage earners, and they are in 
opposition to the bourgeoisie since they lack the ownership 
of the means of production." 
A third view identifies this group as "middle class". 
According to this view, this group is seen as a third force 
in society. Poulantzas explains that on this view the middle 
class faces the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the 
working class, and can be seen as the mediating pillar and the 
basic "stabilizing" factor in bourgeois society.79 Poulantzas 
criticizes this view of middle class in terms of its 
theoretical and political conceptions. He suggests that the 
"middle class" cannot be seen as a homogeneous group, and that 
it is loosely defined in terms of income criteria and criteria 
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of mental attitudes and psychological motivations." 
According to the same view, the middle class is supposed to 
be the result of the dissolution of the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, and the movement of large sections of the working 
class to the bourgeois position. This class is supposed 
finally to form the stew in which classes are mixed together 
and their antagonisms dissolved." For Poulantzas, using the 
term "middle class" in that way means that classes no longer 
exist, since, for him, classes exist at different positions, 
and on the two levels of economic relations and ideological 
and political class struggle. Therefore, claiming that issues 
of class antagonism can be simply dissolved would be to deny 
the existence of social classes. 
After introducing these different views, which place the new 
group of wage earners with the working class, bourgeoisie or 
middle class respectively, Poulantzas argues that this group 
does not properly belong to the bourgeoisie, nor to the 
working class. They belong together with the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie (small scale production workers and owners, 
independent craftsmen and traders), and with them form one 
class, the petty bourgeoisie.82 
Poulantzas says of the new petty bourgeoisie: 
"It is in no way destined to follow the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie, threatened with extinction, and that its 
development and expansion are conditioned by the extended 
reproduction of capitalism itself"." 
This classification of the new wage earning group with the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie needs further discussion. First 
of all, it is accepted that this new group does not belong, 
as Poulantzas argues, to the bourgeoisie, since they do not 
own the means of production. At the same time they do not 
belong to the working class either, since, according to 
Poulantzas, not all wage earners are working class. Poulantzas 
identifies this group of wage earners from the working class 
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by political and ideological factors. That is, although the 
two groups are wage earners and do not own the means of 
production, still, in terms of the social division of labour, 
the new group is maintaining and exercising power over the 
working class through their supervisory work, and by 
extracting surplus value from the workers for the benefit of 
the capitalists. So they represent the political domination 
of the capitalists over the working class.24 
In ideological terms the division between mental and manual 
labour is not just a technical division of labour. Rather, the 
division is essentially based on political and ideological 
relations. Since the new petty bourgeoisie's work is 
legitimized on the basis of knowledge and knowing the secrets 
of work, while the working class is excluded from this 
knowledge, this situation ensures that the working class is 
not only exploited economically, but politically and 
ideologically as well." In fact, this point about the 
difference between the new petty bourgeoisie and the working 
class with respect to knowledge represents the main difference 
between the two classes at the cultural and ideological level, 
which also has to do with the kind of education the two 
classes receive. However, this point about the education of 
the two classes is not central to Poulantzas' analysis, which 
gives an opportunity for the present research to do more 
cultural and educational analysis to investigate how the 
educational system contributes to this cultural and 
ideological exploitation. 
Poulantzas agrees that it might seem strange to identify two 
groups, the traditional and the new petty bourgeoisie, who 
have different places in the economic relations, as belonging 
to the same social class." Elsewhere, he argues that the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie do not even belong to the 
capitalist mode of production, but rather belong to the simple 
commodity form of production which was historically the form 
of transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of 
production." 
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The question is how Poulantzas, after making these points, can 
classify the two groups in the same class. He justifies it by 
arguing that this class unity is a consequence of the 
relationship of both the traditional and the new petty 
bourgeoisie as the class who struggle between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat. He explains this by saying that, "If the 
traditional and the new petty bourgeoisie can be considered 
as belonging to the same class, this is because social classes 
are only determined in the class struggle, and because these 
groupings are precisely both polarized in relation to the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat"." This means that they both 
share the same interests and ideologies in relation to their 
position from both the working class and the bourgeoisie. 
Poulantzas explains the ideological unity between the new and 
the traditional petty bourgeoisie in terms of the following 
three points: 
1) They are both ideologically anti-capitalist since they 
are exploited by capital. They believe that the way to 
change society is through institutional changes and not 
in revolutionary ways." 
2) They are both scared of moving down to the position of 
the working class. Their aspiration is to move up to the 
bourgeois position, and they believe that this move 
depends upon individual ability.90 
3) As an intermediate class polarized between the 
bourgeoisie and the working class they tend to see the 
state as an inherently neutral force whose role is that 
of arbitrating between the various social classes.21  
Poulantzas has introduced these factors to show the unity of 
the two groups. However, his argument can be theoretically 
criticized on the basis that the two classes occupy different 
economic positions, and that they also differ in terms of the 
influence of the expansion of monopoly capitalism on them, and 
finally that they have different interests in the expansion 
of the state. These theoretical points will be more fully 
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elaborated in Chapter Three with reference to the case of 
Egypt. 
The study of Poulantzas' concept of class and the criteria he 
presents for social stratification emphasize the importance 
of conceptualizing social classes at both the objective level 
of economic relations and at the subjective level of politics 
and ideology. This means that the three aspects of economics, 
politics and ideology do not exist independently from each 
other. In the following point the ideological aspects of class 
will be focused upon, taking into account the fact that the 
distinction between the objective and the subjective in the 
analysis is only made for the purpose of the study. The 
study of the ideological aspect of class conceptualizes class 
as a matter of consciousness, culture and common sense, which 
presents itself in the image that a social class has of 
society, and that individual people have of their positions 
and possibilities, as well as of those they identify as being 
"like themselves". 
(B) - 	 The subjective level of study of social class 
The debate over conceptualizing social class at the objective 
or the subjective level has resulted in two approaches. These 
are the objective approach, which takes the form of the study 
of class relations as defined in terms of market or economic 
relations, and the subjective approach which interprets these 
relations in terms of group awareness and consciousness of 
these relations, i.e. the concepts and images they have of 
these relations. The perspective adopted by this research 
attempts to combine the two approaches, and to give a 
theoretical justification for that where it argues that 
concentration on the objective aspect of the analysis will 
displace human agents and their understanding social reality, 
and present a mechanistic version of class analysis. At the 
same time it argues that concentration solely upon the 
subjective aspect of the analysis could only present a 
descriptive report of social relations.22 
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This approach will give the opportunity to avoid the 
inadequacies of the sharp distinctions between the objective 
and the subjective. It also gives the opportunity for more 
consideration of the cultural aspect of class formation as it 
appears in the dynamics of culture, ideology and common sense. 
The cultural level of class will be developed in the field 
study of this research, where social perspectives and class 
consciousness are studied. 
The field study will examine members' of social classes images 
of society in terms of their views about the past, present and 
future of society. They were asked to describe society before 
and after the Revolution of 1952, in terms of the class 
structure of society and the size of those classes. To study 
their present consciousness of the present movement and 
interaction in society, they were asked to identify their own 
class position, to discuss changes which took place in 
Egyptian society in the seventies, and which social classes 
benefited and which were harmed by those changes. They were 
also asked to describe their expectations for the movement of 
society in the future. People were asked to evaluate the 
system of education in the past, present and their own 
expectations for the future. People were asked to express 
their perspectives on some key issues in education such as 
free / fee-paying education, and the level of spending on 
education, which were expected to reveal a diversity of 
interests. 
In order to understand the diversity of people's images of 
society and why and how people from different class positions 
and inside the same class express different views and 
interests, one needs to understand the culture, ideology, 
consciousness and common sense. 
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(i) Class Culture 
In modern society the most fundamental groups are social 
classes and the major cultural forms are class cultures. Each 
individual is born not into a set of particular economic 
relations, but into a particular set of institutions and 
relations i.e. in 'culture'.93  
The world 'culture' refers to, "that level at which social 
groups develop distinct patterns of life, and give expressive 
forms to their social and material life experience"." In its 
social definition, culture is a, "description of a particular 
way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values not 
only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary 
behaviour".93 The analysis of culture from such a definition 
means the clarification of the meanings and values implicit and 
explicit in a particular way of life, i.e. particular culture 
since culture includes a wide range of knowledge, beliefs, 
arts, morals and customs. 
In other words, culture refers to quite concrete 
relationships, the actual ways of life which become 
distinctive to a group or a class in a particular period. It 
is the beliefs common sense, ideas which actually inform their 
practical collective social life." 
These definitions of culture, which mainly speak of 'class 
cultures', give signals that one would 	 expect, since 
culture is the product of a class society which consists of 
more than one fundamental class. Consequently, there are more 
than one set of ideas or cultural forms in society. 
There will be more than one tendency at work within the 
dominant ideas of a society, and more than one major cultural 
configuration in play at a particular historical moment." 
Since 'cultures' are the product of a class society, and 
classes are unequally ranked in relation to one another in 
terms of their productive relations, wealth and power, so 
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'cultures' are differently ranked and stand in opposition to 
one another in relationships of domination and subordination." 
The talk about cultures in the plural does not mean that 
people do not share some aspects of the 'same' culture. In 
fact, groups which exist within the same society and share 
some of the same material and historical conditions do 
understand and to a certain extent share each others 
'culture'.99  
At the same time, the talk of dominant and subordinate 
cultures, does not mean that the subordinate culture will be 
passively subordinate to the dominant culture. They will enter 
into struggle with, seek to modify, negotiate, resist or even 
overthrow its reign or its hegemony. In addition, they may 
coexist for long periods, negotiating the space and gaps in 
it .100 
In order to understand such a complicated and contradictory 
cultural configuration, in which social classes, who may share 
and understand each other's culture, but also express 
different values, views and consciousness and in general 
represent a diversity of images of the social reality, the 
concepts of ideology, common sense consciousness and hegemony 
will be necessary. They are essential conceptual tools for the 
analysis of the complexity of culture. 
(ii) Ideology 
Ideology is one of the most 'difficult' concepts in social 
science, which has been given different meanings and functions 
in different theoretical approaches. 
In the classical Marxist view, Marx identified ideology as 
false consciousness. This false consciousness arises from the 
division of labour, i.e. the division between the commercial 
and the industrial, between mental and manual labour, and 
between capital and labour. These divisions have been 
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translated by Marx into a division between private interest 
and communal interest, which is to say a division between the 
dominant and the dominated."1 The division of labour leads to 
contradictory classes, and on the ground of that contradiction 
Marx has conceptualized ideology, which in his sense was 
formed to defend the interests of certain social classes. In 
this sense, the traditional Marxist view of ideology is that 
it is false consciousness, or a system which distorted reality 
in order to serve the interests of the dominant classes. 102 In  
Marx's words, "Ideologies are not only false ideas, but they 
match particular interests. Ideologies claim to be the truth, 
but reflect the needs of specific groups.103  
In other approaches, which, in part, will be adopted here, 
ideology is seen in a positive sense, as the world-view 
expressing the values of a particular social group. 104  This 
sense of ideology means that one can speak of 'ideologies' in 
the plural, as the opinions, theories and attitudes formed 
within a class in order to defend and promote its interests."Th 
The positive sense of ideology, linked to the political class 
struggle, has been used to describe the challenge to the 
ruling class ideology, which in itself is ideology too. The 
concept of ideology here indicates the point of view of each 
class and refers to class political ideas, rather than to the 
making of contradictions."m 
From that definition of ideology, it follows that ideology 
does not exist only at the theoretical and political level of 
discourse. It also exists and represents ordinary people's 
beliefs, ideas, and views. It presents their practical 
consciousness of every day life, i.e. their 'common-sense'. 
This level of ideology, is the subject of Part Two of this 
research, since ordinary people's views, beliefs and ideas 
about social, economic, political and educational matters are 
studied. 
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At this level of ideology, i.e. the level of common-sense and 
people's daily experience, people's views, beliefs and ideas 
are not usually unified. Rather, they are different and often 
contradictory. To understand this, one needs to look at how 
people's consciousness and ideologies are formed. 
Marx explained how consciousness is formed. He said: 
"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines 
their consciousness".107  
According to this, thought and its production cannot be 
separated from one's world, and forms of consciousness are 
forms of life that are social and historical in nature. 108  So, 
according to the above view, if consciousness, ideologies or 
common-sense are formed in a certain group or social class who 
occupy the same position in relation to means of production, 
i.e. have the same material position and are influenced by 
conditions of existence, then these conditions will produce 
one prescribed form of consciousness. 
It is true that circumstances and conditions do set real 
limits on how ideas and meanings develop and change, and they 
also affect which ideas become 'common' and take popular 
root.109 However, one cannot unproblematically 'read off' what 
the ideology of a class must be simply from knowing its 
material conditions.110 This is one justification for the 
approach of this research in introducing an empirically based 
study of people's ideologies which will examine the extent to 
which members of the same class position and from different 
class positions agree or disagree about some economic, social 
and educational aspects of society. 
The differences in people's ideologies come from the fact that 
they live in an circumstances more complicated than just being 
influenced by their relations to the economic base of society 
and by their place at that material level. Rather, they live 
in culture, which means that concrete forms of economic, 
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social, ideological and political life come together to 
generate distinctive patterns and arrangements.111  
The broad complicated sense of culture in which people live, 
and generate different views and ideas, does not mean that 
belonging to a certain social class has no influence on the 
formation of people's consciousness and beliefs. Rather, it 
means that classes are 'of crucial but not final causal 
importance' in forming beliefs.112 
At this point of understanding ideologies and beliefs as 
formed in a class position, Marx introduces a contradictory 
theory of ideology in which he presented people on the one 
hand as having conflicting interests and views, and on the 
other hand as influenced by the single system of beliefs and 
views of the dominant class. 
Marx draws a link between the beliefs and the interests which 
stand behind them in a dynamic way. That is, he does not refer 
to a unified system of beliefs and interests, but to 
conflicting interests between individuals and individuals, 
between individuals and the state, between individuals and the 
social classes of which they are members, between different 
elements within a social class, between different aspirations 
of classes and between social class and social class.1" 
This picture of conflicting interests that Marx introduced can 
be seen in people's every day life and in the way they debate 
different social, economic, political and educational matters, 
examples of which will be introduced in the field study of 
this research. 
The picture of conflicting beliefs and interests is only one 
aspect of Marx's theory of ideology. He also argued that all 
social classes are incorporated within the single belief 
system which is appropriate to the interests of the dominant 
class."" This picture of ideology as having integrative 
capacities has predominated in sociological analysis, 
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supported by the comparative stability which can be recognised 
in the capitalist social order in western societies.1" This 
view of ideology presents society as over-integrated and it 
may conceal the fact of class conflict. To explain that, an 
interpretation of Gramsci's concept of hegemony will be 
adopted here. 
(iii) Hegemony 
By this concept Gramsci explains how the political and 
economic interests and supremacy of a particular group is 
maintained. He explained that these interests and supremacy 
cannot be created and maintained by force alone. It demands 
'consent' and persuasion, intellectual and moral leadership 
as well, which Gramsci called hegemony and identified as; 
"an order in which a certain way of life and thought 
is dominant, in which one concept of reality is 
diffused throughout society, in all its 
institutional and private manifestations, informing 
with its spirit all tastes, morality, customs, 
religious and political principles, and all social 
relations, particularly in the intellectual and 
moral connotations".116  
The introduction of hegemony in this sense explains the 
situation in western capitalist societies where there is the 
use of consent, often more in the form of acquiescence than 
consensus, rather than coercion by the state. This is 
explained by the fact that civil society, which includes a 
complex institutional array of political parties, schools, 
churches and mass media, has developed alongside the political 
society, which includes state, army, government and legal 
system.1" 
The development of the civil society in western countries has 
made it predominant over political society. Hence, hegemony 
and consent are more likely to be used by the state than 
coercion, though it is always there 'in reserve'. Gramsci 
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explains that the relationship between state and civil society 
varies from one society to another. In some cases the state 
is more developed in regard to civil society. In this case one 
may expect more use of coercion by the state organs.'" This 
point has to be taken into account when one applies the 
concept of hegemony for a sociological analysis of societies 
like Egypt, where, as a peripheral society, the civil society 
is relatively poorly developed in relation to the state and 
the use of coercion by the state organs is not uncommon. 
However, this does not mean that the state only functions by 
coercion, since the state itself is an instrument of hegemony 
as well as coercion, and the main point is the particular 
balance in the use of both means. 
The concept of hegemony has developed from a matter of 
political relations of domination between states to the 
relations between classes. That is to say, it is not limited 
to matters of direct political control but seeks to describe 
a more general domination which includes, as one of its key 
features, a particular way of seeing the world and human 
nature and relationships.'" 
Hegemony is an aspect of ideology in that it is seen to depend 
for its hold not only on its expression of the interests of 
a ruling class but also on its acceptance as 'normal reality' 
or 'common sense' by those who are in practice subordinated 
to it.VW This analysis of hegemony and the way that hegemony 
is formed and works in society and works as common-sense, may 
help to explain why, in Egypt, the masses of the working class 
appear to give their support to government policies which may 
well be harming their interests. This leads one to ask whether 
hegemony is always successful in gaining the consent of the 
subordinate classes. In fact, Gramsci was aware that hegemony 
should not be understood as producing over-integrated 
societies. That is why Gramsci said that the hegemony of the 
capitalist class is not complete, and hegemony does not 
achieve perfect control of subordinate classes.121 
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Gramsci explains the incomplete dominance of hegemony by his 
explanation of the nature and the way the working class 
consciousness or common-sense is formed and how it works. 
Gramsci explains that workers do not give complete support to 
the capitalist class since workers have two consciousnesses. 
On the one hand is a consciousness determined by life-
experience and interests which unite workers "in the practical 
transformation of the real world" where this kind of 
consciousness is implicitly oppositional. On the other hand, 
they have another consciousness formed as a whole traditional 
way of thinking, informed by the dominant culture and 
"uncritically absorbed".m  
From this way of forming working class consciousness, Gramsci 
explains the contradictory nature of 'common sense' or the 
'thought of the masses'. For Gramsci, common-sense or human 
consciousness is viewed as a complex combination of 'good' and 
'bad' sense, a contradictory realm of ideas and behaviour in 
which elements of 'accommodation' and 'resistance' exist in 
an unsteady state of tension.w 
In other words, common sense for Gramsci is made of 
subjectivity characterised by forms of discursive 
consciousness imbued with 'insights' into the social reality 
as well as with 'distorting' beliefs that mystify and 
legitimate the reality.124 So, the contradictory nature of 
common-sense gives the two possibilities for the working class 
to accept and co-exist or reject and try to overthrow the 
hegemony of the dominant class, which explains why hegemony 
is never complete. 
The explanation of the nature of common-sense as 
contradictory, may explain the contradictions in the working 
class ideologies and consciousness with regard to economic, 
political and educational aspects of social relations, which 
will appear in the analysis of the field study material. 
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From the example of taken for granted attitudes, the benefit 
of applying concepts of ideology and hegemony can be seen. 
Ideology as a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, and 
hegemony as the partial domination of one ideology over 
others, expose those taken for granted beliefs to critical 
analysis. What people perceive as normal and natural matters 
in economics, politics and education, will be rather analyzed 
as hiding certain relations of domination and subordination 
in society. The dynamics of ideology, hegemony and common-
sense do not only explain the general aspects of social 
relations in economics and politics, but they also can be 
found to exist in the educational system. They exist and 
function at different levels in the system, which range from 
the specific practices inside the classroom and in the school 
knowledge, to the general level of education and the 
reproduciton of class relations and cultures, which will be 
more fully elaborated below. 
IV. Education in relation to development, state and social 
classes  
In this part of the theoretical discussion of education, one 
can concentrate on certain educational aspects which relate 
to the subject of this research. This research is concerned 
with education and social class. It deals with the 
quantitative unequal division of education opportunities to 
some extent, and the qualitative aspects of class cultural and 
ideological power relations and how they work to influence the 
policy of education, both at the level of the state, where 
policy is formaulated, and at the level of class ideologies 
and practices, represented in people's perspectives of 
education and other social, economic and political matters. 
In order to study the main concern of this research a 
theoretical discussion is needed in this chapter, to lay the 
ground for the coming detailed discussion of education in 
Chapter Four which will be concerned with the study of the 
system and policies of education in Egypt, especially the 
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crisis of education in Egypt as one of the developing 
countries, the influence of colonial rule on education and the 
role of the state in educational policy and the class nature 
of the system. For the coming discussion, theoretical tools 
will be needed to analyze the material of the field study 
which is concerned with how people from different class 
positions perceive economic, political and educational 
matters. 
In order to study these questions, two main theoretical issues 
will be addressed in this chapter. These are: 
(i) The educational crisis of developing countries, and 
(ii) Education and class reproduction. 
The discussion of these two points will use the previously 
discussed theoretical and conceptual framework of state, 
class, ideology, hegemony and common sense. 
(i) The Educational Crisis of Developing Countries 
In the 1960s there was an international trend which placed 
great confidence in formal education as the main means of 
promoting development. According to this view, developing 
countries have invested in the expansion of education and have 
set ambitious enrolment targets at the different levels of 
education. Developing countries have invested in education to 
achieve economic, political and cultural objectives. 
In economic terms, spending in adult literacy programmes and 
primary education was expected to enhance social mobility. 
Secondary education graduates were needed to perform technical 
and administrative functions, university graduates were needed 
to supply professional and managerial skills needed in both 
the public and private sectors.1" 
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In cultural terms, spending on education was seen as a 
contribution to public socialization and cultural 
homogenization, expanding the use of national languages and 
deepening the understanding of national history.126  
When setting these targets, developing countries thought that 
more schooling would create equal opportunities for millions 
of people to develop their individual abilities to their 
maximum potential and escape the vicious circle of poverty. 
Behind these ideas stands a theory which has dominated 
educational thought in developed and developing countries, 
namely, human capital theory. 
Human capital theory is an expression of modernization theory 
in the educational field. As explained in earlier in this 
chapter, modernization theory has its roots in the structural 
functionalist perspective and sees modernization in terms of 
change in the central value system. From this perspective, to 
be modern means resocialization of the population and the 
selection and allocation of talented and trained manpower 
which will be able to work in the modern sector of the 
economy. 127  
According to the theory, education in western countries is a 
major source of that amount of economic growth which cannot 
be attributed to the growth of fixed capital only, and that 
investment in human capital is a necessary component in 
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achieving economic growth.128  Consequently, education is 
considered important in increasing labour's productivity by 
embodying in the labour force increased skills and knowledge. 
At the same time, school develops individuals to their fullest 
potential, and increasing the amount of schooling for 
individuals will increase their wages and reduce social 
inequality.129  
These targets, which the expansion of formal education was 
expected to achieve, have not been fulfilled. The view that 
formal schooling would achieve economic growth, social 
equality and upward mobility for the poor have all come under 
criticism. However, the critique of expansion of education in 
developing countries does not mean that it was a complete 
failure, because it could achieve some positive results: it 
opened up new opportunities for millions of disadvantaged 
young people and gave them upward mobility. Education could 
also increase the domestic reservoir of middle and high level 
educated manpower, who are essential for developing these 
countries further.1" 
In spite of these successes, other facts about education and 
development in third world countries came under criticism. 
That is, although these countries have increased their GNP, 
increased educational enrolment and participation rates, 
economic and educational development was lopsided and 
inequitable .131 
The inequitable pattern of economic and educational 
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development is clear in the rural / urban gap, where, 
according to the rural surveys, 40 per cent of the rural 
population live in absolute poverty with very poor health, 
food and educational facilities.m  
Even in the cities, where the main modernization projects were 
constructed, and the modern sector was established with modern 
industry, government, buildings, schools and colleges, showed 
signs of inequality. The modern sector, with its educated 
labour force, capital intensive industry, and high wages, 
still constituted only a small fraction of the whole urban 
economy. The majority of the city dwellers are uneducated and 
unemployed, who have moved from smaller cities and rural areas 
to the large cities. Urban poverty is no less than rural 
poverty.m  
In addition, these countries still suffer from high drop-out 
rates, high levels of functional illiteracy among primary and 
secondary school graduates, and a high percentage of school 
failures. These elements constitute the picture or surface of 
the crisis of development and education in the developing 
countries. Behind this picture lies a complicated range of 
factors which add to the difficulties of these countries. Some 
factors indigenous, and can be seen in the dilemma that the 
governments of these countries face in determining their 
educational and developmental priorities. This dilemma is 
mediated by class power and class relationships in society, 
and demands reference in this analysis of the role of the 
state and class relations influencing educational policies. 
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The other factors, which add to the problems, are external, 
and can be seen in the fact that most of the developing 
countries are ex-colonial countries, and their education 
system was, and still is, influenced by colonial rule. 
Colonial influences take different forms, ranging from the 
direct control of the developing country's educational system, 
to indirect influence through cultural domination and foreign 
aid. 
State, Class and Choices for Educational Policy 
In the analysis above, it was argued that the state in 
developing countries is not completely autonomous, but is 
influenced by class power relations in society. In that 
respect, the state has relative autonomy. This point about the 
class content of the state is essential to the analysis of 
education policies, since these policies cannot be regarded 
as neutral, or as working for the interests of all classes. 
Rather, these policies and choices in education will be seen 
as formed in tension and conflict between different class 
interests. Example of these difficulties emerge when the 
developing country's leadership has to choose between the 
expansion of expensive secondary and higher education, and the 
relatively cheaper expansion of the first nine years of 
schooling. The complexity in the choice has economic, 
political and class origins. That is, in order to spend on 
expensive secondary and higher education the government would 
need to shift resources to education from other sectors of the 
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budget such as agriculture, housing or health, which is not 
an easy matter.134  
That is, in spite of the fact that these sectors of health, 
housing and agriculture are parts of the state apparatuses, 
it cannot be assumed that they all have a common purpose or 
that they operate in the same way and in harmony. In reality 
there are differences in interests and in methods of state 
apparatuses which result in tensions between different 
apparatuses .135 
On the other hand, shifting resources towards primary level 
education would mean cutting back on secondary and higher 
education, which is demanded by the upper and middle classes. 
Restricting these levels of education means that the state has 
to face the anger of these classes, who are important for 
political support.136  
The choice between these alternatives will be associated with 
the model of development adopted by the country, and this 
again will reflect the complexity of educational choice and 
policy. In this process, state, development, class and power 
relations are all involved. To explain this, it will be 
assumed that a country will adopt a development model in which 
economic growth is the main target for the development plan, 
spending on higher and upper secondary education will be 
reduced, more spending will go to primary and vocational 
education, and there might also be a reduction in the 
percentage of the national budget going to education.137 If the 
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main goal of the development plan is to improve the standard 
of living for the poor majority of the population, spending 
on education will be more oriented towards adult education 
programmes, providing funds for rural areas where villagers 
can organize themselves to improve their circumstances, and 
in urban areas, planners might set quotas for the proportion 
of students from different income groups who could be admitted 
to higher education which would be consistent with their 
proportions in society as a whole.' 
The choices which are related to the development model and the 
ideology which stands behind these models, create political 
problems, since any reduction of higher education will affect 
the upper and middle classes, and the choice of spending on 
adult education means that the state is ready to change the 
social order and give more opportunity to the poor. This seems 
a difficult political choice, since it hits the interests of 
the upper and middle classes. 
From these examples it seems that educational choice and 
policy are not easy or straightforward to design and apply, 
and that the national government in developing countries is 
faced by tremendous challenges. Part of these challenges is 
external, and is represented in the influence of colonial rule 
on their education system. 
The Influence of Colonial Rule on Education 
Most of the developing countries were under colonization. At 
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the present time, most of them have achieved their 
independence, but they still suffer another kind of 
colonization which binds them to their old colonizers. 
The new relations no longer take the form of direct, armed 
occupation, but they take the form of economic and cultural 
relations. The new colonization relations are established 
through education systems and the schools established by the 
colonizers. In spite of independence, the colonial education 
system still exists in some third world countries. 
The colonial power created in the third world countries 
different kinds of education, marked by class differences. It 
created a duality between two systems, the indigenous system 
(the traditional one) and the modern one established by them. 
The schools established by the colonizers were closed for the 
majority of indigenous people, because of the selective 
admission practices and the high cost. 19 
Colonial schooling did not aim at developing and improving the 
traditional occupations like agriculture and the handicrafts. 
It created a dual system of traditional and modern 
occupations. Colonial education was tied to employment outside 
indigenous occupations, and prepared the colonized for limited 
roles in colonial institutions.140  
According to these conditions, and the privileges that this 
kind of colonial education could give, it was expected that 
the indigenous people would send their children to these 
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schools, where it was considered as a means of social mobility 
and getting a well paid job. 
By this duality in the educational system, colonial education 
can be considered as a logical extension of class 
relationships within the colonized country, and it involves, 
in this case, class relations between countries. Altbach and 
Kelly argue that education under classical colonialism was 
modeled on the working class variant of the metropolitan 
education .141 
The model of education that the colonizers introduced to the 
elite of these countries was in almost the same relationship 
to the metropolitan working class education as that working 
class education was to the elite education within the 
metropole. 142  
That was the situation and type of education introduced under 
direct colonization. After liberation, the colonial relations 
still exist in the educational field, and represent one 
mechanism of what has come to be called neo-colonialism. 
The cultural and educational relationship between independent 
countries and the advanced countries represent another 
dimension of the centre/periphery relations. The western 
countries could constitute "centres" of international 
educational and intellectual life, by virtue of their wealth, 
advanced technology and well established educational 
institutions and research centres. The third world countries 
87 
are at the "periphery" and dependent upon the centre in 
getting modern education and technology.143 
Dependency in the cultural and educational field leads to the 
important question of knowledge dissemination in the world, 
especially between the centre and the periphery. The advance 
world has control over knowledge, by virtue of having the 
scientific institutes, the big publishing houses, journals and 
the ability to finance all these activities. The third world 
is still dependent upon the industrialized countries, or in 
Altbach's terms suffer from, "an unfavourable balance of 
intellectual payments".1" This means that these countries 
import more knowledge than they export. Under these 
conditions, the third world is not allowed easy access to 
knowledge. 
The third world countries suffer from many obstacles which 
hinder them from overcoming this situation. A shortage of 
finance does not allow them to establish advanced research 
units, limits the number of publishing houses, laboratories 
and library facilities, and limits the market.145  
In fact, these very particular problems of technology, 
transforming knowledge, and lack of finance, lead these 
countries to accept foreign aid. 
Foreign Aid 
Because of the shortage of resources, most third world 
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countries welcome foreign aid in different fields, whether 
economic, military or cultural. The cultural and educational 
aspects of aid are no less important than other aspects, such 
as military and economic. The importance of this field led 
Philip Coombs to consider the educational and cultural aid as 
the "fourth dimension of American policy", i.e. it has the 
same importance in foreign policy as the political, military 
and economic dimension.1-'16 
The countries of the centre gain more benefit from this aid 
they pay to the third world countries, since it helps them to 
perpetuate their hegemony over these countries, not by force 
but through ideological and cultural domination."7  
Most aid is channelled through international organizations 
like the World Bank and Unesco, but it is very well known that 
these organizations are influenced and under the control of 
the west and the United States. Third world countries are 
trapped in a vicious circle of shortages of finance and 
equipment, and they have to depend upon the west and the USA. 
Most research about the third world itself has been conducted 
by the west and western intellectuals. In order to learn about 
their own societies, scholars from the third world must learn 
from the west, who can in this case represent and form the 
facts about these societies in a way that serves their 
interests. Hence the developing countries remain suffering 
from the vicious circle of economic and cultural dependency. 
In summary, in this part of the chapter which dealt with the 
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educational crisis in developing countries, the analysis 
concentrated on the critique of the functionalist approach, 
which considered that the expansion of formal education would 
in itself allow for attacking poverty, would provide people 
with jobs, and push the modernization process forward. Reality 
was very different, since these countries still suffer from 
a great deal of unequal educational opportunities, and 
increasing poverty in urban and rural areas. 
The analysis has focused upon two important factors which 
reveal the structural roots of inequality and the difficulties 
these countries are facing. These two factors are 
- the challenges faced by the independent states in their 
developmental and educational choices and their class 
implications, and 
- the impact of the colonial rule on education 
opportunities and the quality of education provided to 
people in these countries. 
The consideration of the state and class power relations as 
the structural factors which lie behind the educational crisis 
in developing countries takes the analysis of education to a 
step further. Aspects of education crisis, like illiteracy, 
drop-out, low level of enrolment and school failures will not 
be regarded -as a functionalist perspective would do - as 
technical matter which requires strengthening planning methods 
and improving teachers training and salaries.'" 
Rather, from a Marxist perspective, these aspects will be 
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analyzed in a wider perspective which involves institutions 
and power relations in society, and which considers education 
as working against certain groups in society, limiting their 
opportunities in developing their abilities. In this respect 
education does not necessarily lead to upward social mobility 
but it may work to reproduce the existing class structure and 
social inequalities. The analysis of education in this 
direction will bring to the discussion concepts of ideology, 
hegemony and 'common sense' as employed in the process of 
reproduction. 
(ii) Education and Class Reproduction 
It has been mentioned earlier that in order to study the 
influence of class power, culture and ideologies on education 
policy and practices a theoretical framework is needed. 
Part of this framework must deal with the theory of 
reproduction in education. This point is important for the 
later analysis, in Chapter Four, of the system and policy of 
education in Egypt which will address the question of the 
extent to which the education system in Egypt could work as 
a means of providing the possibilities for social mobility for 
the masses or whether it works as an apparatus for reproducing 
the class structure of the Egyptian society. The following is 
an analysis of what is meant by reproduction and a critique 
of the negative and positive aspects of conceptualizing 
education in that sense. 
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The concept of reproduction comes from Marxist theory, which 
explains the cycle of production-reproduction. Reproduction 
is not confined to the economic field, but extends to the re-
creation of the physical, social, political and ideological 
conditions for the function of a given society.149 
 
The Marxist view of reproduction refers to the case of the 
contested reproduction of a society's fundamental relations, 
which enables society to reproduce itself but only in the form 
of a dominant and subordinate, i.e. antagonistic, not 
functional, social order.15°  
This kind of reproduction at the political and ideological 
level, with its antagonistic nature, brings to the analysis 
of the dynamics of this process concepts of ideology and 
hegemony as well as the role of the education system. 
As one can understand from the early discussion of hegemony, 
hegemony is a set of practical activities and a world view 
through which the ruling class exerts its dominance. The 
function of hegemony is to reproduce on the ideological plane 
the conditions for class rule and the continuation of social 
relations of production.'51 
 
At this point, the educational apparatus as involved in 
ideological work can contribute to the process of creating 
hegemony and in the reproduction of social relations of 
production. Althusser explains the process of reproduction and 
how hegemony and ideology are involved. In that respect he 
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stressed, following Gramsci, that no class can hold state 
power without exercising hegemony over and in the ideological 
state apparatuses, where these apparatuses work to mystify the 
workings of social formation through ideology.MU 
In this sense ideology exists in apparatuses and institutions. 
That is, according to Althusser, it has material existence in 
the form of rituals and practices which exist in particular 
social institutions, and education is one of them. 
So, the education apparatus is an important means for the 
ruling class to represent their ideas. However, this is not 
a simple task and does not mean that education is simply 
controlled by members of the ruling class, as will be 
explained in detail later. 
In creating and maintaining the hegemony of the ruling class, 
the role of the state appears, since the state is the sphere 
where the organisation of class power takes place. Since the 
state does not function by coercion alone, but by consent as 
well, the state plays an important role in the creation of 
hegemony. Hegemony is not merely concerned with economic 
domination but also with ideological domination and with the 
maintenance of spontaneous consent through both economic 
concessions and through political and ideological 
organisations .1" 
Education is one such organization, and Althusser considers 
it as part of the ideological state apparatuses which enable 
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the state and the ruling class to function by consent. 
From this conceptualization of ideology and state, Althusser 
explains how education as part of the ideological state 
apparatus plays its role in the reproduction of the productive 
force, i.e. labour power and the relations of production. 
According to him, it is not enough to ensure the material 
conditions for the reproduction of labour power, but the 
labour power must be "competent", i.e. "suitable to be set to 
work in the complex system of the process of production".154  
This means that the labour power must be reproduced diversely, 
according to the requirements of the socio-technical division 
of labour. This preparation and reproduction of labour power 
is the responsibility of the educational system. 
Althusser also explains how the school contributes to the 
reproduction of relations of production i.e. to the 
ideological level of productive forces. He explains that by 
looking at school knowledge, i.e. the subjects that children 
learn at school, one can see that they transmit certain 
ideological messages which tend to be those of the ruling 
class. Some of the ideological messages that children receive 
are directly and simply loaded by the ruling class ideology; 
for example, the subjects of ethics, civil instruction and 
philosophy. Others have with less direct ideological messages, 
like arithmetic and science.1" 
Since not all the students carry on to the same level and they 
do not stay in education the same length of time, these 
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differences locate them in different positions in relation to 
production. That is, masses of students leave school at an 
early age and indulge in the world of work and they become 
workers, while others carry on to a level which allows them 
to occupy the posts of small and middle technicians, white 
collar workers, small and middle executives i.e. petty 
bourgeois of all kinds. A third group carry on to the top 
level and those come out of the system to provide different 
sorts of intellectuals, like the 'intellectuals' of collective 
labour, agents of exploitation like managers, agents of 
repression like soldiers and policemen and professional 
ideologists like priests and teachers."6  
From Althusser's view one can understand that education is 
reproducing classes not only at the economic level, in terms 
of the places they occupy in economic production, but also at 
the level of ideology and consciousness. 
However, Althusser's view in the role of education in 
reproducing relations of production and hence in contributing 
to the hegemony of the ruling class, may depict the hegemony 
of the ruling class as unchallenged. This view can be 
criticized in the light of the previous analysis of ideology, 
common sense and hegemony, since education is one of the 
institutions which produce and is involved in ideological 
activities. 
It has already been pointed out that ideology is filled with 
contradictions, since ideology is seen as lived experience, 
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practices and social relations which are often internally 
inconsistent. It was also noted that common sense has elements 
within it which can see through to the heart of the unequal 
benefits provided by society, at the same time as it tends to 
reproduce the ideological relations and meanings that maintain 
the hegemony of the dominant class. 
However the hegemony of the ruling class is never complete, 
since people's common sense, according to Gramsci, has 
elements of accommodation and resistance which exist in an 
unsteady state of tension and struggle. 
Another important point in the reproduction critique is that, 
the reproduction process is not all negative and does not tend 
in all cases to produce agents of repression or professional 
ideologists who perpetuate the ruling class hegemony. The 
education system also produces intellectuals who may ally 
themselves with the subordinate classes. And according to 
Gramsci, who identified intellectuals by their commitment and 
social function rather than by their intellectual skills and 
kind of education, this identification opens the way to bring 
those with conventional academic education into the service 
of the working class as working class organic intellectuals."' 
From this critique, the reproduction process must not be 
simply understood as a direct and simple process. Rather, it 
should be analyzed as complicated and contradictory in nature 
and institutions. Since other institutionssuch as family, mass 
media, and others, are involved, it is set of processes which 
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includes more than education. 
The above analysis of the role of education in reproducing the 
class structure is mainly derived from the experience of the 
western capitalist societies. So, when reproduction theory is 
applied to developing countries one must consider the 
differences in the economic, political and ideological system 
of these countries and see how this may reflect upon the 
dynamics and patterns of reproduction in these societies. This 
will be more illustrated in Chapter Four when the system and 
policy of education and their class nature will be analyzed. 
In spite the fact that Althusser stresses the role of the 
Ideological State Apparatuses in the process of reproduction, 
he concentrates on the role of the school more than other 
ideological apparatuses, like the family. The family gets more 
attention in theories of cultural reproduction which stress 
the analysis of the principals underlying the structure and 
transmission of the cultural field which includes two aspects: 
the study of the role of the family cultural capital and the 
study of how school culture and knowledge is selected and 
produced to satisfy the interests of certain social classes. 
Pierre Bourdieu explains that family cultural capital includes 
different sets of linguistic and cultural competencies that 
individuals inherit by way of the class-located boundaries of 
their families.1S8 This means that a child inherits from his 
or her family sets of meanings, qualities of style, modes of 
thinking, and types of dispositions that are accorded a 
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certain social value and status as a result of what the 
dominant class or classes label as the most valued cultural 
capital."9  
The role of school in legitimizing and reproducing the 
dominant culture comes from the fact that school transmits 
this kind of dominant culture through the school knowledge, 
and only specific students are familiar with its codes. This 
familiarity comes from the set of skills that particular 
students have received from their family background and class 
relations, which are essential for success and continuation 
at school.'" 
The two theories of reproduction offered this research the 
opportunity to look at reproduction at its general level of 
class power and hegemony and at its specific level of family 
culture. Both are included in the analysis of the system and 
policy of education in Egypt and in the specific study of the 
case of sixty families from different class positions to 
analyze their perceptions of different economic, political, 
social and educational matters. 
The theoretical point of reproduction, ideology, hegemony and 
common sense will raise some important questions about the 
dynamic of class relations, power and interests, as well as 
class ideologies and beliefs. Examples of these points will 
be addressed later in the analysis of the field study. These 
are: 
- 	 the extent to which people's ideologies, consciousness 
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and common sense are influenced by their class interests, 
in terms of whether they would express the same 
interests, or divided and conflicting ones. 
- what are the dynamics which lie behind people expressing 
ideas which may act against their own interests. 
- the extent to which class cultural capital could 
influence parents' relations with the school, parents' 
evaluation of school knowledge, or their ability to deal 
with the school and to facilitate or hinder children's 
success and continuation at school. 
V. Conclusion  
This chapter has introduced the main theoretical points which 
are essential for the following analysis of the Egyptian 
context in terms of social, economic, political and 
educational matters. 
- The discussion of development and developing countries has 
introduced the main characteristics of these countries and the 
difficulties they face in developing their economic, social 
and political system, due to internal and external factors as 
peripheral societies exploited by the advanced capitalist 
societies. These considerations lay the ground for discussion 
of Egypt's development programmes since 1952. In this 
discussion the main characteristics that Egypt shares with 
other developing countries will be shown. There will be a 
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discussion of Egypt's movement from the independent model of 
development in the sixties to the dependent model in the 
seventies. The discussion of these two models of development 
will be presented in the light of their class content and the 
political systems which accompanied them. 
- The discussion of the concept of state, in which it was 
argued that state in Third World countries in general and in 
Egypt in particular does not float above society, but has a 
class content and relative autonomy. This conceptualization 
of the state, will be more fully illustrated in the 
theoretical discussions which follow, in two places: 
First: in Chapter Three, state power and social class 
formation will be discussed. In the discussion, state power 
and relative autonomy will be analyzed in relation to social 
classes, taking into account that the amount of power and 
relative autonomy that the state enjoys, differ from one 
historical period to another according to the development and 
the power of social classes in their struggle to control the 
state apparatus and to secure their own interests. 
Second: in Chapter Four, the policy of education and the class 
nature of the education system in Egypt will be examined. The 
study of the class nature of the state will be reflected in 
the discussion of policies of education, where the policy and 
the system of education is controlled by the state and the 
fundamental changes which took place in policies of education 
under Nasser and Sadat will be analyzed in terms of the class 
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content of the state and in terms of class power and 
alliances. 
The study of the concept of class has taken into account the 
two levels of class, that is, the study of class as located 
in both the objective level of economic relations and the 
subjective level of ideology, culture and consciousness. 
From that theoretical background the research can move further 
in the analysis of the influence of social class on education 
which will be presented in Part Two of the thesis, where a 
case study of the perspectives of sixty families will be 
presented. This will demand the use of a theoretical 
conceptualization of class in building categories for 
classifying the respondents in the sample of the field study, 
and this framework will be presented in Chapter Five. 
The theoretical discussion of the concept of class provides 
the research with some conceptual tools, like culture, 
ideology, hegemony and common sense, which are essential in 
the analysis of people's perspectives. These include an 
interest in people's perception of some general political and 
economic issues in the past, present and future of Egypt and 
people's perception and evaluation of some general aspects of 
policy and the system of education in Egypt. Also included are 
some of their perception of their immediate relation and 
experience with the education system as it appears in their 
own children's education. 
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THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EGYPT FROM 
1952 TO THE PRESENT DAY 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the economic and political 
context of Egypt and with the different models of development 
that Egypt followed in different political and historical 
periods. 
The study of the political and economic systems and the models 
of development relate directly to the study of the class 
influence upon education, in particular at the level of 
educational policy. As will be shown in Chapter Four, policies 
of education were changed under different models of 
development, i.e. under Nasser and Sadat. 
In brief, under the socialist policies Nasser aimed to 
construct national industry, increasing agricultural 
production, the raising of the standard of living for the poor 
majority by following a planned state-controlled economy and 
a massive nationalization programme and the establishment of 
a public sector. In such a development programme education 
appeared as an essential element in preparing the cadres 
needed for these programmes, at the same time as education was 
seen as having other social and cultural impacts in terms of 
social justice and cultural integration. The policy of 
education reflected these aspects in the form of a massive 
increase in the number of students, free education at all 
levels up to university, and the control of foreign and 
private education. 
Under the open door policy, private and foreign capital were 
encouraged with market competition. when this was introduced 
into educational policy it encouraged more private, fee-paying 
education, created the duality inside government education 
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between basic education and fee-paying language education, and 
controlled student numbers at university level. 
Consequently, the study of the political and economic system 
and the model of development will present the background 
against which educational policies will be analyzed. However, 
the relationship between education policy and the development 
programme is not simple and direct, since it is mediated by 
the complexity of class power and class practices and the role 
of the state, as will be illustrated in the discussion of the 
political system in Egypt. In this discussion the main focus 
will be upon class power and class relations, as presented in 
the political organizations. In addition, some indications 
will be given as to whether the state could play the role of 
arbitrator between social classes or not. 
I. The Present Economic Crisis  
Egypt has been in a continuous economic crisis for a long 
time. This economic crisis represents one of the main 
characteristics that Egypt shares with other developing 
Fhz 
countries. The crisis of these countries can be seen inTvery \-qN 
levels of foreign debt, a shortage of hard, foreign currency, 
and limited production in agriculture and industry which 
cannot satisfy the needs of an increasing population. 
The present monetary situation shows that Egypt suffers from 
a shortage of hard currency which was mainly coming from 
remittances of the Egyptian overseas work force. In 1984 the 
amount of these remittances was $4 billion, and this fell to 
$3.7 billion in 1985, and to $2.7 billion in 1986.1 The other 
factor which decreased Egypt's foreign currency is the fall 
in oil prices where Egypt's income has dropped by $1.1 billion 
between 1985 and 1986. Egypt's hard currency reserves fell 
from $9.7 billion in 1985 to $6.9 billion.2 Egypt's foreign 
debt grew from $38 billion in 1986 to $40 billion in early 
1988.3 
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Egypt's increasing fiscal crisis is accompanied by other 
problems, including a growing population, high rate of 
unemployment and low levels of agricultural and industrial 
production. The increasing population is one of the problems 
which puts a strain of the development programme. 
According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics (CAPMAS), in 1985 Egypt's population was increasing 
by 1.294 million. By the middle of 1986 the population was 50 
million. This represents an annual growth rate of 2.8 per 
cent.' The increasing population of Egypt is made worse by 
the fact that the population is not distributed throughout the 
country, but concentrated in the narrow Valley of the Nile, 
which comprises on 3.6 per cent of the total of Egypt's areas  
The growth of population is the result of a range of health, 
economic, cultural and religious factors. In terms of health, 
there is no doubt that the growth and improvement of the 
health service has helped to decrease child mortality, and has 
raised the population growth rate (See Appendix 2). Economic 
impetus has been given to the population growth, as children 
are good resources for income, especially in rural Egypt. 
Cultural and religious factors have negated government 
programmes for birth control. For Muslims, contraception is 
seen as a sin, in spite of the Al Azhar 'fatwa' which 
legitimised contraception. The Christians consider themselves 
a threatened minority and see contraception as a threat to 
their existence.' 
The large population of Egypt is only one problem among many 
which have hindered the development programme. As mentioned 
earlier, Egypt is suffering from low productivity and high 
foreign debt. The issue of the increasing population is a 
complicated one, because in some societies, as in South Asia 
for example, the large population is a source of cheap labour 
which also provides a large market for the economy.7 It is 
important to understand this point, because some developing 
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countries view population increase as the sole source of 
problems in their countries. In this way, population increase 
is sometimes used to conceal other reasons for the failure of 
development programmes. 
Employment is another major problem. With the increasing urban 
population of Egypt, the labour force has become urbanized. 
Rural Egypt and the agricultural sector no longer absorb the 
majority of the work force, and the sector decreased from 42 
per cent to 34.6 per cent between 1985 and 1986.2 The 
increase in urban employment has largely been in the service 
and government employment sectors, rather than in the 
productive sectors. Government employment and service 
industries rose from 23.6 per cent of the work force in 1976 
to 30 per cent in 1984.9  
In the two main sectors of commodity production, i.e. 
agriculture and industry, the rate of production is not 
keeping up with the growth of the population. Particularly in 
agriculture, the rate at which additional land is brought 
under cultivation is well below the rate of increase of the 
population. For example, from the beginning of the century to 
1927, the population increased by 46 per cent, while 
agricultural land increased by only 10 per cent. Similarly, 
from 1947 to 1966, the population increased by 62 per cent and 
agricultural land by only 9 per cent.1°  
At the present time agricultural production is still falling 
behind the increasing population, where agricultural 
productivity increases by only 2 per cent per annum and the 
population by 3 per cent. Agricultural production, as a share 
of GDP, declined from 16.3 per cent in 1981 to 19.3 per cent 
in 1985/86.11 	 (See Appendix 3, which shows the share of 
different sectors in the GDP.) According to these figures, 
Egypt has moved from being self-sufficient in food and an 
exporter of agricultural commodities in the 1970s to the point 
where the current annual net deficit in agricultural trade is 
$3 billion.'2 
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The position of industrial production is not much better. 
Industrial growth slowed markedly in 1985/86, owing mainly to 
growing foreign exchange constraints. Industrial exports 
(mainly textiles, and metallurgical and engineering goods) 
were equivalent to only 7 per cent of the value of industrial 
production in 1984/85, which is a very low percentage.13  
This general view of the Egyptian economy in recent years 
reflects the critical situation of Egypt. This situation has 
its historical roots dating back to the different economic 
policies followed by Egypt under different political systems. 
Egypt has followed two distinct lines of policy: the 
"independent" socialist model under Nasser, and the 
"dependent" capitalist model under Sadat. The different 
economic models were conducted under different political 
systems and with different methods of organization. 
II. The Economic and Political System under Nasser  (1952-
1970) 
(A) The Economic System 
The economic system under Nasser went through several 
different stages; each one had its own aims and ideologies. 
The first stage, which started with the beginning of the 
Revolution, lasted from 1952 to 1956. This period was marked 
at the political level by the abolition of the monarchy, and 
the abolition of political parties and powers in order to 
build a new, modern and independent society." 
In the economic field, Egypt continued her capitalist model 
of development, and the Egyptian big bourgeoisie were still 
active and cooperating with the new system. Although agrarian 
reforms reduced the power of the large land owners, they could 
find other activities, such as the construction industry in 
urban Egypt. 
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The period 1956 to 1961 can be identified on the political 
level as the crucial years for the Egyptian Revolution, when 
Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, and participated in the 
non-aligned movement." In general, it was a period marked by 
the struggle for independence from foreign powers, to 
emancipate the Egyptian political decision making process from 
the hegemony of the imperial powers. This period laid the 
foundation of independent development in Egypt, since Nasser 
was aware that economic and political freedom are inseparable. 
The radical change in Egypt's economy and ideology came in the 
period 1960 to 1967. The main characteristic of this period 
was the adoption of a socialist policy. This policy translated 
into different forms, starting with the nationalization laws, 
the constitution of public sectors and the First Five Year 
Economic Plan (1960-1965), and the building of the High Dam 
at Aswan in order to increase the supply of water and 
electricity for agriculture and industry." 
The new economic policies and the new ideologies of socialism 
had to be justified and legitimized. The justification came 
in the form of the "Charter of National Action". This charter 
expressed the new ideology of socialism as a means not only 
for economic development, but also for social freedom. The 
charter stated that, "Socialism is the way for political 
freedom"." The Charter also states that, "Scientific socialism 
was the suitable style for finding the right method leading 
to progress" .1e  
The profound change in the Egyptian economy had to find 
legitimacy in the socio-political field. This was achieved by 
the discussion of the new policies in the National Congress 
of Popular Forces, which included national capitalists, 
peasants, workers, professionals, civil servants, university 
staff, students and women." 
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The new economic policy and the First Five Year Plan achieved 
an annual growth estimated at 6.4 per cent." The plan included 
measures to cover importation, and private and foreign 
investment. In spite of the drive towards independence, 40 per 
cent of investments came from foreign aid in 1963/64, since 
the domestic saving ratio was only about 12.7 per cent of the 
total national production.21 
The Egyptian economy suffered from a deficit in the balance 
of payments of £413 million, which represented 5 per cent of 
the total national production.22 These figures deteriorated 
after the 1967 defeat: for example, the saving ratio declined 
in the period 1970 to 1975 to 4 per cent of the total national 
production, and the deficit of the balance of payments rose 
to £969 million in 1975, i.e. about 21 per cent of the total 
national production." 
In spite of these problems which faced the economic plan in 
the sixties, the policy achieved its main targets, which were 
the increase of production in the main sectors - agriculture 
and industry - and the achievement of social justice through 
the redistribution of national income. 
A number of measures were taken to ensure the redistribution 
of national income. The Nationalization Laws of 1961 included 
the control of the income of some groups, by reducing the 
income of the big bourgeois, and setting a ceiling on the top 
income of employees in the nationalized enterprises.24 Other 
measures were taken to control rents from buildings, 
commercial and industrial profits, interests and dividends. 
These sources of income were directly controlled by 
nationalization and sequestration. This has proved more 
effective in reducing disparities in income than other systems 
of progressive taxation in the capitalist system.25  
The process of redistributing income has been by the above 
direct measures, along with other measures such as the 
programmes of industrialization, social, health and education 
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services. 
In the two main sectors of the economy, agriculture and 
industry, Egypt has increased her production. In agriculture, 
from 1952 to 1970, about 884 thousand feddan were reclaimed." 
Land reclamation almost stopped in the seventies. Industry has 
achieved a growth in different aspects. For example, factories 
employing more than ten workers rose from 100 factories in 
1960 to 383 in 1960, electricity production increased by 800 
per cent between 1952 and 1970, and industrial workers have 
increased from 350,000 to 1.2 million." The share of 
industrial production in the national product has risen from 
9 per cent to 22 per cent between the fifties and the 
beginning of the seventies.28  
In the health service, the figures show that the provision of 
basic food needs has improved, and individual daily intake has 
risen from 2,300 to 2,600 Calories.29 Medical care has 
developed in terms of numbers of doctors, which rose from 
5,000 doctors in 1952 to 18,000 in 1970, an increase of 375 
per cent. As a result, the ratio of people to doctors has 
fallen from 4000 to 2000.2° The improvement of health services 
has helped to reduce mortality rates from 18 per thousand to 
13 per thousand, and the average life expectancy has risen 
from 42 to 53 years.31  In education, student numbers increased 
from 2 million in 1952 to 6 million by the end of the sixties. 
The previous figures indicate that the development in 
agriculture and industry has led to an increase in the 
availability of basic goods, which has helped to satisfy and 
secure the basic needs of the masses. The discussion of 
developments in education and health show how the surplus 
value was used and invested to meet the basic needs of the 
people also. 
The Nasserist independent development programme depended upon 
a planned economy, run and controlled by the state, which 
aimed at, and succeeded in, increasing the production of the 
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two main sectors of production, namely agriculture and 
industry, and concentrating on satisfying the basic needs of 
the masses. 
(B) The Political System 
Although the Nasserist development programme worked for the 
majority of the masses, the political system under which these 
policies were carried out did not allow for democratic 
freedom. The system in 1952 abolished all political parties, 
and established itself in the form of a one party system. In 
the early years of the Revolution two organizations were 
established, that is, The Liberation Rally, from 1953 to 1958, 
and the National Union, from 1958 to 1961. 
With the move towards socialism in 1961, the system 
established a new organization, the Arab Socialist Union 
(ASU). Membership was universal and voluntary. Membership was 
very important for appointment to any cooperative board, 
local, regional or national assembly, or the board of any 
union.32  
The ASU was meant to represent the national alliance of 
popular forces consisting of the workers, peasants, 
intellectuals, national capitalists and soldiers.33 This kind 
of organization was meant to represent the Revolution's 
ideology that the new regime was above class and that it 
represented all social powers in society, which gave the image 
of a state which could arbitrate between classes. This idea 
proved to be false in reality and in practice, where, inside 
the ASU, members from different social class positions did not 
stand on the same footing in terms of their cultural, 
ideological and political power. 
An example of this was the position of the workers and farmers 
in relation to the intellectuals who could exert more cultural 
and ideological power, in spite of the fact that fifty per 
cent of the seats in all committeees of the ASU were allocated 
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to farmers and workers in an attempt to mobilize those who 
were at the margins. However, in reality this did not work 
effectively, because the intellectuals and the professionals 
were against this allocation, on the grounds that farmers and 
workers were not educated, and consequently not able to 
express themselves." 
The intellectual resistance has coincided with another 
critical problem of identifying the farmers and workers. The 
definition of farmers and workers was wide, unrestricted, and 
vague. According to the definition, a peasant is "one whose 
personal and family holdings should not exceed ten feddans, 
agriculture should be his main occupation and source of income 
and he should live in the countryside"." This definition 
excluded the rural workers and the small land owner, and in 
1962 the definition was changed to raise the permissible land 
holding to twenty five feddans for a peasant, which in turn 
excluded more farmers from the right to stand in elections for 
assemblies as representatives of the farmers. 
A labourer/worker was defined as "one who is not eligible for 
membership in the professional unions, and not a graduate of 
a university, higher institute or military college." The loose 
definition of workers meant that technicians and intellectuals 
have been included. This has led to a misrepresentation of the 
working class. That is to say, groups like technocrats, 
university teachers, company directors, heads of syndicates, 
heads of agricultural reform societies and cooperatives were 
elected as workers and farmers." 
The problem of definition is not simply a technical one. 
Rather, it has ideological and political origins and 
consequences. It gives a lesson to those who work in the 
development field, that vague definitions do not allow in 
reality for a genuine representation of the working class, and 
consequently they lose their chance to be heard and to defend 
their interests and to share in decision making in society. 
This point is important for this research, which is concerned 
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with access to, and control of, education in Egypt, i.e. with 
what kind of education, and how much, is given to different 
classes. In order to study that, clear criteria to identify 
social classes are needed so that one social class should not 
be confused with another. A clear definition is needed, not 
only in the political field, but also in any other field where 
development programmes are designed, and the needs and 
interests of different classes have to be identified. 
The ASU has suffered from a structural problem, namely, the 
domination of the bureaucrats, who concentrated on their 
executive activities more than on the ideological and 
political ones." 
In general the ASU has failed to represent the workers and the 
farmers. It was divided internally between the top politicians 
from the left and those from the right. Hence it could not 
represent the interests of the social alliance of popular 
power, and it remained, until 1974, the arena of political and 
ideological conflict between the left and right, and between 
Sadat and those who represented the Nasserist system. 
As was pointed out in Chapter One, the ruling class uses both 
coercion and consent to secure its economic, political and 
ideological supremacy. In that respect the Nasserist political 
system worked to contain different political powers. The 
process of containment occasionally took the form of direct 
and explicit confrontation, where some groups, in some cases, 
refused to be contained. An example is the case of students 
in their uprising after the 1964 defeat. Another is the case 
of the workers in the early years of the Revolution in 1952.39  
Containment has taken the form of implicit coercion in the 
case of the professional syndicates of doctors, engineers, 
lawyers, journalists and teachers. These syndicates were put 
under the regime's control, because they were regarded as a 
potential source of resistance to the new policies for 
socialism." The syndicates were not abolished, but the leaders 
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were sometimes effectively appointed, as the elections were 
manipulated by syndicate members who were loyal to the ASU. 
They could influence the results and ensure the victory of the 
ASU candidates.41 
The press, also, was under state control. Newspapers were 
owned by the ASU. Journalists were automatically members of 
the ASU. Any suspension of their membership of the 
organization also meant automatic suspension from the practice 
of their profession.42  
The Nasserist political system moved between the containment 
of different political powers, co-option of people in 
sensitive positions in the mass media, and explicit coercion 
of the workers and intellectuals. 
In spite of the limited political freedom, the Nasserist 
system restored to the Egyptians and to the Arabs their lost 
identity and pride, after centuries of submission to the 
colonial powers. The system achieved remarkable progress at 
the social and economic level, by following principles of 
social justice and equality, which were demanded urgently by 
the poor and the deprived. The system gave priority to the 
issues of independence, social justice, development, and Arab 
unity, while it postponed for a long time the issue of 
democracy. 
III.  The Economic  and Political System under Sadat (1970-
1981)  
When Sadat came to power in 1970 he had two tasks to achieve 
in two different periods. 
The First Period: 1970-1973 
Sadat could get rid of his political opponents, i.e. the heads 
of state, who represented the system he inherited from Nasser. 
The second task was the preparation for war. 
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The Second Period: 1973-1981 
By 1973, Sadat had consolidated his power and secured his 
legitimacy, which allowed him to reorientate Egypt towards the 
west. He announced the new policy in the October paper of 
1974, which has become known as the open door economic policy. 
(A) The Open Door Economic Policy: 
The October paper explained the meaning of the open door 
policy as the opening of the Egyptian economy for direct 
private investment of both Arab and foreign capital alongside 
Egyptian capital." 
The open door policy ('Infitah') was seen as justified as the 
cure to Egypt's economic ills. These problems were identified 
in terms of the decline in the country's development rate, 
which fell from 6.7 per cent in 1956-1965 to less than 5 per 
cent in the mid seventies. Military expenditure was seen as 
a heavy burden on the economy, and the country was in urgent 
need of foreign resources." 
The open door policy represented a model of development based 
on the functionalist ideas of modernization which consider the 
western model of development to be the model which 
underdeveloped countries need to follow. This model stresses 
industrial growth through the intensive use of technology, and 
more integration into the international capitalist market. In 
political terms, it places stress upon the adoption of the 
western democratic political system. The open door policy 
which followed such a model of development did not, in 
reality, solve Egypt's economic crisis. Rather, it increased 
Egypt's foreign debt, and in social terms it widened the gap 
between classes, and in political terms, as will be explained 
later, the multi-party system was not a guarantee for widening 
the base of democracy, and it did not prevent the state from 
using its repressive apparatus when it was needed. 
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The Effect of the Open Door Policy on Social Justice and 
Economic Distribution: 
The open door policy widened the gap between classes. There 
are no statistics or official information concerning income 
distribution in the seventies. All that is available are the 
efforts of some researchers to draw a picture of income 
distribution at that time." 
One of the indicators of the income gap in Egyptian society 
is the share of both wage and ownership revenue from local 
income. That is to say, the logic of economic development 
allows for an increase in the wages of workers at the expense 
of the entrepreneurs and owners. A comparison of the share of 
ownership revenue and wages from local income shows the 
following: 
- From 1959/60 to 1969/70 wages, as a share of local 
national income, increased from 44.8 per cent to 49.1 per 
cent. 
- Over the same period, the share of ownership revenue 
decreased from 55.2 per cent to 50.9 per cent. 
- After 1971 the share of wages decreased, so that by 1979 
it stood at 30.3 per cent, while ownership revenue 
increased to 69.7 per cent." 
Even though these percentages give some indication of income 
distribution, they do not tell the story of uneven 
distribution among the wage earners themselves, i.e. between 
those who work in the foreign investment sector, and those 
with similar qualifications and experience who work for the 
government and in the public sector. 
Another study of differences in incomes was made by Ramzy 
Zaki, who designed a scale for measuring social distinction. 
124 
Lacking statistics about income distribution in Egypt, Ramzy 
Zaki had to depend upon personal observations and accounts in 
designing his scale. The scale was based upon measuring the 
wealth of different classes, which he considered to be a 
function of the level of income. The scale shows people who 
benefited, and those who have been harmed, in terms of wealth 
accumulation and income during the seventies. 
People who benefited in terms of wealth were the capitalist 
class in agriculture, industry and real estate owners, because 
they depended upon material wealth - land, houses, jewels -
of which prices rose during the seventies. The people who were 
harmed were the middle class, workers and craftsmen because 
they do not usually own material wealth but monetary wealth - 
shares, money on deposit - of which the value went down or 
fluctuated. 
The Egyptian economy under the open door policy has witnessed 
a state of false circulation and false economic growth. This 
state reflected itself in the increasing consumption in urban 
and rural Egypt, increasing saving and investment rates, and 
increasing resources of hard currency.47 However, this state 
of circulation and growth was not a sign that the Egyptian 
economy was doing well under the new policy. Because the 
Egyptian economy could not develop production in the main 
national sectors of agriculture and industry, it depended upon 
unreliable and insecure sources of foreign exchange, such as 
oil exports, remittances of the Egyptian workforce abroad, 
the Suez Canal and tourism." When the oil price declined, 
along with a reduction in the other resources, Egypt was left 
with a very high foreign debt, as was explained earlier. 
The Open Door Policy and Dependent Development 
The influence of foreign organizations over the Egyptian 
economy increased during the seventies, and this has continued 
to the present time. The Egyptian economy today is designed 
and supervised by international organizations such as The 
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World Bank, The International Monetary Fund, and The 
Consultative Group. In fact, Egypt accepted the principle of 
international supervision over her economic policy as a 
condition for financial aid from Arab and western sources.49  
The World Bank: The first start to its activities in 1974 was 
for the Bank to send one of its advisors to Egypt to recommend 
a development strategy.so 
The International Monetary Fund: This organization introduced 
another form of domination over the Egyptian economy. Egypt 
was obliged to introduce the so called "Letter of Intent" in 
order to get credit from the Fund. The letter is linked to the 
implementation of a set of measures in the economic field.s1 
The Consultative Group: This third organization is an 
association of aid donors. In Egypt's case it consists of all 
countries and regional and international organizations 
providing aid. The meetings of this organization are usually 
to review the policies adopted by the country receiving aid, 
and the process made towards reform.s2  
These organizations are still working in Egypt and represent 
the external control in the redirection of the Egyptian 
economy and social policies. A lesson can be learnt from 
history. In 1876 the Egyptian economy came under foreign 
control in the rule of Ismaal. Britain and France formed a 
mission to supervise the Egyptian economy and to ensure the 
payment of foreign debts. The members of the mission had the 
final word on Egyptian economic, financial and transport 
affairs. 
(B) The Political System 
Sadat's open door policy was accompanied by political 
liberalism, which presented itself in the establishment of so 
called independent "platforms",s9 who contested parliamentary 
elections in 1975. These platforms were authorized as 
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political parties in 1976. 
The ASU resolved to establish political parties after public 
discussion called the "listening committee" in 1974.54 The 
resolution of the ASU was supported by different social 
groups, especially the intellectuals of both left and right. 
The only group which opposed the ASU was the workers, who 
wanted to protect their 50 per cent representation, but the 
weak workers' organizations and unions could not defend the 
workers' interests.55  
In 1977 official permission was granted for the formation of 
political parties. In 1978 Sadat announced his intention to 
establish his National Democratic Party, and pronounced his 
ideology of "democratic socialism". The party programme 
reflected his own slogans based on Islam and rural Egyptian 
traditions and morality." The election of 1979 resulted in a 
massive majority for the NDP, without any representation for 
the left or religious right. 
The Limits of Sadat's Liberal Policy 
The multi-party system under Sadat did not mean that Egypt 
enjoyed more political freedom than under Nasser. The new 
pluralist system was controlled by the very highly 
concentrated power that the president enjoyed. This authority 
enabled the system, when faced by major problems, to suppress 
opposition by explicit and implicit means of coercion. 
These problems were of an economic, political and religious 
character, and included: 
- the economic problem and the rising prices and increasing 
cost of living which led to the food riots from north to 
south Egypt in 1977, 
- 	 the increasing criticism of the peace treaty, 
- the sectarian struggle between Muslim and Christian, and 
- the increasing Islamic fundamentalism, which was 
supported by Sadat himself in order to attack the left 
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and to attract the rich Arab countries so as to get 
financial support from them. 
Facing these problems, Sadat used implicit means of coercion 
against the popular masses and his opponents, by authorizing 
new laws which restricted people's freedom to protests' 
The media, especially the newspapers, were under Sadat's 
control. This he achieved by appointing the heads of those 
newspapers, and when the opposition newspapers became too 
critical he banned them, especially after the food riots in 
1977.58 In reality, the pluralist system under Sadat was 
working and using the same authoritarian measures as Nasser. 
Sadat's regime had to face the economic, social, religious and 
political crises which challenged the system and ideology. The 
climax of the crisis was in September 1981 when, after bloody 
clashes between Muslim and Christian, 1,536 Egyptians were 
arrested." Those who were arrested represented different 
political powers and different ideologies. They included 
Muslims, Christians, left wing and right wing intellectuals, 
journalists and university staff. Muslim and Christian 
associations were closed, newspapers were banned and the 
Coptic bishops were suspended. 
By October 1981 Sadat was in conflict and hostility with all 
political powers. This situation was ended by his 
assassination by fundamentalist Muslims. 
IV. Egypt under  Mubarak 
Mubarak inherited a very complicated social, economic and 
political situation. Mubarak faced the increasing economic 
crisis, the rising cost of for the masses, and sectarian 
conflict and corruption. Politically he faced Egypt's 
isolation from the Arab World, and internally he had to 
reconcile the different political powers in Egypt. 
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(A) The Economic Crisis 
In his first speech as president in 1981, Mubarak announced 
his economic, political and social line. In facing the 
economic problems he would bring benefits to the poorer 
members of society, and attack those who created illegal 
wealth. The open door policy would continue, but it had to be 
productive; important food subsidies would remain, but luxury 
goods would be stopped." 
Mubarak called for an economic conference in 1982 to discuss 
Egypt's crisis. Mubarak himself participated and gave his 
account of the size of the problem and of prospects for the 
future.61 These future prospects included the predictions that 
by the year 2025 the population would reach 140 million. This 
increasing population would demand services, housing, food, 
health care and education. In line with this increase in 
population, by the year 2000 Egypt would need to create 24.1 
million jobs for workers, and by 2025 53.3 million jobs. In 
education, by the year 2000 the education system would have 
to absorb 12 million children in primary school, compared with 
6 million in 1976. 
In the face of these future problems, Egyptian economists have 
introduced their own views and recommendations to meet the 
problems. The first important recommendation is to return to 
a system of national planning in running the Egyptian economy. 
By this means, foreign aid could be controlled, subsidies 
which protect the popular classes could be maintained, 
additional manpower training programmes introduced, with 
priority given to industrialization. In addition, the rate of 
local investment could be encouraged, a more equal 
distribution of resources between rural and urban Egypt 
secured, more resources allocated for land reclamation and 
increasing agricultural production, while at the same time 
reducing public expenditure in all fields except defence and 
the military. An important aspect of this policy would be a 
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narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor, by 
imposing a high tax rate on the rich, and increasing work 
opportunities, services and training programmes for the poor." 
By 1986/87 the crisis of the Egyptian economy had increased 
as a result of the loss of oil resources, tourism and the 
remittances of the Egyptian workforce abroad, and the 
increasing current account deficit was estimated to be four 
to five billion dollars, i.e. more than twice the export 
earnings. In order to face the crisis Egypt had to follow, not 
the recommendations of the Egyptian economists in 1982, but 
the recommendations imposed by the USA and IMF. 
The USA and IMF pressures resulted in the so called 1986/87 
economic reform. The reform comprised a group of measures. 
Decree No. 121 of 1986 gave the private sector more 
opportunities to import corn and a wide range of foodstuffs. 
In the five year plan starting in 1987, the private sector was 
given a greater share in investment." In order to get the IMF 
loan in 1987 Egypt had to devalue the Egyptian pound, and to 
reduce consumer subsidies by 20 per cent. The government sold 
off what were supposed to be unprofitable public sector firms 
to the private sector, and some hotels to European hoteliers." 
In the agricultural sector the government declared that the 
subsidy on corn would be terminated by the end of 1987. The 
private sector was allowed to import fertilizers. The state 
was no longer responsible for reclaiming land, but would 
provide the infrastructure in the newly reclaimed areas before 
selling them to private investors." 
These measures, which mainly deprive the poor of Egypt, are 
part of a wide process of the dependent development policy 
which started in 1974 with the open door policy, and which is 
part of a strategy to integrate the Egyptian economy with the 
world capitalist order. The policy of integrating Egypt in the 
world capitalist system started soon after the Second World 
War. At the present time, the process of reintegration is 
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carried out under pressure from the USA on Egypt to adopt the 
so called new orthodoxy in development, which is based on the 
abolition of policies of import substitution, the protection 
of the national economy through measures like tariffs, and the 
promotion of policies which involve reducing government 
control, encouraging the private sector and directing foreign 
aid towards the private sector." 
(B) The Political System 
Mubarak faced his first political crisis in 1986 when police 
riots had to be broken up by poorly paid soldiers. This 
situation reflected the frustration and suffering of this 
group of young people of working class origin. Mubarak also 
had to face the growing political and militant power of the 
fundamentalist Muslims. 
Under Mubarak two elections have been held, in 1984 and 1987. 
The electoral law in Egypt put many obstacles and restrictions 
on the formation of parties, as mentioned earlier. The new 
Electoral Law No. 114 of 1983 has introduced still more 
restrictions. It introduced a new system of elections based 
on proportional representation, according to which no parties 
are allowed representation in parliament unless they obtain 
at least 8 per cent of the national vote." 
The two elections have allowed a massive majority for the 
government party, the NDP, while it excluded the left 
progressive elements and allowed for the first time the 
representation of the fundamentalist Muslims. (See Appendices 
4 and 5 for the composition of the Poeple's Assembly after the 
two elections.) In these two elections the opposition had to 
face the same kinds of control which was practised under 
Sadat, including rally breaking, ballot rigging and newspaper 
seizures." 
Recognising this control and corruption, the masses have 
reacted with political apathy, since they know that the 
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results have already been decided in favour of the government 
party. The political apathy may result from the worry of 
securing everyday necessities, and from the high rates of 
illiteracy in the country. All this has resulted in low turn-
outs for the elections. According to the official figures, 
only 54 per cent of the registered voters (14.3 million) cast 
their vote in the 1987 elections." 
The political picture of Egypt shows that many radical changes 
are needed on the level of political laws, political freedom 
and political practices. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the economic and political system of 
Egypt and different models of development adopted in different 
historical periods. The discussion of the model of development 
was essential as a basis for the analysis of the changing 
policies of education under each model of development, which 
will be analyzed in Chapter Four. The study of the different 
models of development has shown how Egypt has moved away from 
the independent model of development under Nasser to the open 
door policy. The discussion at the political level has 
supported the argument that the state in Egypt is not 
autonomous, but has relative autonomy in respect of different 
social classes. This is in contrast with the political 
propaganda which claimed that the state fairly represented the 
interests of different social classes. Even inside the 
political organization of the ASU, which was meant to present 
a national alliance of different social forces, these forces 
did not enjoy the same amount of political, cultural and 
ideological power. This point of class cultural, ideological 
and political power will be the subject of Chapter Three, 
which concentrates upon the relationship between state power 
and the social class formation of Egypt. The discussion will 
trace when and how the state has enjoyed a considerable degree 
of power in relation to different social classes, and when and 
how the state was under pressure from the growing power of 
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the bourgeoisie. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STATE POWER AND CLASS FORMATION IN EGYPT 
Introduction 
In Chapter Two the analysis stopped at the level of 
identifying the economic and political policies which were 
associated with different models of development which have 
been applied in Egypt since 1952. Reference was also made to 
the impact of these policies on educational policies in Egypt, 
taking into account the fact that this influence is 
complicated, as it is mediated through class power and the 
state. This chapter will take the analysis one step further, 
giving a detailed analysis of the class formation of Egypt at 
the present time in relation to state power. This kind of 
analysis is essential to achieve a number of theoretical and 
practical goals: 
In theoretical terms, the identification of the class 
formation comes as a part of the study of class at its 
objective level, where the place of each social class in 
relation to the means of production is identified. The 
subjective aspect of class in terms of class culture, 
ideologies and consciousness, has been introduced. The 
general theoretical analysis of this approach has been 
set out in Chapter One. This chapter will deal with the 
specific case of Egyptian society. 
The class formation of Egypt is analyzed in relation to 
state power, since the approach adopted here to the study 
of class and education in Egypt shows the state to be 
central to any development plan, and the state also 
controls the education system and shapes educational 
policy, as has been explained earlier. 
From that reality it is important to study the 
relationship between the state and social classes and to 
know how much power the state enjoys with regard to 
different classes. From this relationship can be deduced 
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the state's power in applying social, economic and 
educational policies. The place of each class in 
practising economic, cultural and ideological power can 
also be understood. Hence, their opportunities in 
defending and maintaining their economic, cultural and 
educational interests can be identified. 
- 	 In practical terms, the identification of Egypt's class 
formation is essential in order to prepare the categories 
for the analysis of the field study material, which will 
be analyzed using "class" as a prime classification and 
variable. 
I. 	 The Theoretical Background of the Study of the Class 
Formation of  Egypt  
The study of class formation in Egyptian society, as mentioned 
in Chapter One, will be influenced by the neo-Marxist approach 
to the study of class, especially the work of Poulantzas. 
Following him the analysis will take into account not only the 
economic position of social classes, but also will consider 
the political and ideological aspects. This will be covered 
through discussion of the conflict between the state power and 
social classes over economic, political, ideological and 
cultural interests. 
In the analysis, four social classes will be identified. These 
are: the bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the 
new petty bourgeoisie, and the working class. In the analysis 
of these classes reference will be made to the different 
fractions of the bourgeoisie, to show how they differ in their 
amount of power in society. There will be, following 
Poulantzas, an analysis of the group of new wage earners whom 
Poulantzas calls the new petty bourgeoisie, which was refered 
to earlier in Chapter One. In this chapter it will be 
explained how this research coincides with or differs from 
some points in his analysis. In addition, this class will be 
given a more theoretical focus, since there is a debate around 
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the possibilities and capacities of this class in leading the 
modernization of Egypt. In the present research attention will 
also be directed to the working class and how this class can 
be divided into the proletariat and the lumpen-proletariat. 
II. The Historical Background of the Class Formation of Egypt  
(A) Class Formation and Egypt's Integration in the World 
Capitalist System 
The discussion of class formation in Egypt cannot be 
understood away from the study of Egypt's integration in the 
World Capitalist System. Egypt's integration in the system 
means that the economic and social structure was controlled 
by the laws of the system. That is to say, in the centre, the 
development of the capitalist mode of production tended to 
destroy the former social classes to a certain extent and 
substitute two antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat.1 
In the periphery, the situation was different. That is, the 
integration of the periphery in the World Capitalist System 
has created a weak bourgeois and proletariat. That is, both 
bourgeois and proletariat in the periphery had to work under 
the conditions of the system, i.e. to do what the division of 
labour inside the system allowed them to do. The activities 
that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat practice differ from 
one phase of the system to another. In the first phase of the 
imperialist system the periphery bourgeoisie was prohibited 
from investing in industry; it was allowed only to invest in 
agricultural production. In the second phase, and with the 
revision of the international division of labour, the 
bourgeoisie became allowed to invest in industry but in the 
mode of substitution for imports.2  
This situation created a weak and dependent bourgeoisie, and 
divided the working class. Even so, the bourgeoisie of the 
periphery had to struggle for revision of the international 
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division of labour, but this struggle did not change the fact 
that the political parties of the bourgeoisie were unstable 
and weak. 
Egypt, in this respect, shares many of the peripheral 
countries' main characteristics: the population is 
concentrated in rural areas and the agricultural sector 
dominates; the working class is fragmented, and mainly active 
in small firms, and there is a high level of unemployment.3  
Egypt was allowed to invest in light industry, depending upon 
foreign capital and technology. 
Egypt's dependency was dictated by the British occupation, 
which allowed Egypt to specialize in cultivating cotton. Egypt 
was different from other colonies in one point, that is, it 
had a limited degree of capitalist development and a growing 
market, due to foreign capital investment in banks, insurance, 
trade and industry.4  
This situation in Egypt created a bourgeoisie integrated with 
the imperialist power, sharing the main interests with the 
British occupation. The working masses were opposed to the 
occupation, and received much lower wages than the foreign 
workers inside and outside the country. So Egypt's integration 
in the World Capitalist System has resulted in a weak and 
divided bourgeoisie and working class. 
(B) Changes in Egypt's Class Formation since the 1952 
Revolution 
After the 1952 revolution, the class formation of Egypt 
witnessed two major changes: the change in authority and the 
change in wealth. The change in authority came as a result of 
moving the authority from the hands of the king, the 
bourgeoisie and the British to the hands of the army and the 
state. The change in wealth, which also had an impact on the 
practice of authority and political power, came first as a 
result of the agrarian reform of 1952. It resulted in 
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undermining the power of the large land owners and the 
emergence of a new class of rich farmers who own from 20 to 
50 feddan. The land reform limited the maximum ownership to 
50 feddan.5 About a million feddan were redistributed, which 
helped to improve the life of 342,000 families, mainly the 
families of tenant farmers and permanent wage labourers, but 
it did not do much for the poorest in rural Egypt, i.e. the 
unsettled rural workers.' 
In 1961 came the nationalization of industry and the banks, 
which helped to liquidate the authority of the capitalists. 
At that time the public sector was established, and a greater 
number of bureaucrats and technocrats were needed to run the 
new projects. This resulted in the increase of the new petty 
bourgeoisie. The establishment of modern industry created a 
modern working class in Egypt. 
These are the main changes in the class formation after 1952. 
The following is a detailed discussion of each social class 
before and after the Revolution, illustrating the relationship 
between the state and different classes. 
III. The Composition of the Present Class Formation of Egypt  
(A) The Big Bourgeoisie 
Before the Revolution the Egyptian bourgeoisie could be 
divided into two groups: The originally Egyptian and the 
Egyptianized bourgeoisie. The Egyptianized bourgeoisie came 
from Greek and Jewish origins. They were active in all non-
agricultural activities, such as the stock market, export, 
wholesale trade, and they were opposed to the growth of the 
national Egyptian bourgeoisie.?  
The Egyptian national bourgeoisie was developed in the context 
of the domination of the Egyptianized branch. The Egyptian 
bourgeoisie cooperated with the Egyptianized bourgeoisie and 
with the foreign interests. The activities that they were 
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allowed to do, according to the international division of 
labour, were, the cotton trade, banking, insurance, and in 
industry they were allowed textile manufacturing, mainly for 
cotton, food production associated with agriculture, and light 
industry such as paper, leather and glass.°  
Politically, the Egyptian bourgeoisie were divided. The 
division was characterised by the absence of strong, coherent 
political parties. Instead, they formed numerous small 
political parties which resulted in their inability to 
constitute an independent political entity able to pose a 
solution to the crisis of independence and developing the 
society.9  
After the 1952 Revolution, and according to the changes in 
wealth and authority which were set out above, the economic 
and political power of the bourgeoisie was restricted. 
However, in the early years of the Revolution, the new system 
decided to achieve development in nearly the same context as 
that which existed before the Revolution. Consequently, the 
Revolution gave a chance to the Egyptian bourgeoisie to share 
in the development programme. 
The main domains which the bourgeoisie monopolized between 
1952 and 1959 were construction, provision of marine 
transport, storage facilities for small scale manufacture and 
the assets required for financial, commercial and trading 
services." Doing these activities, the traditional bourgeoisie 
could not give up its quick and high profits or abandon its 
traditional perspective of close association with western 
private capital.11 
Because of this attitude, the relationship between the state 
and the bourgeoisie underwent a major change when the state 
sector was established in 1959, and later, in 1961, when most 
of the banking, industrial, financial and commercial 
enterprises were nationalized. 
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In political terms, the abolition of the political parties 
served to undermine the power of the bourgeoisie with regard 
to the power of the new regime. The bourgeoisie, in the early 
years of the Revolution could not control the state apparatus. 
They could not direct national development policies.12 However, 
the bourgeoisie could penetrate the political organizations 
such as the Liberal Rally and the National Union by means of 
corruption.11 
The economic and political measures taken by the new regime 
allowed a considerable degree of state autonomy. The 
increasing power of the state represented Nasser's influence 
over the state apparatus, and Nasser's view that an attempt 
should be made to place the state above class interests, so 
that the state was not representative of one class. In 
reality, this did not work without tensions and conflicts. 
There was a tension between the new regime and the old, 
established bourgeoisie, who resisted the new economic 
policies, and another tension between the state power and the 
state bourgeoisie, i.e. the managers of the public sector and 
the government executive organs, who were, for some time, the 
stronghold of Nasser and were his close associates.14  
As mentioned earlier, these patterns of power and authority 
were not fixed. Up to 1967 the state still enjoyed a certain 
amount of autonomy from the interests of the bourgeoisie and 
the state bureaucrats and technocrats. After the defeat of 
1967 the bourgeoisie, consisting of large landowners, 
businessmen, capitalists and elements of the state bureaucrats 
and technocrats, started to gain more power and to express 
their own interests and ideologies. They aimed towards a 
reassessment of the public sector, increasing opportunities 
for private and foreign capital, the export of Egyptian 
manpower and the promotion of emigration.15  
After Nasser's death in 1970, Egypt under Sadat entered a new 
phase of her history. As mentioned earlier, Sadat's open door 
policy had economic and social consequences. Even today, there 
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is no consensus on the exact effects this had on the 
relationship between state power and the bourgeoisie. In some 
views, exemplified by the view John Waterbury set out earlier,VhE 
st:cd-e is autonomous from different social forces.16 On the 
opposing view, there is a belief that after the open door 
policy the bourgeoisie enjoyed increasing power, and that they 
could influence decision making." 
The problem in deciding what is the actual position of the 
bourgeoisie in Egypt is that evidence exists which supports 
both cases: on the one hand there is the increasing power of 
the bourgeoisie, on the other the increasing autonomy of the 
state. For example, the way in which state revenue is spent 
can be seen as favourable to the bourgeoisie and taken as a 
sign of their increasing power.19 On the other hand, the power 
of the state appears to have increased to the point where the 
state could launch an attack on the Islamic bourgeoisie in 
1986.19  
Many examples like these can be found to support either view. 
In order to reach a conclusion it is necessary to study the 
reality of the bourgeoisie in Egypt under Mubarak today. 
Through such a study it can be seen whether they constitute 
a coherent class in terms of their activities, political power 
and culture. Any such coherence will be influenced by 
historical factors, and the traditional division of the 
bourgeoisie into different economic, social and political 
tendencies. Consequently the present bourgeoisie must be 
treated in two main sections: the secular bourgeoisie and the 
Islamic bourgeoisie. 
What distinguishes the secular from the Islamic bourgeoisie 
is the Islamic character and the kind of financial activities 
practised by the Islamic bourgeoisie, who are, for example, 
absent from the financial and economic organizations used by 
the secular bourgeoisie such as the chambers of commerce and 
councils of businessmen.20 
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(i) The Secular Bourgeoisie 
In discussing the secular bourgeoisie in terms of their power, 
several different fractions must be identified. That is, after 
the 1952 Revolution, the commercial bourgeoisie and those who 
were involved in trade could keep their position as the most 
prosperous fraction of the Egyptian bourgeoisie since the 
Revolution attacked the economic and political power of the 
landowners and the industrial bourgeoisie. This attack has 
taken the form of agrarian reform, the nationalization of 
industry and the establishment of the state sector.21 With the 
open door policy the commercial bourgeoisie has benefited from 
the new policy, which mainly encouraged the commercial 
activities through new laws on investment and import-export 
regulations.22  
In terms of political power, some of the commercial 
bourgeoisie have exercised overt political activities, such 
as ministerial responsibility, or indirect political power, 
through their contacts, family and friendship relations. They 
could exert political influence through their individual and 
collective participation in a number of legislative, planning 
and advisory organs." 
While the commercial bourgeoisie has enjoyed more 
opportunities to act, the industrial bourgeoisie has been 
controlled by nationalization and the state sector. Under the 
open door policy they did not get many opportunities, as they 
were restricted to work in the small and intermediate 
industries which were connected to foreign investment.24  
Apart from the differences in activities and political power 
between the different fractions of the bourgeoisie, other 
differences appear in cultural aspects, including religion, 
education, places of residence and social background.25  
At the present time, however, there is some evidence which 
suggests that the secular bourgeoisie is moving towards 
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becoming more coherent. This can be seen in the coalition of 
businessmen in joint venture banks, which bring together 
businessmen who started their activities with the open door 
policy with foreigners and Egyptians from the old aristocratic 
families who were harmed by Nasser's regime. The other 
evidence is the increasing organizational activity of the 
bourgeoisie, such as the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce and the 
Federation of Industry.26 
 So the secular section of the 
bourgeoisie is gaining more power, and to a certain extent 
moving towards more coherence, but not yet to the extent that 
would make it certain that they could control the state. 
(ii) The Islamic Bourgeoisie 
These are distinguished culturally by their Islamic character 
and by the Islamic nature of their economic activities, which 
mean that they operate on Islamic principles, which does not 
allow for usury in the profit given to investors. By this 
Islamic character they could attract the savings of those 
Egyptians who were working in the Arab oil countries. In 1977 
the number of investors was estimated to be one million.27  
The activities of the Islamic bourgeoisie are concentrated in 
two main fields, banking and what are called investment 
companies. The investment companies started with the open door 
policy in 1974. In order to protect themselves from government 
attacks, they claimed that they invested in activities which 
were going to help Egypt's economic problems and represent 
essential needs for the public. These activities are the stock 
exchange, food production (dairy farms, poultry installations, 
bakeries) and housing. 
In spite of the claims that they work in these productive and 
vital activities, the Islamic banks and companies were first 
attacked for illegal activities by the left wing newspaper 
"Al-Ahaly", which maintained they had smuggled about 16 
billion pounds out of the country and invested them abroad in 
the world capitalist market and stock exchanges, and exposed 
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such parasitic activities as speculation on the Egyptian pound 
and working on the black market for hard currency.28  
Like the secular bourgeoisie, cultural and political divisions 
can be found in the Islamic bourgeoisie. These differences 
appear between those who are engaged in Islamic bank 
activities and those who run the Islamic investment companies. 
Those who are associated with Islamic banks are more likely 
to come from upper class origins than those who are associated 
with Islamic companies. Those who are in the Islamic banks 
keep themselves distant, socially and politically, from those 
who are in investment companies, since they consider them to 
be new rich and competing with them for investments." 
In terms of political relations, those who are engaged in 
Islamic banks are more associated with traditional Muslim 
Brothers and the National Democratic Party, while those who 
are in investment companies are more connected to the more 
radical Islamic movement." This point will be illustrated more 
fully later. 
Those who work in the Islamic companies could penetrate the 
state apparatus and make strong relations with some government 
executives, and they hired the religious leaders of Al Azhar 
in order to give fatwa, i.e Islamic legal opinion, that the 
activities of their companies truly follow Islamic law.31 
The activities of both the secular and Islamic bourgeoisie are 
giving signals of the tendency of this class to organize 
itself by establishing their own organizations which can 
defend their interests and consolidate their power. 
(B) The Petty Bourgeoisie 
The analysis of the category of the petty bourgeoisie as an 
intermediate class has been given a great deal of attention 
by Poulantzas, as was explained in Chapter One. In his 
analysis of the petty bourgeoisie, Poulantzas has identified 
148 
two groups of petty bourgeoisie. These are the traditional and 
the new petty bourgeoisie. However, in the final analysis, he 
combined both of them in one class, and stressed their unity. 
Poulantzas' unification of the two classes raises some 
theoretical problems, especially when it comes to the question 
of applying the analysis to the Egyptian class formation. It 
will be argued that it is important to separate the two groups 
as having different class positions at the objective and 
subjective levels of class, as will be explained below. 
From the point of view of this research, the two classes of 
the traditional and new petty bourgeoisie are not only 
occupying different economic positions, but also are different 
in the effect which the expansion of monopoly capitalism has 
had on them. The traditional petty bourgeoisie is constantly 
threatened by the growth of monopoly capitalism, while the new 
petty bourgeoisie is dependent upon monopoly capitalism and 
its relations with the state for its reproduction.32  
If one looks at the case of Egypt, one sees that the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie were harmed by the open door 
policy, and were threatened by big industry and foreign 
capital. The discussion of the new petty bourgeoisie in Egypt 
will show how they developed and expanded under the 
establishment of modern industry and large production. In 
terms of interests, it will be shown that the new petty 
bourgeoisie, especially those who occupy senior positions in 
the state and government, could benefit from the new open door 
policy by collaborating with the big bourgeoisie and take 
advantage of the foreign sector in the Egyptian economy which 
opened new job opportunities for them, while it threatened the 
interests of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The new petty 
bourgeoisie has, in general, an interest in the expansion of 
the state, while the traditional petty bourgeoisie are 
generally worried by and less interested in big government and 
large state expenditures.33 
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In political terms, it will be shown that the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie are mainly likely to be recruited into 
fundamentalist Muslim groups. In contrast, the new petty 
bourgeoisie are more likely to be organized through the 
political parties. 
Another feature which differentiates the two classes is a 
cultural one. The educated new petty bourgeoisie have a 
different way and style of life, and attitudes which, in 
general, are more orientated towards the west than the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie. 
This theoretical discussion of the identification of the new 
and traditional petty bourgeoisie has been necessary in order 
to provide the theoretical underpinning, and to give an 
explanation, of the classification of the two groups in 
different social classes. 
It is worth noting as well that the analysis of the Egyptian 
new petty bourgeoisie tends to depart from Poulantzas' 
identification which combines the two classes. The analysis 
followed here will be nearer to those who speak of a new 
middle class as a mediating pillar and as a basic stabilizing 
force in society. 
(i) The Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie consists of those who 
possess a small amount of capital which enables them to live 
from their own work without having to sell their labour power 
and without buying the labour power of others, except 
marginally." 
The history of the traditional petty bourgeoisie before the 
Revolution shows that this group of small owners suffered 
oppression form the foreign power, the big and middle 
bourgeoisie. 
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After the 1952 Revolution, this class changed in terms of its 
weight and size. The change came as a result of the building 
of modern industry and the state sector of the economy, which 
needed bureaucrats and technocrats to run it. This led to 
expansion of the new petty bourgeoisie. However, this did not 
mean that the traditional petty bourgeoisie had no role in 
production. On the contrary, there are still large numbers of 
small shopkeepers working and engaged in handicrafts, repairs, 
service and small scale commodity production. Appendix 6 shows 
the structural duality in the composition of establishments 
according to the number of persons employed. While one finds 
modern large and medium sized factories form the core of 
manufacturing industry in Egypt, this core is surrounded by 
a large fringe of small businesses." 
From the table, the predominance of establishments which 
employ only one person can be seen. Nevertheless, the evidence 
indicates a clear trend in the decline of the relative 
importance of small establishments in the 1960s.36  
The figures show that, although the percentage share of 
establishments employing ratio of establishments employing 2 
to 9 persons to the total number of establishments employing 
2 or more persons remained more or less the same over the 
period 1960 to 1964, the relative share of the smaller 
businesses in the percentage of employment declined from 59 
per cent to 45 per cent. Moreover, the share in employment of 
establishment which employed twenty persons or more went up 
from 41 per cent to 55 per cent over the same period.37  
More recent figures from the World Bank for 1980 show that the 
small scale industries, i.e. those employing between 10 and 
50 workers, accounted for about one third of the total value 
added generated by industry, and 54 per cent of the total 
industrial employment, while the artisan sector, which 
includes small firms which employ 1 to 9 workers, employed 
around one third of a million workers.3a (See Appendix 7) 
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Interests, Ideologies and Political Power of the Traditional 
Bourgeoisie 
The position of the petty bourgeoisie in Egypt is a 
contradictory and complicated one. As owners, they have a 
privileged position in a society where the majority do not own 
any instrument of labour. However, before the Revolution they 
were defenceless against the political and economic pressure 
exerted by the interests which dominated the Egyptian market.39  
In this context, they found themselves in a contradictory 
position: that is, they could not be promoted to capitalists, 
and at the same time they were more and more driven into the 
ranks of the working class and the disinherited." They are 
ideologically and politically in conflict, caught between 
supporting the bourgeoisie who oppress them, and at the same 
time represent the ideal example for them, or supporting the 
working class which they afraid to fall down into. 
Under the open door policy of the seventies, the small scale 
firms were threatened by the modern larger ones. the new 
economic policy favoured the modern large firms and restricted 
the smaller firms' access to credit and raw materials.41 
They had to fight to survive under such conditions, by 
absorbing the reductions in remuneration and the deterioration 
in working conditions, where workers in these firms had to 
work longer hours for less pay than those who work in large 
modern industries.42  
So, in terms of their interests and benefits in general, they 
did not benefit from the open door policy as much as the 
large, modern and foreign projects in the country. 
The situation and desperation of those who work in the small 
firms and of those who own them have political and social 
consequences. This group is economically productive, even 
though it is ignored by the government and is socially 
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marginal. From this situation they are a greater threat to 
political stability than peasants or workers in modern 
industries who are organized into unions and have different 
means of protest. That is to say, this group are not engaged 
in the protest activities and strikes practised by industrial 
workers, and are more likely to be recruited into the militant 
Islamic groups." This point will be explained in more detail 
as part of the discussion of the political power of the 
bourgeoisie. 
(ii) The New Petty Bourgeoisie 
As mentioned earlier, the petty bourgeoisie is divided into 
two groups, the traditional and the new. The new, or the 
modern, group of the petty bourgeoisie are refered to in a 
number of different ways in the Egyptian literature. They are 
called the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the new middle class and 
the state bourgeoisie. All those who use these terms mean to 
speak about this group of wage earners who work in the 
government, public sector, administration, military and 
technical cadres and those who have intellectual and cultural 
skills. 
The rise of this group in Egypt and in the Middle East has 
attracted the attention of some writers like Manfred Halpern 
who noticed the emergence of a new social class which can work 
as revolutionary and is 'potentially' a stabilizing force.44  
This is supported by the realization that the leadership in 
all areas of Middle East life is increasingly seized by a 
class of men inspired by non-traditional knowledge, and this 
group is clustered around a core of salaried civilian and 
military politicians, organisers, administrators and experts .45 
 
However, the new class does not consist of one group. Rather 
different interests and concerns can be found inside the 
different strata of this class. While some are interested in 
ideas, action, and careers, and represent the most influential 
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core of this class, other strata are mainly concerned with 
safe careers, like clerks." 
The idea of the rise of a new class in the middle East and in 
Egypt as the potential power which going to lead society, has 
come under attack from others like Amos Perlmutter, who argues 
that, in the case of Egypt, neither the new middle class nor 
the army, after 1952, are even potentially one social, 
ideological or political class. They are not cohesive, and 
consequently they are not a source of stabilization and are 
unable to modernize society.47  
He developed his argument from his analysis of the policies 
and the role this class played in Egypt. He considered that 
this class has failed in mobilizing people and in increasing 
the political participation of the masses, and that stability 
in Egypt was due to the traditional political apathy, coercion 
and dependent bureaucracy rather than consolidation of social 
and political groups." 
In spite of this critique, Perlmutter admits that Nasser and 
his followers in Egypt worked to change and modernize the 
country. He says "Nasser's inner circle has moved Egypt to a 
point of no return, is unquestionable that they are 
modernizers is a fact."49  
This sentence contradicts Perlmutter's other conclusions that 
there is no need to look to a class other than the traditional 
middle class to understand social change in Egypt." In effect, 
Perlmutter admits that there is a group in Egypt who are 
modernizers, and it is clear that the group of Nasser and his 
followers were not traditional middle class. 
In fact, the view that there is not a new class in Egypt and 
in the Middle East makes it very difficult to understand who 
shapes politics and makes the fundamental decisions in this 
area, and this may lead to a simplistic understanding of these 
changes as merely performed by individual personalities. 
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From the viewpoint of this research, changes in the Middle 
East and in Egypt in particular must be understood in terms 
of their class content. The following historical analysis of 
the role of the new class in Egypt since Muhammad Aly until 
the present time will illustrate the extent to which this 
class could carry out the modernization process, what kind of 
challenges it had to face and what choices and kind of 
alliances it went through. 
The History of the New Petty Bourgeoisie in Egypt 
The history of the new petty bourgeoisie can be traced back 
to the era of Muhammad Aly (1805-1849). By acquiring modern 
education a secularly educated group was created and occupied 
the important positions in the military and civil state 
apparatuses as well as in the all production and service 
institutions. That is, since Muhammad Aly, a group of 
technocrats, bureaucrats and professionals was created to run 
his project of modernization.51 
By creating this group Muhammad Aly attacked the traditional 
middle class of Aulama, Shekhs and merchants whose political 
role was restricted and the last significant role they played 
was leading the resistance against the French expedition at 
the end of the eighteenth century. 
The creation and the formation of the new class in Egypt is 
different from that in Europe, since in Egypt it was created 
by modern education, and it did not start with commercial 
activities and making capital and then move to modern 
industry, as was the case in Europe. So, the difference 
between the new class in Egypt and in the Middle East in 
general, in contrast with their counterparts in the West, is 
that Egypt and the Middle East moved into the modern 
administration age before it reached the machine age. The 
salaried middle class attained power before it attained 
assurance of status, order, security or prosperity. 
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Consequently, this class uses it power not to defend order and 
prosperity but to create them." 
In the struggle to build its political, economic and social 
power, the new class in Egypt had made three attempts to 
control state power and the state apparatus. 
The first attempt was the Auraby revolution (1879-1882): at 
this time Egypt was under the rule of Ismail, who was 
ambitious to modernize Egypt on the western model. The new 
class became more ambitious and they felt that they had an 
important role to play. However, Ismail's policies of 
modernization brought Egypt into debt and led to more foreign 
influence which ended with the British occupation in 1882.33  
This situation led Auraby and his colleagues in the army to 
lead a revolution which demanded two main things: the 
maintenance of the national independence and the establishment 
of the constitution. This attempt was defeated by the foreign 
powers. 
The second attempt by the new class at the political level was 
in the 1919 revolution led by Saad Zaghlol, who mobilized 
people in the cities and villages. This time they had the same 
demands as the previous movement, that is the independence and 
the constitution." 
This time, the movement of the new class succeeded in 
achieving partial independence in 1922 and the constitution 
in 1923. However, these gains allowed only the upper strata 
of this class to play a political role, while the middle and 
lower strata remained isolated from practising a political 
role . 3S  
The upper strata of this class, which was allied at the 
beginning with the middle and lower strata, turned against 
this alliance after they gained political power and changed 
their alliance to the palace and the British occupation power. 
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As a result they became more isolated from the middle and 
lower strata." 
From the movements of the new class it can be noticed that 
they did not go for a comprehensive programme of change at all 
political, economic and social levels. Rather, they 
concentrated on the demands of independence and democracy, 
which were very urgent at that time because of the challenge 
of the foreign occupation of the country. 
The split in the new class between the upper strata on the one 
side and the middle and lower strata on the other side, led 
the latter strata to form their own organisations in the 
forties of this century. These organisations included the 
Muslim Brothers, Young Egypt and the Marxist group. Through 
these organisations the new petty bourgeois intellectuals from 
the middle and lower strata led the resistance against the 
British occupation, since they had no interest in the survival 
of the oppressive system, while they had an interest in the 
growth of national capitalism which enabled them to achieve 
higher social levels. That is to say, the expanding capitalist 
system would need middle level cadres and intellectuals and 
cultural spokesmen. 
In these circumstances, and by the intellectuals' efforts, 
cultural life revived with a critique of the existing social, 
political and economic system; students' and workers' 
movements increased. This atmosphere led to the emergence of 
more demands from the national movement. That is, beside the 
demands of national independence and democracy, more demands 
of social equality and justice, cultural authenticity and more 
Arab Unity emerged." 
In these circumstances the new class launched its third move 
and attempted to gain political power and control state power 
and the state apparatus in the 1952 Revolution, which brought 
the new class into power. 
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Under Nasser and after the establishment of the state sector 
and the nationalization movement, this class has expanded in 
number and gained many benefits under the socialist system, 
especially on the level of the professionals and the top 
managerial level. The expansion of the professions can be 
measured by the increasing membership of different syndicates, 
in particular in the period from 1962 to 1972, where in some 
specializations numbers were doubled (as in the case of 
teachers) or tripled (in the case of engineers). For more 
details see Appendix 8. 
It can be seen that some of the professionals have gained 
authority and an effective political voice, as is the case 
with engineers, especially after the expansion of modern 
industry under the state bourgeoisie. 
The second group which has witnessed an expansion in size, 
authority and benefits was the managers. They are classified 
into a hierarchy of levels which imply different authorities 
and responsibilities. The top managerial jobs are those 
required to coordinate and integrate diverse functions." 
Administrative and supervisory jobs are those primarily 
concerned with running activities and monitoring results 
against policy objectives. In between, holders of middle 
management jobs are concerned with organizing, staffing and 
directing to achieve policy aims." 
The standard of education for this group is high. Among the 
managers employed, about 20,000 (57.7 per cent) had received 
a university degree (including about 400 with post graduate 
degrees)." This shows that this stratum of the petty 
bourgeoisie does not only occupy important positions for 
policy implementation, but they are among the most highly 
qualified in a society in which more than fifty per cent of 
the population is still illiterate. 
One other privileged group inside the new petty bourgeoisie 
is the "special cadres". This term covers people who work in 
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the army, police, judicial bodies, the staff of universities 
and research institutes, and members of the diplomatic and 
consular service." The privileges they have include a higher 
salary than other employees with the same qualifications. They 
also get special allowances attached to certain groups in top 
administrative and specialized jobs." The number of employees 
who enjoyed these privileges rose from 42,064 in 1961 to 
212,028 in 1971/72. 
At the top of the new petty bourgeoisie in Egypt stand those 
who can be called the elite of the petty bourgeoisie. They can 
be divided into three groups, occupying different positions, 
practising different power, and gaining different interests. 
The top elite comprises the Prime Minister, other important 
ministers, the military command, top army leaders and 
presidential advisers." They mainly have control over the 
creation of state policies in the political apparatus, and the 
production of ideology in the ideological apparatus. 
The middle elite consists of ministers and governors of the 
provinces. They have authority in their own domains, but still 
depend for their tenure upon the president." They are involved 
in the execution of state policies and the dissemination of 
ideology. 
The sub-elite are the group which is supposed to link the 
elite to the population, and comprises the civil servants in 
the various departments of state, commanders of military 
units, public sector managers, editors of newspapers and the 
leaders of syndicates and chambers of commerce, and the local 
notables who head branches of the state party." They have 
different ideological roles. For example, editors of 
newspapers are working to produce and disseminate ideology, 
while a group like the civil servants are excluded from 
creating or disseminating ideology. 
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From the figures and numbers, it is clear that the new class 
which emerged under Muhammad Aly at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century has reached its great expansion and gained 
political power and controlled state apparatuses in the middle 
of the twentieth century. However, the role of this class in 
leading modernization and in changing society was not totally 
successful. It was influenced by the divisions inside this 
class and by internal and international challenges which it 
had to face. That is, any project for modernizing society must 
involve painful decisions about who shall receive rewards and 
who shall not and what kind of targets and needs are to be 
satisfied immediately and which ones to be postponed." 
This kind of choice may create divisions inside the strata of 
this class since they are not all expected to have the same 
views. At the same time they will create in society some 
alliances and some enemies between those who benefited and 
those who were harmed. 
The new class under the leadership of Nasser made its choices 
and alliances among the farmers and workers and the lower 
strata of the new class. However, in setting their priorities, 
Nasser and his followers gave more priority to the issues of 
social justice, independence, development and Arab Unity while 
the issue of democracy was postponed.67  
At this point we can understand, in contrast with Perlmutter, 
that the new class did not fail. It was not that it was 
incapable of leading development. Rather it had to decide 
priorities, in response to the internal demands of the 
situation and the international pressures. The combination of 
these considerations brought issues of social justice, and of 
the wide gap between different people, to the fore. It also 
accentuated the importance of the defence of national 
independence, and the resistance of foreign hostility. 
After the 1967 defeat, the new class has entered a critical 
phase of its history, marked by a crisis in identity and doubt 
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in their abilities to lead the country. This has been linked 
to a growing attack from other social powers, in particular 
the pre-revolutionary bourgeois, who claimed that this class 
is not capable of leading the country. This paved the way for 
the later changes in the new class alliance and priorities, 
under Sadat in particular, after the open door policy in 1974. 
The new alliance comprised: 
1. The middle class, civilian and military who made very 
good use of the Revolution and benefited from it socially 
and politically but were looking for more political and 
economic power. 
2. The remains of the pre-revolution upper class who were 
harmed by the Revolution's land reform and 
nationalization. 
3. The new rich of the entrepreneurs and wholesale and 
merchants. 
4. Those who work in the Arab oil countries and wanted to 
invest their savings." 
These four groups which formed the alliance came from 
different class backgrounds. They have no common history and 
they do not occupy the same position in relation to the means 
of production. However, they were united by one main target, 
that is, to make wealth and to increase their economic and 
political power in Egypt. 
The priorities which the new class with its new alliances has 
decided for Egypt are democracy and the cultural authenticity, 
while it postponed the issue of social justice and Arab Unity. 
And even the two issues which they claimed to adopt i.e. 
democracy and cultural authenticity, have not been fully 
achieved, since the political parties did not actually share 
in the political life which remained dominated by one party. 
This did not increase mass participation. In terms of cultural 
authenticity, Egypt became more dependent in the West than 
before. 
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The new alliance was led by the new class, especially the 
elements of the top and middle elite, who became a 
conservative power under Sadat and the open door policy. They 
became anti-socialist, more inclined towards the west, more 
resistant to the redistribution of resources which began under 
Nasser, and they also supported the market policy and 
privatization." 
The top and middle elite have moved to this conservative 
ideology for some objective reasons, i.e. the changes which 
took place under the open door policy, which opened up new 
possibilities for them to work in foreign companies and banks, 
and to have some private commercial activities. 
The lower strata, especially the civil servants, have seen 
their standard of living decline because of inflation, and the 
high prices and low salaries. The emigration to the Arab oil 
countries has opened the door for these strata to achieve 
social advancement and not fall down completely.7°  
The history of the new class that has been presented so far 
shows that this class, for more than a century, was 
continuously attempting to obtain economic, social and 
political power, until it finally succeeded in 1952. The 
attempts of this class in modernizing Egypt show differences 
and divisions inside the class in determining the priorities 
and which issues should come first and what kind of social 
alliance they should go into. 
These challenges and failures throughout the history of the 
new class in Egypt raises important questions about the 
ability and the capacities of this class to lead modernization 
in Egypt. In particular, in comparison with the power of other 
social classes like the big bourgeoisie, the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie and the working class, it raises questions about 
the kind of alliance that this class will go for. These 
questions will be addressed in the field study of this 
research, where it may be possible to throw light upon aspects 
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of consciousness, agreement and disagreements among the 
members of this class concerning political, economic and 
educational matters in Egypt. In addition, the kind of 
policies, particularly in the educational field, that they are 
more likely to support will be examined. Taking into account 
that the results will be drawn from a limited sample, it will 
not be possible to make sweeping generalizations on any of 
these matters. 
The Political Power of the Bourgeoisie Facing the State 
The Egyptian bourgeoisie is politically divided and her 
political parties constitute a weak opposition. The existing 
parties could not succeed in recruiting members from other 
social classes such as farmers and workers. The political 
efforts of the bourgeoisie are channelled in a variety of 
directions. Four different parties with different ideologies 
and class representation can be identified. 
The National Democratic Party was headed by Sadat, and he was 
followed by Mubarak. The party is the party of government. In 
terms of power, it holds the presidency and all the government 
power. The party is composed of officials, functionaries, 
technocrats, and increasingly traders, contractors and rural 
magnates." 
From its composition the party has attracted the big 
bourgeoisie in urban and rural Egypt and some elements of 
parasitic "Infitah" bourgeoisie. Although the party maintains 
50 per cent representation for farmers and workers, the party 
is more influenced by the interests of the big bourgeoisie. 
The Wafd Party is a reformation of the pre-Revolutionary 
Egyptian Wafd Party founded in 1918. The party presents itself 
as the party of individual freedom and "true" capitalism: they 
are anti-Nasserist.72 It usually attracts the Copts, rural 
middle class and urban liberal professions, mainly lawyers." 
The Wafd Party, like the National Democratic Party, also 
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attracts the parasitic bourgeoisie who are too removed from 
the centres of state power to become truly parasitic.74  
The Socialist Labour Party was created by Sadat in 1978 to 
represent a tame opposition. The party is an extension of the 
pre-Revolutionary populist Islamic Young Egypt Party, founded 
in 1933.75 It is difficult to identify which social classes 
this party represents, since it cannot claim that it 
represents the farmers, the workers, or the petty bourgeoisie. 
In a survey about the class bases of political parties, 35 of 
Egypt's leading scientists gave the following answers about 
the social categories which the SLP represents: 18 said, 
"None"; 7 said, "The middle class"; 3 said, "Capitalists"; and 
2 said, "Workers".75 The party has a clear Islamic orientation. 
It went into coalition with the Muslim Brothers in 1987, which 
secured them some seats in the People's Assembly.77  
Influenced by their coalition with the Muslim Brothers, they 
had to neglect policies on socialism and Arab unity, in favour 
of putting more emphasis upon relations with the Islamic World 
and the struggle to apply the Shariaa law." This reflects the 
growing influence of the Muslim Brothers in Egyptian politics 
following their entry into parliament. With their Islamic 
slogans they meant to attract the majority of ordinary, 
illiterate people." 
The Liberal Socialist Party is a fundamentalist party, 
supposed to represent the "National Bourgeoisie". They went 
into coalition with the Labour Party and Muslim Brothers in 
1987, which gave them 11 seats in the People's Assembly. 
The Nationalist Progressive Unionist Party is the most left 
wing of the political parties. The main recruiting ground and 
base of support is to be found among socially mobile people 
of modest background (sons of workers and peasants) who work 
in public sector industry and government administration. The 
majority of active members are recruited from the ranks of the 
lower level white collar employees, i.e. the new petty 
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bourgeoisie and the intellectuals." Ideologically it 
represents the alliance between Marxists, some Nasserists and 
the few progressive religious scholars." 
The main task facing this party is how to establish itself in 
rural Egypt and in industrial areas. This is not an easy task 
because there is no opportunity for the opposition parties in 
general and the progressive party in particular to reach the 
people through the mass media, which are dominated by the 
government. Radio and television, especially, are government 
controlled, and they suffer form other restrictions which were 
explained in Chapter Two. 
From the social background and the class bases of the 
political parties of the bourgeoisie it is clear that neither 
the government party, the NDP, nor the opposition parties 
could attract the working class or farmers. The bourgeois 
parties are politically divided between the government and the 
opposition, and subdivided into corporate and pluralist 
groups. Although the Egyptian bourgeoisie represent the only 
politically articulated class, they are still lacking the 
cohesion to reach the point of dominating the state." 
Discussing the political power of the bourgeoisie through 
their political parties must lead on to a discussion of one 
important phenomenon in Egyptian politics, which is the rising 
power and influence of the Islamic movement. It appears, in 
comparison with the political parties of the bourgeoisie as 
the political power which is challenging the state, both by 
its violent activities and by the kind of economic and social 
services they advocate for the local people. 
It is also important to look at the social background of those 
who are recruited into this movement to know what kind of 
political organizations in Egypt are able to recruit the lower 
classes. The Islamic movement is divided between the old 
branch of Muslim Brothers and the militant groups. The main 
target for both is to replace the secular government with an 
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Islamic one. The different Islamic groups have different roles 
to play. Those who use violence are working to undermine the 
state apparatus and public confidence in the state." 
The moderates of the Islamic movement represent the legal face 
of participation in the existing political system, and they 
went into alliance with the SLP in order to get the 
opportunity to be represented in parliament. However, the 
Islamic movement is not only working at the political level, 
but is also gaining social power by participating in community 
services. The Islamic banks, investment companies and the 
organizations which collect alms, "Zakat", all together are 
involved in providing health, education and welfare services . 84  
The provision of such social services in a poor, needy 
community, challenges the state structure and the credibility 
and legitimacy of the government." 
If one turns to the ideological aspect of this movement, one 
finds that the Islamic movement represents a conservative 
ideology. That is, they do not intend to shake up the existing 
class formation, and they are not committed to a major socio-
economic transformation in society. 
This appears in a questionnaire answered by their 
representatives about different social and economic issues. 
When asked about their views on changes to existing tenancy 
laws, none of the representatives expressed any interest in 
rural Egypt in general, or in the problems of the peasants in 
particular. None of them saw illiteracy as a critical problem, 
and they would prefer the private sector rather than the 
public sector be responsible for solving economic problems." 
The Islamic movement recruits elements of the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie such as craftsmen and lower middle classes 
such as clerks and junior employees. The orientation towards 
this type of protest and political activity is created by the 
mode of production under which they are organized and produce. 
They work in small workshops where kinship and other 
166 
primordial relations tie the employer to the employed, and 
this works against such collective protest behaviour as might 
force the government to change policies." The kind of 
residential intimacy of their work conditions helps them to 
form small groups of dedicated members, which in another step 
can be integrated into a large movement which forms the base 
for many of the Islamic groups." 
One of the Islamic organizations which was arrested in 1985 
had 73 members. The social background of the members showed 
that only one was a peasant, another a factory worker, and a 
third a construction worker. The remainder were self-employed 
or working in small firms and traditional artisans. Over 40 
per cent of the group were furniture workers, blacksmiths, 
gunsmiths, tailors, painters, waiters and drivers." 
So the traditional petty bourgeoisie in Egypt is not only 
involved in an old traditional mode of production, but also 
represents a conservative political power and ideology. 
In summary, the political power of the bourgeoisie is divided 
between the parties of the secular bourgeoisie and Muslim 
fundamentalism. From the discussion it is clear that, in terms 
of state autonomy, the state is not yet a tool in the hands 
of the big bourgeoisie. The relationship between the state and 
the big bourgeoisie at the present time is very complicated. 
It is a continuous struggle to gain hegemony over economic and 
political issues. 
Under Mubarak, the government has taken some measures to 
control those of the bourgeoisie who started their activities 
under the open door policy, and were very powerful under 
Sadat. However, their power and influence has not been 
eliminated, since both the secular and the Islamic bourgeoisie 
could consolidate their economic and political power through 
corruption, nepotism, kinship and friendship relations, and 
through their relations with the international bourgeoisie. 
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From the discussion it is clear that the relationship between 
the state and the big bourgeoisie has taken different forms. 
Under Nasser the state enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy, 
and could attack the interests of the bourgeoisie, while under 
Sadat and Mubarak, and with the capitalist economic system, 
the Egyptian bourgeoisie is gaining more power and influence. 
While the traditional petty bourgeoisie has declined in number 
due to the modern projects established in the state sector, 
and under the open door policy, they did not benefit that much 
when compared to the big bourgeoisie. So, they turned, in 
their opposition to the state, to militant activities which 
present a threat to state stability. 
The new petty bourgeoisie are themselves in power and control 
both state power and the state apparatus. They entered into 
different alliances during different historical periods. Their 
control of state power and the state apparatus has been used 
to face the threat and the challenge from the growing 
organizations of the big bourgeoisie and the militant 
activities which include the traditional petty bourgeoisie. 
(C) The Urban Proletariat 
Made up of the non-agricultural manual workers engaged in the 
manufacturing industries, construction, railways, ports, 
public utilities and services within the organized sector, the 
proletariat are wage earners and they sell their labour 
power." 
The working class in Egypt is divided into two groups; the 
industrial workers who enjoy stable occupation and a regular 
income, and the sub-proletariat or lumpen proletariat. If one 
studies the history of the working class in Egypt, one finds 
that the industrial workers are expected to be the most 
organized and conscious group. This is because of their 
integration into concentrated units of production where a 
relationship to mechanized social means of production is 
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established. They live and work in largely undifferentiated 
and collective conditions, which might help them to take 
collective action." 
The Egyptian proletariat has developed under colonization and 
their organizations were established under the authority of 
the foreign power in Egypt. The membership of unions was 
exclusive to foreign workers. This situation changed after the 
Second World War." 
Getting their independence from foreign workers, they fell 
under the national bourgeoisie's authority. who were the 
leaders of the nationalist movement after the Second World 
War. The proletariat were a social power which was seen by the 
national bourgeoisie to be an important power to be won. For 
example, in 1947 the Wafd government enacted for the first 
time legislation to recognize trade unions, in an attempt to 
win labour's political support against the king." 
The membership of workers' unions, which were established in 
the nineteenth century, started to attract the Egyptian 
workers, and the numbers grew slowly because the British and 
the Palace saw the labour movement as a threat to political 
security." However, the numbers grew. By 1911 there were 11 
unions with about 7,000 members. In 1947 there were 91,604 
trade union members, and by 1955 the number had increased to 
373,000." 
The development of the Egyptian proletariat in number and as 
an organized group has helped them to play an important role 
in fighting against British rule in Egypt, especially after 
the Second World War. 
In the period from 1945 to 1947 the proletariat, in an 
alliance with students, struggled for the withdrawal of the 
British and against oppression. This fight took the form of 
mass demonstrations and the ideological and political 
mobilization of the masses for armed struggle over the Canal." 
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The workers' struggle started to take a violent form. This was 
mainly in the big factories controlled by the Misr Bank. This 
struggle posed a direct threat and challenge to the stronghold 
of the Egyptian big bourgeoisie." 
This history shows that the Egyptian working class has shown 
that under worsening living conditions they are willing to 
face state power and to protest to defend themselves and to 
take direct action against the government. Examples of such 
action under Mubarak are many. In 1985 about 50,000 workers 
participated in 44 strikes, sit-in protests and confrontations 
with the authorities." 
The numbers of workers who go on such strikes has increased 
due to the worsening conditions of living, and work 
regulations. For example, in 1986, the number of protestors 
reached 100,000 workers. They succeeded in closing down the 
textile mill in Cairo." Railway workers have shared in the 
protest and have closed down the service in 1986. 
The question is how these protests and movements can be 
evaluated, and what amount of political power they reflect. 
This kind of protest reflects the fact that workers in modern 
industry are more likely to take collective protest action 
through strikes. They are different from the traditional 
workers and craftsmen, who are more likely to be recruited 
into the fundamentalist Muslim groups. The workers' protests 
do not mean that the working class is moving towards 
revolutionary action, or even widespread rebellion, since 
their disruption of industrial production is mainly carried 
out to achieve economic rather than general political 
targets .100 
The working class as a political power started to organize 
their power, but they lack a strong organization and unions, 
since the unions are controlled by the state in a move to 
demobilize the workers."1 The state can also control the 
workers by virtue of the fact that those who work in modern 
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industry in the public sector depend on the state for their 
salary, social services and housing, which does not give them 
the opportunity for political manoeuvres. 
In terms of having a political party representing them, as has 
been explained earlier, there is no party which can claim to 
represent the working class. The only party which could claim 
to represent them and depend on their interests is the NPUP, 
which has some union officials as members.102 The appeal of the 
party to the working class might be affected by changes which 
have taken place within the working class. That is, under the 
open door policy, workers were allowed to leave the country 
to work in the oil countries, and to accumulate some wealth. 
This helped some of them to become self-employed and to have 
different interests from the working class. 
The Egyptian working class is weakened by being divided 
between those who are in the organized modern sector and those 
in the unorganized sector, who can be called the sup-
proletariat or lumpen proletariat. The latter consists of 
street vendors and pedlars, domestic servants, porters and the 
unemployed. They constitute the urban disinherited mass which 
is deprived of all material resources and access to organized 
work."3 The sub-proletariat, according to the 1976 Census, 
represent 16 per cent of the working class power (492,000 
workers) .1°4 
Having this substantial number of workers who are in marginal 
activities means that 16 per cent of the labour power is not 
having the opportunity to participate in collective social 
production, in which the working class can create and acquire 
certain social and cultural values. This type of collective 
social production is the context in which the social power of 




The analysis of class formation of Egypt reflects the 
complexity of that formation, where social classes are 
unsteady and still in a state of formation, and where there 
are no clear cut and well formed social classes with 
significant social, economic and political power. 
The analysis of class formation was conducted in relation to 
state power. From the analysis, it can be noticed that the 
relationship between the state and social classes has taken 
different trends in terms of the amount of power that the 
state enjoys in regard to social classes, i.e. state power in 
enforcing political, economic and social policies. 
In relation to the big bourgeoisie, during Nasser's time, the 
political and economic power of the big bourgeoisie was 
undermined and the state enjoyed a considerable amount of 
autonomy. Under the open door policy, the big bourgeoisie 
started to gain more power and to organize themselves, and 
some fractions could influence decision making in society. 
Under Mubarak the relationship between the state and the big 
bourgeoisie is a continuous struggle between them to gain 
control over political and economic issues. In spite of the 
growing power of the bourgeoisie, they have not yet reached 
the stage of making the state a tool in their hands. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie decreased in number due to 
the expansion of modern industry. However, they still play an 
important role in national production. They did not benefit 
from the open door policy as did the big bourgeoisie. On the 
contrary, they were hit by the expansion of modern, foreign 
projects in Egypt, which they could not compete with. As a 
social power they are in a contradictory position between the 
big bourgeoisie and the proletariat. They take from the big 
bourgeoisie their ideal which they want to reach, and at the 
same time they fear moving down to the working class position. 
Ideologically they are a conservative power and more likely 
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to be politically recruited by the militant Muslim groups. 
The working class is divided between those who work in the 
modern organised sector and those who work in the informal 
sector. The latter are the lumpen proletariat. At the 
beginning of the Revolution, workers gained some social and 
economic benefits from the nationalization of industry and 
gained some political rights to be represented with the 
farmers in the parliament. However, these rights remain 
limited due to the fact that the working class is not well 
organised and has no strong unions and the majority are 
illiterate. The last protest movement by the workers in the 
eighties did not represent a general political movement: 
rather it was mainly confined to economic demands. So, workers 
in Egypt are on the way to becoming more conscious, and the 
events have shown that they are not totally passive. However, 
their movements do not present them as a political power able 
to force their will on the state. The low standard of 
education and the high level of illiteracy may make them 
vulnerable to the influence of fundamentalist Muslims. 
The new petty bourgeoisie occupies a special position in the 
class formation of Egypt. It was the dynamic power which led 
the modernization projects in Egypt since Muhammad Aly. The 
middle and lower strata of this class could control state 
power and state apparatus. Under Nasser this class has 
witnessed a great expansion in number because of the 
establishment of modern industry and the state sector. 
The role of this class in modernizing the country, bringing 
stability and the kind of class alliance they may choose, was 
and still is the subject of question, which gives an 
opportunity for this research, on a limited scale, to 
investigate the ideologies and the interests of members of 
this class over particular social, economic and educational 
issues. 
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The analysis of this chapter has shown the complexity of the 
class formation of Egypt which reflects in the practice of 
political activity in terms of the formation of political 
parties and the role these parties can play in Egyptian 
politics. The analysis has shown, in general, that the role 
of the opposition parties is very limited and that the 
government party, NDP, headed by the president, is the most 
powerful one since it enjoys all the presidential power and 
authority. From the analysis of the political parties of the 
bourgeoisie two main points can be drawn: 
- The farmers and working class in Egypt are not yet 
strongly represented by any of the existing political 
parties, which could not yet succeed in attracting them. 
- The political power of the bourgeoisie is divided between 
secular and Islamic parties. Inside these two main 
tendencies, other sub-divisions can be found. That is, 
the secular parties are divided between traditional 
liberal, socialist and progressive parties, while Islamic 
activity is divided between those who practice political 
activities through the legal channels of parliament and 
form coalitions with other conservative secular parties 
and those who go for militant, violent Islamic groups. 
These divisions and sub-divisions weaken and diffuse the 
power of the bourgeoisie facing the state. 
The analysis of Egyptian class formation and class power 
relations is essential for the following discussion in Chapter 
Four of the system and policy of education in Egypt. That 
chapter will examine the extent to which class formation and 
power relations in Egypt influence policy and the system of 
education in regard to equality of opportunity and the 
openness of the system. 
The discussion of the class formation of Egypt is an opening 
to the discussion of aspects of class consciousness and class 
interests in relation to different political, economic and 
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social policies which took place in Egypt in the sixties and 
seventies, and which give an opportunity for this research to 
pick up this point again in the field study to give an 
assessment of how members from different class positions 
perceive and evaluate these policies in a historical 
perspective which takes into account the past, the present and 
the future. 
NOTES AND REFERENCES 
1. Samir Amin (1985) "The Historical Foundations of Arab 
Nationalism", in Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicholas S. 
Hopkins Arab Society: Social Science Perspective 
(American University in Cairo, Cairo) p.33 
2. Ibid, p.34 
3. For more details of these characteristics of 
underdeveloped countries, see Chapter One. 
4. Mahmoud Hussein, Class Conflict in Egypt, op.cit., pp.16- 
17 
5. One feddan is equal to 1.04 acres. 
6. Malak Zaalouk (1989) Power, Class and Foreign Capital  in 
Egypt:  The rise  of the new bourgeoisie (Zed Books, 
London) p.26 
7. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.22 
8. Ibid, p.24 
9. Three main political tendencies can be identified among 
the bourgeoisie. These were: 
1) The aristocracy, which consisted of the large land 
owners of Turkish origin who had close relations with the 
British and the Palace. Political power was concentrated 
in their hands. Culturally they considered themselves as 
a wing of the European bourgeoisie, where French and 
Turkish became their language which worked as a symbol 
to identify them with the Palace, and isolate them from 
ordinary people who spoke Arabic. 
2) The nationalist tendency, which included the ruling 
class members of Egyptian origin. They were discriminated 
against due to the hegemony of the aristocrats and 
westerners in the state apparatus. Because of that, they 
preferred increasing Egyptianization of the state 
apparatus and the economy by reformist means and tended 
to lean on the people's patriotic and democratic 
movement. 
3) The modernist tendency, which consisted of the big 
bourgeoisie who were committed to urban investment and 
175 
who were traditionally detached from traditional large 
land owners. They were closely associated with foreign 
investment. Their political role was anti-patriotic and 
anti-democratic. They were incapable of challenging the 
imperialist monopolies, or envisaging industrial 
development without continued political, financial and 
technical subordination to the British. 
See Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., pp.65-66 
10. Patrick 0' Brien (1966) The Revolution in Egypt's  
Economic System from Private Enterprise to Socialism 
1951-1962 (Oxford University Press, London) quoted in 
Malak Zaalouk, op.cit., p.34 
11. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.1102 
12. Malak Zaalouk, op.cit., p.26 
13. Ibid  
14. Ibid, p.44 
15. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1982) The  New Arab Social System: A 
study on the social impact of the oil wealth (Markas 
Dirasat Al Wanda Al Arabiyah, Beirut) p.112 (Arabic) 
16. John Waterbury, op.cit. 
17. Alan Richards (1984) "Ten Years of Infitah: Class, rents, 
and policy stasis in Egypt", Journal of Development  
Studies, 20, 4 July, pp.323-328, quoted in Robert 
Springborg, op.cit., p.45 
18. Ibid, p.46 
19. Ibid  
20. Ibid, p.63 
21. Malak Zaalouk, op.cit., p.63 
22. Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty (1981) "The Social Formation 
and the Future of the Societal Issue in Egypt", The 
Conference on the Framework for Social Work in the Arab 
World, Kuwait, Arab Institute for Planning, quoted in 
Adel Ghoneim, The Egyptian Model of Dependent State 
Capitalism, op.cit., p.88 
23. Examples of the organizations that the commercial 
bourgeoisie practice their power through are the Egyptian 
Chambers of Commerce, The Association for Egyptian 
Businessmen and the Egyptian-American Business Council. 
See Malak Zaalouk, op.cit., p.147 
24. Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty, The Social Formation and the  
Future of the Societal Issue in Egypt, op.cit., pp.91-92 
25. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.63 
176 
26. Ibid,  p.69 
27. Ibid, p.47 
28. See a series of reports in "Al-Ahaly" newspaper about the 
illegal activities of the companies: 
Al-Ahaly, 
 Vol.384, 8 June 1988 
Al-Ahaly, 
 Vol.349, 15 June 1988 
Al-Ahaly, 
 Vol.350, 22 June 1988 
29. Robert Springborg, op.cit., 
 pp.64-65 
30. Ibid 
31. Al-Ahaly Vol.350, 22 June, 1988 
32. Erik Olin Wright (1978) Class, Crisis and the State (NLB, 
London) p.58 
33. Ibid 
34. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., 
 p.28 
35. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, The Political Economy of Nasserism, 
op.cit.,  p.90 
36. Ibid,  p.92 
37. Ibid 
38. Khalid Ikram (1980) Egypt:  Economic management in a 
period of transition (John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore) p.246 
39. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., 
 p.30 
40. Ibid 
41. Khalid Ikram,  	 pp.134-135 
42. Ibid  
43. Robert Springborg, op.cit.,  p.215 
44. Manfred Halpern (1963) The Politics of Social Change in  
the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton Universtiy 




47. Amos Perlmutter, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle 
Class: A comparative analysis", Comparative Studies in 
Society and History Vol. X, No.1, October 1967, p.55 
48. Ibid,  pp.56-57 
177 
49. Ibid, p.60 
50. Ibid, p.64 
51. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1985) "Society Crisis or Class 
Crisis?: A study in the crisis of the new middle class", 
Al  Manar, Vol.6, June, pp.18-19 (Arabic) 
52. Manfred Halpern, op.cit., p.52 
53. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, op.cit., p.20 
54. Ibid, p.21 
55. Ibid 
56. Ibid  
57. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, op.cit., pp.21-22 
58. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, op.cit., p.101 
59. Ibid 
60. Ibid  
61. Ibid, p.102 
62. Ibid 
63. Raymond A. Hinnebusch (1981) "Egypt under Sadat - Elite, 
Power Structure and Political Changes in a Post Populist 
State", Social  Problems, Vol.28, No.4, p.446 
64. Ibid, p.447 
65. Ibid  
66. Manfred Halpern, op.cit., p.60 
67. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, gp.cit., p.23 
68. Ibid, pp.23-24 
69. Ibid, pp.452-453 
70. Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty, The Social Formation and the 
Future of the Societal Issue in Egypt, op.cit., p.93 
71. Nazih N. Ayubi "Domestic Politics", op.cit., p.75 
72. Ibid, p.76 
73. Mona Makram Ebeid,c2p.cit., p.6 
74. "Parasitic" refers to activities in which profits are 
generated mainly through the subversion of the state and 
178 
the conversion of its resources into private wealth. See 
Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.81 and p.209 
75. Nazih N. Ayubi, op.cit., p.76 
76. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.208 
77. The alliance won 56 seats, 35 of them won by the Muslim 
Brothers, 11 for the liberals and 10 by the labour. 
78. Mona Makram Ebeid, op.cit., pp.88-89 
79. The motto of the party became, "Allah Akbar", "Islam is 
the solution", i.e. with faith in God, all problems will 
be solved. 
80 	 B. Heindrick (1982) "The Legal Left: A case study", 
Middle Eastern Studies, (University of Amsterdam) quoted 
in Mona Makram Ebeid, op.cit., p.10 
81. Nazih N. Ayubi, op.cit., p.75 
82. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.21 
83 	 Ibid, p.219 
84 An example of these services is in health, where they 
have seven clinics in Cairo which serve about 50,000 
patients. Service is free of charge. In education they 
operate Qoranic schools and they give extra help for 
students in English, French and German languages. Ibid, 
p.225 
85. Ibid 
86. Ibid, p.231 
87. Ibid  
88. Ibid  
89. Ibid, p.214 
90. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.93 
91. Ibid, p.42 
92. Abdel Azeem Ramadan (1978) Class  Conflict in Egypt 1937-
1952 (Al Moassah Al Arabiyah Lil mashy, Beirut) pp.187- 
188 
93. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, op.cit., p.114 
94. Ibid 
95. Ibid 
96. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.73 
179 
97. Ibid  
98. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.212 
99. Ibid  
100. Ibid, p.213 
101. Ibid  
102. In a survey 35 political scientists were asked about the 
class representation of different parties: 16 said the 
NDUP represented the workers, 19 that it represented 
intellectuals, 4 that it represented the petty 
bourgeoisie and 11 that it had not yet identified its 
position. See Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.209. 
103. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, op.cit., p.93 
104. Ibid, p.95 
180 
CHAPTER FOUR 
EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN EGYPT: 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE CLASS NATURE OF THE SYSTEM 
Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the class nature of the 
education system. This will be done against the background of 
a critical analysis of policies of education from 1952 to the 
present time, with reference to the introduction of modern 
education under and since Muhammad Aly and the influence of 
British rule on the education system. 
The analysis of these points will bring into discussion the 
following issues: 
The impact of colonial rule on the education system and 
on institutions left behind; 
The extent to which formal education in Egypt could 
attack poverty and illiteracy, and increase social 
opportunities. 
The discussion will raise questions about the role of the 
state in education and the extent to which the class nature 
of society influences educational policy. It will also cover 
the extent to which the system of education in Egypt reflects 
the class nature of society, and the contribution of the 
education system to the reduction of class differences in 
society. 
All these points will be discussed in the light of the 
previous theoretical discussion of the crisis of education in 
the developing countries, the class nature of the state, class 
power relations and the different economic and political 
policies introduced in different periods and under different 
development models. 
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I. The Historical Background of the Education System 
(A) The Beginning of Modern Eduction in Egypt: Education 
under Muhammad Aly (1805-1848) 
In order to understand the educational system which Muhammad 
Aly introduced, one must put it into the context of 
modernization. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Egypt was four hundred years behind Europe in terms of 
development, and was under political pressure to shift from 
a feudal agricultural economy to an increasingly industrial 
economy, and from doctrines of medieval theology to the laws 
of modern science.' To establish his modern state, Muhammad 
Aly built up a military machine, a state system, and he had 
a strategy for educational modernization, which came under the 
control of the central government that he built. 
Muhammad Aly's educational system was an elite organization 
to provide technical and military personnel for the factories 
and army.2 From 1809 he sent students to study military 
science in Europe, and in the late 1820s established schools 
of medicine, veterinary science, pharmacy, and technical 
schools of mineralogy, engineering and applied chemistry, 
agriculture and irrigation. All these schools were coordinated 
by a central educational administration.3  
Muhammad Aly's modern education system was not without its 
problems. One of these was that by establishing higher 
education before primary and secondary education, he created 
an inverse educational pyramid. Students of higher education 
came from established religious schools and were not 
adequately prepared for modern higher education.4 The students 
from such traditional religious education institutes as Al-
Azhar were the only literate graduates in the country, but 
they brought with them traditional methods of memorizing, and 
they treated science in the same way as they would theology.3  
A similar phenomenon could be seen with teachers recruited 
from mosque colleges, who brought with them traditional 
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methods of teaching. 
Schools and students were confronted with a duality between 
the traditional methods and the modern scientific ones. 
Language texts were traditional and science texts were modern. 
The students were expected to apply rote methods in language 
studies, and critical methods in other subjects.' This split 
in the education of the nation contributed to the creation of 
a dichotomized and chaotic culture, which resisted change.' 
The danger that the traditional elite felt was that the 
critical thinking might be applied to the domain of social and 
moral values as easily as to the realm of natural phenomena. 
They tried to ensure that scientific studies were seen as a 
body of ready made information and laws, surrounded by and 
standing within the framework of traditional values and ways 
of thinking.' 
Muhammad Aly's education reform was not a mass education 
movement. It was an elitist education designed to replace the 
traditional religious elite with a modern one. The modern 
elite, especially those educated abroad, held government 
posts. This group constituted a new stratum which could 
appropriate for itself many advantages, including high 
salaries, gifts and land.' 
The education system itself was divided between different 
types which reflected the class nature of society even before 
Muhammad Aly. These can be traced back to the Mamluks who 
ruled Egypt from 1256 to 1517, where there was an elite, 
traditional education, which was mainly religious to prepare 
spiritual leaders, military and practical training for the 
ruling class, and on-the-job training for farmers and 
workers." Some of these characteristics were carried forward 
by Muhammad Aly into Egypt's educational system. 
Although Muhammad Aly was successful in modernizing some 
aspects of society, his reforms were not wholly positive. He 
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was the first ruler in an Islamic society to make a massive 
economic development. He revolutionized agricultural methods, 
built a strong army, introduced large scale industry and 
increased trade and commercial capabilities of Egypt.11 
However, his project was entirely dependent upon foreign 
technology, foreign experts and foreign loans. He planted the 
seeds of Egypt's future dependency upon the west, not only in 
economic terms, but also in cultural ones. Foreign minorities 
of Greeks, Armenians and Jews, who were economically 
influential, established their own schools, and after Muhammad 
Aly's death Egypt was increasing subject to the peaceful 
penetration of European powers. 
Rulers who followed Muhammad Aly, including Ismail (1848), 
Abas (1849-54), and Said (1854-63) were not strongly committed 
to the development of state education, and many of his 
educational reforms were reversed, and people returned to the 
normal manner of living before the intensive reform of Egypt.'2 
 
(B) Education under the British Occupation (1882-1920) 
After Muhammad Aly, Egypt entered a phase of economic and 
financial crisis which ended in the British occupation. 
British education policy in Egypt, as expressed by Lord 
Cromer, aimed to achieve four principles: 
1 	 to raise the general level of education in the village 
schools, 
2 	 to create an efficient civil service, 
3 	 to limit access to secondary and higher education to 
avoid creating a group of people whose education would 
"unfit them for manual labour", so that they would look 
exclusively to the government for employment, and 
4 	 to encourage technical education.'' 
To achieve this reduction of opportunity for higher education, 
free education was abolished in 1907, as Cromer believed that 
people only valued what they paid for.'4 
184 
The economic situation in Egypt was such that only the middle 
classes could afford modern education, even though the modern 
primary and elementary schools were supposed to be for the 
poor. The children of the poor went to the 'kuttabs' which 
were founded by the endowment of each mosque." 
Education was poorly funded by the British, and what was spent 
was devoted to a minority. F.O.Mann was sent to Egypt as a 
British advisor in 1928. He stated that four fifths of 
Egyptian educational revenue went towards 'Europeanized' 
schooling (primary, secondary and higher) while one fifth was 
spent on elementary mass education." Educational achievements 
were not impressive. The 1947 census showed that only 369,760 
Egyptians, from a total population of around 18 million, had 
certificates from primary, secondary or university education. 
Only 30 per cent of males and 12 per cent of females were 
literate. This represents a very modest advance on the 
corresponding figures for 1917 (12 per cent and 2 per cent 
respectively). 17  
In spite of the low level of provision, demand for education 
increased, and parents who could afford it were prepared to 
pay for their children's education. In 1906, 1,636 students 
from government schools, and 1,736 students from school funded 
by private donation, applied for the primary certificate. In 
the following year, the number of students from government 
schools had risen to 1,820, while those from private schools 
went up to 19,636.19  
Under the British occupation education was used as means of 
economic, social and cultural domination. It was used to limit 
economic growth, by restricting access. It prepared people to 
work in government posts and to be obedient clerks, civil 
servants and employees.19 English was made the language of 
education. Arabic was later made the language of instruction 
as a response to popular protests, but French and English 
continued to play an important part in the curriculum." Quite 
apart from government provision, a whole body of foreign 
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schools existed in Egypt from the time of Muhammad Aly, and 
these continued under the British occupation. These schools 
represented a European, and particularly a French, cultural 
influence, and were an instrument of cultural dependency and 
class differentiation. Those who could afford foreign schools, 
either in Egypt or abroad, could monopolize for themselves the 
prestigious positions in government service and dominate the 
professions.21 
Not all the consequences of education, however, were negative. 
In spite of the restrictions, the national and popular efforts 
helped Egyptians to afford education for their children. Those 
educated Egyptians who formed the middle class and the 
intellectuals of society were not alienated from the Egyptian 
masses as the British thought they would be; on the contrary, 
they were the main source of resistance to the British 
occupation. 
(C) Education under the National Movement (1920 - 1952) 
The National Movement was faced by a divided educational 
system: it was a mixture of 500 years of Islamic 'kuttabs', 
300 years of missionary and language schools, and 40 years of 
British influence.22 The National Movement aimed for diverse 
goals, including state control over education, encouraging 
public efforts to establish schools, the establishment of a 
domestic university, and the reform of religious education. 
The education system also had serious internal problems. 
Literacy was still low, especially in rural areas. The country 
needed primary education to prepare secular leaders. This 
brought inevitable conflict with the traditional religious 
leaders who taught mostly religious subjects in the 'kuttabs'. 
To achieve these reforms, teacher training would have to be 
improved, more resources allocated to education, and salaries 
improved.23 
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In their attempts to reform and democratize education in the 
1940s, the National Movement came into conflict with some 
parts of the bourgeoisie. Hafez Ahefy, a well known capitalist 
figure, said in parliament that, "The government cannot spend 
on education, as it has a limited budget. If parents do not 
pay for their children's education, this will limit the 
ability of the government to open more schools or to improve 
education standards" .24 The bourgeoisie were not unanimous in 
opposing free education, however, and some figures, like Al 
Hilaly, argued that the Egyptian government should follow the 
developed modern world and provide free primary and secondary 
education.25  
Similar divisions of opinion can be seen among the 
intellectuals. Husain Haykal, a leading figure in the Liberal 
Constitutional Party, and Minister of Education from 1938 to 
1939 held conservative views about the general expansion of 
education. On the other hand he encouraged the expansion of 
education in rural areas to slow down the drift to the urban 
areas. He argued that, "If education becomes the rule and 
illiteracy the exception, the literate peasants would not be 
able to consider primary education as a means of creating a 
distinction" .26 
The Egyptian intellectuals also had to answer the question of 
who should be educated beyond primary level. They found a 
spokesman in the leading figure of Egyptian literature, Taha 
Hussein, who was Minister of Education from 1950 to 1952. He 
was very critical of the religious education of Al Azhar, 
where he himself had graduated. He was fascinated by western 
culture, and thought Egypt to be part of the Mediterranean 
classical civilization. He stressed the importance of 
education for democracy and for the development of the 
individual. But on post-primary education his view was that 
not everybody needed to know about science, history and 
foreign languages. Higher education, in his view, should be 
restricted to those who could pay, and to a number of poor 
people who could prove that they were qualified for this kind 
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of education through examinations. Taha Hussein's views on 
education for democracy did not mean that he believed that all 
people should be allowed to go beyond primary education." 
So Egyptian intellectuals supported free and universal 
education up to a point. But there were other views, apart 
from those of the capitalists and western secular 
intellectuals. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1929, and 
they gained the support of many young people at the university 
and in the rural class. They had their own social and 
educational activities, establishing mosques and schools, 
sending 'rover' groups to villages and urban quarters for 
literacy and hygiene campaigns, and spreading propaganda." 
The National Movement, therefore, incorporated some of the 
tensions in Egyptian education: between those who promoted 
popular education for democracy, and those who saw mass 
education as a threat to the existing social order; between 
those who wanted a move towards western culture, and those who 
were promoting traditional fundamental Islamic thought. But 
in all its different ideological factions, the National 
Movement was fighting against the British economic, political, 
and cultural destruction of the society. 
From the point of view of the present research, the 
fundamental questions are whether the National Movement 
succeeded in crossing the divide between modern and 
traditional education, and could it succeed in achieving 
democracy in education. In fact, education remained 'elitist' 
right up to 1952, and school fees were an obstacle to the 
democratization of education. For the majority, primary school 
fees were only abolished in 1944, and high school fees in 
1951.29 If one compares trends in literacy in the period of the 
National Movement with the period after the 1952 Revolution, 
one can see how little the National Movement achieved, 
compared with the potential which was tapped later. 
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Table 1: Illiteracy Trends in Egypt, by gender, 1907 - 1960 
Total persona 	 Persons not 
	
Illiteracy 	 illiteracy 	 Total 
aged 10 and 	 able to 	 Rats 	 Rata 
over 
	
read 	 Male 	 Female 
1907 2,848,024 2,277,303 87.0 98.6 92.7 
1917 9,161,944 8,357,461 84.8 97.7 91.2 
1927 10,268,404 8,816,601 76.1 95.6 85.9 
1937 11,603,488 9,885,300 76.6 93.8 85.2 
1947 13,489,946 10,407,972 66.1 88.2 77.2 
1960 17,914,323 12,584,686 56.6 83.8 70.3 
Source: 	 Donald C.Mead (1967) Growth and Structural Change 
in the Egyptian Economy (Richard D.Irwin Inc., 
Homewood, Ill.) Statistical Appendix 301, Table 11 
A 6, quoted in Mahmud Faksh, (1980) "The 
consequences of the introduction of modern education 
and national integration in Egypt", in Elie Kedourie 
and Sylvia Hiam, Modern Egypt: Studies in politics 
and society, (Frank Cass, London) p.48 
According to these figures, we can say that the gap remained 
between the educated youth of Egypt and the illiterate masses. 
Modern and foreign education were on one side, and religious 
education was on the other, and education continued to 
separate the classes. The tasks of achieving democracy of 
education, of promoting equality of opportunities, and of 
bringing cultural unity to the society were among the most 
urgent tasks which faced the Revolution of 1952. The following 
section will show the extent to which the system of education 
after 1952 succeeded. 
II. Education Under The Revolution (1952  to the present) 
The analysis of education under the Revolution concentrates 
upon different policies of education, and different reforms 
introduced by the state. The analysis will emphasize the 
different economic, social and political ideologies under 
which the policies were initiated. The analysis will cover two 
periods. These are: 
(A) The period under Nasser and the socialist policies, from 
1952 to 1970; and 
(B) The period under Sadat and the open door policy, from 
1970 to the present day. 
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(A) Education under Nasser and the Socialist Policies (1952-
1970) 
From the picture of education before 1952, it is not 
surprising that Nasser's main priorities were to bring 
national integration and the enhance the secularization of the 
system of education. Under Nasser, education reform was 
concentrated on mass education, science and technology, and 
the nationalization of foreign education. Arabic language and 
military training in schools were used as a means of unifying 
the country." In his speeches, Nasser emphasized the 
importance of education in liberating individuals, in 
achieving equality, and in building society. Educational 
policies under Nasser reflected the ideological, political and 
economic structure of the society, which is to say they were 
part of the development plan. 
During the early years of the Revolution, from 1952 to 1956, 
while the emphasis was upon political liberation, education 
policy was not radically changed, as there was no explicit 
ideological guide for action at this point.31 The main reforms 
of the period were the unification and expansion of primary 
level education, with revision of the textbooks and 
curriculum. Instruction was further standardized by the 
introduction of a sixth grade examination, but the curriculum 
still depended upon memorization.32  
In 1953 the education ladder was reorganized to comprise four 
stages: primary education, with entry between the ages of 6 
and 8, and lasting for six years, preparatory education, 
lasting for three years starting between the ages of 12 to 14, 
secondary education of three years to follow preparatory 
education, and higher education starting between the ages of 
18 and 20. Higher education involved technical training for 
2 years, higher technical institutes for 4 or 5 years, and 
universities for 4, 5 or 6 years.33 For the details of the 
educational ladder, see Appendix 9. 
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Later on in 1957 to 1961, after the triangular attack on 
Egypt, and the system started to gain more confidence and 
legitimacy, more attention was given to education. The main 
targets were to achieve universal primary education within ten 
years, and to diversify post-primary education with an 
emphasis on technical and vocational education, and 
qualitative improvements in the areas of curriculum, teacher 
training and educational administration." 
Over time the ideological line of the Revolution became 
clearer. The period 1961 to 1967 witnessed the emergence of 
the first ideological document, "The Charter for National 
Action". The whole period was marked by a clear move towards 
socialism, and setting the first development plan of 1960-65. 
In the Charter there is an emphasis on science which Nasser 
considered to be "the weapon with which revolutionary triumph 
can be achieved".35 Socialist policies were based on the 
nationalization of the industry and banks and the 
establishment of a public sector. In education the emphasis 
was on rationalization and the politicization of schools, and 
relating educational policy to the requirements of the 
development plan, and achieving equal opportunity for all 
people." 
This period witnessed the establishment of new organizations 
and institutions, including the Supreme Council for National 
Planning, and the Institute of National Planning, and the 
Committee on National Education. This last committee had 
responsibility for the politicization of the schools, and was 
charged with the task of forming "a new generation of youth 
who understand the stage through which their nation is 
passing".37 These ideas had to find application in the 
textbooks. There were compulsory lessons on socialist 
principles, textbooks stressed the correctness of government 
policies, and emphasised the links between Islam and 
socialism." 
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In this period, Egypt, like many other developing countries, 
used education as a means of achieving political legitimacy 
for the system, by spreading political doctrine. Education was 
used to achieve economic goals by preparing the labour power 
for development, and education was used to achieve social 
integration in terms of expanding the system in order to 
bridge the gap between the illiterate majority and the 
educated minority. 
There were also quantitative changes in the educational system 
which went alongside these qualitative changes. There was an 
enormous expansion in the spending on education under Nasser, 
which gave formal education a great value in achieving 
economic, social and political targets in the sixties. The 
figures show that enrolment in primary education rose from 1.5 
million in 1952/53, which represented 45 per cent of the 
children of primary school age, to 2.7 million, or 65 per 
cent, in 1960/61, and 3.7 million, or 80 per cent, in 1967. 
In preparatory education the rate of development was less than 
in primary, and in secondary education it was lower still. 
Only a quarter of the students who finished primary education 
were to move to preparatory education and then secondary 
education. According to estimates of the Ministry of 
Education, only 40 per scent of those who finished six years 
of primary school entered secondary school." 
The enrolment in secondary education rose by approximately one 
third over the period 1951 to 1961. The number rose from 
92,062 to 126,607 for industrial and commercial schools, while 
agricultural schools more than quadrupled, from 14,356 to 
67,895. By 1969/70 the number of students enroled in academic 
institutions had more than doubled, rising to 293,144, while 
the number of students receiving technical education 
quadrupled to 241,590.4° Expansion over the period 1952 to 1972 
is shown in Appendix 10. 
University education grew by 325 per cent between 1950 and 
1970. This expansion took place in the four major universities 
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in Egypt.41  
In the academic year 1970/71 the number of students who 
attended higher institutes was 36,414, and 23,741 students 
attended Al Azhar (the Islamic University). The total number 
of students in different higher education institutes reached 
212,437 students.42  
The great expansion of the education system under the 
Revolution cannot be denied. However, the system could not 
achieve full primary enrolment, and was still suffering from 
high drop-out and illiteracy rates. The particular class 
implications of these points will be discussed in detail 
later. 
Over this period, expenditure on education rose. The figures 
show that spending went up from about LE 23 million in 1952/53 
(less than 3 per cent of gross domestic product) to about LE 
130 million in 1970/71 (4.1 per cent of GDP)." The class 
distribution of benefits from this increased expenditure will 
also be discussed later. 
(B) Education under the Open Door Policy (1970 to the 
present) 
In 1970 Sadat came to power after the death of Nasser. In 
Chapter Two it has been shown that many of the political, 
social and economic efforts of the Nasserist period had been 
brought to an end by the defeat in the 1967 war. More 
fundamental changes came to the social, economic and political 
system only later on, with the economic open door policy of 
1974. The important point about the open door policy is to 
recognise its social impact, and the class nature of the 
policy. This must be related to an analysis of education 
policy in the seventies. The open door policy opened Egypt to 
foreign and private capital, encouraged the private sector, 
and in social terms worked for the benefit of the middle and 
upper classes. This development model, as will be shown in the 
following analysis, was linked to an educational policy which 
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favoured the same classes. 
The application of these policies led to an educational crisis 
in the seventies. But before that can be studied it is 
necessary to identify the main characteristics of the 
educational system, as defined by the Constitution of 1971 and 
Law No. 139. 
According to the Constitution, the four principles guiding the 
education system are: 
1. Education is a right, guaranteed by the state. 
2. The state shall supervise education. 
3. Education is free in all state institutions and at all 
levels. 
4. Primary education is compulsory. 
The educational system is organized under Law No. 139 of 1981. 
According to the law, the system of education consists of the 
following stages: 
1. Basic education for 9 years (subsequently reduced to 8 
years in 1988) 
2. General and technical education for 3 years. 
3. Advanced technical education for 5 years.'" 
For details of the education ladder in the seventies see 
Appendix 11. 
Theoretically, the main principles which guide the education 
system have not changed since the sixties, although the 
educational ladder has been changed in its basic level, where 
compulsory education was introduced for nine years in 1981, 
and reduced to eight years in 1988. 
The whole education system is suffering from a crisis in 
finance, in quality of education, in buildings, teacher 
training and management. The roots of this crisis date back 
to 1967, when all Egypt's efforts and resources were allocated 
to the preparation for war. At that time, most of the economic 
and social development programmes were suspended. The size and 
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gravity of the crisis is identified by a report by the 
National Council in 1980.45 The report concentrates on primary 
education, and identified the following problems: 
1. The total annual cost is LE 28.8 per pupil per year (LE1 
= approximately $1) of which LE 20.5 is appropriated for 
wages, with the pupil actually receiving approximately 
LE 9 per year. 
2. There are in excess of 10,000 teachers of some 
specializations, most of whom have not received 
educational training, and a "grave shortage" of classroom 
teachers. However, the report does not specify which 
specializations suffer from shortages. 
3. 48.8 per cent of the teachers have been trained in 
teacher training institutes. The rest are not 
certificated. 
4. There is a discrepancy between the required 846 class 
periods and the 648 actually taught. 
5. Of the total 8,027 primary buildings, only 4,453, or 56 
per cent, are suitable for educational purposes, 907 (11 
per cent) need to be pulled down, and the remaining 2,667 
buildings need basic repairs. For more statistics on 
educational buildings see Appendix 12. 
6. 1,903, or 24 per cent, of the primary school buildings 
lacked sanitary utilities, 560 lacked drinkable water, 
and 4,837 (60 per cent) lacked electricity. 
7. 1,970 schools operated only in the afternoon, and 1,972 
schools were on a double shift system. 
8. Failures in the second and fourth grades amounted to 
about 15 per cent of each grade. The total drop out rate 
between the ages of six and twelve was about 20 per cent. 
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Wastage through failures and drop out was evaluated at 
LE 27 million per year. 
If this was the situation in primary schools, things were not 
any better in preparatory education, where classes were 
crowded, and building not originally designed as schools were 
used for educational purposes. In technical education there 
was a problem in that graduates were of poor quality and not 
fitted to the needs of the labour force. Teacher training was 
poor, and the low salaries of teachers led many to look for 
other jobs, or to supplement their income with private 
tuition. The problem of illiteracy persisted. 
Facing these problems, the state introduced a number of acts 
and reforms throughout the seventies and eighties. The two 
main reforms were "Developing and Innovating Education in 
Egypt" in 1980, and "The Strategy for Developing Education in 
Egypt" in 1989. The 1980 reform had to take into account the 
fact that illiteracy still stood at 56.5 per cent in 1976, 
that incomplete enrolment reached 75 per cent in 1980, and 
that there was a need to expand technical education and to 
supply schools with better equipment and buildings. 
The reform programme was based upon: 
* the expansion of pre-school child education, 
* fostering basic education, 
* developing general secondary education to prepare 
students for life as well as university, 
* presenting some vocational programmes in academic 
schools, 
* the expansion of technical education, 
* promoting education in the regions of a special nature, 
including the reclaimed agricultural areas, Sinai and new 
communities, and 
* consolidating non-formal education." 
The policy of 1980, which was designed to face the 
deteriorating situation in educational finance, buildings, 
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curriculum and enrolment, could not achieve its targets, and 
led to the 1989 strategy for developing education. The 
strategy identified the continuing problems in the education 
system and the education process. 
The strategy criticizes the system of education for having no 
comprehensive policy, and for having no national character. 
It argues that education is not integrated with other sectors 
in society, and that education policies are designed without 
reference to teachers and parents. Most educational reforms 
had been partial, and not part of a comprehensive strategy to 
change society. The strategy also criticized people for not 
cooperating with the government in building new schools and 
sharing the expense of education with government.47  
The strategy identifies a number of problems in education, 
including curriculum development, teacher training, 
educational management, the examination system, drop out and 
school buildings, which have reached a very poor state of 
deterioration. 
The strategy introduces six axes for solving these problems, 
which at the same time form the basis for educational policy 
for the eighties. 
1. The increase in the efficiency of educational democracy, 
by quantitative expansion, building new schools, reducing 
class capacity, full enrolment in primary education and 
the control of private lessons. 
2. The expansion of technical education, and raising its 
standard by improving the curriculum, using new 
technology, planning and preparing the technical school 
teacher. 
3. Teacher training; teachers should be trained at 
university level, improving their social position. 
4 	 Finance of Education: 
Facing the problems of finance the strategy refers to the 
study by the World Bank on "Financing Education in the 
Developing Countries" of 1986. The World Bank study 
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advises the developing countries to reduce spending on 
higher education, to give grants to distinguished 
students in higher education and to decentralize 
education administration and expand private schools. The 
strategy comments upon these suggestions, and in so doing 
identifies its own position from that of the World Bank. 
On reducing spending on higher education, the strategy 
says that such a reduction does not fit with the aims of 
the policy, which are to give more care to higher 
education, because of its high social return. However, 
the policy does believe that more spending should go to 
primary education. 
The strategy does agree with the decentralization of the 
system. 
On private education, the strategy notes that expansion 
is acceptable as a way of reducing government 
expenditure. 
5. Increasing educational management efficiency, and the 
decentralization of the educational administration. 
6. Improving educational quality, by improving educational 
content, the examination system and the educational 
ladder. 
(i) The Core of the Policy of Education in the Eighties: 
Critical Analysis 
From the different reform programmes the core of the policy 
of education can be identified and critically analyzed. The 
critique of policy will comprise some of the theoretical ideas 
behind the policy. The presence or absence of equality of 
educational opportunity will be taken as an indicator of the 
class nature of the policies and the dependency of the system. 
The main trends which control the policy are: 
1. 
	
	 At the primary level, the adoption of basic education, 
and the introduction of a differentiated education 
service at this level in the form of fee paying schools 
run by the government, where the language of instruction 
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is English or French. 
2. At the secondary level, the control of general secondary 
education and the expansion of technical education. 
3. At university level, the control of the expansion of 
higher education. 
Primary Education: 
The quantitative analysis of this level shows that the main 
target of reform is to expand enrolment. In 1980 the enrolment 
was 75 per cent, i.e 4.3 million males and females in the age 
range 6 to 12. This number nearly doubled to 7.7 million in 
1984/85. 48 
To help deprived areas, the Ministry of Education applied the 
experiment of one or two classroom schools as an attempt to 
depart from the traditional method set for primary schools. 
As part of a long term plan, 1,650 schools of this type were 
inaugurated up to 1976/77 as part of a plan to build 5,000 
schools in five years.49  
In terms of quality and kind of education presented at this 
level, two main changes have taken place. Basic education was 
introduced in 1979, and experimental government language 
schools were set up in 1979. 
Basic education is a compulsory education for nine years. It 
comprises both primary level for six years and the preparatory 
level for three years. The meaning and aims of this education 
were identified in the programme of developing and innovating 
education in 1980 as a compulsory stage of nine years, aiming 
to provide learners with values, codes of conduct, knowledge 
and practical skills that are suited to the various 
environments (agricultural, industrial, urban and rural), so 
that those who have completed the stage of basic education can 
either engage in the world of work or continue to higher 
stages." 
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An Egyptian/American team identified the objectives of basic 
education as: 
1. Expanding enrolment 
2. Education content relevant to regional needs 
3. Instruction for social needs (citizenship, health, 
hygiene, sound behaviour and religious values) 
4. Emphasis on skills formation and practical training 
5. Coordination with other education skill training by 
employers, adult and non-formal education, secondary and 
higher education. 
The aims and objectives of basic education are not achieved 
in reality. The report on the condition of primary education 
in the eighties which was discussed earlier shows that schools 
are suffering from bad conditions for buildings, a shortage 
of equipment and qualified teachers. When basic education was 
applied in these schools, there were not the right conditions 
in terms of physical provision and staff qualifications.51 
The experimental government language schools were established 
by Ministerial Decree No. 2 in 1979. The aims of the schools 
have been identified in the internal regulations of these 
schools as: 
1. The expansion of teaching foreign languages, science and 
mathematics by foreign language, following the example 
of the foreign language schools 
2. Giving an individual care to each child. In order to 
achieve that, the capacity of each class should not 
exceed 36 pupils. 
31 experimental schools were opened in 1978/79, mostly in 
Cairo and Giza. 19 of the schools were in Cairo, while each 
of the other governorates had one or two schools. The schools 
are not evenly distributed in Cairo, with 8 in Heleopolis, but 
North Cairo, with a population of 4 million, having only two. 




There are two kinds of technical schools at this level: 
1. Three year technical schools for skilled workers, and 
2. Five year schools for technicians in commercial, 
agricultural and industrial field. 
The main target of the government is to expand this type of 
education. In 1976/77, this education enroled 40,000 students, 
or 52 per cent of the students in secondary education." The 
five year plan aims to raise this percentage to 63.5.54  
Technical education is described as a panacea for all the 
problems of education. But this form of education also suffers 
from two problems. The first is the quality of the entrants, 
and the second is the distribution of students between 
different types of technical education. 
Technical education is not popular, and the entrants are 
generally poor quality students who could not obtain the 
grades necessary for general secondary education. This 
admission process may discourage some more able students from 
applying. The best graduates of preparatory schools go to 
general secondary education; the next best group go to 
commercial, industrial or agricultural schools; while the 
lowest graduates go to teacher training institutes to be 
trained as primary school teachers.55  
Internally, there is an uneven distribution of students 
between the specializations of industry, agriculture and 
commerce. There is a surplus of graduates from commercial 
schools, while there is a shortage of graduates from 
industrial schools. Table 2 shows the figures for graduates 
and job vacancies in the different fields. Because of this 
unbalanced distribution, technical school students will be 
allocated as follows: 47 per cent going to industrial schools, 
40 per cent to commercial schools and 13 percent to 
agricultural schools." 
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Table 2: Shortage and Overproduction in Different Technical 
School Specializations: 1978 
Graduates Kind of Applicants for Job vacancies Surplus 
(000's) Zducation jobs (000's) Shortage 
30.8 Industr'l 20.1 65% 22.6 - 2.5 
71.6 Commerc'l 48.8 68% 30.4 18.4 
12.3 Agric't'l 9.8 80% 7.0 2.8 
Source: 	 Ministry of Labour Power (1983) The Implicit  Effects 
of  the Population Change and Development of 
Education on the  Labour Power in Egvpt: Trends and 
Expectations, p.152, Table No.414 (Arabic) 
The reasons for these surpluses and shortages have something 
to do with the poor financial state of these schools. 
Industrial schools, with their need for equipment, new 
technology and machines, are expensive to equip properly. 
Commercial schools are cheap by comparison. This leads into 
a discussion of the financing of education. 
The Ministry of Education has made it clear that new projects 
in technical education will be financed by the World Bank. The 
allocation of resources is a major problem. Three solutions 
or sources have been suggested to date." 
1. The technical schools should have their own projects, 
where they can produce and sell the production. This is 
called "The permanent capital educational project". 
2. Technical schools should be linked to commercial 
projects, and the students allowed to work and earn 
wages, and at the same time receive training in the 
projects. 
3. Loans should be obtained from international 
organizations. This is the scheme which is most likely 
to operate. 
The five year plan for 1987 to 1992 envisages the 
establishment of 53 industrial schools, 18 agricultural and 
29 commercial at a total cost of 73 million pounds: 21 million 
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for educational projects and 52 million for general projects. 
To equip these schools during the five year period would cost 
a total of 235.8 million pound (120.1 million in hard 
currency, and 48.7 million in national currency)." This 
strategy notes that, "This money must be allocated from 
production sectors and self efforts, or through foreign loans 
and aid".59 The 1987 strategy admitted that the schools had 
been poorly equipped, with shortages of buildings, equipment 
and teaching staff." 
The pervasive nature of technical education in all level of 
education in Egypt suggests that it has a theoretical 
foundation. This theoretical base lies in what is known as 
adaptive education, or relevant education, which was well 
known in Europe and America in the nineteenth century, where 
this education was used to bring together the world of school 
and the world of the surrounding community." This kind of 
education is seen in many developing countries as a means of 
attacking rural poverty and connecting the school experience 
to the world of work and community life. However, this kind 
of education has not been successful in many developing 
countries, and has been rejected by people in some cases. 
Examples can be found in India under colonial rule in the 
nineteenth century, where families rejected the curricula of 
the rural schools which emphasized the indigenous system of 
arithmetic and accounting and agriculturally relevant topics. 
These families wanted their children to be qualified for 
higher schooling and government service, which was only open 
to those who had followed more orthodox urban schooling." This 
clearly has a direct bearing upon the equality of access to 
higher level of education. 
Similar experiments were unsuccessful where an attempt was 
made to substitute vocational education for general education, 
in the hope that the school would be able to adjust to meet 
new economic demands. When these experiments failed, some 
critics were moved to observe that, "Schools are remarkably 
clumsy instruments for inducing prompt, large-scale changes 
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in underdeveloped countries".63  
According to this argument, schools alone cannot change the 
poor reality of societies where, "The crucial variables lie 
instead in the structure of incentives within the economic 
system and the degree to which the institutional milieu is 
supportive of entrepreneurial activity. Without such a milieu, 
no amount of vocational instruction can be effective since the 
skills required will not be utilized" .64 
If one applies this argument to the case of Egypt, this 
expansion of technical education cannot be expected to solve 
the problems of education, because these changes are not part 
of a radical change in the economic and social structure. 
Moreover, this education has been introduced in Egypt to be 
an education for the working class. Class differences in the 
approach to technical education will be discussed in detail 
later in this chapter. 
University Education: 
As part of the policy of controlling admission to general 
academic education, university level education has witnessed 
a decline in student numbers since 1984/85 (see Appendix 13). 
(ii) Other Features of Reform Programmes and Educational 
Policies: 
One feature which is prominent in recent reforms is a move 
towards fee paying education, as a solution to the financial 
problems of the system. This has clear class implications, as 
will be discussed later. As will then become clear, these 
class differences are, as one would expect, in favour of the 
upper and middle classes. It needs only be noted here, that 
in its justification of increasing fee paying schools, the 
government argued the exact opposite; that poor families would 
be unduly disadvantaged by the provision of universal and free 
education. "It has been noticed that free education will 
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increase the pressure upon educational institutes, and the 
rich can make good use of it because they can guarantee better 
opportunities for their children, while the poor cannot find 
a place because of that increasing pressure upon the limited 
places. Besides the sharing of the rich and poor in free 
education will limit the opportunity of the poor to make good 
use of free education"." 
The report on developing education suggests some ways to 
overcome the problems of education: 
1. The establishment of a "treasurer's office for education" 
to be financed by a tax paid by the people, this money 
to be allocated for education. 
2. Owners of private schools and parents who have their 
children in private schools should pay money to this 
office, because that is one of the obligations of "social 
solidarity" .66 
The Decline in Spending on Education, Compared with Other 
Sectors: 
The strategy of 1989 stresses that spending on education 
should rise, from LE 571 million in 1981/82 to LE 1,614 
million in 1988/89, and that the percentage spent on education 
as part of the national budget should also increase. It has 
increased from 8.21 per cent of the budget in 1981/82 to 8.87 
per cent in 1983.84 (see Appendix 14) which shows that there 
has been some progress. However, this has to be seen against 
changes in the seventies, when the proportion of the budget 
going to education decreased, while the proportion of spending 
on the oppressive state apparatus (security forces and the 
army) rose sharply. See Appendix 15. 
The Influence of Foreign Organizations on Egyptian Education: 
In the discussion of the finances of education, the growing 
role of international organizations, and particularly the 
World Bank, has already been noted. Foreign pressure has 
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influenced the decision to reduce the length of basic 
education, and British consultants have been used by the 
Ministry of Education in reforming the examination system and 
establishing the Open University in Egypt, French consultants 
in developing science and mathematics curricula, German 
consultants in developing technical education, and Americans 
to advise on financing education projects." 
Such intervention from foreign organizations reflects the 
indirect forms of neo-colonialism which represents itself in 
the cultural hegemony of the west and the undermining of the 
independence of decision making in education. 
The Missing Aspect in the Reform and Policy: A Literacy 
Programme: 
The reform and policy in the eighties has paid lip service to 
the issue of a literacy programme. As will be explained later, 
literacy is still one of the major problems which faces Egypt. 
However, the LE 50 million allocated for literacy programmes 
amounts to no more than LE 2 for each illiterate person, since 
it is estimated that there will be 25 million illiterates in 
Egypt by the year 2000.68  
The strategy referred to the literacy problem as a "national 
issue", i.e. it is not only the responsibility of the state 
to solve the problem, but also a responsibility of the unions, 
popular organizations and different economic and social 
establishments. In reality, calling the problem a national 
issue has resulted in dividing the responsibility to the 
extent that there is no one authority which can be held 
responsible even to monitor the progress in applying the 
programmes. 
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III. The Class Nature of the Education System in Egypt and 
the Reproduction of the Class Structure  
After discussing the main features which characterize the 
policy of education in Egypt, this section concentrates upon 
the class nature of education in Egypt, and how the education 
system works to reproduce the existing class structure of 
society at the economic, cultural and ideological level. 
The reproduction of the existing class structure and the 
contradictions of the school are both existent in developed 
and developing countries. However, the way that reproduction 
operates differs in the developing countries and must be 
understood in those countries and in relation to the 
international order as well. 
In the advanced capitalist countries there was capitalist 
support for the expansion of primary schooling in order to 
develop a habit of respect for the liberal state and other 
forms of bureaucratic authority which could replace 
traditional religious authority, at the same time as preparing 
skilled workers for modern technology." 
In capitalist society, both workers and capitalists have an 
interest in promoting education among wage earners, while in 
developing countries capitalists, landlords and the 
traditional elite were opposed to universal education in their 
societies. The opposition to universal education can be 
understood in terms of the mode of production in the 
underdeveloped countries, which constitute the periphery of 
the capitalist centre. That is, those countries which are 
integrated into the capitalist market are forced to adjust 
their production to the requirements of the market, and tend 
to specialize in one form of production, which is mainly the 
production of raw materials, which does not require advanced 
technology. Consequently, workers do not need to be trained 
in school. In addition to that, in such a mode of production, 
education is a means by which children escape from the 
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traditional economy.70  
So the nature of the accumulation process and the class 
alliances in the periphery are different from those in the 
centre, and they are likely to produce different patterns of 
educational expansion. Popular pressure from different 
classes, and for ideological considerations, produced 
expansion in the education system, which took the form of a 
dual education system. This consisted of a cheap and second 
rate education system for the majority and a relatively 
expensive education system just sufficient to promote 
productivity and to prevent labour shortages in the capitalist 
mode. 71 
The Egyptian education system is a case in point, where the 
dichotomy is found between free and fee paying schools, 
between foreign and Arabic schools, and between secular and 
religious education. Consequently, the role of the Egyptian 
education system in reproducing class structure will be 
studied on five dimensions: 
(A) Illiteracy, drop out, enrolment and rural-urban 
differences in education opportunities. 
(B) The changes in primary education and their class nature. 
(C) Technical education and its social value. 
(D) Higher education and its social value. 
(E) Foreign education and the expansion of private education. 
(A) Illiteracy, Drop Out, Enrolment and Rural-Urban 
Differences in Education Opportunities 
According to the 1976 census, the total illiteracy rate for 
the country was 56.3 per cent. However, these were not evenly 
distribution, and illiteracy rates and level of qualification 
give some indication of the differences between rural and 
urban areas and between males and females. In 1976 68.5 per 
cent of illiterates were in rural areas, although 57 per cent 
of the population live in those areas. Table No.3 shows this 
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distribution in more detail. 
Table 3: Distribution of Levels of Education in Rural and 
Urban Areas in 1976 
Educational State 	 Urban % Rural % Total % 
in society 


















Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics, 1976 Census 
There is also a major difference in enrolment levels between 
rural and urban areas. A comparison between Cairo and one of 
the rural governorates of Fayom in 1982 shows that enrolment 
in urban areas can be as high as 88.1 per cent, and in rural 
areas as low as 32.7 per cent.72 The national total enrolment 
for Egypt for young people between the ages of 5 and 15 is 
54.2 per cent, according to the same source. Enrolment for the 
first year of basic education was 94.2 per cent in urban 
areas, and 31.3 per cent in rural areas. Recent figures for 
enrolment at the national level in 1986/87 show that 93.9 per 
cent are in the first year of basic education. 
There are also differences between the enrolment rates for 
boys and girls. There are more boys than girls enroled in all 
levels of education, but this difference is even more extreme 
if one considers rural areas alone. The figures are given in 
Table 4. 
These percentages show the gap between rural and urban Egypt, 
and between male and female. One must also suppose that there 
are dramatic class differences which parallel the differences 
noted in these tables. 
With reference to drop out rates, a longitudinal study was 
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Table 4: Enrolment of Boys and Girls in Education in Urban and 
Rural Areas in 1982 
Rural Areas 
Boys 	 Girls 
Urban Areas 
Boys 	 Girls 
First year of 
basic education 
41.5 19.2 95.8 93.5 
Primary education 
overall 
50.7 16.1 96.4 89.8 
Basic education 53.9 16.1 93.1 83.0 
Source: 	 Samir Lewis Saad (1982) Enrolment of children in 
basic education schools (The National Center for 
Educational Research, Cairo) 
conducted over the period from 1956/57 to 1978/79.73 At the 
beginning of the period, in particular in 1959/60, where the 
study could find statistics, the percentage of drop out from 
the whole six grades was 9.3 per cent. At the end of the 
sixties, in 1968/69, it became 8.8 per cent, while in the 
seventies it dropped to 5.2 per cent in 1978/79. Table 5 shows 
estimates of the wastage produced by drop out, translated into 
terms of percentage of the education budget. 
Table 5: Percentage Wastage on the National Education Budget 
through Drop Out: 1956-1979 
Year 	 Percentage Wastage in the Education Budget 
1956/57 	 11.39 
1973/74 	 5.76 
1977/78 	 6.7 
1978/79 	 5.4 
Source: Samir Lewis Saad (1980) Prop out in Primary 
Education from 1956/57 to 1978/79 (The National 
Center for Educational Research with the World Bank, 
Cairo) 
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Other recent figures on basic education (i.e. primary and 
preparatory) show that drop out from basic education in 
1983/84 amounted to 25.1 per cent of the total number of 
children of basic school age.74 This means that drop out is 
increasing and persists as a major problem. Probably, the open 
door policy has encouraged the tendency to leave school and 
make money without qualifications. 
The figures show that drop out persists as a major problem. 
Although there is no direct study of the social background of 
drop outs, Samir Lewis gives some indicators for the reasons 
for drop out, which can be understood in terms of class 
position. These factors, which are social, economic and 
educational, include size of family, the early marriage of 
girls, especially in rural areas, a weak relationship between 
the child and his school and teachers, and punishment at 
school which makes the child hate school. Many schools operate 
shift systems, which shorten the amount of time a child may 
be in contact with teachers, and this situation is made worse 
by teacher shortages. Many rural children will also live a 
long way from their schoo1.75  
Studies from other developing countries concerned with the 
sociological and economic aspects of education have supported 
the notion that the lowest income groups typically have not 
been able to have the same effective access to primary 
education as the higher income groups, because of social and 
economic factors. These include the opportunity cost of labour 
of primary education is higher for these groups, the benefits 
are lower, and consequently the private rate of return from 
such education is much lower. These factors contribute to the 
high drop out rates and the low enrolment rates in primary 
education.76 These considerations of the opportunity costs of 
education naturally lead into the consideration of child 
labour. 
The Labour Law of 1981 rationalized the position of child 
labour, but did not eliminate the phenomenon. According to the 
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law, employing or training children who are under 12 years of 
age is banned, and against the law. The law is not applied in 
agricultural areas, where there is a persisting need for child 
labour. The law would appear to be in flat contradiction to 
the basic education law, which states that compulsory 
education lasts to the age of 15.77 The figures show that the 
percentage of workers in the age group 6 to 12 has risen from 
2.7 per cent in 1974 to 7 per cent in 1984, expressed as a 
percentage of the total labour force. For further details see 
Appendix 16. 
The majority of children (around 71 per cent) work in 
agriculture. In urban areas there is a shortage of information 
and studies on child labour and the kind of activities they 
are involved in. However, some indication is given by a sample 
conducted by the Ministry of Labour in 1985. The survey 
studied the cases of 83,397 industrial projects which employed 
children under the age of 17. Table 6 shows their distribution 
between sectors. 
Table 6: 	 Distribution of Child 
Economic Sectors in 1985 
Employees between Different 
Activity Number of Children 
Manufacturing industry 9,774 
Commerce, restaurants and hotels 7,175 
Service 3,325 
Enterprise 308 





Other activities 202 
Source: National Center for Social and Criminological 
Research, Seminar on Child Labour in Egypt, 1988 
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The factors which produced this phenomenon, as presented at 
the "Seminar on Child Labour in Egypt", are mainly poor social 
and economic background of the children, the increasing 
population, the inability to achieve full enrolment in primary 
education, and the high drop out rate from primary schools. 
In a study by the National Centre for Educational Research and 
the World Bank in the eighties, about drop outs between the 
third and sixth grades of primary schools, 2,203 children were 
asked about the jobs they wished to get. The results showed 
that very few of them were in careers they would have chosen, 
with 45 per cent aspiring to government jobs, 11 per cent to 
manual work and 9 per cent to agricultural work. Table 7 shows 
their actual distribution between areas of economic activity. 
Table 7: Survey Results of the Sector of the Economy in which 
Primary School Drop Outs Work 










Other activities 14.7 
Source: National Center for Social and Criminological 
Research, Seminar on Child Labour in Egypt, 1988 
The kind of activities practised by these children reflect the 
social and economic pressures on them at that early age, while 
their answers about career aspirations also reflect their 
frustration at that age. 
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High drop out rates and poor enrolment rates clearly have an 
effect upon the illiteracy rates. Child labour also has an 
impact on illiteracy, by encouraging children to leave school 
early. It is rare for such early school leavers to return to 
other courses for training or to literacy programmes, 
especially in rural areas. This is why lowering drop out rates 
and raising enrolment levels are seen as prime ways of 
removing illiteracy at source. Studies have shown that even 
those who leave primary school after six years may revert to 
illiteracy, and not retain reading and writing skills. 
(B) The Changes in Primary Education and their Class Nature 
It has been mentioned earlier that there were two major 
changes to education at the primary level. These were the 
application of basic education and the opening of the 
experimental government language schools. The documents of the 
Ministry of Education state that, "Basic education is a 
unified education for all males and females in the nation, 
whether in a rural or urban setting, and it is open-channelled 
qualifying for subsequent educational stages"." This statement 
means that all kinds of education, either government free 
school, or foreign language and the experimental government 
language schools are all introducing basic education. In 
reality each of these types of schools has different aims. 
For example, the government language schools aim to prepare 
people who master foreign languages. So if one applies the 
idea that basic education prepares for different environments, 
and prepares people to adapt to those environments, this means 
that language schools prepare for an elite environment, and 
the graduates can get opportunities to work in the most 
distinguished sectors in the economy, namely foreign companies 
and banks. In contrast, basic education aims to prepare people 
who have manual skills, which means they are adapted to a less 
privileged environment, and jobs in rural or urban areas. 
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In fact the rhetoric of basic education is contradicted by the 
aims of parents who send their children to foreign language 
or government language schools, because it is not consistent 
that parents would sacrifice and pay fees for their children 
to learn a manual skill in order to enter into the world of 
work. 
If one looks at the experimental government language schools, 
one finds that the distribution of these schools is largely 
in upper and middle class areas. For example, about 61 per 
cent of these schools are in Cairo, while none are in rural 
areas. 
Dividing primary education into these two kinds of schools, 
government language and free schools (the experimental schools 
also extend to the preparatory and secondary level) is not the 
only feature of the class nature of this level of education. 
Since 1988 the basic education level, which can be seen as the 
popular level of education, has been reduced from nine to 
eight years, under Law No.233 of 1988. The strategy of 1989 
describes this reduction as a response to the advice of Unesco 
to many developing countries to reduce the number of years 
spent in this level of education. 
The argument of the Ministry of Education is that, by saving 
money at this level, there will be an opportunity to improve 
the quality of education by developing the curriculum, methods 
of teaching, teacher training and improving administration." 
As the Ministry explains, the reduction of one year will also 
help in saving places and buildings, shortages of which are 
affecting this level of education. 
In fact, the reduction of the years of primary education was 
discussed as early as 1965, when there was a suggestion to 
reduce primary education from five years to four. However, 
this proposal was rejected by the ministerial committee on the 
grounds that it would violate equality of opportunity between 
those who carry on to higher levels of education and those who 
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stop after primary school." 
The same issue was discussed in the seventies by the National 
Council for Education and Scientific Research. The council 
discussed two options, of making a consolidated primary and 
preparatory education last for either 8 or 9 years. The 
decision was for the latter system. The Council justified this 
decision by saying, "We chose an alternative which is not 
going to disturb the existing system and is not going to put 
people who are responsible for education in trouble, and it 
allows for the gradual application of the system"." 
The other main argument against the reduction was that six 
years did not allow enough time for the students to master and 
to retain their reading and writing skills, and it was 
expected that reducing primary education to five years would 
make this worse." 
There is a class aspect to this decision. The reduction of 
primary education will mainly harm the interests of the lower 
classes, whose children do not usually carry on after the 
basic education level, while the upper and the middle classes 
can compensate for their children for any disturbance which 
might happen at that level. That is, the parents can help 
their children in their study, and they can afford for them 
to carry on to higher levels. So, the government has taken the 
decision to reduce the education level, where the majority of 
people who benefit from it are not politically effective. It 
could therefore apply the decision without too much pressure 
or resistance. 
(C) Technical Education and its Social Value 
Technical education has a low social status in Egyptian 
culture. People give more respect to academic education and 
mental, work. This tendency towards technical education and 
manual work has its historical roots in many of the developing 
countries which were under colonial rule. The colonial power 
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in these countries presented themselves in the form of the 
elite administrators and government servants. This partial 
image of European society affected the type of demand in 
colonized African countries, to be "oriented to the 
acquisition of that kind of education that was perceived to 
be the key to European-type occupational roles".13  
The same attitude was created in Egypt by the British 
occupation, whose main target in the educational field was to 
produce government employees. The effect of colonial rule and 
its educational policies still exists in these countries, even 
after liberation. However, the social position of technical 
education and craft jobs are a very complicated subject to 
discuss, and to give an assessment of people's attitudes, 
because the relationship between level of education and income 
has changed. 
During the sixties the individual return from education was 
represented in the phenomenon of "certificate pricing", where 
wages and salaries were determined and fixed according to the 
number of successful years spent on the educational ladder. 
This meant that the graduate of a university would get a 
higher wage than one who graduated from technical education, 
and technical graduates would get more than preparatory 
graduates." According to this process, higher education in the 
sixties had both social and economic returns, which led young 
people, and their parents, "to make the necessary sacrifices 
whenever it was possible, in order to complete higher 
education".65  
The difference between higher and technical education was not 
only in terms of the economic return, but in the hierarchy and 
position inside different organizations, mainly in the 
government and public sector. Promotion and career development 
were closely linked to the level of education obtained, and 
it was rare to find "a graduate of a technical secondary 
school or even secondary academic education, is able to climb 
the career ladder to the top"." This put limits to the 
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increase of wages or salaries and affected the total life 
earnings of the individual. 
Unfortunately, this discrimination in wages and promotion 
opportunities for the two kinds of education has tended to 
"downgrade technical and vocational education and training to 
a type of education in which only poor or less gifted young 
people enrol".°7  
There has been some change in this position in the seventies 
and eighties, especially after the open door policy. The 
shortage of skills in some areas because of the increasing 
demand from the Arab oil countries for skilled workers, and 
the expansion in construction projects in Egypt, resulted in 
a rise in wages of craftsmen in different sectors. If one 
takes the construction sector as an example, the wages of 
workers in this sector increased by more than 480 per cent 
between 1970 and 1977, while the wages of 3 million government 
and public sector employees rose by only 52 per cent over the 
same period." 
The figures show a great income gap between the employees who 
are educated, and the workers who are not. Uneducated workers 
could earn more money than educated employees, which probably 
means that the certificate has lost its economic value. This 
raises a question about people's attitudes to education and 
their demand for it, and whether they still want certificates 
or prefer to join a skilled and manual occupation. It is 
perhaps too early to be able to come to any firm conclusions 
as to whether this is the attitude or not. 
The most likely effect is that there has been a change in 
attitudes which is still in the process of formation, towards 
joining some skilled and manual occupation. Some university 
graduates have started to join training courses and work as 
craftsmen, but it is difficult to translate this into an 
estimate of how much this will reduce demand for university 
education. Even the graduates who accept work in occupations 
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which are considered inferior like it to be known that they 
have a university degree, because of its social status." 
Another factor which might help the continuation of the 
pressure on higher education is the range of new opportunities 
which the open door policy has opened for the educated people. 
Foreign companies and banks pay high wages, and offer the 
opportunity to emigrate to an Arab oil country also requires 
higher education. 
It is very difficult to evaluate exactly how people calculate 
their chances and make their choices: the field work in this 
study may help to cast some light on people's attitudes and 
choices. 
(D) Higher Education and its Social Value 
A discussion of higher education opportunities in Egypt cannot 
be completely separated from discussion of technical 
education, because the expansion of technical education means 
a decline in student numbers in academic education, and hence 
at the university level. 
The control of higher education in Egypt is, today, one of the 
main targets of the policy of education. The Ministry of 
Education referred to that policy, stating that the Ministry 
"takes pains to limit the number of university admissions. 
This is evidenced by the decrease in the number of students 
admitted to the universities to 63,000 in 1976 against 73,000 
in 1975"." The decline in student numbers must be seen in 
terms of its class connotations. Where there is a heavy demand 
for higher education, there will be increased competition 
between students, and students from different class 
backgrounds will be unequally prepared for that competition. 
Although university education was expanded in the Nasserist 
era, it retained its class nature to a major extent. This can 
be seen in the social background of the students, and in 
public spending on higher education. 
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There is little research which deals directly with the social 
background of the students. However, some studies were carried 
out in the sixties into the social background of some public 
employees, and of university students. The first study, 
carried out by the Institute of National Planning in 1962, 
conducted a survey of public sector employees. It showed that 
those who had obtained university or secondary school 
certificates were mostly the sons of businessmen, merchants 
and employees, and this in turn reflects on the social 
background of those who got higher education in the sixties.91  
Table 8 shows the father's occupation of the educated people 
included in this survey. 
Table 8: Father's Occupation of Educated Public Sector and 
Government Employees: 1962 
Father's Occupation 	 Employees with 	 Employees with 





Business 	 30.8 	 33.5 
Liberal professions 	 26.9 	 17.7 
Clerical work 	 2.7 
	 18.0 
Salaried technical work 	 4.1 	 12.7 
Higher administrative posts 
	 3.9 	 0.8 
Science and engineering 
	 2.3 	 0.7 
Manual work 	 1.4 	 2.8 
Other occupations 	 27.9 	 13.8 
Source: Nazih Nassef Al Ayobi, (1978) Policy of Education in 
Egypt: Political and Managerial Study, (Center of Political 
and Strategic Studies, Cairo), p.72 
The second study, conducted on 475 students in Cairo 
University and 175 students in Al Azhar University in 1966 
studied the father's occupations of those students. The 
results are shown in Table 9. The table shows that education 
during the sixties reflected the class nature of society, and 
the bias of university education towards those from the upper 
and middle classes. The notable exception was Al Azhar 
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University, where 45.5 per cent of the student's fathers were 
farmers. This reflects a historical fact and social reality, 
that Cairo University, when it was established as the national 
university in 1920, was mainly for the urban middle classes, 
while Al Azhar continued to recruit people from the 	 less 
advantaged background of people in rural Egypt. 
Table 9: Father's Occupation of University Students: 1966 







Professionals 33.2 17.9 3.7 
Small employees and 
clerks 
23.0 1.8 3.8 
Land owners and 
businessmen 
29.3 19.6 8.1 
Workers 5.6 7.2 28.3 
Farmers 5.0 45.5 54.3 
Undefined 3.1 8.0 6.8 
Source: Mahmoud Abdel Raziq Shafshaq "The Role of the 
University in Forming the Egyptian Elite", National  
Review of Social Studies, Nos.2 & 3 (Arabic) quoted 
in Nazih N. Ayubi (1978) Policy of Education in 
Egypt: Political and  managerial study (Center of 
Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo) p.72 
As far as the funding of higher education is concerned, it is 
paid for almost entirely from government funds. In a study of 
public spending on higher education, Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil 
examined the distribution of the tax burden implicit in this 
government subsidy to higher education. His study was based 
on the hypothesis that, "Patterns of government subsidization 
of education will reflect the class bias in society, since the 
middle and higher income groups are likely to benefit 
disproportionately from higher education, and the masses 
disproportionately more from primary education".92 This 
hypothesis of increasing rates of subsidization by level of 
education fits the Egyptian case, where the state subsidizes 
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higher education more than primary education. 
In his study, the author identified three criteria in order 
to assess the equitability of government spending: 
1. The equal opportunity criterion: a fiscal programme is 
equitable if different socio-economic groups in the 
population have access to the programme in proportion to 
their numbers in the population, irrespective of the cost 
paid by the different groups in relation to benefits 
received 
2. The cost benefit criterion: a fiscal programme is 
equitable if the cost paid by different socio-economic 
groups in the population are proportional to the benefit 
they each receive, irrespective of access to the 
programme.94  
3. The ability to pay criterion: a programme is equitable 
if the cost-benefit ratio of the programme rises as a 
function of income." 
Abdel Fadil reached the conclusion that on the first criterion 
Egypt's higher education system is inequitable, 
intergenerationally, since those who receive higher education 
benefits are disproportionately the children of the well to 
do, whether measured by income, class or various indices of 
socio-economic status." 
An assessment on the other two criteria is more complicated, 
because one has to take into account taxation studies in Egypt 
which cover all tax burdens in the years 1950 to 1959, 1964 
to 1965, and 1974 to 1975. These taxation studies show that 
there is a steep increase in tax burdens at relatively low 
levels of income (up to LE 250) but that the increase in tax 
burden is much milder at medium and high levels of income." 
Taking these tax findings into account, Abdel-Fadil concludes 
that in terms of his second and third criteria, higher 
education in Egypt is inequitable, and that the children of 
middle class families whose children receive higher education 
are subsidized by both the low income families whose children 
are not educated at this level and by high income groups in 
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the state sector, who shoulder a high tax burden relative to 
income received." 
So the studies indicate that, in spite of all the Nasserist 
efforts in expanding higher education, the benefits of this 
education still go to the middle and upper classes more than 
to the lower classes. At the same time it cannot be denied 
that education under Nasser was a factor for upward social 
mobility, especially in urban areas. This point has been 
researched by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, in a sample survey carried 
out in Cairo in 1979. The survey was conducted on a three 
generation basis - father, respondent and sons. He concluded 
that the middle generation enjoyed greater mobility (mostly 
upward) than did the younger, present generation." His results 
are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: Education and Social Mobility in Cairo in 1979 
Level of Education 	 Generation 
1 	 2 	 3 
Father Respondent 	 Son 
(%) 	 (%) 	 (%) 
Secondary 	 4.7 	 16.4 	 34.7 
College 	 4.4 	 15.1 	 16.3 
Post graduate 	 0.6 	 1.6 	 2.1 
Total 	 9.7 	 33.1 	 53.1 
Source: 	 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Social Mobility and Income 
Distribution in Egypt, 1952-1977" in Gouda Abdel 
Khalek and Robert Tignor (eds) (1982) The  Political  
Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and 
Meier, New York) p.411 
It is clear that the second generation has nearly quadrupled 
the percentage in secondary school and college education in 
comparison with the first generation, while the third 
generation (sons) doubled its percentage in secondary 
education and slightly increased its college and post-graduate 
education in comparison with the second generation. The middle 
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generation was occupationally placed in the 1950s and early 
1960s; the younger one in the late 1960s and 1970s.uml  
Saad Eddin Ibrahim comments that, "Egypt's stratification 
system reached its maximum fluidity from the mid-1950s to the 
mid-1960s, along with ambitious programmes in education and 
with bold socialist policies of equalizing opportunities, the 
Egyptian society witnessed more social mobility than in any 
single decade in this country".101  
As a result of the decline of the opportunities in higher 
education, today there is pressure from the upper and middle 
classes to establish a private university for those who can 
afford to pay, but who cannot meet the entry requirements. The 
call for a private university was announced by the Minister 
of Education, and a good deal of discussion and debate were 
published in the newspapers in 1988.102 
(E) Foreign Education and the Expansion of Private Education 
Since 1952 under Nasser there was a tendency to control 
different types of foreign and private education in Egypt. 
After the 1956 Suez crisis most foreign schools were either 
nationalized or put under tight state control."3 The control 
of these schools came as a move to bring unification to the 
cultural life of society which was divided between different 
kinds of education, such as Arabic, foreign, private and 
public.104 Table 11 shows the decline in the numbers of private 
schools after 1956. 
After 1974, private education in its different forms had been 
increased, and the government established fee paying schools 
in 1979 as was explained earlier. Table 12 shows the number 
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1953/54 5,140 76.1 1,611 23.9 6,751 
1954/55 5,168 72.0 1,984 28.0 7,152 
1955/56 5,399 64.5 2,967 34.5 8,366 
1956/67 5,586 72.5 2,115 27.5 7,701 
1957/58 5,674 76.5 1,748 23.5 7,422 
1958/59 5,670 77.5 1,642 22.5 7,312 
1958/60 5,744 79.6 1,469 20.1 7,213 
1960/61 5,872 82.0 1,289 18.0 7,159 
Source: 	 Amir Boktor (1963) The  Development and Expansion of 
Education in the United Arab  Republic (American 
University, Cairo) p.30 
Table 12: Numbers of Private Schools and Their Competent 
Authorities: 1979/80 
Authority 
	 Number of Schools 
State of Vatican 	 71 
Foreign Countries 
	 5 
Christian Religious Associations 
	 8 
Independent Educational Associations 	 23 
Total 
	 107 
Source: The General Administration of Private Language  
Schools (1980) (Ministry of Education, Cairo) p.7 
Figures include primary, preparatory and secondary schools. 
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1. 	 Schools under the State of Vatican: 
These schools are owned and run by Christian groups of monks 
and nuns. There are different groups: Bon Pastear, Jesuit, and 
Frere."5  
2.Schools under the Supervision of Foreign Countries: 
In these schools, the foreign country has full supervision of 
the finance and the follow up of work. The school has two 
directors, one Egyptian for public relations, the other a 
foreigner who has authority inside the school. There are two 
schools in Cairo, the German School under the West German 
Government, and the American College under the government of 
the USA."' 
3. Schools under Religious Associations: 
These schools are run by Egyptian Christians who represent 
these associations. There is a co-supervision between the 
Ministry of Education, and the Catholic or Evangelical Church 
running the schoo1.1" 
4. Schools under Independent Educational Associations: 
These are originally the French and English schools which were 
nationalized in 1956. The administration and the supervision 
of these schools was given to an Egyptian organization, formed 
to run these schools called The Educational Cooperative 
Association for National Institutes. This association was 
dissolved and each school has its own educational 
cooperative."41 
These schools accept both Christian and Muslim children of the 
Egyptian elite. Table 13 shows the numbers of children 
attending. 
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Table 13: Christian and Muslim Students in Foreign Language 
Schools: 1977/78 
Competent Authority 	 Student Numbers in 1977/78 
Muslim 	 i 	 Christian t 	 Foreigners % 
State of Vatican 	 6,663 	 70.4 	 2,795 	 29.5 	 247 	 2.6 
(10 Sdhools) 
Religious 	 1,880 	 65.5 	 911 	 34.5 	 58 	 2.0 
Associations 
Source: 	 Shibl Badran, "Education and Dependency in Egypt: 
A study in the Foreign Education", in Contemporary 
Education, Vol.3, p.49 (in Arabic) 
The increasing demand after the open door policy led to the 
expansion of private education, especially in schools which 
teach foreign languages. This demand can be understood in 
terms of three factors: 
1.The opening of foreign companies and projects in Egypt which 
demand people who have mastered a foreign language. 
2. People from different social backgrounds who could make 
money, either in Egypt or outside in the Arab oil 
countries, and who demanded more and better education for 
their children. 
3. The long neglect of government schools, and the 
encouragement of the building of private schools which 
were seen by the government as a means of reducing the 
pressure on government free schools. 
The figures show the increase of private education during the 
seventies in different school levels, reflecting the growing 
demand. (See Table 14.) If one compares the figures for pupil 
enrolments in private education in the sixties and the late 
seventies, one can see that the statistics show an increase 
in private education, especially at the preparatory and 
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Table 14: The Size of the Private Education Sector Compared 
with Government Education in Egypt: 1976/77 
A Primary Education 	 B Preparatory Education 
Govt. 	 Private Private Govt. Private 	 Private 
(nos.) 	 (nos.) 	 as 8 of (nos.) (nos.) 	 as 8 of 
total 	 total 
C Cameral Pacondary Educ 
Govt. 	 Private Private 









96,368 5,267 5.2 28,141 7,747 21.6 7,718 2,139 21.7 
Enrols't 
(thousands) 
3,940 212 5.1 1,134 302 21.0 302 912 3.1 
Teachers 
(thousands) 
121 5.4 4.3 33.4 11.4 34.2 15.7 1.81 0.5 
Source: 	 Computed from Ministry of Education Statistical 
Department, Statement of Total Number of Schools,  
Classes, Pupils and  Teachers, at the Different  
Stages and Kinds of Education: 1975/77, quoted in 
Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, Educational Expansion and 
Income Distribution in Egypt, in Gouda Abdel Khalek 
and Robert Tignor (eds) (1982) The Political  Economy 
of Income Distribution in  Egypt (Holmes and Meier, 
London) p.356 
secondary level. In 1965/66 the number of pupils in 
preparatory private schools was 227,000. This number grew to 
302,000 in 1976/77. The corresponding growth in secondary 
schools was from 55,000 in 1965/66 to 91,000 in 1976/77. 
These figures show that private schooling became significant 
to those who wished to climb the educational ladder. The 
expansion of primary education, the large numbers of children 
at that level, meant that private education came to represent 
5.1 per cent of total enrolment, but as one goes further up 
the educational ladder private education becomes still more 
significant. By the preparatory level, private education 
accounts for 21 per cent of total enrolments, and at the 
secondary level 23.1 per cent. 
As has already been noted, private education is not only of 
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one type, but has different levels, so that investors in 
education can use the entire system according to their income. 
Thus they may choose government free schools or private 
schools according to choice, and within private education tend 
to gather together according to their ability to pay. 
These schools represent a special educational service, and the 
results of these schools are taken as an indicator of their 
quality, along with the future social destinations of the 
students, which researchers assume the schools play a 
significant part in achieving. 
The statistics show the difference in the results between 
different types of schools. For example, the results for 
primary school certificates in 1978/79 were that foreign 
language schools attained passes for 98.1 per cent of boys and 
99.2 per cent of girls, while in official and subsidized 
schools 76.4 per cent of boys passed and 76.4 per cent of 
girls. For more details of these results of primary education 
and other levels of preparatory and secondary education see 
Appendices 17, 18, and 19. 
IV. Conclusion  
In this chapter the history of the educational system and 
policy in Egypt has been reviewed. The analysis concentrated 
upon the roots of the class nature of the education system, 
and the cultural impact of introducing modern education since 
the time of Muhammad Aly. From that analysis it can be 
concluded that the education system in Egypt has reflected the 
class nature of society since modern education was introduced 
by Muhammad Aly in the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
because his education programme was far from being a mass 
education movement. Rather it was an elitist system which 
worked to produce specialists for the modernization projects. 
The elitist nature of the education system continued and 
increased under the British occupation, where education 
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opportunities were limited, free education abolished and the 
duality of the system between traditional Arabic education on 
the one side and the prestigious foreign education on the 
other was increased. 
The national movement (1920-1952) was confronted by great 
challenges in the education field. That is, the education 
system was divided between Arabic/foreign, and 
religious/secular. There was a high illiteracy rate and very 
limited enrolment at the primary level. The national movement 
made efforts to unify the system and increase enrolment, and 
to achieve the democratization of the system. However, these 
efforts remained limited in crossing the divisions of the 
system and in achieving the democratization of education. 
Under the 1952 Revolution, one of the main targets, as it was 
in many developing countries, was to introduce a mass 
education movement, which took the form of expanding formal 
education, nationalizing foreign education, enhancing the 
secularization of the system and concentrating on science and 
technology. These educational policies were introduced by 
Nasser and reflected the class bias of the system towards the 
interests of the popular masses. 
Under the open door policy, the class alliance changed, and 
the state supported the interests of the upper and middle 
classes. Hence, education policies moved towards more fee 
paying and private education, increased foreign education and 
limited access to university level. 
The 1952 Revolution's policy of education succeeded under 
Nasser in particular in providing qualified man power, 
narrowing the economic and cultural gap between classes and 
gave real opportunities for the masses to attend education. 
However, the system still suffers from drop out, high 
illiteracy rate, incomplete enrolment and the duality between 
Arabic and foreign, free and private education, which all 
reflect the class nature of the system. Many of these features 
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significantly increased under Sadat. From these concluding 
remarks some general issues can be drawn to form part of the 
basis and context for the second part of this research i.e. 
the field study. 
Education and Cultural Integration: The Impact on Social and 
Educational Issues 
It was explained earlier that education in Egypt, since the 
early years of Mahammad Aly, has suffered from several 
tensions and dichotomies. These are, the dichotomy between 
religious and modern secular education, between foreign and 
Arabic education, between free and fee paying education, and 
between the education of the elite and provision for the 
illiterate majority. These dichotomies have created cultural 
gaps among those who have been educated in different types of 
schools, and between those with some kind of education, and 
those with none, the illiterate majority. 
The high illiteracy rate would tend to support the dominance 
of the traditional cultural beliefs and practices, which could 
block the integration between those who are educated and the 
illiterate majority, since both will have different outlooks 
and views. Illiteracy will limit the knowledge of the 
individual about his/her society and beyond the boundaries of 
the local community. 109 
The cultural gap in Egypt does not exist only between the 
educated and the illiterate. It exists between different 
sections of the educated as well. For example, those who have 
graduated from foreign education and have been instructed in 
foreign languages might have different attitudes and values 
with regard to their own language and culture, since being in 
these schools, they know that they are culturally privileged. 
They know that they are well qualified to control and to 
occupy most of the high positions in society, and those 
positions which demand mastery of a foreign language. Foreign 
education has been strongly encouraged in the seventies 
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through the expansion of private education and the government 
language schools. This combination of factors may lead those 
educated in this way to undervalue their own culture. 
Another major dichotomy exists between those who have been 
educated in religious institutions and those who have been 
educated in the modern secular system. In order to bring about 
cultural integration, the Revolution has tried to reform Al-
Azhar by a new law in 1961. This reform has allowed Al-Azhar 
to provide modern studies in science and human studies 
alongside the traditional religious studies. In fact, the 
reform has created another dichotomy inside Al-Azhar, since 
the reform has failed to have the desired effect upon the 
traditional core of religious studies."°  
So the dichotomy in Egyptian culture and society exists 
between the educated and the intellectuals of the society who 
represent a culture, "marked by a crisis of identity, 
ambivalence of attitudes, values, and beliefs, not only 
towards the traditional order of society but also towards the 
new national order and the elite".111 
These cultural differences lead one to ask how this is 
influencing people's perceptions of Egypt's problems and the 
ways to tackle these problems, which the field work will shed 
light on. That is, in the field study there will be an 
analysis of how people from different class positions perceive 
some general social, economic, and political issues of the 
past, present and future which reflect class consciousness as 
it connects with perceiving social and political history and 
the ongoing present. This will be the subject of Chapter Six, 
where people's cultural and ideological perspectives will be 
discussed. 
The study of the views and ideologies of different members of 
social classes, besides its general concern with general 
economic and political issues, will concentrate upon their 
views on some educational issues, since this is the main point 
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of the study. This concentration on educational issues can be 
supported by the fact, which emerged from the literature 
review, that the education system in Egypt is facing some 
critical decisions. That is, there is a large debate in Egypt 
today over whether spending on education and the state finance 
of different levels of education, should be arranged on the 
basis that education is a right for all people, or on the 
basis that it is a discretionary subsidy, similar to subsidies 
which can be found in other economic fields. If education is 
seen as an economic subsidy, this would legitimize government 
cuts in expenditure in times of economic crisis.t12 
Related to this debate, there is a strong attitude in Egypt 
today, presented by pressure groups, to soften the state 
control over education, and to let it be more free to the 
private sector.1" 
These points, which are concerned in general with the right 
to education and equal opportunities, will be the subject of 
Chapter Seven, which presents the way in which members of 
different social classes perceive particular educational 
issues. 
Educational Provision 
From the review of the history of education in Egypt, it can 
be understood that the education system was, and still is, 
class biased and elitist, especially at the level of higher 
education. The education system is also influenced by foreign 
powers. This has been represented in the form of missionary 
schools, which were established as a form of elitist 
education, and which created the attitude that education and 
instruction in a foreign language is "proper education". This 
trend has continued to the present time, and appears in the 
form of private schools teaching in foreign languages, and the 
government language schools. 
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The general class nature of the education system can be seen 
in the diverse kinds of education: free and fee-paying, Arabic 
and foreign, modern and religious. This leads to the question 
of the extent to which there is unequal provision of 
educational opportunities in terms of levels and kinds of 
education that members from different class positions can 
afford for their children, and the role of the family economic 
and cultural capital in increasing or decreasing these 
opportunities. This will be the main point of Chapter Eight, 
which discusses educational opportunities for members of 
different social classes. 
Through the analysis of the field study material, there will 
be reference to more cultural aspects related to the clash 
between the old and the new forces in Egyptian society and 
education, and the ways in which some of the old forces in the 
educational field are currently enjoying a revival. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
As has already been noted in the Introduction to Part One, 
this research is concerned with the study of the influence of 
class power relations on education in Egypt, and with the 
provision of education for different social classes. 
In order to study this, the research must work on two levels. 
The first level is a theoretical discussion of the class 
nature of society, education, and the provision of education 
for different social classes, as represented in the policies 
and reforms of education which embody state ideologies. The 
study on this level has been introduced in Part One, which 
contains the study of some relevant aspects, such as the 
concepts of class, culture and ideology, state power and class 
formation in Egypt, and the study of educational policies and 
the education system in Egypt. 
In Part One it was explained that the study of class cultures, 
ideologies and views of different economic, political and 
educational matters is not easy, because people's ideologies 
cannot be directly deduced from their class positions. People 
live in complex cultural situations, where economic, social, 
ideological and political factors interact. In order to study 
the complexity of the dynamics of class cultures and 
ideologies, where people live their everyday social relations, 
an empirical study is needed. The empirical study represents 
the second level, and the second part of this research. 
Parents of sixty families with children in primary education 
were interviewed in order to study their perspectives on 
different economic, political and educational matters. The 
sample concentrated upon the new petty bourgeoisie, because 
these are considered to be an essential class in the process 
of modernization and development in Egyptian society, in the 
framework of a sociological analysis of class formation in a 
historical perspective. This was discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Three. 
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Part of the class cultural analysis is people's consciousness 
and awareness of their class relations, their place in 
society, and their interests, i.e. the image they have of 
themselves and of their society. These represent an essential 
aspect of social classes, and are developed in Chapter Six. 
In addition to the study of people's consciousness and 
awareness of general economic, social and political issues, 
there will be a more specific analysis of people's perceptions 
which will be discussed in two chapters: 
In Chapter Seven general issues of education and society, and 
educational policy will be discussed. Examples of these issues 
are equality of educational opportunity, state spending on 
education, and whether education should be free or fee-paying. 
These points are presented on the theoretical foundation laid 
by the literature review of history, policies and system of 
education in Egypt, where these issues have been seen to be 
the centre of debate. The analysis of these points throws some 
light on the way in which the education system plays a part 
in the reproduction of the class structure of society, where 
the process of reproduction is mediated by class relations, 
class power and class interests. The analysis of the material 
of the field study will illustrate the dynamics of this 
process in Egyptian society. 
In Chapter Eight more specific issues of personal experience 
of using educational provision will be studied for members of 
different social classes. The analysis of provision of 
education will be analyzed against the theoretical background 
of the discussion of the historical bias of the educational 
system in Egypt and the role that the family's cultural 
capital may play in contributing to the unequal provision of 
education. 
It should be noted that the material collected from the field 
study provides a rather limited range of information in terms 
of the quantitative analysis of access and provision of 
243 
education, since the material is drawn from a small sample. 
Nevertheless, the data provide opportunities for a complex 
qualitative cultural analysis of the dynamics of class 
cultural power relations and class interests influencing 
access, provision and control of education. 
From these points raised in the three chapters of the field 
study, the main concerns of the empirical study are the 
ideologies and consciousness of parents with children in 
primary education, as part of the analysis of class, culture, 
ideologies and common sense in Egypt. 
To achieve this, the technique which will be used in the field 
study is based upon interviews with parents who come from 
different social class backgrounds. As was explained in the 
introduction, the study of the ideologies of ordinary people 
concerning education has not been given much attention in 
educational and social research in Egypt. This research aims 
to contribute towards filling that gap. 
The study of people's ideologies is presented in Part Two of 
this thesis in four chapters. Chapter Five deals mainly with 
two points: 
- 	
the method of classifying the sample, i.e. the selection 
of criteria for classification, and 
	
a short summary of the process of selecting the sample 
and the tool used in the interview. Details of the field 
study procedures can be found in Appendix 22. 
The subsequent three chapters will deal with the analysis of 
the material of the field study as follows: 
Chapter Six presents the culture and ideologies of the members 
of different social classes. 
Chapter Seven deals with the specific points of education, 
where it will be shown how members of different social classes 
perceive general educational issues. 
Chapter Eight deals with the actual provision and direct 
exerience of educational opportunities for the members of 
different social classes. 
244 
CHAPTER FIVE 
TOOLS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE FIELD STUDY 
Introduction  
This chapter explains the process by which the field study was 
conducted. This will include a discussion of the criteria 
which will be used to classify the sample of the field study 
in terms of their class positions. In order to select those 
criteria, there will first be a review of the different 
criteria available, and a critical review of those criteria. 
This will be followed by a detailed discussion of the criteria 
which have actually been adopted for this research, namely 
Poulantzas' criteria, which will be presented in terms of 
their theoretical bases, their positive and negative aspects, 
and the way in which the work of Erik Olin Wright has 
criticized Poulantzas' criteria, and developed the neo-Marxist 
analysis at this point, by introducing an alternative way to 
deal with the negative aspects and the ambiguities of 
Poulantzas' criteria. 
This chapter will present a short summary of the methodology 
employed in conducting the field study, which includes the way 
in which the sample was chosen, the organization of work with 
members of the sample, and the design of the research tool 
used in the field study. 
I. 	 Selection of Criteria for Classifying the Field Study 
Sample  
Choosing the criteria for classifying the sample of the field 
study is not a matter of technical process. The choice must 
be based on theoretical grounds and supported by a theory of 
class. 
The following discussion will give examples of different 
criteria used in educational and social research. While 
presenting these criteria, the theoretical problems they raise 
will be illustrated. After that, the criteria upon which this 
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research was based will be presented, that is, Poulantzas' 
criteria, with an explanation of the theoretical grounds for 
choosing them. 
The first example of criteria is taken from the Egyptian 
literature. It is a scale for the "standard of socio-economic 
classes in Egypt" designed by Farouk Al-Bohy.1 
The scale is based on the consideration of social class as a 
gradation, rather than looking at class on a relational basis. 
That is, social classes are categorized as upper- middle- and 
lower-classes. There is no clear demarcation between some 
classes, such as the working class and the new petty 
bourgeoisie, since both of them are considered to be wage 
earners and distributed on the scale according to the material 
objects they obtain, including occupation, housing, education 
and income. The approach of identifying classes on a socio-
economic scale provides no opportunity for this research to 
deal with social classes as defined in relational terms, i.e. 
classes in their structured social relationship to each other 
as defined as bourgeoisie and proletariat. 
A second model is based on occupation ranking. The example of 
such criteria taken here is the Registrar General's class 
schema. The Registrar General's scheme is usually adopted by 
the British Government in official reports.2 This schema rests 
on the assumption that society is a graded hierarchy of 
occupations ranked according to skills.3 Occupations are 
allocated to social classes commensurate with the degree of 
expertise involved in carrying out their associated tasks and 
the resulting categories are assumed to be homogeneous in 
these terms.4  
The classification provides a comprehensive list of 
occupations and explains the classification procedures to 
group them under one of five headings. These headings are, 
professional and managerial, intermediate, skilled, partly 
skilled, and unskilled.s In fact, this kind of classification 
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is not usually based on a consistent theory of class, and for 
this theoretical reason it cannot be applied in the present 
research. 
The third model, presented by Goldthorpe, is based on 
sociological rather than taxonomic bases. At its foundation 
is the Hope-Goldthorpe scale for grouping the social grading 
of occupations, based on a popular assessment of the social 
standing of several hundred occupations. The scale was 
developed by the Oxford sociologists John Goldthorpe and Keith 
Hope in the process of an inquiry into occupational mobility.' 
Goldthorpe's scale is based on a Weberian concept of class, 
as defined by the market and work situation of the particular 
occupations. The classification attempts "to combine 
occupational categories whose members would appear... to be 
typically comparable, on the one hand in terms of their 
sources and levels of income, their degree of economic 
security and chance of economic advancement; and on the other 
their location within systems of authority and control 
governing the process of production in which they are engaged, 
and hence their degree of autonomy in performing their work-
tasks and roles".7  
Although the scale is based on a developed theory of class, 
in practice the categories given by Goldthorpe are very 
similar to those adopted by the Registrar General.' (For 
details of Goldthorpe's class categories, and the Registrar 
General's, see Appendices 20 and 21.) 
The theoretical bases of the scale can be criticized from a 
Marxist viewpoint. That is, since the classification is based 
on occupation, it mistakes categories defined by technical 
relations of production (the prevailing state of technology) 
with those defined by social relations of production 
(ownership and non-ownership of productive means).' 
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(A) Poulantzas Criteria 
The criteria which will be adopted in this research to 
classify the sample of the field study is based upon the 
theoretical and conceptual analysis of class presented in 
Chapter One. In summary, the present research adopts a Marxist 
concept of class, which has been justified earlier. From the 
Marxist perspective, classes are seen in a relational 
perspective, and from the neo-Marxist perspective, which has 
also been explained earlier, classes are identified not only 
in economic terms, but also in terms of their political power, 
ideologies and consciousness. This view gives more chance for 
making a comprehensive analysis which deals not only with the 
economic base of society, but also its cultural and 
ideological superstructure. 
These aspects of conceptualizing class have been fulfilled by 
Poulantzas, who, in addition to his conceptualization of 
class, introduced criteria which serve to draw the boundaries 
between social classes. Poulantzas introduces three criteria. 
These are the economic, the political and the ideological 
criteria, which are based on his understanding of social 
classes as influenced by these three levels. 
The important point about Poulantzas' criteria, beside being 
based on a developed theory of class which considers the 
cultural and ideological aspects, is that it gives attention 
to social classes which have not been the subject of 
sufficient study. That is to say, he analyzes the new petty 
bourgeoisie, how to identify them, and how to draw the line 
between them and the working class. This is significant in the 
case of Egypt, which gives an opportunity to study the new 
petty bourgeoisie as a growing class in society. 
From the literature review of class formation in Egypt it was 
noted that there has been a substantial growth of the new 
petty bourgeoisie, in terms of their numbers, their important 
role in management and directing different state projects. 
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Consequently, we need clear criteria to identify this growing 
class and to differentiate them from the working class, since, 
as mentioned in Chapter Two, the working class has frequently 
been confused with the new petty bourgeoisie, on the grounds 
that both are wage-earners. This point of drawing clear 
boundaries between the two classes is important for this 
research, where it will deal with how educational 
opportunities are distributed, and who gets what. 
The following discussion will present Poulantzas' criteria and 
will illustrate that point of identifying the new petty 
bourgeoisie from the working class. 
Economic Criteria: 
This is very important and the prime criterion in identifying 
the bourgeoisie, because it separates those who own from those 
who do not. It is also important in identifying the new middle 
class from the working class. 
Economic criteria refer to: 
1. Economic ownership, which is, "real economic control of 
the means of production, i.e. the power to assign the 
means of production to given uses and so to dispose of 
the products obtained"." This definition refers to 
"possession" which is defined as "the capacity to put the 
means of production into operation".11 This 
differentiation is important, because some people can be 
in a position to put the means of production into 
operation, i.e. they have possession, without being the 
real owners, i.e. they do not have economic ownership. 
In this category would be, for example, managers. 
2. The other element in the economic criteria is the 
distinction between productive and unproductive work. 
This factor is important in identifying the boundaries 
between the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie. 
That is, Poulantzas does not consider wage earning in 
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itself as a criterion of membership of the working class, 
because every worker is a wage earner, but not every wage 
earner is a worker." So Poulantzas considers that 
productive/unproductive work, in terms of producing 
surplus value, is a suitable criterion to identify the 
working class from the new petty bourgeoisie on the 
economic level. 
Political Criteria: 
These criteria are very important in identifying the working 
class from the new petty bourgeoisie and in defining the 
position of the managers. The political criteria refer to the 
relations of domination/subordination in terms of 
supervisory/non-supervisory division of labour. To understand 
this relation we have to refer to Poulantzas distinction 
between technical and social division of labour. Technical 
division refers to the structural position derived from the 
particular technology used in production, while social 
division of labour derives from the social organization of 
production, or relations of production." This means that 
technical division of labour inside different organizations 
is a matter of different levels of technology used, while the 
social division lies in the structure of social production. 
This 	 distinction 	 is 	 important 	 in 	 identifying 
domination/subordination relations, where some groups could 
be exploited in terms of the social division of labour but 
they are themselves exploiters on the technical level. For 
example, the managers and supervisors present this double 
situation. In terms of material production they are productive 
in terms of coordinating and integrating the production 
process. But in terms of social division of labour they 




These are the second important criteria in identifying working 
class from the new middle class. The ideological criteria 
refer to the ideological domination within the social division 
of labour between mental/manual labour. 
This division shows that the working class which performs the 
manual work is not only exploited economically and dominated 
ideologically, but also excluded from the "secret knowledge" 
of the production process, and this exclusion is necessary for 
the reproduction of capitalist social relations." 
Poulantzas goes far beyond the simple meaning of mental/manual 
labour, i.e. for him it is not just doing something by hand 
or using one's brain. It is, as he says, "We could thus say 
that every form of work that takes the form of knowledge from 
which the producers are excluded, falls on the mental labour 
side of the capitalist production process, irrespective of its 
empirical/natural content; and that this is so whether the 
direct producers actually do know how to perform this work but 
do not do so (again not by chance), or whether they in fact 
do not know how to form it (since they are systematically kept 
away from it) or whether again there is simply nothing that 
needs to be known".16  
The classes which are more likely to be identified in terms 
of this division are the working class and the new petty 
bourgeoisie. For example, engineers, technicians, white collar 
workers, low level clerks and secretariat all have been 
identified mainly because of their position on both 
mental/manual work and supervisory/non-supervisory work. 
According to these criteria, the technicians are excluded from 
the working class because they practice ideological domination 
over the working class and they are considered part of the new 
petty bourgeoisie. 
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The following table shows the distribution of different 
criteria between different classes. 
Table 1: General Criteria for Class in Poulantzas' Analysis 




Exploited 	 Basins- Subordi- Doeina- Subordi 
tion 	 nation 	 tion 	 nation 
Surplus 	 Surplus 
Labour 	 Value 
!Extorted 	 Extorted 
Bourgeoisie • + 
Proletariat • - • + 





Key: 	 • criterion present - criterion absent 
+/- criterion usually present but sometimes absent 
-/+ criterion usually absent but sosetisse present 
Source: 	 Erik Olin Wright (1978) Class. Crisis and  the State 
(NLB: London) p.45 
So, from this review of Poulantzas criteria it can be noticed 
that the economic criteria are essential in identifying the 
bourgeoisie, while the political and ideological criteria are 
essential for the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class. 
From the review of Poulantzas criteria, and especially the 
political and ideological ones, it can be noticed that he uses 
them in a circumscribed way, since he confines them to the 
labour process to explain domination and subordination 
relations. This research uses Poulantzas' criteria to classify 
members of the sample of the field study. However, the 
political and ideological criteria are used in a wider sense 
than that of Poulantzas, which has residues of economism. That 
is, political criteria in the general analysis of class 
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relations are not confined to relations of domination and 
subordination in the work situation, i.e. doing supervisory 
or non-supervisory work. Rather, they refer to the class 
political power, to political parties and organizations, as 
illustrated in the analysis of the political contxt of Egypt 
in Chapter Two, and in the analysis of class political power 
in Chapter Three. 
Similarly, in the use of ideological criteria, they are not 
confined to the domain of doing mental or manual work. Rather, 
an ideology of a world view is identified which expresses the 
values of particular social classes and represents people's 
beliefs, ideas, consciousness and interests. This is important 
for this research in order to move from the limited level of 
identifying class at the economic level to the cultural, 
ideological and historical analysis of a specific class 
formation. 
As mentioned earlier, this research accepts with modification 
Poulantzas' criteria for identifying social classes on 
theoretical grounds, and because they have the advantage of 
drawing clear lines between the new petty bourgeoisie and the 
working class. However, in his classification of the different 
social groups, Poulantzas has misplaced one group; he 
classified managers, not with the new petty bourgeoisie, but 
with the bourgeoisie. Poulantzas justifies this classification 
on the grounds that managers have control on the economic 
level over the means of production, even though they do not 
have economic ownership, and they exercise the power of 
capitalists over the workers.'? For that reason, Poulantzas' 
solution was to exclude managers from the new petty 
bourgeoisie, and to arbitrarily group them with the 
bourgeoisie. 
This leads to a position where a certain social group may 
occupy a dual position in the class structure, which is to 
say, according to the criteria might be classified in one of 
two different classes. To resolve this problem, and in 
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preference to resorting to arbitrary classification, Erik Olin 
Wright introduces the idea of "contradictory class locations". 
He considers that an alternative way to deal with ambiguities 
in the class structure is to see some positions as occupying 
objectively contradictory locations within the class 
relations." Wright argues that, bearing in mind that all class 
positions are contradictory locations, then it can be said 
that certain positions in the class structure constitute 
doubly contradictory locations: they represent the basic 
contradictory class relations of capitalist society." 
In his early formulation of contradictory class locations in 
1978, the only such location discussed was that of the 
managers who simultaneously occupy bourgeois and proletariat 
positions. They are bourgeois since they have the capacity to 
tell workers what to do and to punish them, and they are 
proletariat since they were themselves told what to do and 
could be fired. 
Wright has identified three contradictory class locations 
which can be found between the two main classes in society, 
that is the bourgeoisie and the working class. These are: 
1 
	
	 Managers and supervisors, who occupy a contradictory 
location between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, 
2 
	
	 Semi-autonomous employees, who retain a relatively high 
level of control over their immediate labour process, and 
occupy a contradictory location between the working class 
and the petty bourgeoisie, and 
3 Small employers, who occupy a contradictory location 
between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie.2°  
In recent development of his concept of contradictory class 
location, Wright uses the concept to solve the problem of 
locating the middle class as a whole, not only the managers. 
In order to achieve this, Write made his criteria more 
complicated, in order to provide an opportunity to 
differentiate more contradictory locations, especially among 
those who occupy non-managerial jobs. 
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Wright's criteria are based upon a distinction between 
'ownership' and 'possession', where 'ownership' means real 
control over investments (the flow of financial resources into 
and out of production. By 'possession' he refers to control 
over the actual operation of the means of production. This 
kind of control can be divided along two dimensions: (a) 
control over the physical means of production, and (b) control 
over labour within production (authority and supervision).21 
Wright identified several levels of control within each of 
these relations, ranging from full control to no control, 
through partial and minima1.22 According to these scales, he 
could discriminate between different levels of control that 
managers practised. Their control ranged from having full or 
partial control over some, but not all, of the dimensions (top 
executives) to having no control over money capital and 
physical capital, and only partial or minimal control over 
labour (foremen).23  
Wright also classified the class character of non-managerial 
technical and professional jobs, such as teachers and research 
scientists. These were characterized as occupying petty 
bourgeois and proletariat positions. They are proletariat 
since they sell their labour power, but they are petty 
bourgeoisie because they have real control over their own 
immediate labour process within production.24  
The last group which were identified as being in a 
contradictory class location was the small employers who 
combined bourgeois and petty bourgeois class positions. They 
are petty bourgeois since they are self employed and direct 
producers, and they are bourgeois since they employ wage 
labour. 25 The resulting schema of contradictory class locations 
is shown in Table 2. 
The idea of contradictory class locations is useful in this 
research in practical and analytic terms. In practical terms 
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Table 2: Basic Class Map of Capitalist Society 
Capitalist mode of 	 Simple Commodity 






     





   
Petty 
Bourgeoisie 
     
     




      
 
Working Class 
    
Classes 	 Contradictory 
locations 
Source: 	 Erik Olin Wright (1985) Classes (Verso, London) p.48 
it is useful since it draws attention to the special position 
of some groups, such as managers and small employers. This 
will help to prevent confusion in locating such positions in 
the sample of the field study of this research. In analytical 
terms, the idea of contradictory class locations is important 
for the analysis of the possible coincidence of class 
interests and formation of class alliances over political, 
economic and educational interests, and in particular for the 
new petty bourgeoisie who occupy such a contradictory 
position. 
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As Wright explained, class struggle does not occur between two 
perfectly homogeneously organized classes. Rather, in a class 
formation, the typical situation is one in which alliances are 
formed between classes, segments of classes, and between 
contradictory class locations. 26 Consequently, individuals find 
themselves in contradictory class locations and in the 
situation of struggle for class interests they face the choice 
among three broad strategies: 
i) to try to use their position as exploiters, to gain entry 
as individuals into the dominant exploiting class itself, 
which can be seen as the case for managers and 
professionals who buy property and stocks; 
ii) to attempt to forge an alliance with the dominant 
exploiting class; this can take different forms, as when 
the exploiting class try to tie the interests of those 
in contradictory class positions to their own interests, 
or in an indirect way, as when they reduce exploitation, 
by, for example, giving extremely high salaries for upper 
level managers;" 
iii) to form an alliance with the popular exploited class; 
this only happens under certain historical conditions, 
and is probably the most difficult alliance to achieve, 
since the exploited classes do not have many material 
benefits to offer to the people in contradictory class 
locations, and the exploiting classes do." 
However, the prediction of which alliances will occur is 
extremely difficult, especially when considering the position 
of those in contradictory class locations, since they may, 
themselves, have contradictory views and interests. The whole 
issue of the relationship between class culture and 
consciousness and class objective location at the economic 
level is problematic. 
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(B) How Poulantzas' Criteria, and Erik Olin Wright's Model 
of Contradictory Class Locations will be Applied to the Case 
Study of Urban Egypt 
One previous attempt has been made, by the Egyptian economist 
Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, to draw a class map of urban Egypt using 
the idea of contradictory class locations in an attempt to 
identify within Egyptian society which groups occupy these 
positions. 
In his analysis, Abdel Fadil identifies two central classes 
in urban Egypt, the bourgeoisie and the working class, while 
both the new and the traditional petty bourgeoisie occupy an 
intermediary position between the two polar class positions. 
Within the class structure, Abdel Fadil identifies three basic 
contradictory locations in class relations in urban Egypt. 
1 Self-employed artisans and line supervisors, who occupy 
a contradictory location between the petty bourgeoisie 
and the working class, 
2 Small employers as well as technical, professional and 
administrative staff, who occupy a contradictory position 
between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, and 
3 Elements of the lumpen proletariat, who occupy a 
contradictory position between the organized working 
class and the lower ranks of the petty bourgeoisie.29  
The following table shows how Abdel Fadil gave a statistical 
assessment of the size of different classes and the size of 
contradictory class locations. 
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Table 3: Distribution of different socioeconomic categories 
into broad social classes in urban Egypt, 1970/71 
Class 	 Constituent 
	
Appro- Data sources 
socioeconomic 	 ximate 
groups 	 number 
(000s) 
Bourgeoisie Top government 
officials 
Top managers in 
the public sector 
Top independent 
professionals 
Wholesale traders  
1.9 	 State budget 
1971/72 
1.9 	 Survey of 
employment 1972 
26 	 Guess estimate, 
one fifth of 
professions 









	 1966/67 (updated) 
Contractors and 	 n . a . 
other businessmen 
Middle managers 	 10 	 Management survey 
1972 
Government special 20 
	
State budget 
cadres 	 1971/72 
Petty 
	

















190 	 State budget 
employees on 	 1971/72 
'special cadres' 
Line supervisors 	 35 
	
Survey of 
and foremen 	 employment 1970 
The traditional 
petty bourgeoisie 









estimate due to 
high risk of 
'double counting' 
250 	 Informed estimate 
based of 1965 
trade survey 




Salesmen and their 12 
assistants 
Proletarian Production workers 474 
Workers 
Workers in the 	 170 
civil service 
Sub- 	 Enumerated casual 474 










Cleaning, 	 78 	 Survey of 
maintenance and 	 employment 1970 
security workers 
Domestic servants 150 
	
Guess estimate 
Openly unemployed 86 	 Labour force 
people in urban 	 sample survey 1972 
areas 
Persons not 	 138 	 Labour force 
classified by any 	 sample survey 1972 
occupation 
Source: 	 Mahmoud Abdel Fadil (1980) The Political Economy of  
Nasserism (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) 
A number of important features can be noted in Abdel Fadil's 
distribution of the different social classes. In the first 
place, he introduces a classification of four categories 
similar to that of Poulantzas, i.e. the bourgeoisie, the new 
petty bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the 
working class. In his classification, Abdel Fadil has placed 
the top government officials and the managers and the special 
260 







and administrative staff 
204,000 
  




artisans 	 Bourgeoisie 
170,000 	 1.8 million 
(59%) 
Line supervisors and 
foremen 
35,000 










    
 
Classes 	 Contradictory 
locations 
    
Source: 
	
Mahmoud Abdel Fadil (1980) The Political Economy of 
Nasserism (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) 
cadres with the bourgeoisie. That is to say, he puts them in 
the same class with wholesale traders and industrial 
entrepreneurs. The author of the present research does not 
agree with the classification on this point. As was made clear 
in the earlier analysis of the new petty bourgeoisie in 
Chapter Three, this group is related to the state apparatus 
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and the 'superstructure' of society, while the bourgeoisie, 
i.e. the capitalist class, relates to the 'base' of the 
society. In consequence of this, in the present analysis such 
groups will grouped with the new petty bourgeoisie. This 
classification will be adhered to in the analysis of the 
sample of the field study. 
A second feature which differentiates the class map of Egypt 
from that of the capitalist advanced societies described by 
Wright can be identified. That is the class map of urban Egypt 
indicates that the working class is small compared with the 
traditional and new petty bourgeoisie, which account for 59 
per cent of the population. The working class, unlike the 
working class in advanced industrialized countries, is divided 
into two groups: those who work in modern industries and form 
a relatively privileged class which enjoys a stable 
occupation, the lumpen proletariat, which includes occasional 
labourers, street vendors, peddlers, domestic servants and 
porters. The former group accounts for 21 per cent. From this 
picture, one cannot conclude, as Abdel Fadil did, that the two 
major classes in urban Egypt are the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, since one can observe the growing number and 
influence of the new petty bourgeoisie, which leads the 
present researcher to make them a special feature in the field 
study, while at the same time not neglecting the other social 
classes. 
So, in urban Egypt, there is an increasing concentration in 
the new petty bourgeoisie. At the same time the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie is declining. This view is supported by 
figures taken from different years which show a shift in the 
working status of the urban workforce over the years 1962 to 
1976. 
The table shows the steady decline in the self-employed group 
and the increase among wage earners, which includes both the 
working class and other employees. There has also been an 
increase in unemployment from 3 per cent in 1962 to 7.3 per 
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Table 5: Shifts in the Working Status of the Urban Workforce, 
1962 - 1976 
Working Status 1962 t 1972 1976 
Raployers and 
entrepreneurs 
185,000 5 234,000 7 171,139 3.2 




1,443,000 63 2,300,000 66 4,092,702 73.3 
Unpaid family 141,000 6 214,000 6 
Unemployed 71,000 3 112,000 3 408,756 7.3 
Undefined 75,343 1.3 
TOTAL 2,294,000 100 3,495,000 100 5,580,489 100 
Source: Figures for 1962 and 1972 taken from Mahmoud Abdel 
Fadil, op.cit., p.90. The 1962 figures taken from 
a labour force sample in June 1962, and 1972 figures 
from a similar sample in May 1972. 
Figures for 1976 are the present researcher's 
estimates from the 1976 census. 
cent in 1976. 
From this discussion, the general concentration of this 
research upon the new petty bourgeoisie can be understood and 
justified, both in terms of the theoretical reasons set out 
in Chapter Three, and in terms of the statistical importance 
of this groups, as established here. 
For the purposes of the present research, the sample of the 
field study will be classified on the following criteria: 
Economic criteria, which means the position in relation to the 
means of production, i.e. the division between owners and non-
owners, 
Political criteria, which means the position in relation to 
supervisory / non-supervisory work, and 
Ideological criteria, which means the division between mental 
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/ manual work. 
From these criteria, the sample of the field study will be 
classified into four classes identified as follows: 
1 	 The bourgeoisie or the capitalists are the owners of the 
means of production, who employ at least ten workers.3°  
2 	 The working class, who are wage earners who have no 
supervisory role and who do manual work. 
3 	 The traditional petty bourgeoisie, who own their means 
of production, either employing other people on a small 
scale, or working by themselves doing manual work. 
4 	 The new petty bourgeoisie, who are wage earners, do not 
own their means of production, and do mental work. 
It should be noted that these criteria still represent a 
fairly economistic model, which mainly depends on the position 
in relation to the ownership of the means of production, and 
on doing mental / manual work, so it does not really go very 
far towards Poulantzas' wider theoretical views of political 
and ideological criteria. 
II. Methodology and Procedures for the Field Study 
In this part a short summary of the process of choosing the 
sample of the field study is presented, along with the 
procedures followed to conduct the interviews. As mentioned 
earlier in the introduction, the aim of the field study is to 
present empirically based data about the economic, social, 
political and educational perspectives of people from 
different class positions. The researcher decided to take the 
sample from the parents who have children in primary schools. 
The schools were chosen in such a way as to provide parents 
from different social backgrounds. The sample includes parents 
who have children in the following kinds of primary schools: 
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government free schools, government language schools and 
foreign language schools. The pilot study and the survey of 
fathers' occupations in these schools demonstrated that these 
schools contain children from different social backgrounds. 
Where the government free schools mainly draw children from 
working class and traditional petty bourgeois origins, the 
government language and foreign language schools mainly 
recruit those from new petty and big bourgeoisie backgrounds. 
The sample for the main study consisted of the parents of 
sixty families chosen from six schools, two schools of each 
kind. Members of the sample represent the following class 
positions: 
31 families represent the new petty bourgeoisie, 9 families 
represent the traditional petty bourgeoisie, 9 families 
represent the big bourgeoisie and 11 families represent the 
working class. 
The method used in the field study was the interview and the 
tool used was a guide for the interview which consists of a 
variety of questions which covered a wide range of different 
economic political, social and educational issues. To conduct 
the interviews the researcher arranged through the schools to 
visit the parents' houses where the interviews took place. For 
more details about the content of the interview, the selection 
of the sample for the pilot and main study, description of the 
schools and the social background of the pupils in the schools 
see Appendix 22. 
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SOCIAL CLASS MEMBERSHIP AND CULTURAL 
AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Introduction  
This research is concerned with education and social class 
formation. In order to proceed to investigate the influence 
of class power and class interests on education in the next 
two chapters, it is important in this chapter to illustrate 
the respondents' consciousness, awareness and sense of their 
own position in society, and their sense of their economic and 
political interests. These issues are important in order to 
throw light upon the nature and the development of the present 
class formation of Egypt, which has already been presented in 
Chapter Three in relation to state power. This chapter 
presents another dimension of the study of class formation, 
where class is considered as a matter of culture, ideology and 
consciousness. To study class at that level, this chapter 
focuses upon four main points: 
i) It is going to describe part of social reality as it 
appears in the differences between members of the sample 
in their way of life, education and income. 
ii) It will present people's image of society and their 
identification of their own class position, their 
parents' and their children's position, and that of those 
they identify as "like themselves". The image they have 
of Egypt's class formation in historical perspective will 
also be studied. This will include questions covering 
periods back to before 1952, and is important to throw 
light on the degree of the development of class 
consciousness, i.e. the possibility of the the 
development of class for itself. 
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iii) There will be an analysis of people's perceptions of the 
changes which took place in the sixties and seventies, 
and the extent to which they created a conflict or 
unified class interests between classes and inside the 
same social class. This point is built upon the 
theoretical analysis of the political and economic system 
of Egypt undertaken in Chapter Two. 
iv) Finally people's perceptions and images of the future of 
society will be addressed. 
The discussion and analysis of Egyptian culture set out in 
Chapter Four, relating to the cultural dichotomies between the 
educated and the illiterate, and between the religious and 
secular ideologies, will be further developed. The ways in 
which these dichotomies influence people's perceptions and 
abilities to understand, criticize and give solutions to 
economic and social relations will be examined. The role of 
these dichotomies in influencing the fragmentation or 
cementation of the class formation will be studied. 
I. Sample Profile 
The sample consists of sixty families represented by the 
father and the mother of each family. In terms of religious 
belief, Table 1 shows that most of the sample are Muslim and 
the minority are Christian. The sample fall into the age group 
30 to 50 as shown in Table 2. 
Table 1: Distribution of the Sample by Religion 




Big bourgeoisie Working class 
Muslim 24 6 7 9 
Christian 7 3 2 2 
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Table 2: Distribution of the Sample by Age 










Less than 30 1 
30 - 34 4 1 1 1 3 
35 - 39 1 12 1 3 5 3 
40 - 44 8 11 2 2 5 3 5 1 
45 - 49 12 3 3 3 3 1 3 
More than 50 10 1 3 1 4 
(A) Social origin 
Place of birth: 
Most of the members of the sample were born in urban areas, 
apart from the working class mothers, most of whom were born 
in rural areas. These details are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Place of Birth 
Place of Birth New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
Rural 12 11 2 2 4 3 5 a 
Urban 19 20 7 7 5 6 6 3 
Family origin: 
Place of birth is not the only indicator of social origin. 
Those who were born in urban areas generally have parents who 
came from rural areas originally, as Table 4 shows. In that 
sense, more than half of the members of the sample, 
representing different social classes, have origins in rural 
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Egypt. 
Table 4: Family Origin 
Family Origin New petty 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother 
Rural 	 19 	 18 
Urban 	 11 	 13 





6 	 4 
3 
Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
Plither Mother 	 Father Mother 
8 	 8 	 10 
1 	 4 
	
3 	 1 
Coming from rural origin and living in Cairo means that these 
families have migrated from rural to urban Egypt, either as 
the first or second generation migrants. 
The factors which have influenced these families to migrate 
are similar to those factors which influence the migration 
from rural to urban Egypt in general. Information gathered 
from the respondents indicates that, in the case of the new 
petty bourgeoisie, a major motivation for the move to Cairo 
was education, while the search for employment was another 
major motivation. The trend of being the second generation to 
move to Cairo can also be found in other class positions, 
where half of the fathers and a quarter of the mothers of the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie are second generation migrants 
to Cairo, as are two thirds of the fathers and mothers from 
the big bourgeoisie, and roughly a quarter of the fathers and 
mothers of the working class. However, the factors which led 
these different groups to migrate to Cairo are different. That 
is, from the social background of each class it can be seen 
that the working class migrants come from parents who are 
themselves rural workers, so when they leave the village to 
the city, they usually leave in the hope of making a better 
living. The opposite is the case of the new petty bourgeoisie 
and the big bourgeoisie, who moved for education as their 
parents were educated. They moved to Cairo attracted by the 
positive features of city life, as well as the economic 
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attraction. 
Another feature of the migration shown in the sample is that 
of female migration. Women from different social classes have 
moved to Cairo through two main channels, namely, with their 
parents or after marriage, The only exception in the sample 
is the case of a mother from the big bourgeoisie, who moved 
to Cairo alone to carry on her University education. From the 
limited sample of this research one cannot generalize about 
female migration in Egypt, but it is at least probable that 
it is connected with and controlled by the family movement, 
as the movement of the sample shows. However, in the seventies 
the movement of women was influenced by the opportunity to 
work in the Arab Oil countries and it is noticeable that women 
were allowed to move more independently outside the country. 
Social Origin and Different Ways and Styles of Life 
Most of the members of the sample have come from rural origins 
and settled in Cairo. In spite of coming from rural Egypt, the 
bourgeoisie have their own way of life which is adapted to 
urban areas, while the working class who came from rural Egypt 
did not change their way and style of life. Some of these 
differences between members of the sample can be illustrated 
as they appear in different styles of dress, housing and 
language which can be noticed in day to day life. 
Most of the working class and traditional petty bourgeois 
members of the sample wear the Egyptian traditional dress 
(galabya), while the big bourgeoisie and the new petty 
bourgeoisie wear the western style of clothes for men and 
women. In fact, differences in dress have their social and 
economic functions which go beyond external appearance, since 
the different styles of dress separate the different strata 
in urban Egypt. The style of dress has an economic role to 
play. For example, the working class traditional dress reduces 
expenses since they do not need a variety of clothes, in 
contrast with the middle class dress which requires more 
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money. Middle class dress is related to education and 
familiarity with western culture, which is why, in the working 
class families, the educated boys and girls do not dress like 
their parents but they dress like the middle class. This means 
that the way of dressing is signalling a move and a change 
from one social class to another. 
The style of housing differs between the members of different 
social classes. The working class and the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie tend to occupy small dwellings consisting of one 
or two rooms, while the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie tend to live in houses with four to six rooms. The 
style of furnishing the houses is different, since the working 
class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie have simple and 
necessary furniture, while the new petty bourgeoisie and the 
big bourgeoisie tend to have western style furniture. The 
different styles of living also appear in the residential 
area, where the working class and traditional petty 
bourgeoisie live in the traditional alleys (harah) which are 
marked by their close social relations, and work as one social 
unit while the new bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie live 
in modern buildings in complete physical separation from each 
other. 
Class differences appears in language since the working class, 
even though they have settled in Cairo, still keep the rural 
accent while the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie 
have urban accents and, due to their education, use some 
foreign words in their speech.' 
(B) Education level 
Table 5 presents the level of education for all members of 
the sample. The table shows the high percentage of illiteracy 
among the working class mothers while nearly half of the 
fathers are literate i.e. they know how to read and write 
without holding any education certificates, since they learned 
reading and writing in kuttabs. Only a small percentage of 
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the working class fathers hold a certificate (primary and/or 
secondary level - technical school). The petty bourgeoisie 
have the same level of education as the working class, 
Table 5: Standard of Education 
Standard of 	 Mew petty 









Illiterate 4 1 4 1 4 10 
Literate 4 2 1 5 1 
Primary Level 	 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Middle Level 	 5 10 1 2 2 3 
(Secondary) 
More than middle 
less than 	 2 
university 
1 1 
University 	 21 13 1 1 5 3 
(1st degree) 
More than 
university 1st 2 
degree (Ph.D) 
2 
Table 5 shows that the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie are mainly educated at the university level, with 
more than half of the fathers and a substantial minority of 
the mothers being university graduates. The sample reflects 
the fact of the low standard of education for the working 
class and the high percentage of illiteracy among women. 
(C) Income 
The range of income for different classes is shown in Table 
6. The table shows that there is wide range of income 
differences among the new petty bourgeoisie since incomes 
start at the level of 100-199 pounds and go up to the level 
at 500-600 pounds. This is due to the fact that the sample 
comprise a group of big and senior employees beside another 
group of small employees. 
It can be noticed that more than half of the petty bourgeoisie 
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Table 6: Level of Income 
Rate of Income New petty 
(monthly) 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother 









100 - 199 2 11 1 3 
200 - 299 14 3 2 
300 - 399 6 1 4 1 1 
400 - 499 6 2 
500 - 1000 3 3 1 
More than 1000 9 
Total 31 9 9 11 
mothers are working women with an income. The big bourgeoisie 
fall at the level of more than 1000 pounds a month while the 
petty bourgeoisie occupy the middle level between 200-399 
pounds a months a month. The working class is occupying the 
lower income level where a little more than half earn 50-99 
pounds and about a quarter earn £100-199, the only exception 
is one worker whose income falls in the range 500-600 pounds, 
because he works as a welder in a foreign company. This 
difference among the working class incomes reflects the fact 
of the big income gap between those who work in the national 
sector and those who work for foreign companies, which can be 
found in all the different class positions. One notices as 
well that the new petty bourgeoisie can compensate for their 
lowtby the women working, while the working class who have 
overwhelmingly got the lowest incomes have no other source of 
income. 
(D) Number of Children 
The common number of children for all class positions is to 
have a family size of 3 to 4 children. However, one can notice 
in Table 7 that families of 1 to 2 children occur mainly in 
the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie while 
families of more than 5 children most common in the working 
class. 
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1 - 2 15 1 3 
3 - 4 13 4 5 
5 - 6 3 1 





The number of children is important in two respects: first it 
shows the burden of subsistence for each class, which in the 
sample is high for the working class and the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie; second it reflects the fact that birth control 
and the small family size is a more acceptable idea to the 
middle class and the educated people than to the lower 
classes. 
The sample profile is important in illustrating some points: 
- It reflects, in economic terms, the high gap between 
different classes. This is important since it is known 
that, there is no map of income distribution in Egypt. 
So, even though it is a limited sample, it reflects the 
economic gap between different class positions. 
- The profile shows the differences in the family size 
which reflect two facts, namely, the traditional 
resistance of the working class and the uneducated in 
general to birth control and the high burden of 
subsistence for the working class. 
- The profile shows that the traditional petty bourgeoisie 
have some similarities and some differences with the 
working class. Being owners of their means of production 
they are not exploited like the working class and their 
small ownership affords them a middle level of income. 
However, in some aspects, such as education and family 
size, they share the same characteristics with the 
working class. 
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II. Image of Society 
The study of People's image of society will cover the 
following points: 
- The respondents' image of the present class formation of 
Egypt and the model of class formation they identify and 
the size of each class. The respondents were asked to 
identify their own class position, their parents' and the 
children's position in society. 
- The class formation of Egypt will be studied in a 
historic perspective, where respondents will describe the 
image they have of Egypt before the 1952 Revolution. 
- Respondents' images and perceptions of the future of 
society will be discussed. 
The study of people's image of society will help to illustrate 
the extent to which people from the same class position 
present a single, unified, or a different and fragmented 
picture of society. This is an important issue to study, 
because it helps to illustrate the complexity of ideology, 
culture and common-sense as they work in reality in a specific 
social class formation. 
(A) People's Image of the Present Class Structure 
When asked about the present class formation of society, the 
members of all social classes were in agreement on two major 
points: people in society are unequal, and the differences 
between people are very large. 
The three kinds of differences people identified are: 
1. 	 Economic Differences 
These was expressed in terms of differences of wealth and 
income and standard of living. It was the most 
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significant difference, being selected by roughly half 
of all members from different class positions. 
2. Social Differences 
These were identified in terms of the amount of power and 
authority that people have in society. social position 
and opportunities. The big bourgeoisie and the new petty 
bourgeoisie both attached considerable importance to 
these. 
3. Cultural and Spiritual Differences 
These included differences in educational level, and 
religion, in the sense that some people are more 
religious or devout than others. People also differ in 
their cultural heritage which they derive from their 
family and their education. This was mainly expressed by 
the big bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie. 
(B) Different Models of the Present Class Formation 
There is no consensus between the members of different social 
classes about the present class formation of Egyptian society. 
They express their views in the form of different class 
models, which they conceive of in terms of two, three, four 
or five social classes. The responses are summarized in Table 
8. 
Table 8: Different Models of Society 
Class 	 New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Class Model 	 Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
Two groups 
	




3 	 4 
Three groups 15 	 20 	 5 	 4 	 5 	 a 	 6 	 4 
Four groups 
	 7 	 6 	 2 	 2 
Five groups 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 
I don't know 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 2 	 2 
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The table shows that the new petty bourgeoisie and the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie tend to give a wide range of 
responses, ranging from two to five principal groups. In 
contrast, both the big bourgeoisie and the working class give 
responses which suggest there are either two, or at the most 
three, social groups. 
The two group model consists of poor and rich. The three group 
model consists of poor middle and rich. The four group model 
consists of capitalist (very rich), craftsmen (described as 
parasitic), employees and the poor. The five group model 
consists of the very rich, rich, middle class, lower middle 
class and the poor. It should be noticed that these groups are 
classified in a hierarchy as mentioned. 
When the members of the sample talk about, for example, the 
middle class or the rich, they may have in mind different 
groups of people. The 'rich' can cover a very wide range of 
people from millionaires to just 'rich', and may include 
businessmen, craftsmen, and merchants. People do differentiate 
between different degrees of 'rich'. 
The term 'middle class' may be used to mean the educated, 
government employees, or even craftsmen and merchants. 
'Poor' usually means the workers, servants and cleaners. Some 
people put all employees in this class, as they consider that 
the position of employees deteriorated in the seventies. This 
tendency is most clear among the new petty bourgeoisie, with 
members of the sample who are in this group feeling strongly 
about the deterioration of the position of the middle class. 
The content of each class shows how members of the different 
social classes are giving a picture of fragmentation inside 
the one social class, in terms of considering that the one 
class consists of different social groups. 
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(C) The Size of Different Social Classes as Identified by 
People 
Members of the sample were all asked to give an assessment of 
the size of each of the classes in society at the present 
time. In order to give an overview of the responses which will 
reflect the variety of the answers given by members of 
different social classes, the responses will be linked to the 
model which the respondents used. 
In the case of the two group model, which was chosen by some 
members of all classes, there is no agreement about the size 
of each group of poor and rich. 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, fathers and mothers tend to 
give two kinds of division: according to the first, there is 
a 10 to 30 per cent minority of rich people, and a 70 to 90 
per cent majority of poor people. According to the second 
view, society is divided more or less equally between rich and 
poor. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie fathers tend to give a 
single division between a minority of rich, around 20 to 30 
per cent, and a majority of poor, between 70 to 80 per cent. 
The mothers in this group give an equal division between the 
two classes. 
The big bourgeoisie fathers tend to make a sharp division 
between a 10 to 20 per cent minority of rich and an 80 to 90 
per cent majority of poor, while the mothers gave an equal 
division. 
The working class respondents followed a similar pattern to 
the traditional and big bourgeoisie, with the fathers giving 
a division of 20 to 30 per cent rich and 70 to 80 per cent 
poor, while the mothers gave an equal division. 
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For the three group model, which consists of the poor, the 
middle and the rich, there is no easy way to identify certain 
patterns that people follow in their division of the three 
classes. The way in which members of the sample from the new 
petty bourgeoisie and traditional petty bourgeoisie 
particularly divided the poor and the middle group showed a 
very wide diversity of opinion as to where the boundary lies. 
The new petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers tend to give a 
model where the rich are a small group of 10 to 20 per cent, 
while the division between the poor and the middle covers a 
very wide range, with either group being seen as the larger. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie followed a similar pattern 
in their classification of the three groups. 
For the big bourgeoisie and the working class the division was 
different and more clear. The big bourgeoisie identified a 
minority of around 10 per cent as being rich, a relatively 
small group of middle class, around 20 to 30 per cent, and the 
majority of between 70 and 80 per cent poor. The working class 
fathers and mothers followed a similar pattern, although in 
their case the group of rich people tended to be even smaller. 
The four group model was predominantly chosen by the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The four 
groups are labelled capitalists, craftsmen, employees and 
poor. The new petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers gave a 
model in which the rich and the craftsmen together represented 
5 to 30 per cent of society, while the employees and the poor 
made up the rest. But there was no one model of the division 
between the poor and the employees. In some cases they were 
divided equally, in others one or other group was the 
majority. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers tended 
to give a model where craftsmen represented nearly half of 
society, while the other three groups were seen as being 
roughly equal in size. 
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The five group model consisted of the very rich, rich, middle 
class, lower middle class and poor. This was again chosen 
predominantly by the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie. Among the new petty bourgeoisie, the models 
given by fathers and mothers are different. For the fathers, 
there is a sharp polarization between a minority at the top 
consisting of the very rich, rich, middle and lower middle 
classes, who represent 10 to 20 per cent of society. The 
remaining 80 to 90 per cent are seen as poor. The mothers tend 
to give a model in which there is a minority of very rich and 
rich, making up 5 per cent, a small group of poor, of around 
10 to 20 per cent, while the remaining 60 to 70 per cent are 
in the middle and lower middle classes. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie both fathers and mothers 
tend to give a model with a minority of 5 to 10 per cent very 
rich, a medium size middle and lower middle class, around 20 
to 30 per cent each, and a majority of 50 to 60 per cent poor. 
The main characteristics which can be identified from these 
models are that: 
The new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie tend to give a wide range of models from two to 
five groups, while the working class and the big bourgeoisie 
tend to see society as divided into only two or three groups. 
The identification of the relative size of the poor and middle 
class groups is particularly problematic for the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, who gave 
responses which ranged from the two groups being equal to one 
or other of them being in a substantial majority. The big 
bourgeoisie and the working class are more consistent in 
seeing that there is a substantial majority who are poor. 
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(D) People's Consciousness of Their Own Class Position in 
Society 
People were asked to classify themselves, their parents and 
their children into social classes. The researcher asked the 
members of the sample to classify themselves in one of three 
categories, upper, middle or lower class. However, through 
discussion, people identified some more categories, such as 
middle-middle, lower-middle or poor. These classifications 
have been taken into account by the researcher. The results 
are shown in Table 9. It can be seen that the new petty 
bourgeoisie fathers and mothers mainly classify themselves, 
their parents and their children as middle middle class, 
although a substantial number classify themselves as poor. The 
same tendency can be found in the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie who classify themselves and their parents as 
middle middle class, but are less uniform about the 
description of their children, with a fairly wide spread of 
responses from both mothers and fathers. 
For the big bourgeoisie the main classification for themselves 
and their parents is middle middle class, again with a very 
wide range of responses when asked to describe the position 
of their children, ranging from upper class to poor, with a 
good number saying that it was impossible to predict the class 
position of their children. One peculiar feature of the big 
bourgeoisie's classification of themselves is that one in five 
of the fathers and mothers classified themselves as poor. They 
explained this classification according to their view of a 
reference group which was still more wealthy than them. That 
is, when they compared themselves with other big bourgeoisie 
who are millionaires, they consider themselves poor. 
For the working class, the very substantial majority classify 
themselves, their parents and their children as poor. One in 
every ten fathers, and one in every five mothers, classified 
themselves as lower middle class. A slight majority of the 
working class identify their children as poor, but a 
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Table 9: Parents' Identification of thier Own Class Position 
Different 	 Class 
positions 






Trad'nal petty Big 
bourgeoisie 
	 bourgeoisie 




Upper Class Your Parents 1 1 1 
Your Children 5 10 1 2 
Upper Yourself 2 1 
Middle Class Your Parents 1 1 
Your Children 2 2 2 1 
Middle Yourself 16 22 7 7 4 6 
Middle Class Your Parents 20 26 7 6 6 6 2 2 
Your Children 17 15 2 2 2 4 1 
Lower Yourself 3 2 1 1 2 
Middle Class Your Parents 2 
Your Children 3 2 1 
Yourself 9 7 1 2 2 10 9 
Poor Your Parents 6 4 2 2 3 1 9 9 
Your Children 2 3 1 1 6 6 




children Your Children 4 3 4 2 3 1 4 4 
We can't Yourself 1 
classify Your Parents 1 
Egyptian Your Children 1 
Society 
Yourself 
The secure Your Parents 1 
group Your Children 1 
substantial minority say they cannot identify the position 
they expect their children to reach. So, the working class 
mainly expect their children to fall within the poor. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from these observations: 
1. 	 Members of the three bourgeois classes, the big, new and 
traditional petty bourgeoisie, tend to classify and 
identify themselves as middle middle class, and in a few 
cases a minority of the big bourgeoisie mothers 
identified themselves as upper class. This tendency among 
the three bourgeois classes to concentrate themselves in 
the middle position in the class hierarchy gives an 
indication of the weak sense of class identity which the 
members of the bourgeois classes have. In contrast with 
this, the majority of the working class have a much 
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stronger sense about their position as poor. 
2. The uncertainty about children's future position is 
widespread among members from different class positions. 
However, two different patterns can be identified among 
the three bourgeois classes. They expect their children 
to be anywhere from upper class to poor. The working 
class for the most part expect their children to be poor. 
(E) People's Sense of Class Size before the Revolution 
People were not only asked to identify the class formation and 
the size of classes at the present time. They were also asked 
to give a historical account of the shape of society in the 
past, and in particular before the 1952 Revolution. This is 
useful in giving a sense of class consciousness, not only at 
the present time but also in historical perspective. 
In order to ask people about their perceptions of different 
classes before the Revolution, the question was not phrased 
in terms of bourgeoisie and working class, but in terms of 
rich, poor, and middle, which makes it easier for people from 
different classes to understand. This classification is also 
much closer to the one they actually use in their everyday 
life. 
Table 10 shows the responses of the members of different 
classes, giving their views on whether each group was bigger, 
smaller, or about the same, before the Revolution. Generally 
speaking, people's picture of society before the revolution 
is of a society with a small rich group, and a large poor 
group. What was less clear was how they viewed the middle 
class before and after the Revolution. For example, the 
members of the new petty bourgeoisie were almost equally 
divided between the opinion that the middle class was smaller 
after the Revolution, that it was bigger, and that it was 
about the same. A smaller percentage of parents in this group 
were of the opinion that the middle class did not exist before 
285 
Table 10: Size of Social Classes before the Revolution 
Different 	 Class 
groups 
The size of different 




Tradsnal petty Big 
bourgeoisie 
	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
Working class 
Father Mother 
Less 28 27 6 1 7 5 5 2 
Rich More 2 1 2 3 1 3 1 
The same 1 
Leas 8 5 1 1 3 4 1 
Poor More 20 23 7 3 5 3 5 2 
The same 2 1 
Less 10 10 3 2 2 4 1 1 
Middle More 10 8 1 1 3 2 
The same 8 9 4 1 3 2 1 1 
No m'dle class 2 1 1 4 
I don't know 1 3 1 5 1 5 9 
the Revolution, and was created after the Revolution by part 
of the poor gained advancement and moved up to form this 
class. 
So, the model that the new petty bourgeoisie presents for 
society before the Revolution is mainly of a majority of poor 
and a minority of rich. As for the middle class, no specific 
pattern emerges, with some believing that the middle class is 
bigger now, some smaller, and some that it did not exist 
before 1952. This is the case for both fathers and mothers. 
A member of the new petty bourgeoisie, an inspector in the 
Ministry of Education, described the situation before and 
after the Revolution: 
"Before the Revolution the rich were less and they 
were very well educated and cultured, not like the 
new rich today, who emerged from the poor and the 
middle class. Before the Revolution the poor were 
more than today, and the middle class were less". 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, nearly half of the 
fathers believe that the middle class was much the same before 
and after the Revolution, while another third of them thought 
that it had increased. Over half of the mothers in this class 
found it difficult to give a response to this question, 
although the pattern among those who answered was very similar 
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to the pattern presented by the fathers. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie present a model of a 
majority of poor, a minority of rich, and a middle class which 
was either smaller or the same. A member of the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie who is the owner of a small shop described 
society before the Revolution: 
"Before the Revolution the rich were a minority, the 
middle class was small, and the poor were the 
majority of society: today the middle class has 
increased". 
The big bourgeoisie gave a model of society where the rich 
were a minority, the poor were either larger or smaller, and 
the middle class ranged from less, to more, or the same, or 
even that the middle class did not exist before the 
Revolution. The pattern for the big bourgeoisie is slightly 
different from the pattern of the new petty bourgeoisie and 
the traditional petty bourgeoisie. For the big bourgeoisie, 
there was more uncertainty about whether the poor were more 
or less before the Revolution. A member of the big bourgeoisie 
who is the owner of a factory described society before the 
Revolution: 
"Before the Revolution we had a minority of very 
rich people from big respectable families, a big 
middle class, and the poor were a small group. The 
rich were kind and helped the poor". 
For the working class, their responses were substantially 
different, with nearly half of the fathers and four out of 
every five mothers finding it difficult to give a response to 
this question. Of those who did answer, most thought that 
society before the Revolution had a minority of rich, a 
majority of poor, and no middle class. 
A working class cleaner expressed this view: 
"Before the Revolution there were two classes, the 
rich and the poor. The rich were a minority, because 
in my village we knew only one rich person, and that 
person was 'Al-Pasha'. There was no middle class. 
People were either poor or rich. The Revolution 
created the middle class". 
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After this exploration of the image of society of the members 
of the sample which related to the period before the 
Revolution in 1952 and shortly after it, the next step was to 
move forward in time and to ask them for their views on the 
present class structure. 
From these patterns of society before the Revolution a general 
picture can be drawn. This shows a tendency to give a picture 
of a society of a minority of rich and a majority of poor. 
However, the detailed picture is more complicated, and 
considerable differences can be found between classes. 
- It seems that the identification of the middle class is 
problematic for the three bourgeois classes, since there 
is no unified view about their size and position, with 
some respondents thinking they are more, some less, and 
others the same. 
- The traditional petty bourgeoisie share with the new 
petty bourgeoisie the view that there were a minority of 
rich and a majority of poor. 
- The big bourgeoisie in particular are divided about the 
position of the poor, and whether it was more or less 
than it is now. 
- The working class, in contrast with the other classes, 
tended to give a picture of society which was strongly 
dichotomized between the rich and the poor, influenced 
by their experience of rural Egypt, where class 
differences were very sharp. 
(F) Explanations, Justifications and Critiques of Class 
Differences 
In discussion with people as to how they justify and criticize 
class differences, and how these differences exist, three main 
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types of explanations are given. The first one sees the 
differences between classes in terms of the social division 
of labour. This explanation is mainly put forward by the new 
petty bourgeoisie. The second model used to explain 
differences uses the tensions and conflicts that exist between 
people in society. This model was put forward from members in 
a variety of class positions. The third explanation is that 
differences are created by God. This model is put forward by 
members from all class positions. 
The first explanation is a functionalist understanding of the 
differences, where people see differences not in terms of 
inequality, but in terms of the social division of labour. 
This view is mostly expressed by the new petty bourgeoisie. 
For example, a father who is an engineer in the public sector 
said, 
"People are divided into classes in order to have 
different roles to play in society and this in turn 
is important for labour distribution in society". 
The second view of class differences is based on tension and 
conflict in social relations as factors which stand behind 
social differences and the class system of society. This view 
was expressed by both the bourgeois classes and the working 
class. They express the view that God created people equal, 
but that social relations made them unequal. 
A member of the new petty bourgeoisie, who is a father and the 
director of a public sector company said, 
"God created people equal. It is human beings who 
make themselves poor or rich by work. Because God 
knows about these differences, God ordered the rich 
to pay alms". 
A member of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, a father who 
is the owner of a photography shop, said, 
"God created people equal. But it is the social life 
and social relations which made the classes". 
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A mother who is the wife of a working class welder expressed 
her view of how people use each other: 
"God created people equal. Being rich or poor comes 
from people themselves who use each other. The rich 
want to increase their money and wealth. That is why 
they rob other people's money, and from this point 
differences come between people. So those who make 
a lot of money must pay high taxes". 
The third view, which was identified by members from different 
class positions, justifies and understands class differences 
and inequalities in religious terms, i.e. as created and given 
by God. For example, a father who is a university professor 
said, 
"God created us classes. God established this 
inequality in many verses of the Quran, but never 
mentions this wide gap between the poor and the 
rich. The Prophet himself was very kind and helpful 
to the poor". 
A member of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, a tailor, said, 
"God created people equal as human beings but 
unequal in means of living, and God ordered the rich 
to help and pay alms to the poor". 
A father from the big bourgeoisie, who is an engineer working 
as an entrepreneur, said, 
"God created people in classes, but also ordered 
them to pay alms and charitable gifts and to have 
social solidarity. If rich people paid their taxes 
and alms we would not find this big gap between poor 
and rich". 
The working class expressed the same view, that class is given 
by God, and they showed how they accept their fate. A father 
who is a cleaner said, 
"God created people in classes and unequal. I am 
poor but I am satisfied with my position. I do not 
look at people who are higher than me. I only look 
at people who are poorer than me, and I say 'Thank 
God, I am not that poor'". 
From these views on class and social inequalities, it can be 
seen that there are both religious and secular understandings 
of society spread across the class structure. According to the 
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religious beliefs expressed by people, inequality is seen as 
given, and Islam provides a solution to these inequalities, 
not to abolish them, but to reduce them by asking the rich to 
pay alms (zakat) to the poor as stated in the Quran. This 
solution of paying alms was mainly expressed by the three 
bourgeois classes, while the working class tended to express 
their acceptance of their fate. 
The other views which were expressed gave a secular 
understanding of the situation. There were two solutions. One 
is to ask for the rich to pay high taxes, which was mainly put 
forward by the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class, 
and this is considered the responsibility of the state. The 
other solution which comes from those who present a secular 
understanding of the situation, is similar to the religious 
solution specified in the Quran, namely the giving of alms and 
charity. This case was largely advanced by the big bourgeoisie 
and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. 
From that, it can be concluded that both secular and religious 
understandings and solutions for class differences exist among 
members from different class positions. The differences which 
can be found between those who expressed religious 
understanding is that the three bourgeois classes tended to 
give the Islamic solution in terms of the rich paying alms to 
the poor, while the working class who explained differences 
as created by God tended not to offer a solution, but to 
accept their fate. Those who gave secular understandings of 
the differences as created by tensions, conflicts and by the 
social division of labour, are also divided on the question 
of solutions. The big and traditional petty bourgeoisie tended 
to give an Islamic solution, which is the paying of alms, 
while the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class tended 
to give a secular solution, which sees a role for the state. 
This, for example, might be the imposition of higher levels 
of taxation as a means of redistributing wealth in society. 
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III. Political, Economic Interests and Class Consciousness  
(A) Evaluation of the Policies of the Sixties and Seventies 
at the National Level 
From the study of the political and economic context of Egypt, 
it is known that Egyptian society has gone through different 
economic, political and social eras. That is, the era of 
Nasser which was to a certain extent guided by socialist 
thinking and the era of Sadat which introduced the open door 
policy with its capitalist thought. Each era had its different 
social and political impact upon different social classes. 
In discussion with the members of the sample, they were asked 
to evaluate the impact of the two eras in developing society 
and in terms of their personal benefit in the two eras. 
Table 11: Comparison between Sixties and Seventies in 
Developing Society, People's Positions and Education 
Different 
	
Class New petty 	 Trad'nal petty Big 	 Working class 
periods 	 bourgeoisie bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Aspects of development 	 Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 
in different periods 
60s 	 12 12 4 4 4 4 6 5 
70s 	 12 14 4 5 4 5 2 2 
Developing 	 Never improved 7 
our society 	 Before R'v't'n 
1 1 1 
Both 60s & 70s 1 1 
50s 
60s 	 12 18 3 4 3 4 6 6 
70s 	 12 9 4 5 5 5 2 1 
Developing 	 Never improved 4 1 1 
your position 	 Before R'v't'n 2 1 1 
Both 60s & 70s 1 1 
50s 	 1 
I don't know 3 3 
I can't compare because I was young 2 
Table 11 summarises different views. On the subject of which 
period developed society more than the other, it was explained 
to the respondents that the aim was to investigate the 
development of the economic standard of society, of political 
freedom and social life in general. The responses, which 
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compare the sixties and the seventies, show that the 
respondents were almost equally divided between the two 
periods, if one considers only the big bourgeoisie, the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie. 
On the other hand, the working class felt that the sixties 
were more important, with over half the fathers and nearly 
half the mother choosing the sixties, and only a fifth of each 
choosing the seventies. 
From this it can be seen that there is a fairly substantial 
split along class lines as to whether the sixties or the 
seventies were the more important decade for development. 
However, this was not the only question about the development 
of society in which there was a division of opinion according 
to class. Questions were asked about whether the respondents 
thought that there had been improvements in society in the 
sixties and seventies, and whether they thought society did 
not improve. People justified their judgments concerning the 
sixties and seventies with social, political and economic 
reasons. 
The general pattern of responses shows that different points 
were emphasized by different classes. For the new petty 
bourgeoisie there was a split between those who thought the 
sixties produced most improvement in society, those who 
thought that the seventies did, and those who thought society 
did not improve. The traditional petty bourgeoisie placed 
greater emphasis on the flourishing of the economy in the 
seventies, but they were very critical of ethical standards 
in the seventies. 
The big bourgeoisie were divided between those who supported 
the policies of the sixties, and those who supported the 
policies of the seventies. This reflected a conflict in 
attitudes over whether the protection provided by the state 
in the sixties or the competition of the open market in the 
seventies were most advantageous. 
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The working class were clear in their support for the policies 
of the sixties, and this view came directly from their 
everyday experience of suffering. 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, those who thought that the 
sixties had brought development cited both positive and 
negative aspects of the period. A university professor said, 
"The sixties had their good and bad sides. It was 
a period of national liberation and patriotism, but 
it was under a dictatorial system, it gave no 
political freedom and it closed society. The 
seventies came with the open door policy which 
encouraged our relations with the West, and created 
a consumer society. People became more materialistic 
and it shook all our values and principles." 
Those who chose the seventies also had their justifications. 
A mother who is a housewife and comes from wealthy rural 
origins and still has relations with rural Egypt expressed her 
view from her experience with the developments and changes in 
rural areas. She said, 
"The seventies improved society more than the 
sixties. For example, farmers became free to sell 
their crops in the free market. Before they were 
forced to give them to the government. People became 
free to bring money without answering a lot of 
questions about the source of the money". 
Those who believed that society improved in neither the 
sixties nor the seventies argued that the Revolution did not 
follow a specific programme for change, and if there was any 
change it was a reflection of changes and developments on the 
international scene. A university professor expressed this 
argument: 
"The Revolution did not improve our society. If 
there was any change, it was only natural and 
spontaneous. It was part of the developments and 
changes which took place all over the world. If we 
compare Egypt with other countries during the same 
period of the Revolution, i.e. the fifties, we find 
that other countries, like China, which started 
their development with Egypt are today more 
developed than us. I do not believe that there is 
a big difference between the sixties and the 
seventies". 
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The views of the new petty bourgeoisie reflect a wide range 
of economic, political and social explanations and critique 
of the policies of the sixties and seventies, and they show 
the diversity of views and ideologies inside one social class. 
The new petty bourgeoisie are mainly divided between defending 
the two eras. The views of the traditional petty bourgeoisie 
reflect mainly an ethical and economic concern and criticisms 
of the two periods. 
A photographer who owns his own photographic shop said, 
"We built our society in the sixties, people were 
more belonging and faithful to their country than 
in the seventies". 
Those who are positive about the seventies give clear economic 
justifications. A tailor who owns his shop said, 
"The country was closed during the sixties, there 
was no economic freedom. The seventies has opened 
society and allowed people to make money". 
Another owner of a small shop defended the seventies, saying, 
"The seventies developed our economy more than the 
sixties. In the sixties the government was working 
as a ruler and it wanted to play the role of the 
merchant as well. This was wrong because the 
government should stick to politics and leave 
economic activities to the people". 
So, the small owners who run their own businesses express 
their economic interests which flourished in the seventies 
with the open door policy. However, in some cases they express 
how the seventies demoralized society by pushing people 
towards accumulating wealth. 
The same split in views between the virtues of the sixties and 
the seventies can be found in the big bourgeoisie. Those who 
support the policies of the sixties gave clear economic, moral 
and political justifications. 
A businessman who has a law degree said, 
"We made our major progress and achievements during 
the sixties. We built our industry, developed our 
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education and liberated our country". 
Another view from the owner of an electric tools factory 
reflected the bourgeois conflict between the protection 
offered them by the sixties and the opportunities given to 
them in the seventies for more economic activity but with the 
risk of increased competition: 
"The sixties improved society more than the 
seventies. During Nasser's time, Nasser encouraged 
national industry and national bourgeoisie, he 
opened many work opportunities for many people. The 
only mistake was that we were a very closed society 
and we did not have relations with the West. In the 
seventies we started to be open to the West, but 
foreign industry is threatening people like me 
because I cannot stand the competition". 
Those who support the policies of the seventies criticize the 
measures taken in the sixties. An engineer who works as an 
entrepreneur said, 
"I do not agree with the sixties' policies like the 
nationalization which destroyed many companies and 
created problems like the housing problem, because 
people became afraid of doing business because of 
the threat of nationalization. Politically people 
were oppressed. I agree with the open door policy 
of the seventies, which solved these problems." 
From that division of the views between the three bourgeois 
classes and within one class, it can be concluded that the 
working class, who mainly support the developments of the 
sixties, reflect views which come from their own direct and 
personal experiences of their economic problems. It can be 
seen that their views do not cover the variety of political, 
economic and social justifications which are given by the 
bourgeoisie. 
A mother, and wife of a bus conductor in the public sector, 
said, 
"The sixties were better than tody. During Nasser's 
time life was very cheap and income was 4 pounds per 
month, but it was sufficient. Now income is 80 
pounds per month and we cannot manage". 
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The working class also reflect the phenomenon of increasing 
consumption. Another housewife said, 
"In the seventies things like TV, fridges, and 
videos became available more than the sixties. Many 
people could buy them and we could afford to buy 
them as well. However, life in the sixties was more 
secure and cheaper than the seventies". 
From the views of the different members of social classes it 
can be seen that the bourgeois classes are divided in their 
views. This division centres around the two periods of the 
sixties and seventies, and mean that there is no consensus 
between them as to which period developed society more. In 
their discussion of the policies of the two periods, the new 
petty bourgeoisie give a wide range of explanations of what 
happened; they perceive the two periods not only at the 
personal level but also at the national level with all the 
economic, political and social impacts upon society. 
In the responses of the working class, the two periods are 
analyzed in terms of their direct personal relations and the 
influence of the two periods on their daily life. They did not 
give a wide perspective on the effect of the two periods on 
society in general. However, their comments and explanations 
of their lives in the two periods express the suffering and 
deprivation of the working class in the seventies. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, i.e. the small shop 
owners, it would seem that they perceived themselves to have 
benefited from the open economy of the seventies. If one 
compares this with the analysis of the position of this class 
under the open door policy, it would seem that the findings 
of this research contradict the theoretical argument that the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie were harmed by the big 
industries and the influx of foreign capital. What can be 
suggested is that those who were harmed by the policies of the 
open door economy were those who were involved in small 
industries, while those in commercial activities, such as 
those practised by the members of the sample, were not 
seriously affected. 
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(B) Personal Interests and Development in the Sixties and 
Seventies 
The discussion of the two eras of the sixties and seventies 
moves from the perspectives upon the influences of the two 
eras at the national level to their influence on individuals, 
in terms of how much they benefited and improved their lives. 
Membership of different social classes again affected the 
responses. 
The fathers in the new petty bourgeoisie divided equally 
between their views of the two periods, while mothers were 
more inclined to believe that their position had improved in 
the sixties. Other assessments were given of personal 
positions over the two periods: a small but significant number 
of the fathers believed that their position had not improved 
in either period, and a similar number thought that life was 
better before the Revolution. These opinions were much less 
likely to be held by fathers from the new petty bourgeoisie. 
The different personal interests inside the new petty 
bourgeoisie were expressed, and different reasons were given. 
For example, some members of this class said that although 
their income had increased, their standard of living had 
deteriorated. A mother who is an accountant in the Ministry 
of Education expressed this view: 
"Our standard of living was better in the sixties, 
even though we now have more income, but our 
standard of living went down". 
Those who benefited from the open door policy and the foreign 
sector companies had a different perception. A father who is 
an engineer in a foreign company said, 
"I improved my position in the seventies. I had the 
opportunity to work in the foreign sector. In the 
sixties life was very terrifying under Nasser, and 
in the seventies we had more freedom". 
From these views it is clear that not all of the fractions of 
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the new petty bourgeoisie see themselves as having personally 
benefited from the seventies. The situation differs according 
to the sector in which they work. From the material of the 
field study, the difference in income between those who work 
in the foreign sector and those who work for the government 
is large. For example, the engineer who works for a foreign 
company is 38 years old, and he has a monthly income of 500 
Egyptian pounds, while another engineer who is 44 and works 
in the public sector and has the same university 
qualifications has an income of only 250 Egyptian pounds, in 
spite of his greater experience. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, roughly half of both 
the fathers and the mothers believe their position improved 
in the seventies. The open market and encouragement of the 
private sector helped them to make more money. 
A photographer stated that, 
"I started my project of having my own business and 
to run my own shop in the seventies. The open market 
and the increasing money in the country has 
encouraged many people to start their own 
businesses". 
A tailor who has his own shop expressed a similar point: 
"For myself, I developed my position during the 
seventies. My business grew more in the seventies, 
because people had a lot more money, especially 
those who came back from the oil countries, so I 
could make good business and have more customers". 
It would seem that the boom in the Egyptian economy due to the 
increasing consumption and the increase in the circulation of 
money helped those who had commercial interests and those in 
private services increased their income. 
The big bourgeoisie mainly benefited personally in the 
seventies, as more than half of both the mothers and fathers 
agreed. However, members of this class expressed a feeling of 
insecurity more than any other class. 
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A businessman with a degree in law, who has an income of 1,500 
pounds per month, said, 
"If you ask me about my position, during the 
seventies until now I can make a lot of money, but 
you should ask me whether I feel secure and 
satisfied. We lost the security feeling in the 
seventies. We earn a lot of money, but we are 
insecure. I am always anxious and afraid of 
tomorrow, because there is no future planning and 
I think insecurity is one of the characteristics of 
the capitalist society". 
From these views, the big bourgeoisie, who enjoy the highest 
income of all the members of the sample, and who mainly 
enjoyed a growth of income in the seventies, are expressing 
the nature of the competitive capitalist society, with all its 
insecurity. This reflects the conflict which the big 
bourgeoisie have experienced between the protection and 
security they enjoyed under Nasser's policies, which afforded 
protection to national industries, but allowed for lower 
benefits than could be achieved under the open door policy 
with the threat of competition with the foreign sector and the 
insecurity of the market. 
The working class mainly thought that they were living better 
in the sixties than in the seventies, an opinion held by over 
half of both mothers and fathers. They commented upon their 
suffering and the deterioration of their living conditions in 
the seventies. 
A welder in a foreign company, with a monthly income of 500 
pounds said, 
"I was working in the sixties in a steel factory. 
My salary was 12 pounds, but we were living better 
than the seventies and today, even with my high 
salary". 
A cleaner in the public sector, with a monthly income of 70 
pounds, said, 
"All that I know about the sixties and seventies is 
that under Nasser we were living better than today. 
Now we have a very low standard of living. Prices 
are very high and things go from bad to worse". 
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Other comments of members of the working class which related 
directly to their personal position have already been quoted 
in the earlier section of this chapter. 
It seems that the working class are mainly harmed by the 
policies of the seventies. However, some of them enjoyed the 
effects of the boom in the Egyptian economy, along with the 
members of other classes, but this did not continue for long, 
and they continue to suffer from day to day. For them, things 
have gone from bad to worse. 
(C) The Interests of Occupational Groups in the Seventies 
Subjects in the sample were asked to identify their own 
interests in the sixties and seventies, and to identify in 
general those social groups who had benefited from, or been 
harmed by, policies in the seventies. Respondents were asked 
to select from nine occupations which represented several 
different social class positions. They were asked to decide 
which occupations had become rich and powerful, which went 
down, and which remained the same. There was an additional 
category if they wished to say that they did not know. The 
nine occupational groups which they were asked to evaluate 
were politicians, officers, senior officials, businessmen, 
farmers, craftsmen, manual wage earners, teachers and Imams. 
This question was designed to provide a picture of the 
respondent's overall view of how benefits were divided in 
society between members of different class positions. 
From Table 12 it can be seen that there is a broad measure of 
consensus between the members of different classes as to who 
benefited in terms of wealth and power, namely the 
politicians, officers, senior officials, craftsmen and 
businessmen. There was uncertainty as to the position of all 
the other occupations. For example, the position and situation 
of the farmers is not clear cut since members of the different 
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Class New petty 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother 
Trad'nal patty Big 
bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 





30 26 9 7 9 a 7 6 
Politicians Went Down 
The Same 1 2 2 
I don't Know 3 1 3 
Became Rich 
and Powerful 
24 26 6 4 9 7 5 4 
Officers Went Down 3 1 1 
The Same 4 3 2 1 2 3 2 
I don't Know 2 2 3 
Became Rich 
and Powerful 
31 27 9 5 9 7 8 6 
Senior Want Down 
Officials The Same 3 2 
I don't Know 1 2 1 3 
Became Rich 
and Powerful 
31 31 9 7 9 9 9 7 
Businessmen Want Down 
The Same 
I don't Know 2 
Becalm Rich 
and Powerful 
16 15 6 5 8 4 5 4 
Farmers Went Down 9 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 
The Same 5 11 2 2 2 2 
I don't Know 1 3 1 2 
Became Rich 
and Powerful 
31 31 8 7 9 9 9 9 
Craftsmen Want Down 
The Same 1 
I don't Know 
Became Rich 
and Powerful 
12 16 2 1 5 3 4 4 
Manual Workers Went Down 6 1 3 1 3 1 2 
The Same 13 13 4 5 1 5 3 4 
/ don't Know 1 1 
Became Rich 
and Powerful 
22 21 6 5 6 5 6 7 
Teachers Went Down 4 2 1 1 3 3 
The Same 5 8 2 1 1 3 1 
I don't Know 
Became Rich 
and Powerful 
6 6 1 1 2 2 2 1 
Imams Want Down 4 2 1 3 1 1 
The Same 14 15 4 3 2 4 5 5 
/ don't Know 1 2 
social classes would seem to be defining farmers differently, 
with some referring to those who own the land, and others 
referring to those who work the land. Similarly, there seems 
to be some confusion as to whether the reference group for 
manual wage earners are those who went to work in the Arab oil 
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countries or those who stayed in Egypt. 
In the case of teachers, the majority of respondents from 
different social classes believe that teachers were able to 
earn more money because of the increased demand for private 
lessons, but others thought that they went down or remained 
the same, because the basic salary of teachers is very low. 
The same mixed views can be found for Imams, who are 
considered as becoming powerful by those who think that they 
enjoy wide social relations, and that they mix with people 
from different social classes, so that through contacts they 
could work for their own benefit. Others believe that they 
have a very low salary, and that they could not improve their 
position. 
The views of members of different social classes reflect the 
fact that the benefits of the seventies were not distributed 
equally between social classes, and even inside one class 
there are differences between strata. 
Members of different social classes expressed their views that 
there have been an unequal division of benefits and the 
different ways people have of securing those benefits. In 
spite of the degree of consensus about how benefits were 
distributed in the seventies, there are specific points that 
members from different class positions stressed in their 
comments. For the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie and 
the working class one main point of comment was the corruption 
of politicians and businessmen, while the big bourgeoisie tend 
to condemn workers for the deterioration of production in the 
seventies. The following comments highlight some of these 
differences in perspective. 
The New Petty Bourgeoisie 
A father who is a university professor expressed his view of 
how people accumulated wealth in th'e seventies: 
"People can change their position in society by 
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different means, by money, work or education. 
However, in the seventies, people changed their 
position in illegal ways. People moved up materially 
but they moved down morally. The groups which 
benefited in the seventies are the farmers, 
especially workers who gained more money than the 
owners because of their high wages, teachers 
benefited from private lessons, and politicians". 
The Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie 
A wife of an owner of a photography shop, who is a housewife 
with a middle level of education, said, 
"People who benefited in the seventies are officers, 
but not all of them; we have to distinguish between 
army officers who did not benefit and the police 
officers who have achieved wide social relations and 
contacts which they used for themselves. Farmers 
benefited from working in the oil countries and 
teachers improved their position by private 
lessons". 
The Big Bourgeoisie 
The big bourgeoisie share with other classes the view that 
benefits in the seventies were unequally divided between 
classes and within classes. 
A father, an entrepreneur, expressed the difficulty of 
movement in society today: 
"People cannot change their position today. It was 
possible during the seventies. It is difficult today 
because of the economic depression. Some people 
could change their position in the seventies, but 
I have some comments about the movements of some 
groups. For example: Farmers; they moved up but it 
is a superficial mobility, because they abandoned 
agriculture and sold the land. I believe that the 
new technology like T.V. and video did not help in 
developing the countryside. On the contrary, people 
became busy with these things and left their work. 
Craftsmen: they earned a lot of money and moved up, 
but they moved down morally because they spent the 
money on drugs and their skill standard went down". 
It can be noticed that, when the big bourgeoisie discuss the 
seventies and how its policies have interrupted society, in 
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some ways, they blame workers and farmers, because they 
emigrated to the oil countries and left the agricultural land, 
and were corrupted by modern technology. However, the big 
bourgeoisie do not condemn other groups who emigrated to the 
same extent. 
The working class 
The working class fathers and mothers show a clear sense of 
awareness of what happened in the seventies and which social 
classes benefited and which were harmed. A father who is a 
cleaner in the Ministry of Transportation said, 
"It is difficult to change your position today. If 
you are poor, you have to know that the poor class 
reproduce poor people. People who can, change their 
position; those who travelled to the oil countries. 
Society changed during the seventies, everything 
became expensive. People who could change their 
position are: politicians; they could change their 
position because when they came into power they 
stole as much as they could and they get away with 
it. Officers: remain the same. Senior officials 
became very rich. I can tell from what I see in my 
work, the directors and the managers became very 
wealthy. Farmers, went down as well as workers. 
Imams, could improve their position, they are not 
rich but the government raised their salaries". 
This cleaner shows an awareness and consciousness about the 
social movement and the groups which benefited by using their 
position and corruption. The same person, however, when he 
commented on his own position in society expressed an opinion 
which completely contradicts that awareness. He said, 
"I am satisfied with my position. I don't look at 
people who are higher than me, I only look at people 
who are poorer than me and say, 'Thank God I am not 
that poor". 
In fact, this case reflects the condition of many of the 
working class, who are conscious of inequality and injustice, 
but their religious fatalism hinders their resisting what they 
otherwise see as unjust relations. The issue here is not that 
they do not know. They know about injustice and those who use 
their power and corrupt society, but they do not translate 
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this knowledge into action to organize the working class to 
resist. 
Comment 
From the views of members of different social classes about 
interests in the sixties and seventies, some conclusions can 
be drawn. These are: 
- There is no consensus between different members of social 
classes about the influence of the sixties and seventies 
in developing and improving society. The division exists 
between and inside social classes, especially the 
bourgeois classes. The division is less inside the 
working class, who are almost unified in the view that 
they benefited from the policies of the sixties. 
- In terms of personal benefit, the same division exist 
between members of the sample, where some of them were 
in a position which helped them to benefit more in the 
seventies. For example, the new petty bourgeoisie who 
work in a foreign company benefited more than others with 
the same qualifications who work for the government. Both 
petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie have benefited from 
the open door policy. However, the big bourgeoisie show 
a sense of insecurity and threat from foreign investment. 
The case of the working class was very clear: they see 
themselves as being harmed by the open door policy. 
However, some of them have enjoyed the boom in 
consumption in Egypt and they could obtain TVs and 
fridges. Consequently, one cannot say that they were 
completely deprived of the seventies consumer society. 
For them, though, this boom did not last for a long time, 
since they suffer more deprivation at the present time. 
- In terms of the effect of the seventies on social groups 
which benefited or were harmed by the open door policy, 
the views of different members of social classes have 
shown a consensus that the benefits of the seventies were 
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distributed unequally between classes and inside one 
social class, where some fractions of the same class 
benefited and others did not. There is also a great deal 
of consensus about the position of certain social 
fractions who benefited like businessmen, politicians, 
officers, senior official and craftsmen, while there is 
more divided views about the position of other groups, 
like manual workers, Imams, teachers and farmers. 
- 	
In their explanation of those who benefited one notices 
that all members of different social classes have 
mentioned the influence of the emigration to the Arab oil 
countries in making money especially for groups like 
farmers and craftsmen. The big bourgeoisie, in their 
discussion of the emigration of workers and farmers to 
the oil countries show a sense of condemnation of the 
farmers and workers because they abandoned their land and 
their skills have deteriorated. They believe that modern 
technology in rural Egypt, like TV and video, has a 
negative impact on production and rural life, where 
farmers became busy watching them and they neglected 
their work and production, so they spend more leisure 
time than before. They believe this has interrupted 
production. 
- 	
The discussion with the working class fathers and mothers 
has shown a clear awareness on the part of both of them 
of the class interest in terms of those who benefited and 
those who were harmed by the policies. They know that 
working in the oil countries has opened the door for 
their fellow farmers and workers to have opportunities 
to improve their position. 
IV. People's Image of the future:  
People were asked to give their perception of the future of 
the whole of society. The question is an open one to help 
people to express freely what they think about the future. 
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From the responses of members of different social classes, the 
main point that all fathers and mothers mentioned was the 
economic crisis of society, and they identified this as their 
main concern for the future. 
Even though all parents concentrated on the economic problem, 
they had different ways of looking at that problem. 
One group mentioned that they were pessimistic about the 
future because of the economic crisis; they expected the 
problem to increase in the future and to make the life of the 
coming generation very hard. Those who expressed this view of 
the future economic crisis represent quite a large number of 
the sample, and represent a full range of class positions. 
They were distributed as Table 13 shows. 
Table 13: The Future and the Economic Crisis 
New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
Expect 	 12 	 10 	 3 	 6 	 4 	 5 	 10 	 10 
economic 
crisis to grow 
Another group of the sample expressed the same view that the 
economic crisis will be the main feature of the future, but 
this group gave some solutions to the problem, which they 
thought might be effective. This are summarised in Table 14. 
The table shows that solutions came mainly from the bourgeois 
classes, while a small percentage of the working class thought 
of the future in terms of what should be done. The table shows 
that a religious solution to the problem came mainly from the 
three bourgeois classes, who believe in applying Islamic Law 
(Shariaa) in the economic field, for example to stop different 
sorts of usury in economic relations, and that people should 
follow the Islamic law and pay alms (zakat). 
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Other solutions exist which concentrate on increasing 
production, economic planning and training skilled labour 
power. 

















6 	 10 
6 	 5 
2 	 3 




2 	 1 




1 	 1 
1 	 2 
3 	 1 
Working class 
Father Mother 
1 	 1 
Reform and 
More Democracy 
Some of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie 
suggested that, to solve the economic problem, political 
reform is the first step. By that they mean the eradication 
of corruption, especially among politicians, and giving more 
democracy to allow people to share in solving society's 
problems. 
So, the members of different social classes showed great 
concern over the threat of the economic crisis which they 
think will make the future a very hard one. The bourgeois 
classes presented some solutions to the problem. The solutions 
reflected two different views, that is the Islamic religious 
solution in terms of applying Islamic law in our economic 
relations and in social life, which is represented by two out 
of each ten of the fathers and mothers of the new petty 
bourgeoisie, and also of the traditional petty bourgeoisie and 
big bourgeoisie. The secular approach to solutions 
concentrates upon aspects such as economic development, 
manpower training and political reform. The latter is most 
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significant for the new petty bourgeoisie, as the table 
indicates. The working class concentrated mainly upon the 
impact of the economic crisis in making the future very hard. 
The images of the future reflect the main factors which 
influence the different social classes' perception of the 
present and the future. These are mainly the economic factor 
and a cultural factor which is seen in religious beliefs. 
V. Conclusion 
The conclusion of this chapter will illustrate the following 
points: 
- The wide economic and cultural gaps between classes. 
- People's consciousness of their class position and the 
extent to which the sense of class identity has developed 
for different social classes. 
- The influence of the dichotomy of Egyptian culture on 
people's critique and solutions for social and economic 
matters in the present and in the future. 
- The place of the new petty bourgeoisie in social action, 
and as a coherent social class compared with other social 
powers in society. 
- The perception of the future and the influence of the 
economic crisis. 
(A) The Wide Economic and Cultural Gap Between Classes 
The study of the profile of the sample has provided essential 
material about class differences in economic, educational and 
cultural aspects. 
The social origin of the majority of the sample is rural 
Egypt, where one can find that the parents in the sample 
either migrated themselves from rural to urban Egypt or their 
parents were the first generation to migrate. The factors 
which lie behind their migration reflect the general character 
of rural-urban migration in Egypt, where the working class 
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are usually pushed by rural poverty and just looking to make 
a living in the urban area, while the bourgeois migration to 
urban areas is usually for education and because they are 
attracted by the different cultural life in urban areas, as 
well as economic prosperity. 
Cultural differences are clear between members of the sample 
from outside appearances and differences in dress, language 
and the way of living, which all give class indications of 
increasing social distance. The social class distance is 
further widened if one looks at the economic and educational 
aspects. 
In economic terms, the study of the income of members of 
different social classes reflects the wide gap between classes 
and it shows how income is distributed unequally in society, 
with working class income falling in the range £50-99 and the 
big bourgeoisie income falling at the level of more than 
£1000. Since this is a result from a limited sample, it 
suggests the need for a comprehensive study at the national 
level to show income distribution in Egypt for other class 
positions. 
The low income of the working class is accompanied by other 
features which make their circumstances more difficult, like 
the large families which increase the burden of subsistence 
for them. 
The responses demonstrate an educational fact concerning the 
working class, which is that they have very high illiteracy 
rates, especially among women. The other class which shares 
with the working class some cultural and educational factors 
is the traditional petty bourgeoisie, since they have the same 
big family size and low standard of education. However, their 
ownership of their means of production provides them with a 
middle level income. 
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(B) Image of Society 
Members of different social classes gave a variety of pictures 
of Egyptian society, and introduced different models of class 
structure. The big bourgeoisie and the working class 
introduced two and three class models, while the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie introduced 
a variety of models with two three four or five classes. 
From these models, some points can be drawn about Egyptian 
social class formation. These are: 
There is a consensus among the members of the sample that 
the class formation of Egypt is marked by a wide economic gap 
between classes. There is a diversity in people's social 
imagery which is revealed in the identification of different 
models of society, which gives an indication of class 
consciousness, as will be explained below. 
The identification of Egyptian class formation in terms 
of a two or three group model, which was mainly chosen by the 
big bourgeoisie and the working class, reflects one side of 
the picture of Egyptian society marked by a minority of rich, 
a majority of poor, and a relatively small middle class of 
between 20 and 30 per cent. The models chosen by the new and 
traditional petty bourgeoisie present a variety of models 
ranging from two to five groups. These reflect another aspect 
of the class formation and the changes which took place in the 
seventies and resulted in the emergence of millionaires among 
the craftsmen who could accumulate wealth. So, the model 
presented by the big bourgeoisie and the working class puts 
stress upon the polarization between rich and poor, while the 
new and traditional petty bourgeoisie, in the models they 
choose, stress the changes which took place in the seventies 
and the emergence of new strata, which reflects the complexity 
of these developments better than the models of the big 
bourgeoisie and the working class. 
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Identifying their own class position, members of the 
three bourgeois classes tend to identify themselves with the 
middle-middle class, which reflects a weak class consciousness 
and weak development of a sense of class identity, while the 
situation is different for the working class, who clearly 
identify themselves as poor. The weakness of the development 
of a sense of class identity in turn reflects in the 
difficulty which the traditional and new petty bourgeoisie 
have in identifying the size and position of the middle class, 
and in identifying who constitute the middle class and who are 
the poor. The low class consciousness of the new petty 
bourgeoisie in particular must be seen in the context of 
changes which took place in society in the seventies, and 
influenced class formation in terms of changing the positions 
for certain groups, and the unequal division of social and 
economic benefits, as was explained in Chapters Two and Three. 
The new petty bourgeoisie have a relatively low consciousness. 
Their confusion reflects the social reality of society, in 
that the new petty bourgeoisie are aware of changes which have 
influenced the class formation of society. 
In historical perspective, the class formation of Egypt 
in the immediately post-Revolutionary period gives a picture 
of a society with a majority of poor, a minority of rich, and 
no very clear picture of the position of the middle class. 
This picture is mainly presented by the three bourgeois 
classes, while the working class tend to give a model of 
society sharply divided between rich and poor, with no middle 
class. The view of the working class is influenced by their 
experience in rural Egypt where class differences and poverty 
were greater than in urban Egypt. 
If one compares the class structure in the seventies and the 
present time, there is a trend which existed for the majority 
from different class positions. They presented models of 
society where there was a rich minority and poor majority with 
a very wide gap between them. This can be explained if one 
assumes that the class structure is going back to be similar 
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to that which existed before the Revolution. 
The identification of the class formation of society was 
not an easy task for all the members of the sample, since it 
was difficult for some members to cross the boundaries of 
their immediate experiences and to think about the wider 
society. The numbers of those who found it difficult to give 
a response varied from one class to another. It was a minimum 
among the new petty bourgeoisie and at its maximum among the 
working class. The identification of the class formation is 
even more difficult when it is perceived in historical 
context, where, for example, nearly half the fathers and 
nearly four out of every five mothers of the working class did 
not answer this question. This inability to answer was shared 
with the traditional petty bourgeoisie mothers, among whom 
nearly half did not answer this question. The inability of 
members of these two classes to answer this question may be 
understood in terms of the lack of cultural capital, which 
seems important in providing a wide knowledge and perception 
of the present and past. 
The picture of the class formation of Egypt which was 
presented up to this point by the members of the sample, in 
general, gives an image of society with strong potential for 
class conflict, where the economic gap between the classes is 
wide. This gap is clearly present between members of the 
sample, where there is a wide spread of income present between 
them. However, this possible conflict is diffused by two 
factors. The first is an economic one. From the responses on 
economic class interests it is clear that members inside the 
same class have benefited differentially from the open door 
policy, so there is no straight line of demarcation between 
those who have been deprived and those who have not. This 
situation hinders the development of more unified class 
interests and class consciousness. The second factor is 
cultural and ideological, where the religious beliefs reduce 
the degree of tension, since they lead people to accept class 
differences, especially economic ones, as given by God. The 
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working class is particularly likely to accept their fate for 
this reason. 
(C) Division in Class Interests 
The discussions of political and economic interests with 
members from different class positions proved that class 
membership does not mean that members of the same class will 
have the same perceived interests, or will hold the same 
ideologies about social, economic and political issues. The 
division and contradictions in respondents' perspectives 
appear in their views about the policies of the sixties and 
seventies. 
The analysis has shown a division in the view of members of 
social classes especially the bourgeois classes, over the 
issues of economic and political policies of the sixties and 
seventies. They are divided in their views about which era 
developed society, in general, more than the other. They 
support their views for or against each era by giving a 
variety of political, economic and ideological justifications. 
The division also exists in their views about their personal 
benefit in each period, where one finds differences between 
classes and inside one class. For example, the new petty 
bourgeoisie who work in foreign companies benefited more than 
those who work for the government. 
The big bourgeoisie has mainly benefited from the seventies, 
although they express feelings of insecurity because of 
foreign competition. They reflect their conflict between state 
protection of national projects, which allows them more 
security and protection for their production, and the 
increasing profit and benefit they could make in the 
seventies, but with the danger of foreign competition. In fact 
this reflects one of the main characters of the big 
bourgeoisie in Egypt where they find an interest in dealing 
with foreign capital but at the same time they feel threatened 
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by this capital. 
The working class shows less division, and they mainly believe 
that the sixties developed society and developed their 
position more than the seventies. The views of the working 
class reflect a class consciousness of their own everyday 
economic suffering, but they do not reflect a consciousness 
of the wider dimensions of the policies, i.e. they are not 
able, like the new petty bourgeoisie, to perceive the policies 
in a wider perspective of economic, political and social 
dimensions. 
The general evaluation by members of the sample of which 
social classes in society benefited more in the seventies was 
that: 
- benefits in the seventies were distributed unequally in 
society, 
- that members of social classes were clear about certain 
class fractions which became wealthy and powerful in 
society like businessmen, officers, politicians and 
craftsmen, 
- members of social classes recognised emigration to the 
Arab oil countries as one of the important factors of 
class movement and making wealth, especially in the case 
of farmers and workers, 
- the big bourgeoisie in particular condemn the emigration 
of farmers and workers since they see it as the main 
factor in reducing production, while they do not place 
the same blame on members of other classes who emigrated 
at the same time, and they themselves do not rule out the 
possibility of emigration for their children in their 
future. 
The big bourgeoisie are also opposed to the introduction of 
mass media especially TV in rural Egypt, since they believe 
that farmers are taking more leisure time and that they waste 
the time which they should spend in production. 
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From the general analysis of the answers of members of 
different social classes, it can be noticed that the context 
of the answers given by the bourgeois classes, especially the 
new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, reflects a wide 
knowledge and variety of reasons which they give in their 
analysis, since they are able to draw more economic, cultural 
and political arguments than the working class and the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie, who are mainly confined to the 
economic reasons. This again reinforces the cultural power of 
the big and new petty bourgeoisie. 
(D) Perception of the Future and the Influence of the 
Economic Crisis 
Respondents' images of the future have one main 
characteristic, which is their emphasis upon the influence of 
the economic crisis in shaping the future of society. The 
economic crisis has led the working class to hold a 
pessimistic picture of the future which they believe is going 
to be very hard. The three bourgeois classes tried to think 
in a positive way, by suggesting solutions for the crisis. The 
solutions reflect the duality of the respondents' ideologies 
between the secular and the religious way of thinking. 
(E) An Overview of Class Cultures and Ideologies 
The overall view of the analysis of ideological and cultural 
patterns of different classes shows that there are different 
cultural configurations, and that these appear in people's 
different ways and styles of life, their appearance and their 
language. Cultural differences also appear in the dichotomy 
of Egyptian culture between those who are educated and the 
illiterate, and between religious and secular ideologies, 
which have been referred to in Chapter Four. This raises the 
question of how these dichotomies may influence people's 
perceptions of social, economic and political issues. In fact, 
the dichotomy between illiterate and educated appears in the 
difference between those who are educated like the new petty 
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bourgeoisie, the uneducated like the working class. This 
affects their ability to bring discussion and argument, and 
a wide range of political, economic and social knowledge to 
bear on their problems. These represent part of what can 
generally be described as cultural capital, which is partly 
developed through education. 
The dichotomy between the secular and the religious ideologies 
exists throughout the class formation, and appears in people's 
perceptions and solutions for class differences and economic 
problems. However, religious belief plays an important part 
in holding society together and cementing the fragmented class 
formation. As explained earlier, it plays an important role 
in diffusing potential class conflict on the part of the 
working class. 
If one looks at the perspectives of the new petty bourgeoisie, 
which represent an essential class for this analysis, one can 
see that their perception of the class formation of Egypt is 
very much influenced by the changes which took place in the 
seventies. This has its positive and negative sides on their 
consciousness of the class formation. That is, it is positive 
in terms of being aware of the changes which took place, not 
only in the economic aspect of class position, but at the 
cultural and political levels as well. It is negative in the 
sense that they are confused about who to consider as middle 
class and who are the poor of society. This is a misleading 
situation for members of this class who are in positions of 
planning and executing development programmes, where 
identifying those who should benefit from development 
programmes is essential. 
The changes in the seventies left the new petty bourgeoisie 
with another contradiction in their economic and political 
interests. Some of them benefited from the open door economic 
policy, while others were harmed by the same policy. This 
situation makes it very difficult to predict the policies 
which this class is going to support and which social class 
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it is going to ally with. In spite of these contradictions, 
the new petty bourgeoisie, because of their cultural capital, 
are able to perceive Egypt's problems in a wide perspective, 
supported by their wide economic and political knowledge. The 
issue of the new petty bourgeoisie, their cultural capital, 
and their ability to give wide knowledge and perceptions will 
be more fully explored and discussed in the next two chapters, 
when educational issues will be discussed. 
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CLASS PERSPECTIVES ON GENERAL EDUCATIONAL ISSUES 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter social class formation in Egypt and 
people's consciousness in terms of the development of class 
and class interests in economic and political issues were 
discussed. Some of the findings of that chapter are important, 
and need to be reiterated here, because they will form the 
background for the analysis in this chapter. 
From Chapter Six it is known that Egypt has a complex class 
formation which is in a state of flux. This complexity appears 
in the diverse social imagery concerning the class model of 
society, and in the weak development of class consciousness, 
i.e. an awareness of class for itself in terms of people's 
sense of their own class position. This is especially true 
among the three bourgeois classes, while the working class 
have a clearer sense and greater consciousness of their 
position as poor. 
Class cultural capital works as a class cultural power in 
defending and supporting class interests, which appeared in 
the ability of the big bourgeoisie to bring into their 
discussions and arguments a wide range of knowledge concerning 
economic, political and social issues, which the working class 
and traditional petty bourgeoisie were lacking. 
The discussion of economic interests and benefits showed that 
class membership does not mean that the members of the same 
class will have the same ideologies and interests. 
These general points about the class formation and class 
consciousness will be used as the basis and context for the 




class ideologies concerning education and its value for 
the individual and society, 
- class based critique of the Revolution educational 
policies, 
- 	
control and power over education, 
- 
the core of the class conflict around education, 
- future educational change. 
In order to study these aspects, some detailed issues will be 
discussed in the chapter. These include respondents' 
evaluation of education from the Revolution to the present 
time, their perception of the role of education in society and 
for individuals, and their views on equality and inequality 
of educational opportunities between different classes. The 
issue of expenditure on education will be discussed in terms 
of the respondents' sense of which should get more finance and 
the sources of this finance, and the image that they have for 
the education system in the future. 
These aspects were chosen because they are highly 
controversial in Egypt, and they are the subject of debate 
among the state officials and the intellectuals, as was 
discussed in Chapter Four. Here, these points are discussed 
from the viewpoint of memebers of different classes, in order 
to reveal the class content and class influenceof these 
points, and the extent to which they represent different and 
clear class interests, and reveal, as well, some other 
theoretical issues concerning education, social class 
formation and class consciousness. These points are: 
- the correspondence between the diverse social imagery 
that people have for models of society, and the models 
they have for the education system, and 
- the role of cultural capital in providing individuals 
with a basis for evaluating and criticizing the education 
system and education problems in the past, present and 
future. 
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I. The Role of Education in Society 
The study of people's perspectives on the role of education 
in society will include the role of education for both the 
individual and for society. The analysis of people's 
perceptions provides the material for seeing class differences 
in attitudes and beliefs about education. These help in the 
examination of educational values at the present time, i.e. 
after society has been influenced by the socio-economic 
changes which took place under the open door policy. 
(A) The Importance of Education for the Individual 
In their perceptions of the importance of education for the 
individual, five major aspects were made by the majority of 
the sample, along with some less important points which were 
mentioned by smaller numbers. (See Table 1.) 
As indicated in the table, the moral aspect of education was 
mentioned by all of the members of some classes and by a 
majority of other classes. The moral aspect of education 
appears in people's belief that education makes individuals 
polite, decent and in general develops their personalities. 
In order of importance, as measured by the number of 
respondents giving this answer, the second factor identified 
by the sample is that education is essential for ensuring a 
successful future. 
The third factor is that education helps the individual to 
find a good job; this factor was most strongly identified by 
the bourgeois classes, who equate a good job with a 
professional one. The working class were more likely to 
identify a good job as a permanent one, which would imply 
working for the government. 
Other factors were identified by small numbers of the sample, 
including the idea that education helps the individual to have 




Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
Working class 
Father Mother 
3 7 2 2 1 
3 
8 9 4 3 3 2 2 
31 31 7 9 8 9 11 7 
8 3 2 1 2 4 





To find a good 
job 




To be polite 
and to develop 
their personalities 
To know and 
understand society 
and the environment 
High status 
To know their 
religion 
To know their 
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Table 1: Parents' Assessment of the Importance of Education 
for the Individual 
rights and duties 
Discipline 	 1 
To be cultured 	 1 
At least to 
	 1 
know how to read 
and write 
cultured, and to know how to read and write. 
The bourgeois classes share with the working class the views 
that education is important for moral development, and for 
advancement in the world of work, but where they differ is in 
their identification of the kind of work for which education 
prepares individuals. 
For example, a working class father who is a waiter said, 
"The educated person who works for the government 
is very secure, because he is insured and has a high 
salary and a pension, but the uneducated person like 
me is insecure, because if I fall down nobody will 
help me." 
Among the traditional petty bourgeoisie, a similar opinion can 
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be found: a small merchant said, 
"Education is a weapon for the future, because it 
allows the individual to secure himself by finding 
a job." 
(B) The Importance of Edcuation for Society 
The discussion of the role of education in society identified 
three main points, which are summarized in Table 2: 
- education is very important in preparing specialists in 
different fields, 
- education is important in developing society, and 
educated people are more useful citizens for society than 
uneducated. 







Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 
bourgeoisie 






18 18 6 5 2 4 8 9 
To be a 
developed country 
17 15 3 4 7 6 1 2 
There is a big 
difference between 
4 1 2 1 
educated and 
ignorant citizens 
They work and 
increas our 
production 
Inside these three main points, differences between classes 
appear in different conceptualizations of the relationship 
between education and society. However, one trend can be noted 
in the bourgeois classes, who believe that educated people are 
important for developing society, but that it is society or 
the state which does not make good use of educated people, and 
that the government fails to plan for the efficient use of 
educated manpower. This opinion can be seen in a number of the 
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comments made. 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, a father who is an accountant 
in the government said, 
"Educated people are very important for developing 
society, but society does not know how to make good 
use of their abilities and qualifications, they do 
not give them suitable jobs. This situation puts the 
educated people in crisis, because they feel that 
society fails to use their abilities, so they start 
thinking of themselves, working only for their 
personal benefit and not for the benefit of the 
wider society." 
A father who is a petty bourgeois photographer expressed the 
same view: 
"The problem is that the government does not know 
how to use and employ the educated manpower. They 
accept students in unnecessary specializations. The 
government has the problem of unemployment because 
of that. The government keep students in education 
for a long time, i.e. they fail studnets in order 
to keep them for a long time to postpone their 
graduation and hence the problem of employing them. " 
A mother from the big bourgeois, who herself is an engineer, 
described this crisis in society in using educated people: 
"Our country faces the same problem which is faced 
by many other developing countries, which is the 
inability of employing educated people." 
These views express how the bourgeoisie perceive what they see 
as the reality of the situation, and the relationship between 
educated people and society, which reflect tension and crisis 
between educated manpower and society. 
Other patterns express what members of the sample believe 
education is capable of doing for society. They are not 
necessarily describing reality, but they express their view 
of what could be the potential that education can offer 
society. 
Among the new petty bourgeoisie, three tendencies appear. 
These are the importance of education for applying technology, 
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education and the preparation of the elite, and the importance 
of education from a religious viewpoint. The first tendency 
is seen in the belief that education is important if society 
wants to benefit from modern technology. 
A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of Culture said, 
"Education is very important for society especially 
if we want to apply new technology because ignorant 
people cannot use them." 
The second tendency among the new petty bourgeoisie expresses 
the importance of education in the formation of the ruling 
elite. A father who is an engineer in government service said, 
"Education is very important because it is the way 
to form and create the elite of society. This elite 
is important in running and ruling society." 
The third tendency is to see the importance of education for 
society in creating strong personalities who work for the 
benefit of society. This view is supported by the sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammad. A father who is the captain of a ship 
said, 
"Education is very important for society because it 
creates strong educated personalities. This is 
stated in many of the sayings of the Prophet. For 
example, he says, 'The strong believer is more 
beloved by God than the weak believer'. I understand 
this in terms of education and its role in society 
where education is providing society with those who 
are strong in their beliefs and in their 
qualifications, so society will benefit from them." 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie have seen education as 
challenging their traditional crafts. A father who works as 
a tailor said, 
"Education is very important for society, especially 
in applying modern technology, but education is 
challenging craftsmen like me. Education is killing 
off crafts, because educated people do not work in 
small crafts. They prefer to go to modern 
industries." 
The big bourgeoisie put stress upon the importance of 
education in adapting to new jobs created in society. A father 
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who is an engineer working as an entrepreneur said, 
"Education is very important for society, because 
with the changing and the creation of new jobs in 
society, only the educated people can adapt 
themselves to the changing needs of jobs. Educated 
people are easy to be directed and guided to new 
jobs." 
Among the working class, there is a tendency to compare 
educated and ignorant people in terms of what they can offer 
society. A father who works as a fitter said, 
"Educated people are important for society because 
education opens their minds, builds their 
personalities, so educated people can understand and 
know more about the problems of their society and 
the needs of their society than the ignorant." 
So, the bourgeoisie concentrate on the technological and 
practical aspects that education can give society, while the 
working class concentrate on the different quality of 
mentality between the educated and the ignorant, which allow 
the educated to be more understanding of their society than 
the uneducated. 
(C) Class Beliefs and Attitudes about Education and Society 
In terms of class beliefs and attitudes about education and 
society, and the value of education for the individual, the 
following main points can be identified: 
- There is a strong tendency among people from different 
class positions to see education as essential in 
developing the individual personality and in developing 
society. 
- Inside this main trend, different angles of looking at 
the relationship between education and society, and on 
the value of education for the individual can be 
identified. 
The following different angles should be mentioned: 
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1. In terms of the value which education has for the 
individual, the moral value appears to be essential for 
different class positions. Preparing individuals for the 
world of work appeared to be another important factor for 
all class positions. Moreover, the kind of job which 
education prepares individuals for is seen as different 
by people from different class positions. The new petty 
bourgeoisie identified the job as a professional one, 
i.e. they tend to put stress upon education for the 
individual in terms of jobs with high status, while the 
working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie see 
the job as any permanent job which offers security for 
the future, so they stress education for the individual 
in terms of security. 
2. In terms of the existing relationship between education 
and society, the bourgeois classes tend to see this 
relation as in crisis, and in tension where society has 
failed to make good use of the qualified and educated 
people, i.e. society could not use the output of the 
education system because of the lack of planning for 
manpower and unemployment. 
3. In terms of how education can be useful for society, a 
diversity of views can be identified. The new petty 
bourgeoisie stressed technology and the creation of the 
ruling elite. The big bourgeoisie placed emphasis upon 
education and adaptation to new jobs. The traditional 
petty bourgeoisie expressed their fear concerning the 
challenge of new technology and big industries to their 
own small scale crafts. The working class expressed their 
feeling about the different quality of human beings that 
education can afford to society. 
II. Evaluation of the Education System 
The previous discussion of the value of education for the 
individual and society has shown a great deal of confidence 
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in the importance of education in developing society. In this 
part of the discussion, people were asked to evaluate the 
education system throughout a historical period from 1952 to 
the present time. People were asked to identify changes which 
took place in education after 1952, to compare the system in 
the sixties and the seventies, to identify the present 
educational problems, to describe teachers' position in 
society and to express their views on who they think 
influences and controls the education system. 
(A) The Role of the Revolution in Education 
Changes which took place in education under the Revolution 
were identified by the majority of the sample, who believed 
that the 1952 Revolution changed education in Egypt. 
Those who did identify changes which took place in education 
after 1952 mentioned the following aspects, which are 
summarized in Table 3: equal opportunity, new curriculum, and 
free education. However, these changes have been evaluated 
negatively, by quite a high proportion of the bourgeois 
classes, i.e. the new petty bourgeoisie, the big bourgeoisie 
and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. These aspects were seen 
positively by the working class respondents, who answered the 
question. Table 4 shows those who evaluate the policies 
negatively or positively. Comments and views expressed by the 
members of the sample reflect the attitude associated with 
their class possition. 
Among the new petty bourgeoisie, there was a strong antipathy 
towards the Revolutionary policy of education, in terms of the 
quality of education and the ideology behind the system. 
A father, and member of the new petty bourgeoisie, who is an 
accountant in the government blamed the Revolution for 
worsenning the quality of education by increasing the numbers 
of children involved: 
"The Revolution has opened the door for all people 
and accepted very big numbers in the schools, 
Father Mother Father 
17 13 4 
5 7 5 
3 1 
2 1 1 
10 13 6 
4 3 2 













Mother Father Mother Father Mother 
2 6 4 2 2 
2 2 1 2 3 
4 3 3 4 
1 1 1 2 
3 3 2 1 
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Table 3: Parents' Assessment of Aspects of Change in 
Education after the 1952 Revolution 
Important 	 New petty 	 Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
Aspects 	 bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
became worse 
after the Revolution 
because there was no 
stable policy and the 




Superficial change 	 1 
during the seventies 
Don't know 	 2 	 2 	 3 	 5 
without having the resources for that, which 
affected the quality and standard of education at 
school." 








Big bourgeoisie Working class 
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 
Positive 11 13 6 5 3 3 8 6 
Negative 20 16 3 4 6 4 
Don't know 2 2 3 5 
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Another attack on the ideology of equal opportunity and free 
education came from a mother who works as an engineer for a 
foreign company, who graduated herself from a foreign school, 
whose father is a high ranking officer in a family which was 
originally among the big landowners: 
"The Revolution has destroyed education by opening 
the doors to people who should not be educated. 
Those people from the lower classes, when they go 
to education and when they mix with the upper 
classes, the result is that they envy those classes. 
We are a class society and we have to keep class 
differences. The result of the Revolution's 
education policy was the shortage of rural workers 
and in other crafts and the humiliation of the 
landowners." 
So, the new petty bourgeoisie, who were mainly educated under 
free education, criticize those changes under the Revolution 
as having a negative impact on the quality of education, and 
that education was used to legitimize the new, Revolutionary 
system. Ideologies of equal opportunities and free education 
are also criticized for having a negative impact on the 
quality of education, since it allowed large numbers of 
students to enrol, and as having a dangerous effect on the 
system of power and interests in society, since the new 
ideology is seen by some of the new petty bourgeoisie as 
challenging the status quo and the existing class differences, 
which in their view should not be changed. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie also criticize the policy 
of the Revolution in terms of the effect it had on the quality 
of education, and they attack changes in the curriculum, and 
its use as a means to justify and legitimize the new regime. 
A critique of the large number of students at university level 
came from a father who works as a tailor. He shows how the 
policy of accepting large numbers has caused unemployment: 
"The Revolution has changed the education system, 
by introducing free education at university level 
which led to pressure on university education. The 
big numbers at university have led to the 
unemployment problem, since the market does not need 
all graduates." 
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Like the other bourgeois classes, the big bourgeoisie also 
criticize education under the Revolution for using the 
curriculum for political propaganda. They also express a wish 
to undermine the efforts of the Revolution in the educational 
field. 
Those who wished to undermine the changes under the Revolution 
based this view on political and personal evidence. A father 
who is an engineer working as an entrepreneur said, 
"Education deteriorated in its qualitative level 
after the Revolution. I do not think that the 
Revolution has given much attention to education. 
In fact, the Revolution was mainly engaged whith her 
outside politics and problems, and did not give 
enough attention to inside affairs such as 
education." 
A mother who is a housewife, literate, and from a wealthy 
rural family in upper Egypt explained her point of view in 
relation to the experience of her three brothers, who joined 
the university when it was fee-paying, and subsequently worked 
as an officer, an engineer and a university professor 
respectively. She said, 
"I do not think the Revolution has changed education 
as people say. They wrongly believe that the 
Revolution opened more schools and educated more 
people. Before the revolution we had schools and we 
had university and people were able to go to school 
and university. All my brothers got their university 
education before the Revolution." 
The working class, however, mainly support the Revolution, and 
the changes which they believe gave more equal opportunities 
and allowed the poor to get the chance to be educated. But a 
quarter of the fathers and nearly half of the mothers found 
it difficult to answer the question. Those who did answer 
tended to answer very directly, and to support their arguments 
with direct, personal experience. 
A father who is a cleaner in the Ministry of Transportation, 
and who came from a rural area, said, 
"The Revolution allowed the poor people to get 
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access to education. In my village it was only the 
rich and the wealthy of the village who used to send 
their children to school and they were very few." 
Another father who is a welder in a foreign company compared 
the system after the Revolution with that of the present day: 
"At the beginning of the Revolution, education 
became available to many people, especially the 
poor. But today things have changed, quality of 
education has deteriorated and our children are 
taking low quality education now." 
It is clear that the bourgeois classes are critical of the 
ideologies which stand behind the policy of education after 
the Revolution, and they also criticize the politicization of 
the system thorugh the curriculum. Although the three 
bourgeois classes have attacked the policy of education after 
1952, and they seemed sure about that attack, when they were 
asked to compare the two main periods of the Revolution, i.e. 
to compare the sixties and seventies, there was considerable 
disagreement within classes and between classes about the two 
periods. This reflects again, as was discussed in Chapter Six, 
the split around the policies in the two periods, and their 
educational aspect is no expception to the general pattern. 
The views of different groups are shown in Table 5. 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, nearly two thirds of the 
mothers and fathers believe that education was better during 
the sixties. A fairly small minority believe the opposite, 
that things improved in education in the seventies. The views 
that education never improved, or that things were better 
before the Revolution were also recorded. So the question 
arises as to what people took into account when they compared 
the two eras in the educational system. 
Among the majority who thought things were better in the 
sixties, a number of different reasons were cited, like the 
quality of education, especially moral and ethical aspects of 
a teaching career. A mother who is a member of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and an accountant in a public sector company said, 
"Education was better in the sixties in terms of the 
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Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Bother 
Working class 
Father Mother 
Sixties 19 21 6 7 7 7 3 4 
Seventies 4 2 1 1 2 3 
Never improved 4 3 2 1 2 1 




1 1 3 
Fifties 1 
Don't know 3 3 3 
teacher's work and profession. Teachers were 
working hard with students. But today, because of 
the big gap between the people and the low income 
of teachers, they try to make money by private 
lessons, and then they neglect students and lose 
their enthuiasm for work." 
Those who approve of the seventies, and the development of 
education in that period, gave different reasons, covering the 
policy of education, equality of education opportunities and 
the new types of schools encouraged in the seventies. 
A father and member of the new petty bourgeoisie who is an 
accountant in the public sector said, 
"Education was better in the seventies because the 
government encouraged new types of schools like the 
government language schools. Other sources of 
education like cinema and theatre were encouraged 
in the seventies." 
A father who is a director of a tax collecting department 
said, 
"Education improved in the seventies because we had 
a stable policy of education, while the sixties was 
a period of experiments and applying new ideas which 
did not afford a stability for the system and 
affected the quality of education." 
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Others expressed a total rejection of the ideology of equal 
opportunity which lay behind the education system in the 
sixties, so the point about ideology is again reinforced. A 
father who is an engineer in a foreign company said: 
"Nasser destroyed education by his wrong ideas like 
equality, which is against religious belief. Because 
people are classes and they should not be educated 
like each other. The seventies have moved towards 
the right direction of restricting education." 
A pilot supported a similar position: 
"The standard of education was better before the 
Revolution. Opening education to all people has 
destroyed its quality." 
The new petty bourgeoisie, in their comparison between the 
sixties and seventies in terms of education policies, are 
divided in their views. For quite subtantial majority there 
is a belief that the sixties was better than the seventies in 
two essential points: the teachers' qualifications and 
standards, and the quality of education. Restricting 
educational opportunities in the seventies was seen by some 
members as the right policy in order to control numbers and 
improve the quality. 
A substantial majority of the traditional petty bourgeoisie 
believe that the system was better in the sixties than in the 
seventies. 
A mother who is a housewife said, 
"Education was better during the sixties because we 
did not have the problem of private lessons, I mean 
that the problem in the sixties was not as serious 
as today". 
A father who is photographer said, 
"Education was better in the sixties because 
teachers and students had ethics and morality more 
than today." 
The big bourgeoisie continued the same theme of evaluating the 
education system in the sixties as better than the seventies, 
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with three quarters of them preferring the sixties. They give 
the same ethical and professional reasons for their view as 
the other bourgeois classes. 
A father who is the owner of a factory said, 
"Education was better in the sixties because at 
least the problem of private lessons was less than 
in the seventies or today." 
The working class, when they were asked about education system 
in the two periods, found it difficult to give an assessment. 
This reflects the fact that the working class could easily 
express their views about the economic situation which 
directly affected their means of living, but found it harder 
to assess more romote aspects of policy, such as the education 
system. 
However, some of them expressed their views about education 
in the two periods simply in terms of their economic ability 
to afford education for their children. A mother who is a wife 
of a bus conductor said, 
"Education was better in the sixties. Because 
schools did not ask for things like books and 
clothes for the children like today. Besides, 
private lessons were less expensive." 
Another mother said, 
"I do not know about the education system. But I 
know that the cost of private lessons was less than 
today." 
The responses of the working class reflect their general 
impression about the sixties and seventies, where they express 
from their every day economic suffering that in the sixties 
they were better off than in the seventies. This reflects upon 
their views about education. 
Comment 
The discussion and the evaluation of education system after 
1952, during the sixties and seventies reflects a clear 
difference in perceived class interests between the three 
bourgeois classes on the one hand and the working class on the 
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other. There is a preference for the policies of the sixties 
among the working class, while the three bourgeois classes 
have criticized them on some points and supported them on 
others. 
When members of different class positions were asked to 
compare education in the sixties and seventies, in contrast 
to their attachment to the policies of the two periods, the 
three bourgeois classes mainly supported the sixties as having 
better education in terms of teacher training and 
qualifications. This can be understood in terms of the serious 
problem of the present teachers' standard and qualifications 
which is reflected in peoples' evaluation of education in the 
two eras. 
It is important to notice that the three bourgeois classes 
support for the policies of the sixties concentrated on one 
major point, namely, the qulity of teacher training, while 
their main attack was on the ideologies which stood behind the 
policies. They carried this attack on ideology into the 
discussion of other aspects like free and fee paying 
education. So, their leaning towards one aspect of the policy 
in the sixties did not change the main division of interests 
between the three bourgeois class and the working class. 
(B) Educational Problems 
Respondents were asked to identify what they believe are the 
more important problems in our education system. This point 
helps to reflect class consciousness and awareness of the 
negative aspects of the system. From Table No.6 it can be seen 
that the working class could not identify problems, with more 
than half of both the fathers and mothers saying that they 
find it difficult to answer to these questions. 
Problems identified by people show that they have mentioned 
different areas in school and in education in general. These 
areas are: 
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1 	 The curriculum: where they identified some problems in 
the curriculum like the accumulated curriculum, the 




	 Teachers: shortage of teachers and the problem of 
unqualified teachers. 
3. The school itself: problems of shortage of equipment and 
buildings, short school day, overcrowded classrooms. 
The analysis of people's identification of problems shows 
that, class differences are not so much in identifying 
different kinds and aspects of problem, although these 
differences certainly do exist to some extent, but in the 
scope and the variaty of problems they discuss. 
If one looks at the answers of the working class and the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie, one finds that they concentrate 
on those problems which they face in day to day relations with 
school, while the new petty bourgeoisie tend to reflect 
perceptions of more general problems related to aims and 
policy of education. This will be discussed and analyzed 
further in the next chapter. They offer critiques of applying 
new types of education like basic education and put their 
discussion of problems in political perspective. Beside that, 
it can be seen that the working class, for example, are to a 
great extent unable to discuss certain areas like curriculum, 
since reading is a prerequisite of entering into discussion 
in this area, which is not available for the majority of the 
sample. 
Examples of the working class discussions reflect that fact. 
A father who works as a welder in foreign company said, 
"We have some problems in education like private 
lessons and lack of supervision of teachers' work 
and of schools performance." 
A mother described her own direct concern over the link 
between education and unemployment: 
"The big problem in education is the unemployment 
of the graduates. I have one of my daughters who 
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has been looking for a job for two years after she 
finished her technical school. It is a waste of 
money for both government and parents who spend on 
educating their children and then they stay without 
a job." 
The traditional petty bourgoisie reflected the same limited 
view of education problems. For example, a father who is owner 
of a small shop said, 
"I do not have a clear idea about education 
problems: all I know is that teachers neglect 
children and they do not work hard with them." 
A mother who is housewife said, 
"I know about education problems that students 
sometimes make problems with their teachers. 
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Students do not care about their lessons and they 
do not listen to their teachers." 
The new petty bourgeoisie discussed a wide range of problems 
in a wide political and social perspective. One of the 
sample's members is specialized in education; he is an 
inspector in Ministry of Education. He criticized the law 
which organizes Basic Education. He believes that this law is 
responsible for the low standard of Basic Education. He said, 
"We have the problem of big student numbers, the 
short school day because we use the schools for more 
than one shift, the low standard of teachers' 
training and qualifications. I consider the new law 
on Basic Education as a problem, that is, the new 
law allows a child to repeat the second and the 
sixth grade of the school if the child failed. I 
think this will lower the standard of Basic 
Educatio, because those who fail should not continue 
to study because they do not have the ability for 
study. So it is better for them to leave the school 
to those who have the abilities." 
The view of the inspector is interesting. It illustrates how 
the problem of failing the school is seen by some officials 
and specialists in education as the problem of the individual 
and of the individual's inability to be educated. 
Another view reflects the general problems of educational 
planning and the wide perspective which this class has on 
educational problems. A father who is an engineer in a public 
sector company said, 
"We have many problems. The main reason for our 
problems is buildings, teaching, and facilities, all 
come from the effect of the war. Egypt experienced 
many wars which affected our national educational 
and industrial plans. One of the main educational 
problems is that we do not have a stable policy of 
education; the policy is changing with every new 
Minister of Education which gives no opportunity to 
apply any policy." 
The new petty bourgeoisie stress the problem of unqualified 
teachers as very important, and also the problems of the 
curriculum. A mother who works as an employee in Ministry of 
Culture said, 
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"We have many problems like problems of teachers 
training. This problem presents itself in using 
untrained teachers and allowing any teacher to teach 
any subject without being specialized. We have the 
problem of the overcrowded curriculum, the short 
school day because of using the school for more than 
two shifts, and there is no connection between home 
and school." 
The big bourgeoisie, like the new petty bourgeoisie, reflect 
some of the general problems in education, and stress the 
problem of teachers. A father who is a businessman and 
qualified at the university as a lawyer said, 
"Our problems are the same as in any developing 
country. I think, the most important problem is the 
problem of teachers training and their low status 
in society, that is, the state deals with teachers 
as if they are doing second class work. We give more 
importance and high status to the university 
teachers than to primary teachers who are very 
important. We have another problem which is people 
who are responsible for education, I mean the senior 
officials and the minister of education, all of them 
are occupied and busy of doing many other formal 
responsibilities like receptions and public 
relations which gave no time for developing and 
studying education problems. We have as well the 
problem of the accumulated curriculum." 
Another father, who is a university graduate, and is the owner 
of a textile factory, reflected on more general problems at 
the policy level: 
"We have the problem of the big number of students 
and the shortage of buildings. The other important 
problem is in the policy of education. That is, we 
do not have a stable policy of education because 
every minister comes with new policy and new 
experiments, so they do not exactly know what they 
want and how to reform education." 
The views of the big bourgeoisie reflect a great deal of 
consciousness about the problem of teachers training and 
standards, and they ask that teachers should be qualified not 
only at the first degree of university education but at the 
standard of post graduate studies. 
The discussion of educational problems in general has shown 
the importance of cultural capital in enabling individuals to 
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give critical views and to perceive problems in broad 
perspectives. This is clear from the way that the working 
class and traditional petty bourgeoisie have discussed 
education problems, where they had rather limited 
perspectives, in contrast with the big and new petty 
bourgeoisie who presented perspectives which covered several 
areas of the education system. 
(C) Control and Power over Education as seen by Members of 
Different Classes 
To study how people percieve the way power and influence are 
exercised over education people were asked to identify those 
who have the power and ability to solve educational problems. 
People were asked about what should happen, and who should 
solve educational problems. 
At another level, people were asked to identify, and to choose 
from different social groups, those they believed could 
actually influence education. Table No 7 summarizes people's 
views about whom they think can solve education problem. From 
the table, it can be noticed that the majority of the working 
class found it difficult to give a response to this question. 
The majority said that they did not know. Fewer of the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie said that they did not know, but 
this was still a greater percentage than for either the new 
petty bourgeoisie or the big bourgeoisie. 
The minority of the working class who answered this question 
have mainly proposed that the government, with people's help 
and cooperation can solve problems. They concentrate on 
people's conscientiousness in their work, like teachers for 
example, who they believe are responsible for problems like 
private lessons and the low quality of education their 
children have at school. 
A father who is a welder in a foreign company said, 
"The government shouold solve the problems, but the 
government efforts can do nothing without people's 
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Table 7: Parents' Assessment Those Who Can Solve Educational 
Problems 






Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
Working class 
Father Mother 
The government 17 19 2 2 4 5 
Government and 
people together 





4 1 1 1 
People as 
individuals 
3 5 2 2 
People who are 
specialists in 
education 




Don't know 1 2 3 1 6 6 
conscientiousness. People have to change and to be 
faithful in their work in order to help the 
government." 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect, like the working 
class, the importance of the government with the help of the 
people, and that it is very important for people to be 
conscientious. Although they stress the role of the 
government, they reflect one important point about the lack 
of confidence between people and government. 
A father who works as a tailor said, 
"The government can solve education problems with 
people's help, but the problem is, people do not 
trust the government and they cannot see any good 
example of people who are in power." 
A father who works as a merchant commented that it was 
necessary to change individuals before problems could be 
solved: 
"In order to solve educational problems we need to 
be more conscientious and faithful. Because the 
rulers cannot do anything to such problems, the 
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whole thing depends upon individual's 
conscientiousness and beliefs. Like teachers who 
give private lessons, they have to stop that." 
The answers given by the new petty bourgeoisie the big 
bourgeoisie are mainly stressing the role of the government 
in solving educational problems. However, this does not rule 
out other sources, such as the government and people together, 
people who are specialized in education, and people as 
individuals. They did not give these as much emphasis as they 
did to the role of government. For the new petty bourgeoisie 
the stress upon government is clear in parents' comments. 
The view that the government alone is responsible was 
expressed by a university professor: 
"The government is the competent authority who can 
solve all these problems and the National Committee 
for Education as well. The opinions of people and 
parties are only consultative views." 
The same view was expressed by a director of a public sector 
company: 
"If we want to solve our education problems we have 
to start with teachers and the government is the 
only responsible authority, because it possess all 
power and authority." 
A similar point was made by an engineer, who criticized the 
political parties and stressed the responsibility of the 
government: 
"The government can solve the problems, because I 
do not believe in the role of the political parties 
in Egypt. The political parties before the 
Revolution were struggling and fighting to gain 
authority, and today's parties, are not any better. 
They fight between themselves and they do not think 
about educational problems or any other national 
problem." 
The collective responsibility of the government and people in 
political parties and social organizations was expressed but 
not in the same strong manner as the idea that government 
alone could solve the problems. 
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A father who works as an engineer said: 
"The government cannot solve all problems alone. 
People and political parties must share and take 
responsibility." 
Another father said, 
"The government with people's cooperation can solve 
problems. Both of them can communicate through the 
popular councils." 
The individualist trend was expressed by a minority. However, 
its importance comes from its basis in religious beliefs. A 
father who is an accountant for the govenrment said, 
"Any solution must start from the individual. If 
everyone does his/her duties we would not have 
problems. If we solve the individual's problem we 
will be able to reform society and then education. 
This can be achieved when people become more 
faithful." 
A mother who is a primary school teacher siad, 
"All reforms start with individuals. If individuals 
were conscientious and faithful, and did their 
duties we would be able to reform society. After 
this comes the role of the government and the 
responsible people." 
The big bourgeoisie responded almost in the same trends as the 
new petty bourgeoisie, where they mainly emphasized the role 
of the government. The trend which places stress upon the 
government is represented by a father, who is a businessman, 
and said, 
"It is the government's resposibility to solve such 
problems because people do not have the tools for 
reform and the government which fails such 
responsibility is not worthy of any responsibility. " 
The importance of individual responsibility was expressed by 
a father who is an engineer, working as an entrepreneur, 
"If you ask about who can solve these problems it 
is the individual. That is, we need some one who is 
very strong - like a minister of education who can 
penetrate all difficulties and reform education. We 
cannot rely on political parties because they have 
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no authority." 
The trend of cooperation between government and people was 
expressed by a mother, who said, 
"It is the government with the help of people who 
can solve education problems. Political parties have 
no real role in society." 
Comment 
At the level of the analysis of those who can control and deal 
with education problems, members of different class position 
expressed what they think can be done according to their sense 
of the circumstances of society. The analysis reflects the 
limited ability of the working class and the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie to express their views about educational problems 
and solutions. However, they believe in cooperation between 
government and people with stress on the moral aspect. That 
is, if people are not conscientious government's efforts are 
not going to work. 
The views of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie 
embodies a strong belief in state power and authority. For the 
two classes, in some cases the state is seen as the only 
competent authority which has all power, so that it can 
enforce reform. Moreover, they believe that other political 
powers in society like political parties have no power or they 
do not practice pressure which can force the government to 
change things. 
However, the strong belief in the role of the government was 
not universally accepted. The new and big bourgeoisie 
particularly believe that the government can act with 
political parties and other social organizations. They give 
the example of the fields in which they have demonstrted that 
they can work together, like building more schools by public 
donations with the help of the government. 
The third view presents a religious approach to the whole 
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issue and it is in fact not an approach to education problems 
only, but it is an approach to solve all society's problems 
i.e. an approach for reform. That approach sees the begining 
of change not in the outside circumstances, but in the 
individual which has to be faithful and religious, so they put 
stress on the moral aspect, and then comes the secondary role 
of the government and state. 
(D) Occupational Groups which have influence upon Educational 
Policy as seen by Members of Different Classes 
The second point in the analysis of who controls and exercises 
power over education is discussed in this section. This point 
is viewed from what people think and believe is going on in 
reality. They were asked to identify which occupational groups 
they believe have influence over policies of education. 
It was explained that what was meant by 'policy of education' 
were certain aspects of spending and financing education: the 
decision, for example, for expanding or controling certain 
kinds of education. 
Table No 8 summarized people's views. The table shows that the 
majority from different class positions believe that 
politicians are the ones who control policies of education. 
In the discussion they explained that they mean by politicians 
mainly the minister of education. 
Others who might influence education system are teachers. This 
is expressed by a substantial minority of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and working class. In fact those who mentioned 
teachers did not mean that they influence the formation of the 
policy, but they explained that teachers, by giving private 
lessons, are influencing and affecting the financial ability 
of the parents to educate their children, and that teachers 
standards and qualifications are influencing the qulity of 
education. 
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Table 8: Parents' Evaluation of the Occupational Groups which 
have Influence over Education 
Occupational 	 New petty 









Politicians 	 25 22 6 4 7 7 8 7 
Officers 	 1 
Senior officials 






Teachers 	 6 6 1 1 1 
Imams 	 2 3 1 1 
Rich people 1 1 
Senior 	 2 
employees in 
the Ministry of 
3 1 2 2 1 
Education 
Don't know 1 2 2 2 
Senior employees in the Ministry of Education are influencing 
policies of education, in the view of one in every ten members 
of the new petty bourgeoisie and one in every five of the 
traditional and big bourgeoisie. They believe that senior 
employees in the Ministry of Education are sharing in making 
policies concerning student numbers in different levels and 
in desingning the curriculum. 
'Imams' were expected to have influence not in the formal 
policy of education, but in the moral aspect of education. The 
new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie 
expressed that Imams do not have at the present influence upon 
policy but they should have a spiritual influence to guide 
children and youth. 
All other groups which were mentioned by small percentages of 
the sample, like officers, businessmen, the rich, craftmen and 
manual wage earners, were seen to have influence to the extent 
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that they have money and can influence the education system 
by their ability to afford private lessons for their children, 
while other groups in society cannot. So they influence 
education in terms of equal opportunities. 
If one looks at the groups that members of different class 
positions have identified as having influence upon education 
and compare them with their identification of groups which 
became economically powerful and rich in the seventies, one 
can see that there is no typical identification of the same 
groups for the two aspects. However there is a limited trend 
among members of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie to identify some groups which have economic power 
as having power over education, like businessmen and craftmen. 
From that point, the researcher would cautiously suggest that 
members from different class positions identify separately 
those who have the economic power and capital, and those who 
have the cultural power and capital. It is not necessary that 
those who have the economic power influence education 
policies. 
(E) Teacher's position in society 
The discussion of the previous point of the development of 
education has shown that people take the work of the teacher 
and their dedication in doing their work as one of the factors 
which determines the standard, quality and development of the 
education system. In this section, people were asked to 
evaluate teachers' position in society, compared with other 
professions. Table No 9 shows the comparison between teachers 
and other professions in terms of having a higher, the same 
or a lower position than each. 
It is clear that the general evaluation of the teachers' 
position tends to give teachers a lower position than doctors, 
engineers, and officers. However some small percentages put 
teachers in a higher position than those professions. Teachers 
Table 9: Parents' Assessment of Teachers' 









Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
doctors 2 1 2 
Same as 
doctors 1 2 1 1 2 
Lower than 
doctors 28 28 9 8 9 8 9 9 
Higher than 
engineers 3 1 3 
Same as 
engineers 1 2 1 1 2 
Lower than 
engineers 27 28 8 7 8 8 9 8 
Higher than 
officers 5 5 2 1 1 3 
Same as 
officers 1 1 2 
Lower than 
officers 26 25 7 8 8 8 9 8 
Higher than 
clerks 23 26 8 8 8 8 9 11 
Same as 
clerks 7 4 1 1 
Lower than 
clerks 1 1 1 1 1 
Higher than 
imams 11 17 3 2 5 2 4 5 
Same as 
imams 8 6 1 1 3 3 
Lower than 
imams 5 1 3 3 1 2 1 4 
Higher than 
factory workers 30 30 9 7 9 9 9 11 
Same as 
factory workers 1 1 
Lower than 
factory workers 1 1 1 
Higher than 




craftsmen 1 1 1 
were put in a higher position than clerks, Imams, factory 
workers and craftmen by a majority of the sample from 
different class positions. 
So, comparison does not put teachers with the top professions 
like doctors or engineers, but it gives teachers a middle 
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position. There is almost a consensus between all respondents, 
irrespective of their class positions, as to what the 
teachers' position ideally should be. That is, they believe 
that teachers are doing a very important job, which is 
educating and preparing new generations to be qualified for 
different professions, which is an essential task, which 
should give teachers higher credit than other professions. 
However, they admit that the real situation for teachers is 
that they are not evaluated among the higher or top 
professions. 
III. Equal rights in education  
The discussion of equal rights in education is an important 
issue in the study of class based interests in education. 
Equal rights in education will be discussed in terms of the 
following points: 
- A direct discussion of whether people believe that all 
children have the same right to be educated, 
- what are the factors which they think determine their 
right to carry on in education, and 
- Views about free and fee paying education which is going 
to determine the extent of the openness of the system. 
The discussion shows that people from different class 
positions believe by a majority that all children have the 
same right in education, as Table No. 10 indicates. However, 
there is a significant minority of new petty bourgeoisie 
parents and traditional petty bourgeoisie mothers who believe 
that children do not all have an equal right to education. The 
justification given for this view is based in their belief in 
class differences, and that people are unequal, so they should 
not have equal rights in education, especially for some social 
groups like farmers, since they believe that educating farmers 
will draw them away from agriculture. An example of this view 
can be found in the words of a mother who works as an engineer 
for a foreign company: 
"Not all people have the same right to education. 
Farmers for example should not go beyond primary 
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Table 10: Parents' Assessment of the Right of All Children to 
go to School 
Do all 
	
New petty 	 Tradsnal petty Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
Children have 	 bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
the same right 
to go to school? 
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
Yes 	 29 	 29 	 9 	 8 	 9 	 9 	 11 	 11 
No 	 2 	 2 	 1 
level otherwise they would leave the countryside 
and stop working as rural workers. Continuation of 
education should depend upon the family social 
standard. Primary education should be free, but all 
other levels must be fee paying because the 
government cannot pay for all level especially 
university education." 
The discussion of the right to education led to the discussion 
of the factors which members of different classes believe they 
do influence children's right to carry on education. Table No. 
11 summarizes those factors. The table indicates that the 
majority from different class positions believe that 
children's abilities are the factor which most strongly 
determines their continuation in education. Other views select 
the factor of the social background and the position and 
status of the family, where higher social positions are more 
likely to carry on, and a lower position tends to stop at 
certain levels. 
The economic factor also appears. The economic standard of the 
family influences children's opportunities to carry on 
education. 
Free and fee paying education 
The discussion of free and fee paying education is very 
important in identifying class interests and it helps in 
showing the limits of people's beliefs about the right to 
education. This point of free / fee paying education shows a 
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Table 11: Parents' 	 Assessment 	 of 	 Factors 	 Influencing 
Children's Continuation in Education 
Important 	 New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
Factors 	 bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
Child's 	 22 	 27 	 7 	 a 	 7 	 7 	 9 	 6 
aptitude 
Family 	 5 	 3 	 1 	 1 	 2 
position in 
society 















wide range of disagreement between members from different 
class positions. Table No. 12 indicates two main positions, 
either full support of free education at all levels, or 
support of fee-paying education. Inside the fee paying view, 
many varieties and models of fee paying education can be 
identified. 
The following discussion will show class differences and the 
different models introduced. 
The new petty bourgeoisie mainly support fee paying education 
and they present different models which can be identified as: 
1 Dividing the system between levels which should be free, 
like compulsory and secondary, or compulsory only, and 
the rest which should be fee paying. 
2. The duality of the whole system between free education 
in all levels, beside another fee-paying system in all 
levels. 
3. Dividing people themselves into two groups, the rich who 
have to pay at all levels in the private system and the 
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Table 12: Parents' Views of Education Fees 
Views of what 
should be the 
CASO 







paying for rich, 





Free for the 
poor at all 
levels, the 
rich to pay 
Fee-paying 
at all levels 







grants for poor 
students 
New petty 	 Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
3 5 5 6 1 9 10 
4 4 1 1 
2 
6 2 1 
5 4 1 
2 1 1 1 
4 6 1 2 
5 9 2 2 5 6 
1 
poor who have the merit and get it free. 
Beside these models of fee paying education we find among the 
new petty bourgeoisie a small group of parents who would wish 
education to be free at all levels. 
Different models of fee paying education and the views about 
free education, have been justified according to class, social 
and economic reasons. The following class based examples of 
what the parents say will illustrate those justifications. 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, two university professors 
introduce their views about fee paying education. Their views 
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are important not only in terms of their class nature, but 
they also reflect an example of the views of people who share 
in decision making and give suggestions in education. 
The first, a professor of agriculture, spoke about his part 
in developing a programme of higher education: 
"I agree that all children have the right to go to 
school. Continuation depends upon their aptitudes. 
But education should not be free at all levels. 
Basic education can be free, other levels should be 
fee paying for all students. We should offer free 
education for excellent student only. Quality of 
education can be improved by these fees. I suggested 
that fees in government preparatory level should be 
£20, secondary £50, at the university level, for 
human studies about £50 and for science about £100. 
Students who fail in the university should pay full 
fees in order to allow them to repeat the year and 
retake the exams." 
The second professor said, 
"All children have the right to go to school, 
continuation depends upon their abilities. For 
example, some students have no ability for general 
education, so they should go to technical school. 
The right to free education should not be absolute. 
When people get education free, they do not feel the 
value of education, but if they pay they would give 
more care and attention. People should pay for all 
levels. Excellent, poor students should aet it 
free." 
Thes two professors argue that fee paying education will 
improve the quality of education and that people only value 
what they pay for. However, they say that children have the 
same right to be educated. Their views about fee paying 
education place a restriction on this right. 
The new petty bourgeoisie rationalized the necessity for fee 
paying education according to the fact that education is 
already fee paying in an indirect way, since people pay for 
private lessons, and the solution is to make it fee paying 
officially. This view was expressed by a primary school 
teacher: 
"Free education was a good idea in order to give 
people the chance to be educated, but now education 
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is not free, even in the free government school, 
because for example, we ask the new students to 
bring with them some furniture for the classroom 
(chair - desk). The child costs the government £40 
a year for books alone. If we cannot spend on 
education we have to be clear and not to cheat each 
other about the reality of free education. We have 
to make education fee paying officially, because 
today it is fee paying but inofficially." 
The new petty bourgeoisie's view about meritocracy and 
children's abilities is used to justify the control of student 
numbers in different levels of education through a selective 
system of those with "high abilities". This view was presented 
by a father who is accountant in the government. He presents 
the view that there should be selection of students according 
to their abilities, especially at the university level. 
"We should have both free and private education. If 
we offer children good basic education, in this case 
we can discover children's abilities and we can 
eliminate those who are not capable. We have to 
guide students to the suitable kind of education, 
which depends upon (i) the student's desire and 
social and economic standard and (ii) teachers and 
guides who determine children's abilities. At 
university level, our main problem is the inflation 
of student numbers, so, we have to restrict the 
numbers by selecting the best elements among them. 
I encourage the idea of the private university." 
Fee paying education is also justified on social grounds, 
where a group of the new petty bourgeoisie believe that Egypt 
is a class society and according to people's class position 
their standard of education should be decided. So if they are 
from a high social background they should carry on; if not, 
basic education is enough. This view was expressed by a father 
who is an engineer in a foreign company, and who comes from 
a family of wealthy, rural origins. His father is a high 
ranking officer, and he was educated in a foreign language 
school. 
"Education should not be an absolute right, it 
should be for basic education only. Continuation 
depends upon abilities and the family standard. If 
children are from a high social and economic 
background they must continue. If not, basic 
education is enouhg for them, and it should be free, 
while other levels should be fee paying because some 
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lower social levels should not go to the 
university." 
The same justification of fee paying education and the 
elimination of the opportunities on the ground of class 
position in society was expressed by a mother who works as a 
TV censor: 
"Not all children have the right to go to school. 
Some people like the children of cleaners and 
porters should not get more than literacy 
programmes. I do not agree about the extension of 
basic education to nine years, it should be six 
years only. People must pay for education in order 
to feel the value of education. The children of the 
lower classes should be stopped, because everyone 
has to know and uderstand his level, and position 
in society and to know his limits, which they should 
not try to exceed." 
Fee paying education was justified on economic grounds. That 
is, education in effect reduces the number of workers 
especially in agriculture, and the government is not 
responsible for affording free education to all people because 
it is very expensive. A father who is the captain of a ship, 
put this view forward: 
"Not all children should have the right to go to 
school. People see education as if it was the 
responsibility of the government, which is not true. 
It is the individual and family responsibility. The 
claim that education is like air and water for all 
people is wrong, because the spread of education has 
killed many professions especially in agriculture 
because when the farmers are educated, they do not 
want to work as farmers any more, so we have to give 
people in the countryside literacy programmes only. 
So, education must be fee paying because free 
education is very expensive, unproductive and has 
very low standard of efficiency. In this case 
excellent students only, should be educated free." 
These different views reflect the new petty bourgeoisie's 
position on equal opportunities. They show how they draw upon 
different economic, social and cultural aspects which reflect 
and justify their idologies on restricting educational 
opportunities. However, some fractions of the new petty 
bourgeoisie (one out of every ten fathers and one out of every 
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five mothers) support free education at all levels. The study 
of the background of these families shows that they represent 
the lower fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie who, through 
free education, could allow their children to get university 
education. They represent those fractions which benefited from 
free education especially at the university level. An example 
of this fraction in the sample is a family, where the father 
works as store keeper for the government, the mother is a 
housewife, and both of them have primary education. They have 
six children and £140 monthly income. Two of the children are 
at university, one in a higher institute (at less than 
university level), two in secondary school and one in primary 
school. The mother defended free education at all levels: 
"Education should be free in all levels. It is 
unfair to make it fee paying because poor people 
will not be able to educate their children. 
Government free education, is not free in reality 
because we have to pay for private lessons. I do not 
think that fee paying education will solve the 
problem of private lesson, so we will be paying for 
both fees and private lessons." 
The views of the new petty bourgeoisie on free and fee-paying 
education show that they mainly support fee-paying education, 
with a minority of those who are at the lower level being 
provided with the benefit of free education, particularly at 
the university level. The new petty bourgeoisie are 
fractionalized on this issue, and have expressed different 
interests in the free and fee-paying debate. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie mainly support free 
education at all levels, especially those families who have 
their children at university level. A family of a small shop 
owner is an example of the traditional petty bourgeois 
families who benefited from free education. The father is 
literate, with a monthly income of £300; the mother is 
illiterate. They have seven children at different levels of 
education. Three of them have graduated from university, one 
got middle level education (less than university), one is in 
general secondary education, one is in preparatory school and 
one is in primary school. The father expressed his support for 
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free education from the point of view of a tax payer: 
"Education must be free in all levels because 
actually, education is very expensive. Since we pay 
for private lessons, how can we pay for fees? We pay 
taxes and we have the right to educate our children 
free." 
Among the traditional petty bourgeoisie, there is a fraction 
who benefited from opening government language schools, which 
satisfy their ambition to give their children a better kind 
of education. This fraction defends fee paying education. An 
example is a family where the mother is a housewife with 
middle education, and the father is a photographer with middle 
level education and an income of £300. They have three 
children all in government language schools. The mother said, 
"Education should be free in all levels but we have 
to have fee paying schools for those who want better 
education for their children and can pay for it. So 
we have to keep both free and private schools." 
The views of the traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect an 
interest in free education, which allowed some fractions to 
have their children at university level. They raised the point 
that the present system of education is fee paying in an 
indirect way, but they did not reach the same conclusion as 
the new petty bourgeoisie reached, i.e. they did not take this 
point as a good reason to justify abolishing free education 
and make it fee paying altogether. On the contrary, they take 
it as a reason to support free educaion in order not to 
overload people. 
Those who find in fee paying education a satisfaction of their 
ambition for better education for their children, are 
supporting fee paying in addition to free education and they 
did not show the same hostility and cultural superiority 
against other classes, especially the working class, as did 
the new petty bourgeoisie. 
The big bourgeoisie mainly support fee paying education. They 
present the same models as the new petty bourgeoisie, which 
divide the system between free and fee paying at all level, 
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or some levels free and others fee paying, or the model which 
makes the system fee paying at all levels. 
The justification given for fee paying education is based on 
the ground that education is fee paying in an indirect way, 
so we should make it fee paying directly. On this point they 
express the same view as the new petty bourgeoisie. Education 
fees were justified as well on the ground that fees will help 
in improving educational quality and in solving the problem 
of limited resources in education. 
A father who is the owner of a factory said, 
"Today, education is not free. It is fee paying in 
an indirect way because of the private lessons. So, 
education should be fee paying in all levels. These 
fees will help in the improvement of the quality of 
education and in increasing teachers' salaries." 
An example of supporting the duality between free and fee 
paying is a father who is engineer who works as an 
entrepreneur: 
"All children have the right to be educated and it 
is the responsibility of the government to educate 
them. Education should be free for poor and fee 
paying for those who can afford to pay in all 
levels." 
A view which put some restrictions and criteria upon free 
education was put by a father who is an engineer who works as 
an entrepreneur: 
"It is the state's duty to afford education for all 
people. When we discuss education fees we cannot say 
that it should be absolutely free. There are some 
criteria, these are: Basic education and secondary 
level must be free. Basic education must be free and 
compulsory as it is now. I consider this to be like 
military service i.e. obligatory for all people. The 
university could be free but students must go 
through IQ and ability tests: if they are excellent 
we give them free education, and we may help them 
with some money to give them more care. If the 
student passes the test and he/she is well off, they 
should pay fees." 
The views of the big bourgeoisie mainly support fee paying 
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education on the ground of using the fees as a source of 
improving educational quality. It can be noticed that they did 
not show that cultural superiority and prejudice against other 
lower classes as did the new petty bourgeoisie. 
The working class are mainly in support of free education; 
they do not discuss the general issue of free / fee paying 
education or introduce criteria for applying free education, 
in the manner of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie. The working class express directly their own 
problem with fee paying education. 
A father who is a cleaner said, 
"Education must be free in all levels, otherwise I 
will not be able to allow my children to continue 
in education. If there will be any fees, I will be 
obliged to take them out of the school." 
A mother supported the same point: 
"Education has to be free at all levels. Actually 
we do not have a completely free education because 
we still have to pay for books, notebooks and 
private lessons and we can not pay more." 
A different view from the mainstream of the working class, 
which supported fee paying education if it was going to 
improve educational quality, was expressed by a worker who is 
a welder in a foreign company, and whose income is in much the 
same range as the new petty bourgeoisie: 
"Education in Egypt is not free, we pay fees in the 
government schools, we buy books and notebook, and 
we pay for private lessons, so how can we say it is 
free education. I agree to pay fees in all levels 
on the one condition that is the improvement of the 
education standard, teachers level and for us not 
to pay for private lessons: under these conditions, 
I agree about fee paying education." 
Another view which reflects the fear of the working class that 
free education will be taken away was put by a waiter who has 
two childrenat technical secondary education, and one at 
primary level: 
"Education should be free in all levels. If they 
want to open a new fee paying university I agree, 
but this should be for the rich. They must leave the 
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government university for the poor, otherwise we 
will never be able to educate our children." 
The working class mainly support free education at all levels, 
and when they agree about fee paying education, they put many 
conditions and restrictions to protect their own interests in 
free education. 
The discussion of equal rights in education has shown at the 
initial level of analysis that the majority from different 
class positions believe that all children have the same right 
to education. However, the deep discussion of some issues 
which are relevant to the right to education, such as the 
debate around fee-paying and free education, shows that in 
practice this right is not seen as absolute. There are class 
differences, both between and within classes, in the 
perception of interests here: 
The new and the traditional bourgeoisie are divided on the 
matter, with the majority on the new petty bourgeoisie 
supporting fee-paying, while a fraction of those who benefited 
from free education, in particular at the university level, 
supporting free education. For the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie the main line is to support free education, but 
there is a fraction which enjoy a higher income which are 
ambitious for a better education for their children who 
support fee-paying education. 
Both the big bourgeoisie and the working class seem more 
consistent and coherent in the matter, with the big 
bourgeoisie mainly supporting fee-paying education, which all 
fractions of this class can afford. The working class proved 
to have a clear class consciousness about their need for free 
education in order to enable them to educate their children. 
IV. Spending on Education 
The discussion of spending on education asked about three 
points concerning whether there should be more spending on 
education or not, aspects of spending and sources of money for 
financing education. These three issues concerning spending 
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on education are important to illustrate perceptions of the 
possibilities for the expansion of the education system, in 
particular which levels get most popular support, since 
different levels of education have different significance for 
class interests. 
In terms of government spending on education Table No.13 
summarizes people's views. It shows that the three bourgeois 
classes mainly proposed more government spending on education, 
while a small percentage of the new petty bourgeoisie believe 
that the government should not spend more on education. Half 
of the sample of working class fathers and mothers supported 
more spending, but a substantial percentage of working class 
mothers and fathers did not. 


























Should the 	 New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
government bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
spend more on 




No 	 3 
It's not a 	 4 
matter of 
spending more 
money, but of 
how the money 
is spent 
Don't know 
The Table shows that it is mainly the new petty bourgeoisie 
and the working class who did not support more spending on 
education. However, they gave different reasons for that, as 
their replies reflect. The new petty bourgeoisie are against 
more spending because they believe that education should be 
fee-paying and the government should reduce spending, or they 
believe that the government does not need to increase spending 
but to rationalize spending and to reduce waste. The working 
class believe that the government cannot spend more because 
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of the economic crisis. 
The comments of members of the new petty bourgeoisie reflect 
their reservations about spending on education. A father who 
is an engineer in a private sector company who was against 
spending on education said, 
"The government should not spend more on education. 
They should cut the spending and people must pay 
fees, but if we talk about aspects of spending, most 
of the money should go to basic education because 
it is the base for other levels of education." 
A father who is the captain of a ship was strongly opposed to 
increasing spending on education, which he thought should be 
fee-paying: 
"I do not agree about more spending on education, 
because more spending means more people in 
education, which should be restricted. People have 
to pay fees because that is the only way to solve 
our education problems but the government cannot do 
that for political reasons. They must be very brave 
in order to do it. They should not spend more 
because what they spend has no return. It is wasting 
money. Most of the spending should go to basic 
education in order to give a strong base for people 
who are going to leave the system or those who are 
going to continue." 
Those who did not support more spending from the new petty 
bourgeoisie, when they were asked about aspects of spending, 
said that most spending should go to basic education because 
it is the level which many children stopped at before they go 
to the world of work. So, they support spending on primary 
level to support a conservative view of controling other 
levels of education. 
The working class who did not support more spending on 
education, have different reasons from the new petty 
bourgeoisie, who meant by cutting spending to eliminate 
education opportunities. In contrast, the working class 
believe that the government is in economic crisis so it cannot 
spend more. The answers of the working class suggest that they 
are highly influenced by government propaganda about the 
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economic crisis. 
The working class also identified three areas, or levels, of 
spending and they justify them on different grounds than those 
of the new petty bourgeoisie. They ask for equal spending on 
education. They believe that people who have children at any 
level of education are suffering from the economic crisis and 
they need government help at all education levels. They ask 
for more spending on university and general secondary 
education. They are here influenced by the social value of 
these two kind of education, so they believe that they have 
high social value and that they should get more money. They 
ask for more spending on the primary level. They know that it 
has the highest number of students. So, the working class in 
their views do not mean to restrict educational opportunities. 
On the contrary they ask for more help and support for those 
who have children at any level of eduction. The following is 
what members of the working class had to say about that point 
of spending. 
A father who is a bus conductor said, 
"The government should not spend more on education. 
We hear from the radio and from people that the 
government has no money and has many problems, so 
I do not think they can spend more." 
A mother and houswife said, 
"The government shoul not spend more on education, 
because the government has many economic problems, 
so the government cannot spend more on education, 
and they should distribute money equally between 
different levels because people are suffering and 
cannot spend on education. People who have children 
at any level need the help of the government." 
Another mother who does not support more government spending 
was of the opinion that what the government was doing was 
enough: 
"The government should not spend more on education 
because we always hear about the economic problem 
and that we do not have money. It is enough that the 
government pays teachers' salaries and they give 
free education. The government should spend most of 
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the money on basic education because it has the 
largest number of students." 
It can be noticed that the working class are more affected and 
influenced by the state propaganda about the economic crisis. 
Those who asked for more spending on education have identified 
different aspects of spending, and it can be noticed that 
basic education has a higher percentage of support than any 
other level of education. Table No. 14 shows how memebers from 
different class positions gave their main support to basic 
education. 
Table 14: Parents' Views of which Aspects of Education should 



















1 1 1 1 
Technical 
education 
2 2 1 1 3 
University 
education 
1 2 2 2 3 2 
The level 
can take more 
students 
3 2 1 
Buildings and 
equipment 
5 5 1 
Teachers' pay 
and training 
7 5 1 1 2 1 
Equal spending 1 2 1 
Don't know 2 1 2 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, as mentioned above, like other 
classes, their main support went for more spending on basic 
education. The second aspect for them is teachers training and 
salaries which expressed was picked out by about a quarter of 
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fathers and a fifth of mothers. 
The new petty bourgeoisie gave less support to other aspects 
like university level and technical education, and they gave 
no support for general secondary education. In the following 
part we look at the way people identified and justified 
different aspects of spending. 
A father who is a university professor and who supported more 
spending, defended the view that more should be spent on 
universities: 
"The government should spend more on education, but 
it is difficult to estimate the amount for each 
level. We need a detailed study to determine the 
fund for each level. For example, we cannot spend 
on primary education at the expense of university 
level. I am not against spending on basic education, 
which is essential in building an individual's 
personality, but university education needs money 
as well. It needs equipment especially in science 
colleges." 
The professor's view reflects what might be the case of 
conflict over the education budget where each level tries to 
secure more resources. 
Other views give support for spending on basic education and 
teacher's training. These are justified as follows. 
A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of Culture said, 
"The government should spend more on teacher's 
salaries, buildings and on basic education. Basic 
education is very important in forming a child's 
personality and at this level children need a lot 
of health and nutritional care which needs more 
money." 
A father who is an engineer suppoerted spending on basic 
education because it is the last stage of education for many 
children: 
"The government should spend more on education 
because building schools is very expensive and 
because the schools need more than building 
classrooms. They need equipment and laboratories. 
They should spend more on basic education because 
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it can be considered as the last stage for the 
majority of the children. We should not spend more 
on the university because the numbers should be 
limited." 
These are examples of people who support more spending 
especially on basic education and give different reasons such 
as: 
- basic education is the last stage of education for the 
majority of children. 
- basic education is the base for building a child's 
personality and abilities. 
- or basic education prepares children for continuing their 
studies to higher levels i.e. lays the bases for other 
levels of education. 
In fact the new petty bourgeoisie support more spending on the 
primary level, while they did not support more expenditure at 
the university level. This is not necessarily what one might 
expect, as one would anticipate that the new petty bourgeoisie 
would see it in their own interests to support expenditure on 
universities. 
In contrast with this, they support more spending on the 
expansion of the primary level, which usually benefits the 
lower classes, whose children cannot carry on after that 
level. This seems a progressive attitudes towards more 
literacy in society. However, when one looks at the new petty 
bourgeoisie's support for more spending on primary education 
in the context of the previous discussion of their views on 
free and fee-paying education, it can be seen that caution 
must be exercised in arriving at conclusions in the analysis 
of their attitudes. That is, the new petty bourgeoisie in 
their discussion of free and fee-paying education mainly 
supported fee-paying education, especially after the primary 
level. This leads to the conclusion that the new petty 
bourgeoisie support the expansion of primary education, but 
wish to see more restrictions on higher levels. If these 
higher levels were fee-paying, the children of the lower 
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classes would be excluded. Their support for more primary 
spending is linked to a conservative aim of restricting 
educational opportunities, particularly in higher levels of 
education. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie mainly support more 
government spending on education. They support a wide range 
of spending on different kinds of education like technical 
education and university level, more than other bourgeois 
classes like the new petty bourgeoisie. They justify more 
spending at the university level because they believe it needs 
equipment, and they justify more spending on technical 
secondary education because they believe there is a need for 
more qualified and skilled manpower. 
A father who is the owner of a small shop supported spending 
on university education: 
"The government should spend more on education 
especially university level. University needs large 
funds because it needs more equipment than other 
levels. These equipments are expensive." 
A father who is a tailor supported more spending on technical 
education: 
"The government should spend more on education 
especially on technical secondary education, because 
we need skilled workers. Developed and advanced 
countries did not achieve their development by 
university graduates but by the efforts of the 
workers. Technical education helps as well in 
solving the problem of unemployment." 
The views of the traditional petty bourgeoisie express more 
interest in moving towards middle and higher level of 
education. However, two contradictory views about the role of 
university education appear: that is, in the view of some, 
university education must get more money to provide it with 
equipment which is very expensive; the other view believes 
that it is not those who graduate from university who are 
going to build and develop the country, it is technical 
secondary school education which can achieve that by preparing 
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workers. 
The big bourgeoisie mainly gave their support to more spending 
on basic education, technical education, and university level, 
where spending on education is seen as investment which has 
its return to society and which is essential in preparing 
labour power. 
A father who is a businessman expressed this view that 
education is investment: 
"The government should spend more on education, 
because education is not a service which cost the 
government money, but education is an investment 
which has its return. The government should spend 
more on basic education because our main problem is 
illiteracy. The second aspect of spending should be 
university level which needs equipments and 
libraries." 
Technical education is seen as a source for preparing skilled 
workers needed for the market. 
A father who is the owner of a weaving factory supported 
technical education: 
"The government should spend more on education, 
especially on technical education, because we need 
skilled workers and educated farmers who are needed 
for reclaiming the desert and using modern 
technology." 
Spending on basic education is seen, as it was by other 
classes, as important in developing children's personalities 
and it has been seen as vital because it is the last stage for 
many children. 
A father who is the owner of a factory expressed support for 
more government spending: 
"The government should spend more on education 
especially basic education, which is very important 
in developing children's mentalities. Children need 
in these schools facilities, equipment, activities." 
The working class did not give as much support to more 
spending on education as did other classes. However, those who 
asked for more spending supported spending on university and 
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technical education. In fact the working class support of 
university level comes from their support of the poor who have 
children at that level and cannot support them without the 
help of government spending, i.e. communal identification with 
those who have 'done well'. 
A father who works as a waiter said, 
"The government should spend more on university 
level because it is the highest level in education 
and it is very expensive, so the government should 
help people who have children at that level 
especially the poor who suffer too much if they have 
children at that level." 
A mother who supports more spending on university said, 
"The government should spend more on university 
level, because it is very expensive education. They 
need equipment more than any other level and people 
cannot educate their children at that level without 
the help of govenment." 
The working class also offered support for technical 
education. A father who is a cleaner said, 
"The government should spend more on education. 
Especially on technical education because we need 
workers for our industry." 
The analysis of people's views about spending on education 
shows different subjective perceptions of class interests. The 
new petty bourgeoisie do not support more spending on 
education which they consider a waste and that education must 
be restricted and be fee paying. Even those of the new petty 
bourgeoisie who asked for more spending supported more 
spending on primary education in order to afford a good 
standard of basic education as to be the end of education for 
the majority i.e. they have a conservative view which aims at 
restricting education especially at high levels to the elite. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie, from their middle position, 
since they are not too opressed like the working class, 
support more spending on university and technical education 
which could open more opportunities for their children. 
371 
The big bourgeoisie have an interest in more spending on 
education which they consider as investment in human capital, 
and which provides society with the qualified manpower needed 
by the market. 
The working class did not mainly support more spending on 
education, where they are influenced by the state propaganda 
through the mass media about the economic crisis. However, 
those who asked for more spending, supported more spending at 
the university level. They asked for more spending at that 
level in order to support those who are not well. 
Sources of spending on Education 
People were asked to give their views about three suggested 
sources of educational finance. These were: 
1. Shift expenditure from militry to education. 
2. Increase taxes. 
3 	 Foreign aid. 
People were also asked to discuss these three options and to 
suggest other resources as well. Table No. 15 summarizes 
different resources identified by people from different class 
position. 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, the table indicates that they 
mainly support resources coming from increasing taxes on rich 
people. 
The new petty bourgeoisie identified various resources for 
education like fee paying education, and increasing 
production. In the analysis of the new petty bourgeoisie 
argument around sources of spending, three main points can be 
recognized. These are: 
- The majority of the new petty bourgeoisie do not want 
expenditure shifting from militry to education since they 
believe that Egypt still needs a strong army. Those who 
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pay alms (zahak) 
according to 
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Cut government 	 1 
spending 
Don't know 	 1 
	
1 2 
agreed to shifting, support their views by the fact that 
there is a peace treaty with Isreal and that Egypt does 
not need more spending on the army. 
- 	
The majority do not want foreign aid because it adds to 
the country's problems. 
	
The new petty bourgeoisie are keen on the idea of fee 
paying education which they introduce as a solution to 
different problems. The following views express these 
points. 
A university professor said, 
"I do not agree about shifting from militry to 
education because we still need to buy weapons. What 
we can do is to save from other aspects in the army, 
for example, to reduce the period of military 
service and to use the recruits in civil activities 
and services. I do not agree about foreign aid 
because we do not want more debts. I agree about 
increasing taxes on rich people. There is another 
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source for education which is getting money from 
fees." 
Another father who is the captain of a ship did not approve 
of transferring money from the army or foreign aid to 
education, but gave his views on fee paying education: 
"I do not agree about shifting from militry to 
education because we need a strong army. I do not 
agree either about foreign aid because they are 
debts. I agree about increasing tax on rich people 
but I think it is very difficult to get the rich to 
pay tax because they have their own ways of escaping 
from paying tax. The other possible resource is to 
let people pay fees. For example, if the child costs 
the government £150 the parents should pay £75 and 
the government should pay the rest." 
A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of Culture 
expressed a different view, which supported the transfer of 
money from military expenditure to education, but rejected 
foreign aid: 
"I agree about shifting from the militry to 
education because we are at peace time. I agree 
about taxes on the rich and the rich have to give 
donations for building more schools. I do not agree 
about foreign aid because they are debts." 
A father who is a store keeper, however, supported the use of 
foreign aid: 
"We are obliged and forced to depend upon foreign 
aid because we do not have enough resources. The 
other source could be increasing production." 
It seems from the analysis that shifting from military 
expenditure to education and foreign aid are not very popular 
options for the new petty bourgeoisie. However, these two 
options were supported by some elements of the new petty 
bourgeoisie. The new petty bourgeoisie mainly support 
increasing taxes on rich people and they see education fees 
as one important source of money. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie support the increase of 
taxes on rich people. This is much more popular than the 
second choice which was increasing production. The third 
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choice was the transfer of money from military to educational 
use, and only a small minority supported the use of foreign 
aid. 
Where the traditional petty bourgeoisie supported increasing 
taxes, they put the condition of following the Islamic law 
which bases tax on capital, not on the profit made on this 
capital. 
A father who owns a small shop said, 
"I do not agree about shifting from militry to 
education, but the army can share in the civil 
projects. I agree about taxes from the rich but they 
have to change the taxation system and to follow the 
Islamic one which takes taxes on the capital not on 
the profit. I do not agree about foreign aid because 
they are debts. The other source is increasing 
production." 
As with the new petty bourgeoisie, reducing spending on the 
militry is not very popular. A father who is a tailor, 
expresses his views against reducing spending on militry, 
where he sees the problem in its international perspective: 
"I do not agree about shifting from the army which 
is still very important for the country. The super 
powers in the world, they increase their weapons 
although they know that nobody is going to attack 
them, so what about us who live in a dangerous area. 
We need the army to protect ourselves and in order 
to keep the peace. I agree about increasing taxes 
on millionaires." 
From the replies of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, it can 
be seen that they did not support the idea of shifting from 
militry expenditure to education. This view is similar to the 
majority of the new petty bourgeoisie. On the issue of taxes, 
they did support them, like the new petty bourgeoisie, but 
unlike them, they put on restrictions and conditions. So we 
find a suggestion of tax on the capital not the profit and 
another view identify those who have to pay more tax as 
millionnairs. These restriction did not exist in the case of 
the new petty bourgeoisie. But it is understandable in the 
case of the traditional petty bourgeoisie who are themselves 
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owners. 
The main trend in the views of the big bourgeoisie is their 
opposition to increasing taxes. The table shows that they are 
the class which agree least with that option. 
A father who is a businessman rejects the three sources and 
suggests another which is increasing production: 
"We cannot reduce spending on the army because we 
still need a strong army. Taxes in Egypt are a big 
problem because people refuse to pay taxes because 
they do not trust the government and are not 
satified with what the government offered them. I 
do not agree about foreign aid in education because 
it is dangerous to allow any penetration to our 
education system and to affect its policy. We can 
get money for education by increasing production 
which will increase national income in general." 
An owner of an electrical tools factory said, 
"I do not agree about increasing taxes because the 
private sector pays very high taxes and we pay high 
wages for workers and we insure them, so we should 
not pay more tax. I agree about shifting from 
militry to education because we are at peace. I 
agree about foreign aid as well, but on the 
condition that it should be spent on education and 
in productive projects." 
An engineer who works as an entrepreneur does not approve of 
increasing taxes, and he introduces an Islamic view on 
taxation: 
"I do not agree about increasing taxes because we 
have to change our taxation system and to follow the 
Islamic one which takes 2.5 per cent from the 
capital not from the profit. The ruler has the right 
to increase this percentage. I agree about foreign 
aid on one condition, which is to be long term loans 
and interest free and unstipulated due date. I do 
not agree about shifting from the army because we 
still need a strong army to protect the country." 
So, the views of the big bourgeoisie reflect their opposition 
to increasing taxes, since it threatens their interest, and 
that is why they suggest different alternatives, like 
increasing production which would help to increase national 
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income in general. They also suggested not cutting from the 
army but that the army could share in civil activities. The 
big bourgeoisie did not suggest, like the new petty 
bourgeoisie, fee paying education as a source of money for 
financing education. The big bourgeoisie are mainly interested 
in introducing increasing production, which in the end is done 
by workers, as their suggested source of money for education. 
So, the two views are against workers who are either directly 
removed from education by fees, or they are indirectly used 
to supply more spending on education through increasing their 
production. 
The working class mainly support increasing taxes to get 
resources for education. However, there were some who did not 
support increasing taxes for different reasons from those of 
the big bourgeoisie. The views of the workers reflect their 
fear of increasing taxes, because they know that it is the 
poor who always pay tax, not the rich. 
A father who is a fitter in a public sector company said, 
"We can not increase taxes because of the bad and 
critical economic situation of the country. When tax 
is increased it is the poor who always pay. We can 
shift from militry to education because we are at 
peace but I do not agree about foreign aid because 
they are debts." 
The working class are against both shifting from militry and 
foreign aid. They still believe that Egypt needs a strong army 
and they are conscious enough that foreign aid is more debt. 
A mother and housewife expressed this view: 
"I do not agree about shifting from the militry to 
education. The army is still very important for the 
country. I do not agree about foreign aid because 
we are already drowned in debts and we do not need 
more. I agree abaout tax especially on rich people 
like company owners who make a lot of money." 
Sources of spending on education show different class 
interests, where sources such as taxation are against the 
interests of the owners of the means of production like the 
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big and traditional petty bourgeoisie, while taxation was 
supported by wage earners like the new petty bourgeoisie and 
the working class, who demanded that the rich should pay 
higher taxes. Other sources, like shifting from military 
expenditure, or relying on foreign aid, proved to be the least 
popular sources among the majority from all different class 
positions. 
V. Future Educational Change 
People were asked, in an open question, to give their 
expectations for future change in education. Table No.16 shows 
that the majority expect changes in the future, and a smaller 
percentage are expecting no change. Only the big bourgeoisie 
go against this general pattern, with a big proportion 
expecting no change. A high proportion of the working class 
fathers and mothers found it difficult to give an answer about 
the future of education. 
Table 16: Parents' Assessment of Change in Education in the 
Future 
Future changes New petty 	 Traditional petty 
	
Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
in education bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
	
Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
There will be 23 	 19 	 4 	 4 	 6 	 2 	 2 	 2 
changes 
There will be 6 	 7 	 1 	 1 	 3 	 5 	 2 
no changes 




7 	 9 
Those who do not believe in any change in the future gave 
different reasons shown in Table No.17. The table shows that 
the new petty bourgeoisie concentrate on three points, which 
are the absence of any stable policy of education, the 
shortage of resources, and that the government has other 
problems to care about before education, for example, the 
economic problem. 
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Table 17: Parents' Assessment of Reasons for Lack of Future 
Change in the Education System 
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Lack of 	 2 
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3 1 
Lack of stable 3 
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2 1 








A father who is a university professor said, 
"I cannot expect any changes in the education system 
without a stability in the policies. Every new 
minister wants to change the policy which gives no 
time for any reform. We have to make long term and 
short term plans, without planning it will be 
impossible to change the system." 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie gave two reasons, which are 
the government has other problems to care about before 
education and that the people who are responsible for 
education have no new ideas. 
A father who is a merchant said, 
"People who are responsible about education have no 
new ideas to apply in education. They do not change 
curriculum or methods of teaching. That is why I do 
not expect change in the future." 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect a religious 
character in dealing with the future. That is, those who said 
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that they do not know about future changes justified this by 
the fact that the future is in God's hands. 
A father who is a tailor said, 
"I do not know about education in the future. This 
is in God's hands. If you want to ask about the 
future you should ask people who are specialized in 
education." 
This reply reflects the belief that people who are responsible 
for education are the ones who must know about the future but 
not people who are not specialized. 
Another father, who is a small shop owner, reflected a 
religious attitude, but in a different way: 
"I do not know about the future but I know that in 
the future they have to give more care to the 
Islamic studies." 
For the big bourgeoisie who believe that there will be no 
change in the future, they agree with the new petty 
bourgeoisie about two reasons for there being no change. These 
are, the government gives more attention to problems other 
than education and that there is no stable policy of 
education. The big bourgeoisie has raised two other points 
which they consider as hindering future change. These are the 
problem of teachers' qualifications, and that change in 
education must come as a part of the change of the whole 
society. 
A mother who is an engineer said, 
"I do not expect any educational change in the 
future because if we are not able to solve the 
problem of teacher training and raise their 
salaries, it would be very difficult to expect any 
improvements and changes." 
A father who is a businessman said, 
"I do not expect changes in the future, because 
education is a part of the whole system (political 
and economic) and if we want to have any future 
changes we have to change the whole society." 
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The working class concentrate on the worse economic conditions 
and the increasing population which will give no opportunity 
for future change. 
A father who is a cleaner said, 
"I do not expect any change in education in the 
future because everything is getting worse 
especially the economic situation. Why then expect 
that education will be better?" 
A father who is a welder in a foreign company reflects the 
same pessimistic view: 
"I do not expect any future change because of the 
increasing population and the high price the 
government has to pay to improve education for 
increasing numbers, which I think is very 
difficult." 
Those who expected future change gave different expectations, 
as shown in Table No.18. For the three bourgeois classes, the 
main expectations are: 
1. more scientific and modern curriculum. 
2. more qualified teachers. 
3. increasing of technical education. 
4. moving towards fee-paying education. 
The working class mainly expected the private lessons problem 
to be solved and that student numbers would be increased. The 
new petty bourgeoisie expected changes towards more scientific 
and technological studies. 
A father who is an accountant said, 
"I expected changes in teaching technology, because 
the future of any country depends upon technology." 
A father who is an accountant said, 
"I expect changes in teacher training and standard. 
Because the Ministry of Education has already 
started a programme for re-qualifying primary school 
teachers to get a university degree." 
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Table 18: Parents' Assessment of Aspects of Change in 
Education in the Future 
Important 
	
New petty 	 Traditional petty 
	
Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
Aspects bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
	
Father Mother 	 Father Mother 







Curriculum 	 16 	 13 	 1 	 2 	 1 	 2 
more modern / 
scientific 
Private lesson 	 2 	 1 
problem will 
be solved 
More foreign 	 1 
language 
teaching 
Increasing 	 1 
student numbers 
and expenditure 
More qualified 3 	 2 




All education 3 
fee-paying -
a positive move 
More discipline 1 
and new ministry 
leaders 
A substantial number of the parents expected education to be 
increasingly fee-paying. A father who is an engineer in a 
foreign company expected, and supported, the move towards fee-
paying education: 
"For the future there is an increasing trend towards 
the old education system which was fee-paying, which 
I do support. I expected changes towards more 
technical education which I find a very good 
indication. Today we are trying to reform education 
after what the Revolution did to it." 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, future changes lie in 
their expectations of expanding technical education and the 
382 
increasing of teaching of science and technology. 
A father who is a photographer said, 
"I expect changes in the future in technical 
education which is going to be increased in order 
to face the increasing demand on skilled labour." 
For the big bourgeoisie, they share future expectations with 
the two other bourgeois classes. Their expectations for the 
educational future in terms of teacher training, science and 
technology, stress the point of increasing technical 
education. 
A father who is the owner of a factory said, 
"I expect technical education to be expanded in the 
future since we have a very serious shortage in the 
skilled labour and education is going to work 
towards satisfying the market needs." 
It seems that the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie are influenced in their view about the future of 
education by their position in the market, where they may 
notice or suffer from the shortage of skilled workers, so they 
expect future changes in technical education. 
The working class has introduced a different pattern of 
expectation, that is, from the three bourgeois classes. The 
bourgeois classes gave expectations about general aspects like 
the policy of education and the content of the curriculum, 
while the working class mainly concentrate on their immediate 
problem with the system, which is private lessons; they expect 
something to be done about that in the future. 
A father who is a fitter in a public sector company said, 
"I expect them to do something in the future to 
solve the problem of private lessons. They may have 
to increase teachers' salaries for that." 
The image of education in the future is not the same for 
members from different class positions. They are divided 
between those who believe that there will be future change and 
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those who do not. 
Those who do not believe in future change from the three 
bourgeois classes agree that education problems and 
development are not the priority in government thinking, since 
that is concerned with other problems like the economic 
crisis. 
The new petty bourgeoisie concentrated on the level of policy 
of education which they consider to be unstable, and hence 
give no opportunity for change and development in education. 
They are also aware of the limited resources for education. 
The big bourgeoisie share with the new petty bourgeoisie their 
concentration on the policy level, but they care also about 
the future of teacher training and qualifications, which they 
consider as an obstacle to developing education in the future. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie believe that there will be 
no change because people who are responsible for education 
have no new ideas, and that those who know about the future 
of education are the specialists in education rather than 
ordinary people, which is a different attitude from both the 
new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, who feel that 
they can themselves judge the educational future. 
The working class are influenced in their view about the 
unlikelihood of change in the future by the worsening economic 
conditions and the increasing population. 
Those who believe in future change may share in general the 
same areas of change they expect: the curriculum, teacher 
training, technical education and fee paying education. 
However each class has stressed certain points. The new petty 
bourgeoisie emphasized the point of new science and technology 
and they supported the future movement towards fee-paying 
education. 
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The big bourgeoisie share with the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie have shared the belief that technical education 
will be expanded in the future in order to satisfy the market 
needs for skilled workers. 
The working class expressed different expectations for the 
future coming from their immediate suffering and problems with 
the system, since they believe that the future may solve the 
problem of private lessons and increase student numbers. In 
fact these points and the way the working class expressed 
their views can be taken as their wishes for the future, 
unlike the case of the three bourgeois classes who tried to 
formulate a picture of the future based on their understanding 
of policies of education and market needs. 
VI. Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed some general educational issues 
concerning people's perceptions of policies of education under 
different political systems, the value of education for 
society and the individual, power and control over education 
and the free / fee-paying education debate. From thes 
discussions some concluding remarks about these subjects can 
be drawn. 
(A) Class Ideologies about Education and Its Value for 
Individual and Society 
The discussion with members of different classes has shown 
that there is a strong positive attitude towards education in 
terms of its value for individual and society. This subjective 
value of education and the role of education in developing 
society present a point of general agreement on education. 
This consensus is in sharp contrast with the view that 
education has lost its perceived currency. This case has been 
argued by some of the social scientists who thought that 
education might lose its value because of the dominance of new 
beliefs in the seventies and due to the influence of the open 
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door policy which devalued the certificates and allowed 
uneducated people and craftmen to get more money than educated 
people. This situation has raised a major question mark about 
the value of education and about social demand for education.1  
In spite of this consensus about the general positive value 
of education, the precise conceptualization of the value of 
education took different forms and this was associated with 
the class origin of the respondents. The three bourgeois 
classes identified a crisis in the relationship between 
education and society. They identified the crisis in terms of 
the inability of society to make good use of the educated 
people who are important for developing society. For them the 
crisis can be seen in the high rate of educated unemployment. 
So, for the three bourgeois classes, education did not lose 
its value for individual and society but it is in a crisis 
created by society itself which has no plan to employ those 
people. So, there is an agreement between the three 
bourgeoisie classes about the nature of the crisis of 
education and society. 
On other points of difference in interests appeared between 
the three bourgeois classes. In identifying the importance of 
education for society, the new petty bourgeoisie stressed that 
education is important for using technology and in creating 
the elite who run society. This reflects the importance of 
education for the new petty bourgeoisie, which, as was 
explained in the discussion of the class formation of Egypt, 
was created by the introduction of modern education. This will 
help to explain why they are against a general expansion 
education for the lower classes, since it attacks their 
existence and puts them in competition with those who want to 
move to a new petty bourgeois position. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie agree about the importance 
of education in developing society, but they expressed their 
fear that education and new technology are challenging their 
old traditional crafts. The view of the traditional petty 
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bourgeoisie can be understood as reflecting their 
contradictory class position. That is, although they know that 
education is essential for developing society, it is 
threatining their position since they are not using advanced 
technology. So education and technology do not have the same 
importance for them as they do for the new petty bourgeoisie 
who were created by the development in means of production. 
At the same time they are not at the position of the big 
bourgeoisie who need well qualified and educated manpower, 
since the traditional petty bourgeoisie rarely employ others. 
For the big bourgeoisie education is very important- in 
creating trained labour power who are able to adapt to new 
jobs. So they see education in terms of their own interest in 
having educated labour. 
For the working class, education was seen as a means of 
creating different quality of personalities who are more open 
mindedand conscientious than uneducated people. So, they 
express what they feel they actually lack as important 
qualities as human beings. 
Education has positive value for all classes, but they have 
different concepts of that value, and hence for what they mean 
by education which they have discussed according to their 
class interests. 
(B) Class Based Critique of The Revolutions' Educational 
Policies 
The discussion of policies of education under the Revolution 
takes into account two periods, the sixties with its socialist 
policies and the seventies with its open door policy in 
economics. Members from different class positions were asked 
to evaluate the policies in the two periods. People's views 
and ideologies on this point are very important in identifying 
which policies will be supported or rejected by certain 
classes. 
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The analysis has shown that there is a division between and 
inside the social calsses on the evaluation of education 
policies. The two bourgeois classes, by a substantial 
majority, have critized the policy in the sixties as having 
a negative effect on the quality of education, while the 
working class has supported the policies in the sixties from 
their direct experience with day to day relations with the 
school, where in the sixties the burden of financing their 
children's education has laid completely on the state. In the 
seventies they had to bear a higher burden to finance their 
children's education. Expressing their views about education 
in the post revolutionary period, the working class were 
influenced by their experience in rural Egypt, where class 
difference were greater than in urban areas. So they explain 
from this point that before 1952 education was exclusive to 
the rich in the village. The traditional petty bourgeoisie 
have mainly seen the policies of the sixties as positive. 
However, unlike the working class, there is a minority of the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie criticizing the sixties' 
policies in the same manner as the new petty and big 
bourgeoisie. 
The crucial point in the critique of the bourgeois classes is 
that they concentrate on the political and ideological aspects 
which stood behind these policies. These three classes 
stressed the point of politicizing the education system and 
using the curriculum as a means of political doctrine. 
Education was seen by the three bourgeois classes as a state 
apparatus which the new revolutionary system used to 
legitimize its existence, and they believed that by doing that 
the Revolution distroyed the history of Egypt by presenting 
all pre-Revolutionary systems as corrupt. 
In the attack of the policies of the sixties it is clear that 
the new petty bourgeoisie felt more strongly about this than 
the big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The 
equal opportunity policy of the sixties which opened education 
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to all people was seen by the new petty bourgeoisie as a 
threat to the existing status quo of society, especially when 
education became opened to farmers and workers who might be 
encouraged by education to climb up the social ladder and to 
compete for bourgeois position. 
When the discussion reached the point of comparing the 
policies of the sixties with those of the seventies, the 
results show that the majority of the three bourgeois classes 
said that education was better in the sixties than seventies. 
In fact, their answers concentrate on one point which is 
teachers' training and qualifications, which they believe were 
better in the sixties. So, this point is dealing with a 
technical aspect of education concerning teachers' training 
while their main critique of the ideologies behind the 
policies remained. This is more crucial than criticizing 
technical aspects, because it reveals different class 
interests between and inside one social class, and it 
underlines the previous critical discussion that membership 
of the same class does not mean that members of the same class 
will have the same interests and ideologies. In this case the 
attack on the ideological aspects which stands behind the 
policies, have a great deal of influence on class support or 
opposition to certain policies and it is crucial in 
determining aspects like how education opportunities are 
divided in society. 
The evaluation of the education system has illustrated another 
theoretical point which was raised earlier in the chapter. 
Class cultural capital appeared to be essential for 
individuals to develop critical views about the education 
system. This was clear in the ability of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie to perceive educational 
policies in a wide ideological, political and economic 
perspectives, while the working class in particular were more 
confined to their immediate relations with the system and 
their ability to afford their children's education. 
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(C) Control and Power over Education 
The study of control and power over education has addressed 
two points. These are respondents' views about those who 
should bear the responsibility for solving and dealing with 
education problems. Respondents were asked to identify also 
those who, in reality, have power and authority over education 
policies and system. 
Those who should take responsibility for dealing with 
education problems were identified differently by members from 
different class positions. The main trend which can be 
identified for the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie 
is their belief that education problems should be solved by 
cooperation between the people and the government. This trend 
can be understood in terms of the way of life of the working 
class and traditional petty bourgeoisie in (Hara) Community, 
where they have strong traditions of helping and of being a 
caring society. The big and new petty bourgeoisie put the 
responsibility mainly on the government, which, in some cases, 
they consider to be the only competent authority for dealing 
with such issues. This view has its significance in the 
political life in Egypt, where people usually undermine the 
role of social and civil institutions, and put more stress 
upon the role of the state and government. They have little 
confidence in other organizations like political parties. This 
feature of political life in Egypt was fully explained in 
Chapter Two. The minor role of liberal organizations compared 
to the state, was reinforced when people were asked about 
those who have control over education in reality. The majority 
from different class positions tended to agree that it is the 
government officials and Minister of Education who have real 
control over education. Only a minority identified other 
groups, like businessmen and craftsmen, as having influence 
over education through their economic power. These views 
indicate that social groups which have the economic power and 
capital were not typically seen as having control over 
education. 
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(D) Free and fee-paying education: the arena of class 
conflict over education 
The discussion of free and fee-paying education has provoked 
a clash of class interests and a clear class conflict inside 
the fractions of one class and between classes concerning 
spending on education and whether the government should spend 
more and which levels of education should get more. 
The new petty bourgeoisie, who are supposed to be most 
benefited by the fr'ee education policy under the Revolution, 
are mainly against free education. They introduce different 
models and ways to restrict education, either by dividing the 
system into two parallel systems of fee paying and free 
education, or dividing people into two groups, the rich who 
can pay and the poor who cannot. However, inside the new petty 
bourgeoisie, free education got support from the lower 
fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie, who benefited from 
free education especially at the university level. The big 
bourgeoisie supported the same policy as the new petty 
bourgeoisie i.e. dividing the system of education. 
The working class mainly support free education. The 
traditional petty bourgeoisie, from their contradictory 
position, mainly support free education at all levels. 
However, those elements who could send their children to 
private education support the duality of the system between 
free and fee paying education. So, the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie are on one hand like the working class and need 
free education, and on the other hand, with their better 
economic situation than the working class are able to afford 
kinds of education for their children available to the new 
petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie. 
Conflicting class interests appeared through the discussions 
and some important theoretical points can be drawn as well. 
That is, the majority from different class position have 
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supported more spending, especially on the primary level. The 
working class are conscious of their interest in free 
education, but do not support more spending on education, and 
they give their support to government cuts in spending which 
harm their interests. However, they seem to have been 
influenced by government propaganda about the economic crisis 
and believe that the government cannot spend more on 
education. The contradiction in the working class ideology 
about free education on one side and spending on education on 
the other can be understood in terms of how ideology and 
hegemony work in society. The working class, because of their 
low and false class consciousness, are more influenced by the 
dominant ideology and the hegemonic ideas disseminated by the 
ruling class about the economic crisis in Egypt. The working 
class acquiesce to the idea that the government is doing the 
best for the society. 
In terms of which levels should get more finance, the analysis 
so far demonstrates the result that the new petty bourgeoisie 
support for more spending upon basic education is working to 
support a conservative view which seeks to make basic 
education terminal for the majority of working class children. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie has supported a wide range 
of spending at the university level and in technical secondary 
education, in order to satisfy their rising hopes for their 
children. The working class has supported wide range of 
spending especially at university level, mainly in their view 
to support the poor who have children at that level. 
The big bourgeoisie supported spending at university and 
technical education to prepare the labour power needed for the 
market and they have seen education as an investment in human 
capital, while the new petty bourgeoisie has seen it as 
wasteful. 
If aspects of spending reflect different class interests, 
sources of spending reflect class alliances, where the big 
bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie are both 
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against tax as a source of financing education. The big 
bourgeoisie in particular has insisted on increasing 
production as the main source to increase the education 
budget, i.e. they moved the burden from themselves to the 
workers who have to increase production and then to increase 
the amount of surplus value extracted from workers. 
The new petty bourgeoisie and the working class both support 
tax on rich people as source of spending. This is understanble 
in a system of taxation in Egypt where the tax burden is very 
high on the wage earners while those who own the means of 
production have their own ways of avoiding paying tax. 
(E) Future Educational Change 
In their image and perspectives of future educational change, 
members from different class positions were divided between 
a majority who believe that future education change will occur 
and a minority who believe that there will be no future 
change. 
The no change view was explained by the new petty bourgeoisie 
and the big bourgeoisie by the absence of a stable policy of 
education, the shortage of resources to develop education, and 
by the fact that education is not the priority in the 
govenment agenda comperad with the economic problem. Other 
factors of no change in education introduced by the big 
bourgeoisie were the absence of better teachers' 
qualifications and training which were considered important 
in any programme for developing education. 
The view which believe that there will be future change 
identified four areas of expected change. These are: 
curriculum, teacher training, technical education and fee-
paying education. Inside these areas, members from different 
class positions emphasized different areas. The new petty 
bourgeoisie anticipated changes towards teaching more science 
and technology. The big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty 
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bourgeoisie anticipated change towards more technical 
education to satisfy the market need for labour power. 
The working class has expressed a different type of 
expectation which concentrated on their problems with the 
system, that is, their expectations of solving the private 
lessons problems and increasing student numbers. 
(F) Illustration of Egypt's Class Formation 
In general terms, respondents' perceptions of some key 
educational issues discussed in this chapter help to 
illustrate some points concerning the class formation of Egypt 
and class consciousness. That is, respondents from different 
class positions presented diverse and not very coherent models 
of society, while they thend to introduce more coherent 
education models for free and fee-paying education, based on 
clear and different class interests in education. At this 
point of the analysis it seems that respondent confusion about 
the general picture of society does not necessary apply when 
they discuss specific issue like education. 
With reference to the new petty bourgeoisie in particular, 
some concluding remarks can be added. The class cultural 
capital of this class works as cultural power which defends 
their education interests, through their ability to argue 
their case with a wide knowledge about economic, social and 
political issues. 
The confusion of the new petty bourgeoisie over the position 
of the middle class in society, in terms of who constitute 
this class, seems not to appear in their discussion of who 
should be educated, and for how long. They appear to have more 
clear class identity, which will be more illustrated and 
examined in the next chapter when class access to education 
and the direct relationship with the education system will be 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CLASS PROVISION AND APPROPRIATION OF EDUCATION 
Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to study class differences in the 
actual distribution and access to education, not only at its 
quantitative levels, but more importantly at its qualitative 
level of the underlying cultural and ideological aspects and 
their reflection upon the class formation of Egypt. In order 
to do that, this chapter is going to address the following 
educational issues: 
I. Class membership and perceived social advance 
opportunities and ambition for children's education. This will 
comprise the following points: 
(A) How parents perceive their children's opportunities for 
social advance. 
(B) Parents' ambition for the kind and level of education 
they want their children to have, and the social value 
they give to different kinds and levels of education;  and 
how educational opportunities are distributed between 
classes. 
II. Educational practices. These comprise the following 
points: 
(A) Parents' evaluations of schools. 
(B) Parents' evaluations of the school knowledge. 
(C) Extra tuition. 
(D) Other forms of non-formal types of education provided for 
the children. 
III. Parents' image of their children's future. 
These educational issues will be analyzed against the 
background of the theoretical framework which reflects upon 
certain aspects of the class formation. These are: 
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i) Class cultural integration. In the analysis of the class 
nature of the education system in Egypt, it was shown 
that the elements which constitute the class nature of 
the system include drop-out, the duality between free and 
fee-paying, Arabic and foreign education, between 
technical and academic education, and the social value 
of university education. In this chapter, which is based 
on empirical material, the impact of these dualities will 
be studied, and the cultural integrity of social classes 
examined, along with the cultural tensions and conflicts 
this may provoke. 
ii) Class cultural capital. There will be an illustration of 
the influence of class cultural capital in assessing 
class relations with the school, and in being able to 
evaluate school knowledge. 
iii) The education system and class reproduction. There will 
be an illustration of the role of the education system 
in producing and reproducing class positions and class 
cultural capital through the study of how education 
opportunities are distributed and the social value that 
parents attribute to different kinds of education. 
I. Class Membership and Perceived Social Advance Opportunities 
and Ambitions for Children's Education  
(A) Opportunities for Social Advance 
Before turning to the study of the actual provision of 
education, social and cultural opportunities for the 
respondents' children, an examination will be made of how 
parents perceive their children's opportunities for social 
advance, and the factors they believe are responsible and 
important for social advance. 
Table 1 shows parents responses about whether their children 
have opportunities or not. The Table shows that quite a high 
percentage of all classes believe that their children have 
opportunities for social advance. Those who believe that their 
397 
Table 1: Parents' Assessment of the Opportunities for Social 
Advance 
Opportunities 	 New petty 	 Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 
	 Working class 
for social 	 bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
advance 
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 
	 Father Mother 
Yea, they have 	 15 	 19 	 6 	 8 	 7 	 a 	 5 	 6 
opportunities 
No, they don't 	 5 	 3 
have opportunities 






This is in 	 1 	 2 
God's hands 
children have no opportunity are nearly half of the working 
class fathers and a quarter of the working class mothers. One 
can notice that the bourgeois classes have expressed their 
doubt as to whether their children have opportunities, which 
they explain in terms of the economic, social and political 
problems in society. This doubt was expressed by half of the 
fathers and a little more than a quarter of the mothers of the 
new petty bourgeoisie, by fewer of the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie, and by still fewer of the big bourgeoisie. 
These answers show how the working class are clear about this 
matter i.e. as individuals they believe either that their 
children clearly have, or that they clearly do not have 
opportunities. Social doubt exists on this point in the 
bourgeois classes. 
The parents were asked to compare their children's 
opportunities with other children in their residential area 
and at school and to compare their children with others on a 
larger scale i.e. the society-wide scale. 
When parents compared their children with other children in 
their residential area, as shown in Table 2, the three 
bourgeois classes' answers indicate that the majority believe 
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that their children have as much chance, or more chance, than 
the children of others. 
Table 2: Parents' 	 Assessment 	 of 	 their 	 Children's 
Opportunities for Social Advance Compared with Other 
Children in the Same Residential Area 
Opportunities New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
for social 	 bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
advance 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
Same as other 9 
	
13 	 4 	 2 
	
2 	 5 	 1 	 1 
children 
Less than other 10 	 5 	 2 	 4 	 9 	 9 
children 
More than other 12 	 13 	 3 	 2 
	
6 	 4 
Don't know 
The other point is that the working class are much more likely 
to believe that their children have less chances than other 
children, and they are the only class of this opinion. 
The choice that their children have more opportunities than 
others is clear in the case of the big bourgeoisie, with more 
than half of the father and mothers selecting this option. 
Fewer of the new petty bourgeoisie, and still less of the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie were of this opinion, while this 
choice was not selected at all by the working class. 
The trend in the distribution between the three possibilities 
of chances seems different when the parents are asked to 
compare their children on a wider scale, i.e. by other 
opportunities in the society. 
Table 3 presents these possibilities, and shows that the 
category of less chances is the predominant response for all 
classes, especially for the working class, of whom nine out 
of eleven thought this was the case. It can also be seen that 
only a small minority believed that their children had more 
than others, and that even for the big bourgeoisie only about 
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a quarter believed this was the case. Even for the new petty 
bourgeoisie, only a small minority believed their children had 
more chances than others. 
Table 3: Parents' 	 Assessment 	 of 	 their 	 Children's 
Opportunities for Social Advance Compared with Other 
Children in Society 




Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 
Same as other 
children 
4 	 6 2 	 2 	 2 
Less than other 
children 
25 	 24 7 	 S 	 3 	 5 10 10 
More than other 
children 
2 	 1 3 	 2 
Don't know 1 	 1 1 1 
Parents were asked to identify the factors which they believed 
were very important in achieving social advancement, and in 
giving children better or worse opportunities than others. 
Table 4 summarises their responses to these questions. From 
the table it can be seen that the main factor selected by 
parents was an economic one. In all classes more than half the 
mothers and fathers selected this response, and in the working 
class this figure rose to 100 per cent - the entire sample 
believing that the economic factor is primary in determining 
chances. 
The next factor to be considered is social status and power. 
This factor was selected by slightly more than half the big 
bourgeoisie, and by about a third of the new and traditional 
petty bourgeoisie. In contrast, very few of the working class 
attached importance to this factor, and the working class 
would appear to identify chances very firmly in economic 
terms. 
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Other factors, such as better housing, opportunities to travel 
abroad, small families, good luck and God's will, were all 
seen as less important that the economic and social status 
factors, but were cited by small numbers of parents, and give 
an indication of opportunities which are not seen purely in 
terms of income and luxury. For example, a small percentage 
of the mothers of all the bourgeois classes thought that 
travelling abroad was important, as it gave a child a good 
opportunity to see different societies and to have a wider 
knowledge of different parts of the world. 
Table 4: Parents' Assessment of which Children have most 







Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
Working class 
Father Mother 
The rich 26 20 7 8 5 4 7 9 
The well 
educated 
3 6 2 2 1 1 
Those with high 
social status 
and power 
11 7 3 3 5 5 1 
Those who 
travel abroad 
1 1 1 1 
The better 
housed 




Those with 	 2 





While the previous results give one view of the importance of 
various factors in making opportunities available in society 
in general give one picture, a rather different picture 
emerged when parents were asked to rank factors which are 
important for social advance. Table 5 shows the patterns of 
these priorities. In this case, social background, education 
and personality all come higher than economic factors. In 
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order to elucidate this seeming contradiction further, the 
members of the sample were asked what they meant by each 
factor. 
Table 5: Parents' Assessment of Factors which are Important 
for Social Advance 
Factors 






Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
Working class 
Father Mother 
1 18 10 2 1 2 5 1 
2 6 10 2 1 1 1 2 1 
3 3 9 2 6 3 6 
4 2 2 3 1 4 3 5 2 
5 1 1 2 
Education 
1 5 6 4 1 3 3 2 3 
2 15 16 4 6 5 5 6 3 
3 5 6 1 1 1 1 3 1 
4 6 2 1 4 
5 
Character 
1 a 9 2 4 2 1 2 2 
2 8 8 1 1 3 3 2 4 
3 12 12 3 1 4 3 3 5 
4 5 2 3 2 2 2 
5 2 
Income 
1 1 1 1 1 5 6 
2 4 3 2 1 3 3 
3 10 4 3 1 3 5 2 2 







5 2 1 1 2 
God's help 












Typically, the new petty bourgeoisie took social background 
to mean strong family relations, religious upbringing, and an 
introduction to Islamic principles. Education meant higher 
education in particular, which can lead to social advance, 
especially where it involved specializations as medicine. 
Personal character meant ambition, flexibility, stability and 
being a religious person who knows his or her duties and has 
organized and logical thinking. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie mean 
very similar things, although they have a tendency to think 
that a wider range of education may be able to promote social 
advance. Importantly, the working class takes a very similar 
view, although not restricting the importance of education to 
higher education, and taking a rather narrower view of 
personality, namely that it means only to be religious. 
The patterns of answers of the members of all classes 
indicates that religious sentiments are seen as important, 
both in their influence upon family background and their 
influence on the formation of character and personality. 
Consequently, when the bourgeois classes had to compare 
economic factors which they thought important with other 
cultural factors are important for social advancement, they 
tended to stress what might be called cultural capital, in 
terms of laying emphasis upon the family being religious and 
educated rather than that it being rich. 
A new petty bourgeois father who is a ship's captain expressed 
his belief in the importance of these cultural aspects in 
these terms: 
"Some children have more money than my children, but 
their parents do not know how to spend the money 
because they are uneducated. Consequently they are 
ignorant and they cannot open more opportunities for 
their children with money alone. Money without 
education gives no opportunity". 
While social and cultural factors were given higher priority 
than economic factors by all classes, working class mothers 
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and fathers were more likely to put economic factors at the 
top of their list than any other class. This reflects the 
importance attached to economic factors by the working class, 
which has already been noted in the responses dealing with 
factors affecting the distribution of opportunities. 
A working class mother, who is the wife of a bus conductor 
earning 80 pounds per month, and who has seven children, 
explained the importance of income: 
"I do not identify any standard of society which is 
lower than ours. I do not think that there are other 
children who have a harder life than my children. 
Income and money are very important, more than any 
other factor. Everything depends on whether you have 
money or not". 
From the discussions of respondents' perceptions of their 
children's opportunities it can be noticed that the three 
bourgeois classes perceive their children's opportunities 
differently depending on whether they are asked to evaluate 
them in their own residential area alone, or in society at 
large. They tended to believe their children as having the 
same opportunities as their neighbours, but as being 
disadvantaged in society generally. Looking at those who they 
perceived as having better opportunities in society in 
general, the main basis for that advantage was seen as 
economic. However, when the three bourgeois classes selected 
important factors responsible for social advance, they mainly 
identified cultural factors like social background, religious 
beliefs and education, ahead of the economic factor. The 
working class presented a different pattern, tending to 
identify their children's opportunities as less than others 
on both comparisons. At the same time, the working class 
tended to stress more than other classes the role of the 
economic factor in social advance. 
The stress of the three bourgeois classes on cultural factors, 
and the working class stress on the economic one, will lead 
to the following detailed discussion of how members from 
different class positions try to appropriate more social and 
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cultural advantages to their children. Our focus will be on 
their efforts in the education field, in terms of the parents' 
ambitions for their children's education, the social value 
they give different kinds and levels of education, and the 
actual education provision they can afford for their children. 
(B) Class Membership and Ambition for Children's Education 
The study of respondents' ambition for their children's 
education will include: 
i) The kind of education demanded for their children, 
ii) The actual provision in terms of level and kind of 
education, and 
iii) The social value of different levels and kinds of 
education. 
i) 	 Demanded Kind of Education for Children 
Parents from different class positions were asked to identify 
the kind of education they wished their children to have and 
their ability in reality to send their children to the kind 
of education they wanted. Table No.6 summarizes the kind of 
education preferred by parents. The table shows that the main 
choice for the new petty bourgeoisie parents lies in different 
kinds of fee paying education including all its different 
types like foreign language schools. Foreign language schools 
accounted for roughly half of the preferences of the fathers 
and the mothers, and were followed by government language 
schools which accounted for a further quarter. 
The extent of achieving these wishes is shown in Table No.7, 
which indicates that the new petty bourgeoisie families could 
largely achieve their wishes in having their children in fee 
paying education. Three quarters of the families in this class 
could afford fee-paying education for all their children, and 
more than half the rest could afford it for some of their 
children. 
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Table 6: Kinds of Schools Parents Prefer for their Children 
Different 	 New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
kinds of 	 bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
schools 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
Government 	 1 	 1 	 5 	 4 	 7 	 7 
free school 
only 
Foreian 	 15 	 IS 	 2 	 2 	 7 	 6 	 2 	 1 
language school 
only 
Government 	 8 	 7 	 1 	 1 	 1 
language school 
only 
Mixed wishes 	 3 	 3 	 1 
	
1 	 2 




Al Azhar only 1 
Those who could not achieve their wishes of sending their 
children to fee paying school gave as the main reason the 
inability to pay the fees which were too expensive for them. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie only one in five wished 
their children to attend foreign language school, and only 
half as many wished them to attend government language school. 
The remainder;  roughly half the parents in this class, wished 
their children to attend government free schools. One in three 
of the families were able to secure fee paying education for 
their children, which means that there was no great gap 
between what they wanted and what they achieved. This may be 
because they are realistic about what they can afford for 
their children, and set their expectations accordingly. 
The big bourgeoisie mainly wished to send their children to 
foreign language schools. Well over two thirds of the parents 
wished their children to be in foreign language schools, and 
in almost every case where the parents wished for fee-paying 
education, the children were in fee-paying education. 
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For the working class only a minority have the ambition of 
foreign education for their children while the majority wanted 
government education which is the only option they could 
achieve. 
Table 7: Distribution of Children in Different Kinds of 
Schools 
Kind of school New petty 	 Traditional petty 
	
Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Government free 	 3 	 6 	 11 
schools only 
Mixed free and fee- 	 5 	 2 
paying schools 
Fee-paying schools 	 23 	 3 	 7 
only 
The choice and the wishes show that both the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie have high ambitions for 
their children, which were completely achieved by the big 
bourgeoisie and substantially achieved by the new petty 
bourgeoisie, where a minority of them failed for economic 
reasons to send their children to the kind of school they 
wished. The traditional petty bourgeoisie are in a middle 
position where they are not completely deprived of achieving 
their wishes, as is the case with the working class, and they 
are not as highly fortunate as the big bourgeoisie. It can be 
noticed that their ambitions are less than those of the new 
petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie. 
ii) The Actual Provison of Kind and Level of Education 
This point will present detailed information about the actual 
distribution of the respondents' children at different levels 
and kinds of education. This will throw light upon the equal 
or unequal division of educational opportunities. Table 8 
shows this distribution. The information in the table is based 
on the number of children that members of the sample have. In 
this case there are 83 children of members of the new petty 
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Table 8: The Distribution of Children of the Sample in 
Different Kinds and Levels of Education 
Class 	 New petty 
	






free 	 General Scndy 
school Tech. Scndy 
Govern- Primary 
ment Preparatory 




schools Geneal Scndy 
Private Primary 
lang. Preparatory 




Working after primary 
education 







3 4 1 
1 2 2 
3 5 
26 3 6 
3 















6 Below school age 
Government free 	 1 
nursery 
Government language 	 1 
	 1 
nursery 
School for the 	 1 
metally retarded 
bourgeoisie, 40 children of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, 
25 children of the big bourgeoisie and 48 children of the 
working class. As shown in the table, the main characteristics 
of the division can be summarized for each class as follows: 
for the new petty bourgeoisie, they have 20.2 per cent of 
their children in government free schools, apart from 
university level, while they have 36.1 per cent of their 
children in government language schools, and 27.7 per cent in 
foreign language schools, and 6 per cent in private language 
schools; for the traditional petty bourgeoisie they have 55 
per cent of their children in government free schools, 10 per 
cent in government language schools, 5 per cent in foreign 
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language schools and 5 per cent in private language schools; 
for the big bourgeoisie they have 12 per cent of their 
children in government free schools, 24 per cent in government 
language schools and 64 per cent of their children in foreign 
language schools; for the working class they have 52 per cent 
of their children in government free schools, and no children 
in any kind of fee paying education, the rest of their 
children drop out or, in the case of girls, get married 
without completing their education. 
If one looks at university education, as indicated in Table 
9, the majority of parents from different class positions want 
this for their children. In spite of this high level of 
ambition, the information collected from respondents shows a 
significant class differences in the presentation of children 
at this level. For the new petty bourgeoisie, of their 9 
children of university age, 66.7 per cent are at university. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, 50 per cent of the 16 
children of university age are at university. The big 
bourgeoisie have no children of university age, while the 
working class have 15 children at university age and none of 
them at the university. According to the limited number of the 
sample, one cannot generalize about the distribution of 
university education in the whole society. However, this 
limited sample gives an opportunity to see the big differences 
even in a small scale. It shows that the new petty bourgeoisie 
are benefiting to a large extent from university education, 
and the traditional petty bourgeoisie are able to obtain a 
high proportion of university education for their children. 
From the discussion of the kind and level of education wanted 
for their children, two main trends can be identified. These 
are: 
- 	 The emphasis on foreign education and other types of fee- 
paying education by the new petty bourgeoisie and big 
bourgeoisie, and to a limited extent by the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie. 
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Table 9: Level of Education Parents want their Children to 
Reach 
Level of 	 Neu petty 	 Traditional petty 
education bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
aspired to 







Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
1 
University 	 29 	 27 	 9 	 9 	 7 	 7 	 10 	 10 
Post studies 2 	 3 1 	 2 
 
No ambition 
as to level 
Post studies 
for boy but 
not for girl 
 
1 
To gain secondary 




The demand by the majority of the respondents for 
university education for their children, including the 
working class parents. 
These trends lead to the following discussion with parents 
about the social value they give to different kinds and levies 
of education. 
iii) The Social Value of Different Kinds and Levels of 
Education Chosen by Parents 
The discussion of the social value of different levels and 
kinds of education will address those kinds and levels 
prefered by the respondents, as well as those kinds, like 
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University Education and its Social Value 
For university education, it was noted earlier that the 
majority wanted this level of education for their children. 
Table No.10 summarizes different values people give to 
university education. The table shows that university 
education is believed to give high status in society. This was 
expressed by more than fifty percent of the three bourgeois 
classes while only one in five of the working class expressed 
this view. 
Table 10: Parents' Reasons for Choosing Certain Levels of 
Education for their Children 




To be at the 1 	 1 	 2 	 1 
same level 
as me 
To compensate for 	 2 	 2 	 3 	 4 
my lack of 
education 
They should choose 
for themselves 
The respect and high evaluation of university education is 
reinforced by the three bourgeois classes' view that a 
university degree is very important in itself. That is, it is 
very important socially to show that the individual holds a 
university degree. This was believed by a substantial number 
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of all the bourgeois classes. 
University education was seen as significantly enhancing 
opportunities to obtain a good job. This is mainly the view 
of the working class, with roughly half of them taking this 
view, and of the new petty bourgeoisie with roughly a quarter 
of them agreeing. Fewer of the traditional petty bourgeoisie 
or the big bourgeoisie took this view. 
Other values given to university education which distinguish 
between classes is the view of the new petty bourgeoisie of 
the importance of university education in giving better 
chances for promotion. University education was also seen as 
a means of compensation for educational deprivation of the 
parents; this was mainly expressed by the working class and 
the big bourgeoisie. 
So, university level is extensively loaded with values and 
ambitions for different class positions. In general it has a 
social value of giving high position in society, or allowing 
for a good job especially for the social classes who are wage 
earners like the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class. 
University education is a means of compensating for lost 
opportunities in education especially among those deprived of 
earlier opportunity, such as the working class and some 
elements of the big bourgeoisie, who have the economic capital 
but not the cultural capital. 
Technical Education and its Social Value 
Parents were asked to identify the most important kinds of 
education for society. On this question, as shown in Table 
No.11, technical education received a high percentage of 
importance from different class positions. However, when 
people were asked if they would agree to send their children 
to technical education, their answers are summarized in Table 
No.12 which shows that although people identified technical 
education as important for developing society, they rejected 
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Table 11: Parents' Assessment of the Kinds of Education 
Important for Society 
Kind of 	 New petty 









Technical 	 21 
education 
19 6 4 3 4 5 6 
Technical and 
religious 
1 1 1 1 
Academic 	 1 2 1 1 
Religious 	 2 5 1 1 2 2 2 
All of them 	 6 4 2 2 1 2 1 
Don't know 1 1 
I cannot 	 1 
decide because 









this kind of education for their own children. Only a minority 
of the new petty bourgeoisie said they would agree to their 
children having technical education, and the case was much the 
same with the big bourgeoisie. The majority of the working 
class wanted to send their children to technical education. 
Two thirds of the traditional petty bourgeoisie wanted to send 
their children to technical education. This shows that they 
did not totally accept it as the working class did, but at the 
same time they did not reject it as the new petty bourgeoisie 
and the big bourgeoisie. 
Technical education was seen as having no future by some 
elements of the three bourgeois classes especially the new 
petty bourgeoisie, who value technical education as a kind of 
education for unsuccessful people as a second chance. The 
whole working class and a significant proportion of the 
traditional petty bourgeoisiehave no prejudice against this 
kind of education. 
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Table 12: Parents' Responses to the Idea of Sending their 
Children to Technical Secondary Education 
Response 
Yes 
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education is 
not for girls 
The Social Value of Different Kinds of Free / Fee-Paying 
Education and Religious Education 
As mentioned earlier, different types of fee-paying education 
were prefered by parents, in particular by the new petty and 
big bourgeoisie. In order to study the reasons behind their 
choice and the value they give to fee-paying education, 
parents were asked to compare different kinds of schools, such 
as government free schools, government language schools, 
foreign language schools and private schools in terms of their 
role in developing children's abilities, which include 
developing intelligence in general school achievement, and 
talents like music and drawing. Table No.13 shows how people 
compared different types of schools. 
The table shows that the majority from different class 
positions believe that foreign language schools are better 
than any other school in developing children's abilities in 
the three matters identified. This is seen even by the working 
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Table 13: Parents' Comparison of Schools in Developing 
Children's Abilities 
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class who have no relations with any kind of fee paying 
schools. 
It can be noticed that, the new petty bourgeoisie who 
complained that the foreign language school does not give 
enough care to children's activities and prefer to give more 
time to academic subjects, were inclined to give some credit 
for promoting children's activities to government language 
schools and government free schools. However, the majority 
still believed that foreign language school is better in this 
matter. So, there is a consensus from different class 
positions that foreign language schools are the best compared 
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with government language schools, private schools and 
government free schools. They believe they develop children's 
intelligence, talents and school achievement more than any 
other school. 
An example of the belief that foreign language schools are the 
best comes from a mother who is an employee in the Ministry 
of Culture, and has her only son in a government language 
school. She gave her impression of the foreign language 
school: 
"I wanted to send my son to a foreign language 
school, but he was under the age of acceptance. The 
government language school does not give the full 
meaning of education which is the full development 
of the individual's abilities. I think foreign 
schools achieve both aims i.e. giving knowledge and 
developing individual's abilities and talents. In 
the government language school they give children 
a lot of homework. my son hates the school although 
he is excellent. The school cancels the sports 
classes in order to teach English and mathematics." 
Those who have their children in any kind of fee paying 
schools were asked about their reasons for sending their 
children to these schools. Table No.14 shows the reasons given 
by the three bourgeois classes, while the working class is 
excluded since they have no children in fee-paying schools. 
For the new petty bourgeoisie the reason that learning foreign 
language is very important is in order to be well educated and 
cultured. So they considered that a well educated and cultured 
person as equivalent to learning a foreign language. The 
second reason they selected was that the social standard of 
students in these schools was higher. Finding a good job in 
the foreign sector, and the belief that the school was better 
organized than government schools came equal third as reasons. 
For the big bourgeoisie the three main reasons are the same 
as for the new petty bourgeoisie, although there are minor 
differences between points of emphasis among fathers and 
mothers of the big bourgeoisie, where the table shows the two 
main points of emphasis of mothers are the importance of 
416 
Table 14: Parents' Reasons for Sending their Children to 
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I went to a 
foreign school 
foreign language in being well educated and cultured, and the 
high social standard of students in these schools. In 
contrast, the fathers stress the importance of the good 
organization of the school, and the higher social standard of 
the schools. 
The three traditional petty bourgeois families who have their 
children in fee paying schools gave different pattern of 
answers from the other two bourgeois classes, thinking that 
a good job in the foreign sector was most important, followed 
by the cheapness of government language schools compared with 
foreign language schools. 
From the answers given by the three bourgeois classes it can 
be noticed that the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie considered that mastering a foreign language is 
the mark of being well educated and cultured, and they have 
also shown a class prejudice against other social classes, 
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since they prefer fee paying schools because they accept 
children from high social background. The traditional petty 
bourgeoisie mainly concentrated on the aspect of finding a 
good job in the foreign sector and the less expense of the 
government fee paying schools. 
The choice between different types of schools is not as simple 
as the table indicates, since the decision especially for the 
new petty bourgeoisie is invoking a cultural tension, 
especially when the discussion involves religious education. 
The division inside the new petty bourgeoisie is clear between 
those who support government fee paying schools and those who 
prefer foreign language schools. 
The government language schools were preferred by some because 
they pay attention to Arabic and religious studies. A father 
who is a university professor said, 
"I prefer a government language school for my son 
because it is not very expensive and it is under 
government supervision. The most important thing 
about these schools is that they do no neglect 
Arabic and religion. At the same time they give the 
advantage to learn English. That is why I prefer it 
more than foreign schools." 
Others are very clear in their support of foreign schools. A 
father who is an engineer and a director of a factory, and who 
has a boy in a government language school and two girls in 
foreign language schools commented from his experience of the 
two kinds of schools: 
"I prefer foreign language schools to government 
language. In the foreign schools the social standard 
of the children is high, and the English language 
teaching is good. Language is very important because 
it gives the children a wide chance to find a good 
job in the foreign sector. In the foreign school 
they keep children busy all the time by homework, 
which I like and prefer for children." 
While this father preferred foreign language school for his 
children, others condemned this type of school for making 
children very westernized and these missionary schools are 
biased towards Christianity. 
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A mother who is a primary school teacher, and whose two sons 
attend a government language school, said, 
"I did not like to send my children to a foreign 
language school because these schools make children 
westernized, that is why I preferred the government 
language school. But if you ask me to compare 
between the education standard of the two schools 
in terms of teaching standard, of course foreign 
language schools have a very high standard of 
teaching and they develop children's abilities more 
than government language schools." 
A deep and strong religious and cultural tension which is 
created by the existence of foreign schools is expressed by 
a father who is an engineer in the public sector and has his 
children in government language school: 
"I did not like to send them to a foreign language 
school because in these school missionaries have a 
very strong religious influence and they are biased 
against Moslem children which affects their 
behaviour and achievement at school. So, the 
advantage of the government language school is that 
it teaches language and at the same time it is under 
government supervision. That is why in the 
government language school there is no monetary or 
religious exploitation." 
The tension inside the new petty bourgeoisie becomes even 
clearer when the issue of religious education is discussed. 
Religious education was seen in different ways. Some take 
religious education as a step to carry on to university 
education, since Al Azhar schools lead to the Al Azhar 
university, where students can study subjects like medicine 
and engineering. Others are more divided where a conflict 
between the strong religious feeling on one side and the 
practical needs of life appears. 
A father who is university professor, and views religious 
education as a step for university education, said, 
"The only advantage of Al Azhar education, is giving 
a wide access to the university, because students 
from these schools can apply to Al Azhar university 
to study medicine, engineering or any other 
specialization, without needing to compete with 
other students from general secondary schools." 
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It must be understood that Al Azhar in this case is not taken 
as a religious institute but as a means to achieve a secular 
purpose which is going to one of the modern science faculties 
like medicine or engineering. For others, there is a clear 
tension between their religious feeling and the decisions they 
have to make for their children's education. 
A father who is an accountant in the government explained that 
he was thinking of sending his children to Al Azhar, and why, 
in the end, he did not: 
"I" thought of sending my children to Al Azhar when 
Al Azhar announced that they were going to accept 
children at a very young age for primary school. So, 
I wanted to send them at that early age because this 
education concentrates on religious studies which 
is very important in forming the individual's 
personality and this education is open to the 
university. But when it came with taking the 
decision, I could not send them to Al Azhar because 
I want them to learn a foreign language, which is 
very important in finding a job. That is why I sent 
them to a government language school." 
However, this tension does not appear for all people. There 
is a croup who are clear in their position on religious 
education: for them it is old fashioned, has very bad image 
in society and is not a condition of becoming a religious 
person that one must have religious education. A father who 
is an engineer and a company director, and has his children 
in a foreign language school, said, 
"Al Azhar gives good religious education but I never 
thought of sending my children to this school 
because it is old fashioned and does not suite the 
modern time. It could be suitable for me but not for 
my children." 
In another view, it is not necessary to go to Al Azhar in 
order to be religious person. A father who is an engineer in 
a foreign company, graduated himself from a foreign language 
school, and has his children in a foreign language school, 
said, 
"I never thought of Al Azhar. All that I wanted from 
the foreign school is to give more care to religious 
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studies. It is not necessary to learn Quran in Al 
Azhar in order to be religious. I can be a religious 
person without going to Al Azhar." 
So, the new petty bourgeoisie are divided in their views about 
different kinds of education, especially secular and religious 
education, and it seems that the decision and the choice of 
the kind of school is causing tension for one section while 
others have no hesitation about the value of foreign education 
and they have no conflict concerning religious education. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, their choice of the 
kind of school did not reflect the same conflict as was the 
case with the new petty bourgeoisie. Their choice of the kind 
of school was mainly determined by their economic abilities 
and was influenced at the same time by their limited 
information about some kinds of education like Al Azhar. 
A father who is the owner of a photography shop explained how 
he made the choice between schools on an economic basis. He 
said, 
"I know that foreign language schools are the best 
in teaching standard and in developing children's 
abilities, but these schools are very expensive. 
That is why I sent my children to government 
language school. The fees are reasonable, because 
I pay f105 a year which I can afford. If you ask me 
to arrange schools according to their teaching 
standard and achievement I put foreign schools 
first, government language schools second and 
government free schools third." 
Others were influenced in the choice by their limited 
information about different kinds of schools. 
A father who is the owner of a small shop said of Al Azhar and 
religious education: 
"My children are in government school. I did not 
think of another kind. Al Azhar: nobody advised me 
to send them to Al Azhar. I believe that this kind 
of education is very important. I wish I could send 
one of them. At least she could be able to recite 
the Quran." 
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His wife said, 
"I have no clear idea about Al Azhar. I think Al 
Azhar schools are not widespread, maybe there are 
a few schools. I know one girl who went to Al Azhar, 
but that was because she was younger than the age 
of acceptance in government schools." 
A father who is a tailor and owns his own shop said, 
"I thought of sending my daughter to foreign school 
but many of my friends and customers have told me 
that all our best doctors, engineers and ministers 
have graduated from government schools, so there was 
no point of sending them to foreign school if they 
can get good education from government school." 
He went on to explain why he did not choose Al Azhar: 
"I did not think of Al Azhar because I had no idea 
about girls education in Al Azhar." 
It can be noticed from the answers of both the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie that the 
latter does not have enough information about certain kinds 
of education. So they say that they do not know, or nobody 
told them. They also tend to get their information from 
friends, while in the case of the new petty bourgeoisie, they 
give clear information about different kinds of schools and 
the negative and positive sides of these schools, which may 
explain why cultural tension and conflict is clearer in their 
case than in the traditional petty bourgeoisie. 
The big bourgeoisie were clear about kind of education they 
want for their children. They did not suffer the same conflict 
as the new petty bourgeoisie. 
A father who is a businessman was clear about the failure of 
Al Azhar: 
"Foreign schools are better organized than 
government schools. I never thought of sending my 
children to Al Azhar because it failed in teaching 
both religious and modern subject." 
Another family was clear about their strong desire for foreign 
education for their children. The father is the owner of a 
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factory with middle level education, and the mother is 
illiterate. They never thought of Al Azhar and they sacrificed 
a lot of money to have their children in foreign school. The 
father said, 
"My children are in foreign schools - foreign 
education has many advantages, because learning a 
foreign language became very important to get a good 
job in foreign companies. The social standard of the 
students is high, these schools give more care and 
better education than any other school." 
On Al Azhar education, he said, 
"I have never thought of sending my children. I 
thought only of foreign schools. Do you know how 
important it was to me to get my children in these 
foreign schools; I had to pay a thousand dollars for 
each child to be accepted in the school." 
The mother also made a comparison between different types of 
schools: 
"We were in the Gulf area, my children were in the 
American school. The standard of teaching of that 
school was higher even than the foreign language 
school here. I never thought of Al Azhar because of 
the low social standard of the students. I want my 
children to be in foreign schools in order to 
compensate my deprivation of education, so I want 
the best for them." 
The working class, in reality, have no choice between 
different kinds of schools, and only have their children in 
government free schools. The only other option which was 
available to them was Al Azhar, where some of them had tried 
to send their children. The working class expressed a feeling 
of doubt about their children's abilities for certain kinds 
of education which were not expressed by any other class. 
Those who tried to send their children to Al Azhar explained 
the difficulties they faced and why they were not successful. 
A father who is a fitter in a public sector company said, 
"I sent my younger daughter to Al Azhar but she 
hated the school because of the way they treated 
children and because they study many subjects which 
make it very difficult. I tried to move her from Al 
Azhar to a government school and it was very 
difficult. When the government school accepted her 
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they put her in the first year not in the second as 
she was supposed to be. We accepted that she should 
lose one year rather than being in Al Azhar." 
Another family tried to send their children to Al Azhar, but 
the children refused to study because it was very difficult. 
The mother said, 
"I wanted to send my older son to Al Azhar but he 
refused because study is very difficult in Al Azhar, 
but he refuses all other kinds of education as well. 
He could not get his primary school certificate. I 
tried with my younger son but he refused Al Azhar, 
because it is difficult to study and he does not 
like the way they treat children." 
A father who is a cleaner, and who does not trust his 
children's ability in education, said, 
"I wanted to send my children to Al Azhar, at least 
they would learn the Quran, but my children refused 
education. It is my fate that my children refused 
education because they have been endowed with a 
limited mentality." 
The comments of the working class on different kinds of 
education, indicate that: 
- They tend to discuss different kinds of education as 
outsiders, i.e. they are not involved in that matter. For 
example, they say about foreign education, "We hear that 
it is good education", while the new petty bourgeoisie 
and the bourgeoisie express a practical experience in 
that field where they have their children in foreign 
education. 
- When the working class discuss Al Azhar education, and 
why they did not send their children, they already have 
experience of this kind of education because some of them 
have sent their children who did not continue in Al 
Azhar, for the reasons mentioned earlier. So the working 
class does not reject this kind of education. 
- When the working class say why they did not continue in 
this education, the main reason is the difficulty of this 
education, i.e. they doubt the abilities of their 
children in succeeding in this education, while in the 
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case of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie, they might mention this reason, but they 
have other important objections about the quality, the 
value and the future of this education which they reject. 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, the main characteristics of 
their responses is that, while they have a clear attitude 
against technical education for their children, they were 
divided in their attitude towards foreign education and 
religious education, which created cultural conflict for some, 
but was no problem to others. For the big bourgeoisie there 
was no tension or conflict in their attitudes to foreign 
education. The traditional petty bourgeoisie, a minority of 
whose children are in foreign language or government language 
schools, did not experience a tension or conflict in their 
choice, which seems to be determined to a certain extent by 
their ability to pay and by their economic position. 
TI. Educational Practices  
At this point, the analysis moves towards the study of 
parents' specific relations with the school, and their 
evaluation of the kind of education that their children are 
already getting at school. This will be studied against a 
background of the influence of the family through economic and 
cultural capital in securing more social, educational and 
cultural opportunities for children and in influencing 
parents' relations with the school. This will be studied 
through four main points: 
(A) Parents' evaluations of the school: 
in terms of i) identifying positive and negative aspects of 
the school, and ii) parents' evaluation of their relations 
with the school in terms of two points: 
- relations with school teachers, and 
- the value they place on the authority they may have 
through the parent's committee. 
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(B) School knowledge: 
parents will evaluate the curriculum in terms of identifying 
which subjects they believe are more or less important, and 
how parents criticize the structure of the curriculum and how 
they perceive the influence of studying different subjects on 
their children's future. 
(C) Extra tuition: 
will be discussed as part of the family's efforts to afford 
more education opportunities for their children. Reasons 
behind extra tuition will be discussed, beside the 
illustration of the role of the family's economic and cultural 
capital in that matter. 
(D) Other forms of non-formal education: 
this will show the family's efforts to provide more non-formal 
types of education which add to their children's cultural 
capital. 
(A) Parents' evaluation of the school 
i) 	 Positive and negative aspects of school 
As a part of the discussion of the actual provision of 
education, parents were asked to evaluate their children's 
school in terms of the positive and the negative aspectsthey 
could identify. Answers are summarized in Table No.15. The 
general trends which can be identified from the table are that 
discipline of children, the high standard of subjects that 
children study, the teaching of foreign languages and good 
teachers are seen as important. In class terms, some 
similarities and differences can be found between classes in 
identifying what they consider to be good. For example, 
discipline is mentioned by different classes, and is pointed 
to as a positive factor by a very high percentage of the big 
bourgeoisie more than four out of five of them making this 
point. Since the big bourgeoisie have their children in 
foreign language schools, this means that there is a great 
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deal of confidence about discipline in these schools. Having 
good teachers at school was expressed by different class 
positions but not on the same scale as discipline. 
Table 15: Aspects that Parents Like in their Children's School. 
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3 3 8 8 2 3 
1 1 
1 2 5 
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3 	 3 
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If one looks at the aspects which each class believe are 
provided for their children, one finds that for the new petty 
bourgeoisie their children are getting from school good care 
in teaching foreign language and Arabic and religion, 
especially those children who are in government language 
schools. The new petty bourgeoisie also believe that the 
standard of education in terms of subjects that their children 
study is high. For the traditional petty bourgeoisie there is 
nothing in particular mentioned apart from discipline and 
teachers, but a small percentage of fathers said that the 
school contacted them to report on their children's work, and 
a similar percentage of mothers said they liked the school for 
its own sake, because it taught their children. 
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The big bourgeoisie, like the new petty bourgeoisie, believe 
that their children are getting a high standard of education 
in terms of the content of education subjects. For the working 
class, the point that they stressed beside discipline and 
teachers was that they like the school for its own sake 
because it teaches children. 
From the answers, one can understand that the new petty 
bourgeoisie believe that their children are provided with a 
good standard of education content, with a balanced education 
between foreign language on one side and Arabic and religion 
on the other, beside a good discipline for their children at 
school but a limited claim that their children have good 
teachers. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie did not choose to 
distinguish anything in their children's education apart from 
discipline and teachers, and those who have their children in 
government language school believe that their children are 
getting a balanced education of foreign language on one side 
and Arabic and religion on the other side. 
The big bourgeoisie believe that their children are getting 
a high standard of education, in addition to good teachers and 
good discipline for children at school. 
The working class mainly believe that their children are well 
disciplined at school. In term of teaching standard it is only 
a quarter of the fathers who believe that their children are 
getting good teaching, while mothers did not mention that at 
all. Roughly a quarter of all fathers and mothers did not 
identify anything which they liked about their children's 
school, i.e. they did not identify any positive aspect in the 
actual education of their children. 
Moving to aspects which parents believe are missing in their 
children's education, the problem of teacher's standard 
appears with a higher percentage than those who are satisfied 
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with teacher's standard. Related to this point about teachers 
is the complaint that children are forced to take private 
lessons, which was noted by members of different classes. (See 
Table No.16.) 
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It can be noticed that the new petty bourgeoisie who have 
their children in government language school are highly 
disappointed with teachers, especially those who teach 
English. Since the new petty bourgeoisie send their children 
to this kind of school in the hope of getting a good standard 
of English teaching and to get the opportunity to be educated 
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in English, they are frustrated when they compare English 
teachers in government language school with those in foreign 
language school. 
A father who is an insurance inspector expressed this view: 
"I do not like teachers because they are not highly 
qualified especially in English and this shows the 
difference between these schools and the foreign 
language schools where teachers are very highly 
qualified especially in languages and some of them 
are originally native speakers of the language." 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie reflected another aspect of 
problems with teachers, which might exist more in government 
free schools. This relates to the way in which teachers treat 
children: 
"I do not like any thing in my children's school. 
They treat children badly. Teachers always punish 
and beat children without any understanding of the 
child's personality. It is the teachers' treatment 
which makes the child love or hate the school." 
When the traditional petty bourgeoisie have the opportunity 
to educate their children in the schools used by big 
bourgeoisie and new petty bourgeoisie, they may express the 
same hopes and frustrations. A father who is the owner of a 
photography shop and has his children in a government language 
school commented on English teachers in the school: 
"I like in my children's school the small number of 
students in the class. And I like it as a new 
experiment in teaching languages. I do not like 
teachers. They are not qualified, and they have no 
conscience. They do not give full effort in the 
classroom because they are not well paid. These 
schools try to imitate the foreign schools but they 
cannot reach the same level because of the different 
quality of the teachers." 
The big bourgeoisie express the problem of teachers who 
exploit parents by expensive private lessons. A father who is 
a factory owner and has all his five children in foreign 
language schools said, 
"I like in my children's school the high standard 
of education they get especially in languages, but 
I do not like that teachers force children to take 
430 
private lessons and they ask for a very high price 
because they teach all subjects in foreign 
language." 
The working class feel that their children are neglected by 
teachers, they do not give them enough academic or social 
care. A mother who is the wife of a welder said, 
"I do not like in my children's school that teachers 
neglect children, they do not give them enough care 
in explaining lessons or in social care. They do not 
try to understand the children's difficult 
circumstances." 
Looking at the main characteristics of each class, it can be 
noticed that, for the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie, there is a complaint that schools neglect 
activities such as music and sports. This was expressed by 
around one in five of the new petty bourgeoisie, and by even 
more of the big bourgeoisie. The new petty bourgeoisie who 
have their children in foreign language school complain that 
this kind of school neglects Islamic religious studies. This 
is the exact opposite of the view of those who have their 
children in government language school, who believe that their 
children have the advantage of having both foreign language 
and religion. A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of 
Culture evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of 
government language schools in these words: 
"I like in my son's school the care they give to 
religion and Arabic lessons. The headmistress is 
well qualified to run such a language school because 
she got her university degree in English language. 
I do not like the way they punish children. They 
make them cowards. They intimidate them. I do not 
like the school cancelliing activities and classes 
in order to teach more English, and they give them 
a lot of homework even during the holidays." 
The opposite view about teaching religion come from a father 
who is military officer and has his children in a foreign 
language school. He said, 
"I like in my children's school that they have 
discipline. I do not like that the school neglects 
Islamic religion because it is Christian school. I 
do not like that they give children very heavy 
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homework and neglect the school's activities." 
The same problem of neglecting school's activities is 
expressed by big bourgeoisie. A mother who is the wife of an 
entrepreneur, and who has a university degree, said, 
"I do not like that the school neglects activities 
like drawing and music. My children have musical 
talent and the school does not help them to develop 
it. I think that the school does not understand the 
importance of such hobbies. In fact hobbies protect 
children from deviation because it absorbs all their 
power, so it is very useful for the child and 
society." 
The new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie who have 
their children in foreign language schools believe that their 
children are not taking enough religious studies. At the same 
time they complained about the lack of activities such as 
music and sports, which are very important for the cultural 
capital of these classes. 
The new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie who have 
their children in foreign language school believe that 
government control over these schools, in terms of controlling 
the amount of money that these school charge as fees so that 
they cannot take the real cost they need to improve teaching 
methods and pay high salaries for teachers, is affecting the 
quality of education their children receive. A father who is 
a captain of a ship criticized government control: 
"I like the discipline and the high standard of 
teaching in my children's school. But I do not like 
the financial problems that the school suffers 
because of the government control of fees in this 
kind of school. They force the school to charge less 
than the real cost and then the school cannot 
improve its methods of teaching or pay high salaries 
to teachers. This situation forces the school to 
ask for more money from parents in the form of 
donations." 
A father who is an entrepreneur made the same point: 
"What I do not like in the foreign language school 
is the financial problems. This problem is created 
by the government supervision of these schools. They 
impose some regulations on these schools such as 
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fees. The school is forced to take a certain amount 
of money which is not sufficient for the school 
expenses, and that is the reason the school asks for 
parent's donations." 
So, the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie are 
against government control of foreign language schools, which 
they believe is preventing these schools from improving their 
education standard. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class have 
expressed problems of their own. For example, there is the 
problem of the bad results of the school, which the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie did not mention, while the-
working class expressed a problem of her own which is the 
school asking for things that they cannot afford for their 
children, like sports uniform and books. 
A wife of a bus conductor in the Ministry of Transport said, 
"I like my children's school for the sake of the 
school because it educates children, but I do not 
like that they asked for things like hooks and 
sports clothes which we cannot afford." 
The general picture which members of different class positions 
have drawn of the actual provision of education for their 
children shows clear class differences, where the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, who have their children 
in foreign language and government language schools, believe 
that their children are getting a high standard of education 
in terms of the content they study and because they study all 
subjects in a foreign language. They also believe that their 
children are well disciplined at school. However, they feel 
that their children are deprived in certain areas of education 
like music and sports where the school concentrate more on the 
academic subjects. Those who have their children in foreign 
language school believe that their children are deprived of 
religious subjects. They also believe that the government 
control of foreign education is depriving their children of 
even better education opportunities, since government 
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restrictions prevent these school from improving their 
education service. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class feel 
that their children are disciplined at school, but they did 
not say that their children are getting good education. They 
believe that their children are neglected academically and 
socially by their teachers, the school results are not good, 
they are forced to give their children private lessons which 
they cannot afford and for the working class they find it very 
difficult to afford the cost of books and sports equipment for 
their children. 
ii) Parents' relations with the school 
Parents' relations with the school will be studied in terms 
of two points: 
- Parents' relations with teachers, and 
- Parents' evaluation of parnets' committee influence. 
Parents' relations with teachers 
Table No.17 summarizes different types of relations with 
teachers, which reflect differences in class power, and 
tensions in relation to the school. The table indicates that 
more than fifty percent of the three bourgeois classes have 
no problems with teachers. Only a quarter of working class 
parents were of a similar opinion. 
Those who have problems with teachers expressed different 
aspects which they do not like in their relations with 
teachers. The new petty bourgeoisie criticized teachers for 
believing they make no mistakes, for not giving enough time 
for discussion, or because they feel frustrated after they 
talk to teachers. 
A father who is an engineer criticized teachers who do not 
accept any criticism. He said, 
"If my children have any problem which is usually 
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Table 17: 	 Parents' Relations with Teachers 
Different 	 New petty 
types of 	 bourgeoisie 
relations 
Father Mother 
No problem in 
	 16 	 17 
dealing with 
teachers 
Teachers believe 1 	 4 
they never make 
mistakes 
Not all teachers 1 	 1 
are the same 
Not enough time 3 	 3 
to discuss 
Trad'nel patty Big bourgeoisie 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
5 	 4 	 7 	 6 
1 	 2 	 2 
Working class 
Father Mother 
3 	 3 
1 	 3 
problems 
I always feel 1 
frustrated 
after I talk 
to them 
They don't 	 1 
cooperate 
sincerely 
I leave older 	 1 	 1 	 1 
brothers and 
sisters to deal 
with teachers 
I don't like the 	 2 
way they talk 
to me 
We have no 	 2 	 1 	 1 
problems 






to face them 
related to their achievement, I go to see their 
teachers. I discuss with them, but teachers never 
accept any criticism of their work. They think they 
are the only people who understand in education." 
A father who is the head of a government department complained 
that teachers are unfair in their evaluations of children's 
standards. He said, 
"When I discussed with teachers my children's 
standard and achievement, they always evaluate the 
child down in order to force parents to give 
children private lessons. I always feel frustrated 
after I talked to teachers." 
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Another different criticism came from a new petty bourgeois 
father, who criticized the way teachers treat the working 
class parents in his children's school, which is a government 
free school. He said, 
"I have no problem in dealing with teachers, but I 
do not like the way teachers treat the uneducated 
parents. Teachers always attack their children and 
consider them doing very badly at school. I see that 
parents cannot argue with teachers and cannot defend 
their children." 
The comments of the new petty bourgeoisie reflect a great deal 
of tense relations between this class and teachers, since the 
parents of this class believe that they are educated, and they 
trust themselves to argue with teachers who feel that they are 
challenged by parents. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the majority see 
themselves as having no problem in dealing with teachers, and 
it seems that they do not have the same level of tension in 
relations that one finds between teachers and the new petty 
bourgeoisie who are very critical to teachers behaviour. The 
traditional petty bourgeoisie, with the working class, may be 
less challenging to teachers because they have their own way 
of avoiding dealing with teachers, since they often prefer to 
send their educated children to deal with them. 
A father who is the owner of a small shop, is literate, and 
has three children with university degrees, said, 
"If there is anything to discuss about the 
children's achievement at school, we preferred the 
older sister to go and discuss it with teachers. I 
think my daughters can do it better because they 
are educated." 
The working class reflect another kind of relations with 
teachers, whereby they may completely avoid discussion with 
them. A mother who is the wife of a cleaner said, 
"I do not go to visit my children's school, even 
when they send for us. I know this is wrong because 
we should go and asked about the children, but I 
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feel embarrassed to go and talk to them." 
The big bourgeoisie in general have no real problems with, or 
challenges to, teachers. However, they reflect a class example 
of the importance of cultural capital in dealing with 
teachers. An example is a wealthy family; the father is owner 
of a factory with a middle level of technical education and 
the mother is illiterate. The family has her five children in 
foreign language schools. The mother described how teachers 
treat her badly because she is not educated: 
"When my children have a problem I go to see their 
teachers. They treat me very badly because I am not 
educated. My children have problems in studying 
foreign language and I cannot help them and the 
teachers always tell me, if you cannot help them 
why don't you take them out of this school to any 
government school. I feel humiliated and I come hack 
home in a very bad condition." 
Discussion with members of different class positions has shown 
that there is a class difference in relations with teachers 
and in the opportunity of different class positions to follow 
up their children's performance at school. The discussion also 
shows the importance of cultural capital in the direct 
relations between teachers and parents. It seems that the new 
petty bourgeoisie are able to a fair extent to follow up their 
children's performance at school. However, this is done with 
much tension between parents and teachers, who both stand at 
the same class position and share the same cultural capital. 
Teachers are more challenged by this class which considers 
that they stand on the same ground with teachers and that they 
are qualified to argue with teachers about educational 
matters. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie are able to follow up their 
children's performance at school with no open challenge to 
teachers since parents themselves avoid contacting teachers 
and send their educated children on their behalf, which 
supports the idea that cultural capital is important in 
forming relations between parents and teachers. This point can 
be followed and reinforced in the case of the big bourgeoisie 
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who may have the economic capital but not the cultural 
capital, which in this case puts teachers in a stronger 
position in dealing with this fraction of the big bourgeoisie 
who are uneducated. The working class seems to be the group 
which has the least opportunity to follow up their children's 
performance, and in some cases withdraw altogether from the 
situation of facing teachers. 
Parents' committee 
The discussion of the role of parent's committee, based on 
parents' beliefs about the reality of the committee, moves the 
discussion from the level of personal relations between 
teachers and parents to the collective level of relations 
between members of different classes and the school. This will 
lead to the discussion of the amount of influence and power 
that social classes can practice at that level of relation to 
the school. 
Table 18: Membership of Parents' Committee 
New petty 	 Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
T'm not a member 	 7 5 	 1 	 4 	 2 	 1 
but T attend 
meetings 
I'm a member 	 4 1 	 1 
I'm not a member 17 24 	 9 	 8 	 4 	 7 	 8 	 11 
and I don't go 
I used to go 	 3 1 	 2 
but I've stopped 
The actual attendance and membership of the parent's committee 
is very limited among members of the sample as Table No.18 
clearly indicates. In spite of the limited attendance at the 
committee, parents were asked to give their views about what 
they think is the reality of parent's committee in terms of 
the kind of problems they believe the committee discusses, and 
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the power and authority the committee has in school affairs. 
Table 19: 	 Problems that Parents' 	 Committees Discuss 
Kinds of 	 New petty 
problem 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother 
Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
Working class 
Father Mother 
Financial 	 24 24 8 6 4 7 7 4 
Teacher / 	 16 
student problems 
15 3 3 5 5 5 4 
Students' 	 4 
achievement 
6 2 2 2 1 3 3 
Courtesy call 1 
School services 
Sanction of the 
school fund 
I don't know 	 1 
	 1 	 2 	 3 
In identifying the committee activities Table No.19 shows that 
financial problems are believed to be one of the important 
issues discussed by the committee. This issue, as the table 
indicates, has been identified by a majority from different 
class positions. After that come teacher's and student's 
problems and student achievement, along with other minor 
issues. 
Table 20: Parents' Committee's Influence 
Has it 	 New petty 	 Trad'nal petty Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
influence? 	 bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 
Yes 8 8 4 1 6 4 4 5 
No 22 20 5 6 2 4 3 1 
Don't know 1 3 2 1 1 4 5 
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In terms of the committee's power and influence at school 
Table No.20 shows a class division in their views about the 
amount of authority and influence the committee has. 
The majority of the new petty bourgeoisie believe that the 
committee has no influence at school, for reasons that are 
given in Table No.21. The reasons show that people believe 
that the committee is a formal one and has no real authority. 
This case was made by a quarter of the parents in this class. 
The belief that the committee has no influence because the 
school and education department has all the authority was 
cited by a similar number of parents. A slightly smaller 
proportion felt that the headmaster/headmistress had all the 
power. 
The new petty bourgeoisie are divided in their views about the 
authority and the power the committee has. Those who believe 
in the role and influence of the committee concentrate on the 
role the committee has in solving the school's financial 
problems. A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of 
Culture and has her son in a government language school said, 
"T do not attend the meetinas but I think they 
discuss student's problems, methods of teaching and 
the teacher's standard. They give suggestions like 
using educational aids and building new classrooms. 
The parent's committee is very important. Tt has 
important role to play in such problems. For 
example, they collected money to buy educational 
aids like T. V. and equipment for teaching English." 
This view reflects the aspect that parents believe that the 
committee can achieve something which is usually financial. 
However, this is not the only view about the committee. Other 
parents believe that they have very a limited role and they 
cannot challenge the authority of the school staff. 
A father who is an accountant and has his children in a 
government language school shows how it is difficult for 
parents to raise certain problems and topics in the committee: 
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Table 21: Parents' Assessment of the Reasons the Committees 
have No Influence 










Its a formal 
committee 




have all the 
power 




5 5 3 4 3 
It has 
influence 
8 8 4 1 6 2 4 5 
Don't know 1 3 2 1 1 4 5 
"Parent's committee discuss financial problems, or 
how teachers explain lessons. But I cannot raise or 
discuss how teachers force students to take private 
lessons because I do not want problems for my 
children with the school." 
A father who is an accountant and has his children in a 
foreign language school described the relations within the 
committee and the limits of the parents' influence: 
"I attended the meetings. We discuss financial 
problems, teachers' and students' problems. The 
committee has influence in solving financial 
problems, but has no control over teachers or the 
teaching process. We cannot, for example, move 
teachers from the school. Parents become members 
partly by election and partly by personal relations. 
The headmistress chooses people whom she knows are 
going to help her in financial problems." 
So, the new petty bourgeoisie are divided in their views about 
what the parent's committee can do and the power it has at 
school. Some believe that it has influence through solving the 
financial crisis of the school, others believe that the 
authority is still mainly in the hands of the school 
administration. 
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For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the majority believe 
that the parents committee has no influence. This was the view 
of more than half the fathers and two thirds of the mothers. 
They believe it a formal committee, and that the headmaster 
or headmistress has all the authority. 
A father who is the owner of a photography shop and has all 
his children in government language school said, 
"I have no time to attend the parents' committee, 
but I think they discuss financial problems, 
students activities and achievement. They have no 
influence because the final decision is always for 
Ministry of Education." 
For the big bourgeoisie, the situation seems different; the 
majority believe that the committee has influence, and a large 
percentage actually attend the committee. The big bourgeoisie 
believe in the committee influence and complain of the 
obstacles put by the government supervision of the school. A 
father who owns a factory and has his children in a foreign 
language school, attends the parents' committee. He said, 
"I am a committee member. The committee is very 
strong and powerful at school because of the 
financial problems. Parents have to pay. For example 
we developed all the school educational aids, we 
bought T.V. and video which the school could not 
afford from its own budget. I think the main problem 
we suffer is the government restrictions on the 
school because the education department always ask 
schools where they got the money from, because what 
we pay is not included in the school fees." 
Another father who is an entrepreneur and has his children in 
foreign language school said, 
"The committee has a very important role to play. 
Actually without parents' financial support the 
school would not be able to improve its education 
service. We pay a lot of money and since we pay that 
money parents asked to buy part of the school shares 
but the school refused." 
It seems that the economic capital of the big bourgeoisie is 
effective and gives more confidence to this class in their 
collective action in the school, where they know that the 
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school can not do without their money. 
For the working class it can be noticed that the majority said 
that they do not know about the parents' committee and that 
a very high percentage do not attend the meetings. 
The working class expressed a different way of looking at the 
parents' committee. They think it is not their business since 
the committee asks for money which they can not afford. 
A father who is a welder in a foreign company said, 
"I attend parents' meetings. We discuss the school 
financial problems. At the end of the meeting the 
school administration ask parents to pay money to 
repair school furniture, but parents cannot always 
pay what the school asks for." 
Another father who is a cleaner expressed the same point: 
"I do not attend the parents' committee because they 
always ask for money which I cannot pay. This kind 
of meeting is not for poor people like us." 
The discussion shows a class difference in the views about 
their own collective action and role in school affairs. It 
seems that the big bourgeoisie are more confidant about their 
role and influence in the school since they can afford a lot 
of money to solve financial problems. At this point it can be 
argued that the economic capital of the class is very 
influential and effective in collective action, more that the 
cultural capital of the new petty bourgeoisie. This is also 
clear example in the case of the working class who have stated 
clearly that they do not attend the meetings because they have 
no money to pay. 
In terms of the parents' committee's influence in different 
types of schools, it seems that parents' committees in foreign 
language schools have more influence than those in government 
free and government language schools. This can be explained 
in terms of the reliance of the foreign language schools on 
parents' donations to provide a better education service, 
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which matches with the fact that parents in foreign language 
schools are well off and can afford to pay more than the 
parents of children in government schools. 
(B) Parents' critique of school knowledge 
When people were asked about the most important aspects of the 
curriculum, as Table No.22 indicates, the majority from all 
classes said that all subjects are important in forming the 
child's knowledge and it is important to know about different 
subjects. However, parents from the new petty bourgeoisie and 
the big bourgeoisie were very critical of the content of the 
curriculum. Their critique covered different subjects like 
Arabic and religion, which have direct and explicit 
ideological  messages, and other subjects like sciEnce and 
mathematics which have less ideological messages. 
Table 22: Parents' Identification of the Most Important 
Subjects their Children Study 
Subjects New petty 
bourgeoisie 







Father 	 Mother 
Science and 
mathematics 
1 1 1 2 





All subjects 31 31 7 6 9 9 6 
For the new petty bourgeoisie, a variety of criticisms were 
mentioned, for different subjects. In religion, the curriculum 
was criticized as unsuitable for the children's age (6-11 
years at primary level), and that the content of the verses 
chosen from Quran were influencing children's personalities 
in a negative way since it was intimidating them. A father who 
is a university professor said, 
"The curriculum is overcrowded and very long. 
Sometimes subjects are not suitable for children's 
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age for example, some of the Quranic verses are not 
suitable especially the ones that discuss marriage 
relations, reward and punishment. These verses 
intimidate children." 
The Arabic curriculum was criticized for being boring to 
children or as full of fabulous stories, which would be more 
appropriate to younger children and does not help to develop 
the children's mentality. A mother who is an accountant raised 
that criticism of the Arabic curriculum: 
"In Arabic curriculum some lessons are under the 
child's age. For example in the Arabic reading book, 
there is a story call 'the knot finger' which is 
about a very tiny boy whose size is just a knot 
finger. I think this story is under the mental age 
of eleven year old children and does not help to 
develop children's way of thinking. There are many 
things in the Arabic curriculum which I consider to 
he fabulous." 
So, new petty bourgeoisie criticisms of religion and Arabic 
curriculum concentrated on the influence of these subjects in 
forming children's personality. It shows that the personality 
created by these subjects are intimidated and the mentality 
formulated on myth. 
The critique of science and mathematics takes a different 
approach from that of Arabic and religion. There is no problem 
with the content of science and mathematics subjects as such, 
or with the influence of these subjects in formulating 
children's mentality, since they have less ideological 
messages. The critique of mathematics and science is 
concentrated upon the size of the curriculum and the 
distribution of the subjects through different level of 
education. A father who is a university professor, criticized 
the complicated science curriculum: 
"In the science curriculum children take information 
which is higher than their mental age. For example 
in the sixth grade at primary level, children study 
in science subjects about plants, animals, alkalies 
and acids. I think these subjects together are too 
much and very long for a child to learn all of them 
in one year." 
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A father criticized the practical parts of the curriculum 
which are part of basic education: 
"Basic education subjects like crafts and 
agriculture should start at the preparatory level 
of basic education. At primary level, it is a waste 
of time since children should concentrate on the 
basics of readinc, writing and mathematics." 
The criticism of the science curriculum reflects a broader 
problem of organization within the curriculum. A mother who 
is an employee in the Ministry of Culture criticized the long 
and complicated curriculum: 
"Curriculum is very overcrowded. I mean by 
overcrowded that it is very long and it contains 
many subjects. For example, in science they study 
sound, light and magnetism. I believe that if they 
gave them one branch only, that would he better and 
more concentrated. I give you another example fro: 
history. They cover long historical periods from the 
beginning of Islam until modern times. Because of 
this long curriculum children cannot concentrate and 
understand; they only memorize and then they forget 
all the information after the academic year." 
Basic education subjects were criticized as irrelevant and 
useless. A mother who is a bank employee said, 
"All subjects are important, but basic education 
subjects like agriculture and industry have no value 
for children. It is a waste of time especially for 
children who are in urban areas." 
The new petty bourgeoisie's critique of the curriculum shows 
that they believe that all subjects are important in forming 
a child's mentality and personality, so they prefer a wide 
range of information for their children. However, the content 
and the organization of the curriculum was under attack. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie identified all subjects as 
important. In contrast with the new petty bourgeoisie the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie did not introduce a wide range 
of criticisms of different aspects of the curriculum. However, 
they concentrated on basic education subjects. They have 
different views among themselves about the value of basic 
education. 
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A mother and housewife who has her children in a government 
language school said, 
"All subjects are important, but I cannot give all 
subjects the same importance. Basic education 
subjects like agriculture and domestic economy are 
less important than languages and mathematics which 
the children are going to carry on studying." 
An opposite view of basic education, which stressed the 
importance of manual and practical work, was expressed by a 
father who is a tailor: 
"All subjects are very important. I find basic 
education subjects are very important because 
practical activities in these subjects can absorb 
children's energy and use it in productive way." 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie, do not have a unified 
position on basic education subjects, since many of them are 
themselves in a position where they look at the new petty 
bourgeoisie and imitate them in having their children in 
private language education, in which case basic education 
subjects are seen as irrelevant. At the same time, another 
part of them is still very close to manual work and they have 
their children in government schools, so basic education for 
them is relevant and might have a positive impact by using 
children's energies in productive ways. 
The big bourgeoisie mainly evaluated the curriculum, in a 
similar way to the new petty bourgeoisie. That is, Arabic was 
criticized as full of fairy stories, mathematics and science 
were criticized as being difficult, long and using teaching 
methods which do not use laboratories and experiments with 
children only watching teachers doing experiments. Basic 
education was attacked as well as irrelevant. A mother and 
housewife who is a university graduate said, 
"I believe that basic education subjects are not 
important. They waste children's time. The school 
should give all the time to, and put stress on, 
language and mathematics." 
The big bourgeoisie, however showed some differences from new 
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petty bourgeoisie in their reaction to the whole point of 
criticizing the curriculum. That is, the new petty bourgeoisie 
seemed more confident and more acquainted with the knowledge 
of the curriculum and deal with it as part of their own 
cultural capital, while the big bourgeoisie, especially these 
who are not highly educated, do not have the same confidence 
to criticize the curriculum. A father who is a factory owner, 
with a middle level of technical education, and has all his 
children in foreign language schools, said, 
"All subjects introduced to children are very 
important. I cannot criticize the curriculum because 
the curriculum is designed by specialists who 
understand children's mentalities and abilities, so 
they aive the amount and level of information 
suitable for children." 
The working class, compared with other class positions, can 
be considered as alienated from this area of discussion and 
debate around the curriculum, due to the fact of the high 
illiteracy rate. However, those who know how to read and 
write, might have a general idea about what their children are 
doing. They identified the science subjects, like other 
classes, as difficult but they explained this in a completely 
different way from the three bourgeois classes. The working 
class considers difficult subjects as a means of eliminating 
numbers of children from education. A father who is a fitter 
in a public sector company and has primary level education 
said, 
"All subjects are important, but some subjects are 
higher than children's level. For example, science 
subjects which were designed for preparatory level 
are now taught to the primary level. They do so in 
order to make it difficult for children to continue 
and then eliminate the number." 
This comment from a working class parent proved that science 
and mathematics are seen by all classes as difficult and 
complicated for their children's age. However the 
understanding of the reasons lying behind this was different 
between the three bourgeois classes on one side and the 
working class on the other side. For the three bourgeois 
classes, difficult curriculum was understood as part of the 
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process of developing and modernizing the curriculum, and if 
the curriculum was hard this is seen as a mistake in the 
design of curriculum. The working class saw this as an attack 
on their children's opportunities in carrying on education. 
Comments of members of different classes about the complex 
curriculum of the primary level indicate that it favours those 
with high cultural capital, where the children of the new 
petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie will be able to aet 
parental help and if needed more help with private lessons;  
while working class children are deprived of both. 
Parental evaluation of the importance of curriculum subjects 
is to a certain extent influenced by how much these subjects 
contribute to the children's academic future. Subjects like 
basic education are irrelevant for making a professional 
future to the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie. 
(C) Extra Tuition 
This is part of the educational provision given to children. 
The discussion of extra tuition will concentrate on families' 
strategies to secure provision for their children and the 
influence of the family economic and cultural capital on that. 
Private lessons will be discussed as a type of extra tuition 
with reference to how parents perceive the reasons for private 
lessons. 
Extra tuition can be given in different ways, by parents if 
they are educated, by private lessons given by teachers which 
is more expensive, or by extra tuition organized by the school 
after the end of the school day. Discussion with the parents 
shows why, in their view, extra tuition is needed, especially 
private lessons, and what strategies they follow to be able 
to afford their children the maximum opportunity, as well as 
the reasons behind this phenomenon. 
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Table 23: Parents' Position on Helping their Children to Study 
Do you help? New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
yeS 25 25 3 4 6 7 5 1 
No 6 6 6 5 3 2 6 10 
Giving extra tuition to children may involve the parents 
themselves, but this depends upon their own cultural capital. 
Table No.23 shows that a large number of new petty bourgeoisie 
and big bourgeoisie families help their children, while the 
number is less among the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the 
working class, especially among working class mothers, only 
one in ten of whom help their children. One important reason 
given by working class and petty bourgeois parents as to why 
they could not help their children was their own illiteracy. 
Another reply came from the two classes which reflects the 
lack of confidence of some traditional petty bourgeoisie and 
working class parents in helping their children even though 
they know how to read and write, but they feel that they are 
not educated enough to do so. The reasons given by the new 
petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie were that they have no 
time to do it. All reasons are summarized in Table No.24 
Kinds of help that parents give are shown in Table No.25. For 
the new petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers there is a wide 
range of subjects that they can help their children to study, 
which almost cover 	 all areas of curriculum. The big 
bourgeoisie are helping in many areas, while areas for the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie concentrate mainly in helping 
in reading, science and mathematics. For the working class the 
main help they give is in reading. 
The figures show that the children of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie are getting, in addition 
to their privilege of being in private schools, a wide range 
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Table 24: Parents' Reasons for not Helping their Children to 
Study 
Reason 	 New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
I can't read 	 4 	 1 	 4 
	 1 	 4 	 9 
or write 
I have no time 5 	 1 	 2 	 3 	 1 
I'm not 	 1 	 1 
interested 
They should 	 1 
depend on 
themselves 
I'm not well 
	
3 	 2 
educated 
of help in different subjects which gives them more chance to 
carry on successfully to higher levels. 
i) 	 Private lessons 
As mentioned before, this is the most expensive way of 
providing extra tuition, and economic capital is an important 
factor in providing this kind of help for children. Table 
No.26 shows how different types of extra tuition are divided 
between classes. The big bourgeoisie families mainly give 
extra tuition by teachers; the new petty bourgeoisie employ 
a mixture of teachers and organized groups by the school, and 
the same is true for the traditional petty bourgeoisie, while 
the working class has the lowest number using teachers. 
The discussion of private lessons included the reasons for 
this phenomenon, how it affects equal opportunities and how 
the new petty bourgeoisie in particular invest heavily in 
their children's education. 
ii) Purpose of private lessons 
Members of the sample were asked about the purpose of private 
lessons, and why they give this kind of tuition to their 
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Table 25: Kinds of Help Parents Give to their Children 
Kind of help 	 New petty 
bourgeoisie 
Father Mother 
Read with them 4 	 10 
Help in all 	 1 	 2 
subjects 
Explain 	 1 	 2 
difficult points 
Arabic 	 1 	 5 
Science and 	 17 	 4 
mathematics 
Human science 	 2 	 8 






2 	 2 
1 












4 	 1 
1 
children. The three bourgeois classes were asked about their 
own experience with this kind of tuition. Since the working 
class who are using this kind of tuition is only a very small 
percentage, they were asked to explain why they thought other 
people give this kind of tuition. Table No.27 summarizes 
people's reasons for giving private lessons. The table shows 
the competitive nature of the education system, especially for 
the new petty and the big bourgeoisie who give their children 
private lessons to be ahead. The same competitive nature 
appears again when they say that it depends upon the child's 
standard, which means that in all cases they give private 
lessons to all children. If they are of a high standard they 
give them lessons to make them higher; if they are of a low 
standard they give lessons to make them equal. 
A new petty bourgeoisie father who is university professor, 
explained how he forced his children who are excellent to take 
private lessons: 
"I force my children to take private lessons although 
they are excellent at school. I want them to get high 
grades especially in mathematics, science and English." 
The comment of this professor reflects the competitive nature 
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Table 26: Sources of Extra Tuition 
	
New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie bourgeoisie 
Teachers 	 13 	 4 
	
7 	 2 
Lessons organized by 11 	 3 
the school 
Teachers and organized 2 	 4 	 2 
groups 
By the mosque or church 	 1 
of the system and how the new petty bourgeoisie concentrate 
on certain subjects like mathematics, science and English, 
which are important for preparing for professions, which is 
what the new petty bourgeoisie usually want for their 
children. 
Table 27: Purposes of Private Lessons 
Purpose 	 New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 
equal 	 11 	 10 	 4 	 6 
ahead 	 11 	 9 	 2 	 2 
upon 8 	 9 	 3 	 1 














	 Father Mother 
2 	 2 	 3 	 5 
3 	 4 	 5 	 5 
4 	 2 	 3 	 1 
Giving private lessons is not always an easy task for the new 
petty bourgeoisie to do, especially those who have their 
children in foreign language schools, and have limited income 
as employees. This reflects how foreign education has an 
important cultural meaning for this class and how it 
worthwhile for them to make sacrifices. An example of those 
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who invest heavily and sacrifice for their children is a 
family which pays most of its spare income for their 
children's education. They have two in a foreign school and 
one in a government language school. The parents are 
university graduates, work as tax collectors, with a monthly 
income of £200 for each. The mother said, 
"My children take private lessons in mathematics. 
Lessons are very expensive because all subjects are 
in French. We pay f10 for one hour teaching. We pay 
about f200 per month for lessons. I consider myself 
and my husband working for the account of our 
children's education. We cannot save anything; it 
all goes to the school and the lessons." 
The same point was expressed by a family where both parents 
are university graduates, both working in the government. The 
father has a monthly income of £250 and the mother £150. They 
have two girls in foreign language school. The father said, 
"I help my children in mathematics but one of them 
takes private lessons in French, science and Arabic. 
We pay for her f170 pounds a month; the other takes 
lessons in a group organized by the school and we 
pay for her f50 pounds a month." 
The new petty bourgeoisie mentioned a reason for giving 
private lessons whi:77h reflects tension with and the power of 
teachers, where they force students to take lessons since they 
have 40% of the year's work of the children. One mother said, 
"I help my children. I study with them Arabic and 
human science. I give them private lessons in 
English. It costs about f30 per month. Actually my 
children do not need lessons, but want to satisfy 
their teachers. The cause of the lessons is the low 
salary of the teachers. At the same time parents are 
forced to give lessons to the children because class 
teacher give 40f of the grades as year-work and 
parents try to satisfy teachers." 
One can recognize the great effort by the new petty 
bourgeoisie to keep their children ahead in the competitive 
education system and how far some families will go, the major 
part of their investment for the future going to their 
children's education. 
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The big bourgeoisie share with the new petty bourgeoisie the 
fact that they give private lessons for their children to be 
ahead, but for the big bourgeoisie there is a relationship 
between the economic standard of the family and the purpose 
of private lessons. They consider that a rich family can 
afford private lessons usually to keep children ahead, while; 
 
in the case of the family which has a low income, it usually 
pays for lessons just to keep their children equal. A father 
who is engineer working as entrepreneur said, 
"I help my children study mathematics, and their 
mother helps them to study French because of her 
educational background_ They take private lessons 
in Arabic. I think that students who take private 
lessons, do that for different reasons. If they are 
from a wealthy family, it is usually in order to he 
ahead, if they are from an ordinary family it is 
just to remain equal." 
The big bourgeoisie also present the case of the family when 
it has the economic capital but not the cultural capital to 
teach children. This is represented in a case of a wealthy 
family where the father has a middle level of technical 
education and he is the owner of a factory, while the mother 
is illiterate. The family has five children in foreign 
lanauaae schools. The father said, 
"My children take private lessons in English, French 
and science. They cost me £500 pounds a month f.7.r 
the five children. The reason I give them private 
lessons is that we are uneducated. We share this 
problem with many other families who are obliged to 
give private lessons because the family is not 
educated, so we cannot give any help to our children 
by ourselves." 
It can be noticed that the big bourgeoisie do not complain so 
much about how much they pay for private lessons as the new 
petty bourgeoisie, who pay a higher proportion of their income 
for these lessons. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie the aim of private 
lessons is to keep their children up to the average, which to 
a certain extent differs from the aim of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie. Nearly half the fathers and 
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two thirds of the mothers concur in this view. The cost of 
private lessons for them is less than the other two bourgeois 
classes, since they mainly have their children in government 
schools and they rely on groups organized by the school more 
than the two other bourgeois classes. 
The working class generally do not have private lessons for 
their on children, and they believe that private lessons are 
given to children to put them ahead. For themselves they 
expressed the difficulty they face in affording any kind of 
help for their children. 
A father who is a cleaner in the Ministry of Transport said, 
"I cannot help my children, because I cannot read 
and write. The only help T can give to them and can 
afford is a group organized by the school. I pay £7 
per month for one daughter who is in preparatory 
school. We could not pay for the other one who is 
in primary school. We could not pay for both of them 
to take lessons to be ahead." 
Within the working class there are differences in income which 
make a difference to what they can afford for their children. 
A welder in a foreign company with monthly income of £500, can 
afford private lessons for his children. He said: 
"Two of my children take private lessons, it costs 
me about £40 per month for both of them. They start 
the lessons from the summer holiday. Students take 
lessons to remain equal. The cause of the lessons 
is the low salary of teachers and private lessons 
is the only way to get more money." 
Another example of a privilege for a working class family is 
to have one of the children educated to a middle level of 
education so he/she can help other brothers and sisters. An 
example of that is the family of a waiter who has one of his 
daughters educated and working as a primary school teacher. 
The father said, 
"I cannot help my children in study because I cannot 
read and write. But my daughter who is a teacher 
helps them, so I do not need to give them private 
lessons. Teachers are the cause of private lessons. 
These lessons are unfair and they make education 
fee-paying in an indirect way." 
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Another family, where the father is a bus conductor with an 
income of f80 per month, has seven children, three of whom are 
in primary education. The mother said that it was very 
difficult to find the money for private lessons, and that she 
doubted whether her children would be able to continue in 
school: 
"I cannot help my children to study because I am not 
educated. I give my children private lessons only 
in the last month before the exam because I cannot 
afford to pay. It costs me F27 a month which is too 
much for us. All my neighbours say that my children 
will never continue their studies because we cannot 
give them private lessons. The cause of the private 
lessons is teachers who want money." 
Sc, the working class are deprived of both the cultural and 
the economic capital to afford their children extra tuition. 
iii) Reasons for Private Lessons 
After discussing with people their own purposes in paying for 
private lessons, they were asked to identify from their view 
point what they believe are the reasons why lessons exist. 
Their replies are summarized in Table No.28. The following 
reasons represent the general trends expressed by the 
respondents from different class postions: 
1. Teachers 
The first reason given by all parents from different 
classes was that teachers want to get more money, so they 
aive private lessons. This response received a very high 
level of agreement among all classes, with more than 
three quarters of the new petty bourgeoisie agreeing to 
this view, and a similar proportion of other classes. 
2. The school conditions 
The sample gave a group of reasons concerning school 
facilities and conditions like the big number of students 
in the classroom (this was mainly identified by the new 
petty bourgeoisie), the short school day, accumulated 
difficulties with the curriculum, and not giving enough 
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Table 28: Reasons for Private Lessons 










Teachers want 	 26 
more money 
23 5 5 9 7 11 10 
Large cl 	 12 3 1 2 2 1 
Studnets not 	 4 
serious 
8 3 1 1 2 
Competition 	 5 
for grades 
3 2 2 1 






2 1 1 










care to students. 
3. The competitive education system 
Parents have identified the very competitive education 
system and hence the competition to get high grade which 
encourages or forces students and parents into private 
lessons. This was mentioned mainly by the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie. 
4. Parents 
Parents were seen as a cause of the problem in two 
respects; either condemning those new wealthy people who 
have money, but are not educated, so they can buy private 
lessons for a very high price (this was identified by the 
new petty bourgeoisie), or suggesting that parents are 
very busy and cannot help the children (this was 
mentioned by the traditional petty bourgeoisie). 
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5. 	 Students themselves 
Parents condemned the students as not being very serious 
in their studies, and careless. That was seen as a reason 
why they need lessons (this was mentioned by the new 
petty bourgeoisie). It can be noticed that mothers are 
more likely to blame children themselves of negligence 
than are fathers, which may be because mothers are doing 
most work and study with children. 
It can be noticed that the working class concentrated their 
reasons on the personal aspects of the problem, like teachers 
and students, while other classes gave a wide range, including 
objective reasons concerning school conditions and the 
education system. 
iv) Parents' Opinion about Private Lessons 
When parents were asked about how they saw private lessons in 
terms of educational equality and inequality, the majority 
from all classes have the consensus that private lessons 
affect equal opportunities and that they are unfair. The two 
exceptions to that consensus came from the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, with 
between ten and twenty percent of the parents arguing that the 
system of private lessons was fair. The new petty bourgeoisie 
who took this position argued that private lessons did not 
affect educational opportunities, while the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie said that private lessons are fair because it is 
the ambition of parents that their children should get high 
grades, so it is fair to pay for that ambition. 
(D) Other Types of Non-formal Education: 
The discussion of extra tuition has illustrated class 
differences in appropriating mre education for their children. 
However, education and extra tuition are only part of a wid 
range of other cultural and social privileges which can be 
provided for the children, in particular by the new petty and 
459 
big bourgeoisie, who try to provide more non-formal types of 
education, which appear in buying books for children in 
different subiects such as story books, religious books and 
stories in English and French to improve their children's 
language. Table No.29 shows the variety of choices that the 
new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie afford for their 
children and the limited choice for the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie, and the extraordinarily high percentage of the 
working class families who cannot afford any books for their 
children at all. 





Big bouraeoisie Working cla 
Children' 	 2Aories 
and 	 mag.a!-.inE:- 
31 6 8 3 
Rr.liaious 4 1 
English or Frennl,  
stories 
6 1 2 
We don't buy books 
we borrow them 
1 1 1 
No childreri's books, 7 
Children from the new petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie 
background also have more opportunities and different ways to 
spend leisure time which includes travel, sport in the clubs, 
reading and watching T.V., while, as Table No.30 indicates, 
the working class children have one way of spending their 
leisure time which is exclusive to them, i.e. children go to 
work with the father during the summer holiday. The working 
class share with the petty bourgeoisie and the new petty 
bourgeoisie the category of "street play", but while this is 
important for the children of half the working class families, 
it is only practised by the children of one in thirty of the 
families of the new petty bourgeoisie. 
These two examples of books and leisure time show the class 
differences in getting access to the cultural wealth of 
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Table 30: Ways in which Children Spend their Leisure Time 
New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Watching T.V. 	 16 	 6 	 5 
Go to a club 	 19 	 4 	 5 
Cinema / children's 
theatrF, 
Street. play 	 1 	 2 	 5 
We encourage them 	 3 
to reed 
Travelling in the 	 11 	 4 
summer holiday 
9t, lying the Quran 
at the mosque 
Activities with th 	 1 	 1 
church 
Boys work with 
during the summer 
holiday 
society. It is not completely free and open for all people. 
ITT. Children's future 
Parents were not only asked about their children's 
opportunities at the present, but also in the future, and the 
image they have for their children's future. Predicting their 
children's future members of different social classes gave a 
number of responses. The general trend of class responses 
reflect three ways of looking at the future. 
First, a group of the respondents said that they were not 
worried about their children's future because they have faith 
and they know that the future is in God's hand. 
Second, another group believed that their children can have 
a future secured by their education and qualifications, where 
they see education as offering their children the opportunity 
to find a job and to work either in Egypt or abroad. 
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Table 31: Parents' who Believe the Future is in God's Hands 
New petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 	 Working class 
bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
4 	 1 	 2 	 3 	 2 	 1 	 1 	 4 
Table 32: Parents' who Believe Education is a Way of Securing 





Big bourgeoisie Working class 
Father 	 Mother Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother 
17 	 lg 3 	 2 5 4 3 1 
Third, another group could not give a clear vision of the 
future because, as they said, the increasing economic and 
social problems make the future more uncertain for their 
children, so they could not predict what the future was going 
to be like. 
Table 33: Parents' who Believe it is Difficult to Predict 
their Chidren's Future 
Mec7 petty 	 Traditional petty 	 Big bourgeoisie 
	 Working class 
bourgeoisie 	 bourgeoisie 
Father Mother Father Mother 	 Father Mother 
	 Father Mother 
7 	 11 	 4 	 4 
	 4 
	 2 	 3 
If we look at the specific replies given by members of 
different social classes, it can be seen that respondents from 
all classes divided between the three responses set out in the 
tables. However, some points of emphasis can be found. For the 
new petty bourgeoisie the stress is upon the role of education 
in securing a good future for their children. They share this 
view with the big bourgeoisie, while the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie stressed the difficulty of predicting the future 
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because of the economic crisis. The working class emphasized 
different points, with the fathers paying attention to the 
role of education in securing a good future, and the mothers 
stressing that the future is in God's hands. Fewer of them 
believe in the positive role in securing the future of their 
children than are to be found in any other class. 
Yet another class specific response can be identified, mainly 
in the responses of big and new petty bourgeoisie, which is 
their vision of their children's future, in terms of 
emigrating abroad and making their future outside Egypt. This 
was expressed by one in ten of the new petty bourgeoisie 
fathers and nearly a quarter of big bourgeoisie fathers. These 
two classes could see their children's future in a wider 
perspective which extends beyond the Egyptian society to 
abroad. This emphasizes the power of the cultural capital of 
these two classes which appears as a strong asset which can 
secure them and their children a future at the local and 
international level. This picture can be further illustrated 
when we look at the working class, who expressed their views 
of their own, that their children 'have no future', and that 
what they can predict is derived from the very harsh 
conditions they live in today. This was the opinion of nearly 
half the fathers and over a quarter of the mothers. This kind 
of harsh response reflects both economic and cultural 
deprivation. 
The responses of members from different class positions 
reflect one of the characters of the cultural aspects of the 
class formation, which is the duality between the secular and 
the religious thought in perceiving the present and the 
future. This duality can be identified in the respondents' 
perceptions of the future as influenced by secular factors, 
such as education and economics, as well as by religious 
factors, which is God's will. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to study the actual provision of 
education, not only how it is distributed quantitatively, but 
also in qualitative terms, i.e. the dynamics of ideological 
and cultural aspects which have an influence on the cultural 
level of class formation. From the discussions in this 
chapter, some concluding remarks can be drawn. 
(A) Social Advance and the Power of Cultural Capital 
From the analysis of people's perspectives of opportunities 
for social advancement, and the factors which are responsible' 
for advancement, some class cultural differences can be 
identified. 
The working class is conscious of the lack of 
opportunities which are available to their children, and 
they have a clear vision as to whether those 
opportunities exist or not. The bourgeois classes 
perceive they have good opportunities at the local level, 
in the school and local residential area. However, they 
recognise that they have less opportunities at the 
broader, societal level, because they know that others 
have higher incomes, social relations and contacts, and 
more power than themselves. 
When members of the sample were asked to arrange the 
factors affecting social advance in order of importance, 
the bourgeois classes put social and cultural factors 
such as religious belief and education above economic 
factors. Both the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie expressed the view that having money alone 
is not enough to secure social advancement. Indeed, on 
this point they criticized developments in the seventies, 
which enabled uneducated people to make a lot of money. 
They believe that money without cultural awareness cannot 
secure social advance. These two classes, which the 
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profile of the sample shows are those which have both 
high incomes and a high level of education, would appear 
to wish to maintain a distance between themselves and 
those who have only economic, but not cultural, capital. 
- 	 It has been argued that the seventies, with the open door 
policy, capitalist market and consumer boom, led to an 
increased emphasis on money as the only important thing. 
The responses of the bourgeois classes in the sample, 
however, indicate the exact opposite, and show the 
importance which these classes attach to education and 
being cultured. 
- 	 The working class attach more importance to economic 
factors in social advancement than any other class. This 
does not mean that they do not attach any importance to 
cultural aspects. 
In general terms, the cultural power of the family background, 
religion and education are very clear and important factors 
for the new petty and big bourgeoisie and to a certain extent 
to the traditional petty bourgeoisie, who probably still 
emphasize the economic factor with the working class, but 
their views are held back by religious views. 
(B) The Unequal Division of Educational Opportunities and 
Class Reproduction 
The discussion has shown the unequal division of education 
between different class positions. The inequality appears in 
the kind of education that children from different class 
positions can enter, and the level of education they can 
reach. If one looks at that distribution on a class basis, one 
finds that all kinds of fee-paying education are effectively 
dominated by the new petty and big bourgeoisie, with a limited 
share from the traditional petty bourgeoisie, and the complete 
exclusion of the working class. 
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If one looks in particular at the working class education, 
some important characteristics which reflect the limited and 
low standard of the education they receive can be noticed. 
- the highest level their children reached is technical 
secondary education, for only 6.3 per cent of their 
children, without any representation at university level. 
- The working class have children in some categories which 
are exclusive to them like children who dropped out of 
the school after four years (12.5 per cent) and 
uneducated girls who are married (8.3 per cent), while 
the working class share with the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie the category of children who go to work after 
primary level (10.4 per cent for the working class, 5 per 
cent for the traditional petty bourgeoisie). 
At university level, quite a large proportion of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and traditional petty bourgeoisie reach 
university, while the working class children are completely 
absent, and the maximum they reach is technical secondary 
education. Beside the high representation of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie children in all kinds of fee 
paying education, these children enjoy more opportunities 
through the cultural capital of the family which represents 
itself in affording more types of non-formal education like 
reading books, travel and sports, while part of the working 
class children spend their leisure time of the summer holiday 
in working to increase family income. 
The differences in the division of education opportunities has 
its qualitative implications which go beyond the quantitative 
one, whereby this mechanism of division of the education 
system works to reproduce the unequal class structure of 
society. The dynamics of reproduction was explained by 
Althusser, that students leave education at different levels 
and after spending different lengths of time at school. They 
leave school 'provided' with the ideology which suits the role 
they have to play in class society. So, according to the 
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explicit, unequal division of education, the children of the 
working class either drop out of school and join the world of 
work and become unskilled workers, or at best they reach 
technical education and become semi-skilled workers. The 
children of the three bourgeois classes usually carry on to 
the university level and then occupy the middle class 
positions of employees and professionals. 
(C) Class Membership and Demand for Type and Level of 
Education 
The type of demand for education of the three bourgeois 
classes lies in different types of fee-paying education. In 
reality the big bourgeoisie could achieve their demands and 
send their children to fee-paying education, while the new 
petty bourgeoisie to a large extent could achieve that, and 
the traditional petty bourgeoisie could to a limited extent 
to send their children to fee-paying education. Other kinds 
of education, such as technical education, were rejected by 
the new petty and big bourgeoisie as a type of education for 
their children, since they consider it as a second chance: the 
working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie did not 
show any prejudice against this type of education. 
In terms of continuation of education, respondents from 
different class positions wanted their children to go to the 
university. University education is over loaded with moral, 
cultural and economic values. 
Respondents demands and choice of certain types of education 
and their rejection of others, reflect two important points: 
- The present researcher would suggest that there will be a 
high level of frustration among the working class, who want 
university education for their children, while in reality the 
best their children achieve is technical secondary education. 
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- Class awareness of its identity at the cultural and 
ideological level tends to get clearer when approached via 
educational issues, where the choice and demand for education 
shows a clear distinction between academic and university 
education as 'middle class education' and technical 'working 
class education'. 
(D) The duality of the Education System and Class Cultural 
Integration: 
Discussions with the respondents around the value of different 
types of education and why people would choose certain types 
and reject others reflected class cultural tension created by 
the existing duality between Arabic/foreign, 
technical/academic and secular/religious education. 
The cultural tension and conflict appears in the choice 
between foreign education and government language education 
and between secular and religious education. This tension 
mainly exists among the new petty bourgeoisie who find 
themselves in contradiction between what they should do as a 
Muslim in terms of educating their children in religion and 
what they actually do and educate their children according to 
the modern needs of society. This conflict does not exist 
among all class positions where, for example, the big 
bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie are clear 
about their choice of foreign education and have no cultural 
conflict about it. These differences among social classes in 
that matter reflect one of the contradictions of the class 
formation at the cultural level. That is, members from 
different class positions were clear about what constitutes 
middle class education and what they consider to be working 
class education which reflects a more defined class identity. 
However, this integration and identity seemed divided when 
respondents discussed and made decisions which involved their 
religious belief where the conflict between secular/religious 
and modern/traditional appears, and where different classes 
are divided between those who suffer the conflict and those 
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who do not. 
(E) Educational Practices and the Power of Cultural Capital 
The study of educational practices has involved the following 
points: 
- parents' evaluation of positive and negative aspects of 
their children's school, 
- parents' relation with the school and the role of 
parents' committee, 
- parents' evaluation of school knowledge, and 
- parents' views about extra tuition given to their 
children. 
Parents' Evaluation of the Positive and Negative Aspects of 
School 
In terms of the evaluation of the positive and negative 
aspects of their children's school, some class differences can 
be identified. For the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie who have their children in foreign language 
schools, they believe that their children are getting a high 
standard of education in terms of the content of the subjects 
they study, especially in foreign languages. However, they 
complain that their children are not getting enough religious 
studies and school activities are neglected. Those who have 
their children in government language schools believe that 
their children are getting a balanced education in Arabic, 
religion and a foreign language. However, they are not 
satisfied with the standard of teaching foreign languages in 
these schools and believe that the standards are better in 
foreign language schools. This reflects the frustration of 
those elements of the new petty bourgeoisie who wish to 
educate their children in what they consider a 'proper' 
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foreign language in a foreign school. 
When the new petty and big bourgeoisie speak about the 
standard of education they mean general things including, 
discipline, quality of teachers, the social background of the 
children and the content of the subjects they study. It is 
worth noting that parents who consider that the content of the 
subjects in foreign language schools is higher than that in 
Arabic schools mainly attribute this to the language of 
instruction, where the content of subjects in the two types 
of schools is the same. This positive attitude towards 
instruction in foreign language is reinforced in their belief 
that mastering a foreign language is the mark of being well 
educated and cultured. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, their views about their 
children's school depend upon the type of school they have for 
their children. Those who have their children in foreign 
language or government language school reflect the same 
attitude as the new petty and big bourgeoisie, while those who 
have their children in free Arabic Schools share the same 
views with the working class who complain that their children 
are getting a low standard of teaching, bad school results, 
and teachers who are not giving children enough academic and 
social care. 
Parents Relations with the School and the Relative Power of 
both Economic and Cultural Capital 
Discussions with respondents from different class positions 
showed some class differences in relations with the school at 
the personal level represented in direct parent/teacher 
relations and at the collective level represented in the 
parents' committee influence. 
At the personal level of the relation, it seems that the new 
petty bourgeoisie are able to follow up their children's 
performance at school but with a considerable level of tension 
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and challenge to teachers. In the case of the big bourgeoisie 
the problem in relation with the school appears when the 
family has the economic capital but not the cultural capital 
to deal with teachers and in this case teachers feel more 
dominant. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class may 
avoid contacting teachers and send their educated children to 
deal with them, which reinforces the point of having the 
cultural capital to deal with teachers. 
At the level of collective relations with the school as it 
appears in the role of the parents' committee, it seems that 
the cultural capital retreats and gives way to the economic 
capital to operate, since schools are mainly suffering from 
shortage of resources. Consequently, the big bourgeoisie are 
more confident about their power and their relation with the 
school. While the new petty bourgeoisie are more powerful in 
their individual position to argue with teacher, they are not 
at the same level of power as the big bourgeoisie in their 
collective power, which is to a large extent influenced by 
their economic power. 
For the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class, 
their collective action at school is very limited especially 
for the working class who believe that the committee is not 
their business since they cannot afford what the school asks 
for. 
Parents' Critique of the School Knowledge and the Influence 
of Cultural Capital 
Parents' critique of the school knowledge is represented in 
their views about the curriculum that their children study at 
school. 
The views of respondents from different class positions show 
that they believe that all kinds of knowledge that children 
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get at school are very important in forming the child's 
mentality and knowledge. However, the content of most of the 
subjects was criticized by the new petty and big bourgeoisie. 
They mainly criticized subjects which, according to Althusser, 
have an explicit ideological message. According to Althusser, 
these are language and religion - Arabic and religion in the 
case of Egypt. They criticized the moral and ideological 
messages coming from these subjects which they evaluate as 
intimidating children and not helping to emancipate them from 
superstition. The critique of other subjects which have less 
explicit ideological messages, such as science and 
mathematics, concentrates on the organisation of the 
curriculum in terms of the size of the curriculum and its 
distribution through different education levels. 
Basic education subjects were seen as irrelevant and they 
considered this kind of education as more suitable for 
children in rural environments. The views of the new petty and 
big bourgeoisie on different subjects reflect how the 
practical ideology representing itself in the explicit 
transmission of knowledge at school produces ideological 
effect in the form of parental attitudes and beliefs towards 
school knowledge. That is, in spite of the fact of the 
movement of basic education which aims at introducing 
integrated studies of academic and practical studies, members 
of the new petty and big bourgeoisie in particular still 
recognise school knowledge as divided between abstract 
academic subjects for the able talented students, and 
practical, technical subjects for less able students, mainly 
in rural areas. The traditional petty bourgeoisie did not 
introduce as wide a range of criticism as the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie. The parents have limited 
access to school knowledge which is influenced by their own 
level of education. The point which can be noticed about the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie is their division about basic 
education. It was seen by those who have their children in 
fee-paying schools from the same perspective as the new petty 
and big bourgeoisie, as irrelevant. But those who have their 
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children in free government school tend to see it in a 
positive way, that is, they see practical studies in basic 
education as important in absorbing children's energy and 
directing their activities to such productive practice. 
The working class are almost excluded from the issue of 
evaluating school knowledge. However those who are more 
literate have different views about the complicated and 
difficult science and mathematics curricula. They consider the 
difficulty as a way to eliminate their children from 
education. The same point was seen by the new petty and big 
bourgeoisie in the context of developing and modernizing the 
curriculum. That is, it was thought that difficult curricula 
are a mistake in educational design. So, these views are 
reinforcing the importance of the cultural capital and how it 
works as a cultural power which may influence what is to be 
considered as 'relevant' or 'irrelevant' school knowledge and 
what is to be considered as a 'high' or 'low' standard of 
knowledge. 
Extra Tuition 
Extra tuition given to children reflects some of the economic 
and cultural aspects of the class formation in economic terms. 
When extra tuition is given in private lessons, this reflects 
the economic power of those who can afford it for their 
children, in particular the big and the new petty bourgeoisie. 
It reflects as well the heavy investment and sacrifice by the 
new petty bourgeoisie to educate their children, where they 
expect both cultural and economic return for this spending - 
cultural return in the form of being well educated and 
mastering a foreign language and economic return in terms of 
being able to work in the foreign sector. 
Extra tuition also reflects the family cultural capital, where 
the new petty and big bourgeoisie in particular are able to 
use their own education background to afford more help for 
their children and to provide them with a wide range of help 
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in different subjects. The children of the working class are 
deprived of both parental help and private tuition, while the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie could secure for their children 
a standard of help which is better than that of the working 
class. 
Extra tuition and the help that children get from their 
parents reinforces the issue of how the education system is 
an important force in the process of class reproduction, 
through family cultural capital, where children from new petty 
and big bourgeoisie background are inheriting from their 
families more cultural competences and skills which are 
important for school achievement and of which working class 
children are deprived. 
(F) Children's Future 
Members from different class positions have an image of their 
children's future influenced by religious, economic and 
educational factors. The religious belief appears when people 
answer that future is in God's hand, so one cannot give 
predictions about it. The economic crisis of the society 
appeared as an obstacle for perceiving the future and giving 
any expectations about how children's futures are going to be, 
since the economic crisis allows for no job opportunities. 
Education appeared as a factor which is going to influence 
children's futures, especially in the view of the bourgeois 
classes who have strong belief that education will qualify 
their children and allow them to secure their future by 
finding a job, while the working class are not that sure about 
how education can help their children because of the 
difficulties that their children have at school. 
Another view of the future was that emigration was a 
possibility for the future of their children. This was mainly 
introduced by the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie, while the working class was the only group which 
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had a very pessimistic vision of the future, since they could 
not see anybody taking responsibility for the future of their 
children. The serious pressure of the economic problem, the 
difficulties in educating their children and unemployment had 
led them to this expectation. 
If one looks at the factors which influence people's vision 
of the present opportunities for social advance and their 
image of their children's future, it seems that the main 
factors which influence people's perceptions in the present 
and the future are the same. These are the religious, cultural 
and economic factors. One difference which can be identified 
is the influence of the religious factors in perceiving the 
present, where it works as an incentive for achievement and 
for good behaviour while in perceiving the future, the 
religious factor seemed to prevent people from thinking about 
the future, and they tend to be fatalistic. 
The responses of the new petty bourgeoisie, in particular at 
the level of education practices, proved what was suggested 
in Chapter Seven, that their class identity becomes clearer 
when they discuss educational issues where they clearly 
identify what is middle class education and what is working 
class education. This picture gets arises from the results of 
this chapter, where it was shown that the new petty 
bourgeoisie invest heavily in their children's education in 
foreign language and government language school, and they 
sacrifice to provide them with extra help for private tuition 
which is a big burden for some fractions of this class, 
especially the government employees. This gives an indication 
of the importance of education for this class. 
However, the picture of clear class identity around education 
is not that simple, where contradictions among the new petty 
bourgeoisie can be identified. That is, the choice between 
religious and secular education, where this class is divided 
in their feeling between those who find no problem in the 
choice of foreign education while for others it provokes a 
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personal cultural conflict between what they think they should 
do as Muslims and what the necessities of modern life force 
them to do. However, the choice at the end goes to secular 
education in foreign language or government language schools. 
At the level of education practices, it seems that the 
cultural capital of the new petty bourgeoisie is their main 
asset where it allows them to follow up their children at 
school, give them extra help in study, and provide them with 





The conclusion of this thesis will illustrate some important 
theoretical issues and will present further discussion of the 
findings of the research. This will include the following 
points: 
I. 	 An overview of theoretical and conceptual issues, 
II. The changing Egyptian political and ideological scene and 
its effect on economic, political and educational 
systems, 
III. The cultural dynamics of Egypt's complex class formation, 
and 
IV. Class based perspectives of education present and future. 
The latter includes the following points: 
A. The importance of education for society. 
B. The unequal provision of education and its implications 
for class reproduction. 
C. Education practices and their implications for political 
power and class cultural capital. 
D. The duality of the education system and its influence on 
cultural integration. 
E. A class based critique of education policies and their 
role in underlying class conflict. 
F. Images of the future. 
G. Class alliances and possibilities of social action and 
their implication for the class formation. 
V. 	 Suggestions for further future studies. 
I. 	 An Overview of Some Theoretical and Conceptual Issues 
The main aim of this research has been to study the influence 
of the class formation of urban Egypt on the level of policy 
of education and on the popular level of access, control and 
educational practices. The study of this subject is attempting 
to break new ground by looking at social class and education 
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in urban Egypt. Because of the small sample size, it is not 
possible to draw quantitative conclusions concerning the 
distribution of educational opportunities, nor to generalize 
any of the findings of the present research. This study does, 
however, offer a new qualitative insight into the influence 
of social class and ideology on ordinary people's perspectives 
on economic, social and educational matters. Social class in 
this research is conceptualized as more than a matter of 
economic relations. It is also a matter of culture, ideology 
and common sense. The field of this research is needed to 
provide an account of these elements in Egypt, since the 
literature of sociological and educational studies neglects 
these aspects. In sociological research, and in social class 
studies, there is more concern with the study of class at the 
economic level. When the superstructure is addressed, the main 
point is usually the political power of classes, while class 
cultures, ideologies and common sense receive little 
attention. 
In educational research, there is little class based analysis 
of educational policies and when class is addressed it is 
studied in a way which neglects important cultural and 
ideological issues. In the educational literature, human 
capital theory is more likely to be employed. Its stress is 
upon the importance of educational expansion as a means to 
attack poverty, achieve full employment and contribute to 
economic and social development. However this approach 
neglects important aspects such as the study of the unequal 
provision of education, the role of education in reproducing 
the class society and the role of class cultural capital in 
influencing education opportunities. This thesis is concerned 
with these gaps. It attempts to contribute to some areas, such 
as the class formation of Egypt, and to emphasize the cultural 
and ideological level, by introducing a field study of popular 
perspectives and analyzing education policy in relation to the 
state and its class nature. All this is done against the 
background of Egypt as a peripheral society. 
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The design of the research to cover all these areas has 
encountered two main analytical difficulties. The first one 
is the difficulty of applying concepts which are problematic 
in nature, and the debate around them has not yet been 
resolved. These include the relationship between base and 
superstructure and the relationship between class culture and 
consciousness and class objective position at the economic 
base. Other concepts are difficult to apply to the specific 
case of Egypt as a peripheral society. An example is the 
concept of state relative autonomy, where views are divided 
between those who consider state in third world countries as 
autonomous and those who speak about the relative autonomy of 
these state. This was discussed in Chapter Three. 
The second analytical difficulty comes from the dependent 
development of sociological and educational research on 
western literature. This means that the research has to be 
careful in applying some concepts developed in different 
societies and cultures, since the Arab literature did not 
develop its own theories and concepts. It has been impossible 
to neglect the development of concepts in a literature which 
is essentially international. However, throughout the 
sociological analysis in this research, an attempt has been 
made to relate the concepts of state, culture, ideology and 
class to the specific nature of society in Egypt. This 
research has applied a neo-Marxist approach to the study of 
education and society. 
II. The Changing Egyptian Political and Ideological Scene,  
and its Effect on Economic, Political and Educational Systems  
The analysis of the influence of class formation on education 
in urban Egypt was performed against the background of the 
changing politics and ideologies which influenced the economic 
system and policies of education. 
After the 1952 Revolution, under Nasser, Egypt witnessed 
changes in its political and economic system. Political 
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parties were abolished and replaced by a one party system. 
Economic measures taken included agrarian reform. However, the 
serious economic change came in 1961 with the nationalization 
programme, and the first development plan. All this was done 
against the background of new ideologies of socialism and 
equality. The state as a leading figure for such changes and 
enjoyed a considerable amount of power and autonomy. 
Education came as an important part of the development plan 
and the wide movement of social change. Under Nasser's 
socialist policies, education was expanded in a mass education 
movement, the duality of primary education was abolished, 
university education became free and foreign education was 
taken under the state control. These changes in the education 
policies meant increasing state involvement in education and 
they reflect the kind of class alliance that the state worked 
for, where under Nasser these policies benefited the workers, 
farmers and the middle classes. In spite of these 
achievements, education under Nasser still suffered from drop 
out, low enrolment levels, differences between rural and urban 
areas and shortage of resources. 
In the seventies, under Sadat, new policies and ideologies 
were introduced in the form of the open door policy which 
opened the Egyptian economy to private and foreign investment. 
The political system was changed to a multi-party system. The 
new policies and ideologies of the open door policy had their 
social consequences where they widened the gap between 
classes, worked for the benefit of the middle and upper 
classes and could not attack poverty. At the political level, 
in spite of the multi-party system, there was no widening of 
the base for more popular participation and democracy. The 
policies increased Egypt's debts and dependency on the West. 
Education policies were changed under these new ideologies and 
policies, where private fee paying schools increased, the 
government established its own fee paying schools, the 
government languages schools, to satisfy the demands of the 
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middle class, basic education was introduced as working class 
education, academic secondary education was controlled and 
technical secondary education increased, and university 
education was controlled with the continuation of problems of 
drop out, low enrolment and the gap between rural and urban 
Egypt. 
These educational characteristics demonstrate that education 
in Egypt reflects the same education crisis as in other 
developing countries, where the expansion of formal education 
did not solve problems of unemployment, attack poverty or 
bring more equal opportunities. The education system in Egypt 
is marked by class features reflected in the drop out, 
differences between rural and urban areas, the duality between 
foreign and Arabic education and the different social value 
for technical and academic education. 
These class features of the education system have their 
historical roots dating back to Muhammad Aly (1805-1848) who 
introduced modern education to Egypt as part of his 
modernization plan. However his education policy was not a 
mass education movement, rather it was an elitist system to 
produce the professionals and bureaucrats needed to run his 
modern projects in industry, the army, and agriculture. 
Education created a wide cultural gap in society between who 
are educated and the illiterate majority and between those who 
were educated in traditional religious schools and those who 
educated in the modern secular system. 
Under the British occupation (1882-1920) education 
opportunities were limited, free education abolished and the 
education budget was severely cut, which increased the elitist 
nature of the system where the middle and upper classes were 
the only people who could pay for their children's education. 
Taking this history in account, Egypt since the early 
nineteenth century has had a continuous struggle for 
developing and modernizing society. Education comes as central 
to these efforts which were made in a context of persisting 
economic and political crisis mediated by a complex class 
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formation and a central role for the state. 
III. The Cultural Dynamics of Egypt's Complex Class Formation 
Egypt is conceptualized as a peripheral society structured by 
social classes whose formation is complex and in a state of 
flux. The features of the complexity of the class formation 
can be identified from the findings of the empirical study and 
can be analyzed and understood in the light of the dynamics 
of Egyptian culture. The complex features of Egypt's class 
formation can be partly identified from the clear class 
differences in the outside appearance in the way that people 
from different class positions dress and speak, in their ways 
of life, and in their level of education and income. Other 
features of the class formation can be identified by looking 
at the following aspects: 
(i) How people identify their own class position, (ii) the 
images they have of society, (iii) their understanding and 
explanation of class differences, and (iv) their economic and 
political interests. 
(i) In terms of identifying their own class position the 
results of the empirical study show that the three bourgeois 
classes have mainly concentrated themselves at the level of 
middle-middle class. This means that members of the big 
bourgeoisie may not identify themselves at a different level 
from members of the traditional petty bourgeoisie in spite of 
the differences in the economic level in terms of the size of 
ownership and employing other people. This result has led the 
research to the conclusion of the weak development of class 
identity among the bourgeoisie classes. In addition the three 
bourgeoisie classes find it difficult to identify who 
constitute the middle class and who are the poor of society, 
while the working class are clear about their own class 
position as the poor of society. However, their class 
consciousness comes from a limited view of their everyday 
economic suffering. Other aspects of class identity seem more 
clearly formulated when the three bourgeois classes discuss 
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educational issues, where they are clear about what 
constitutes middle class education and what constitutes 
working class education. 
(ii) In identifying the class formation of Egypt there is a 
consensus among members from different class positions that 
people in society are unequal and that differences between 
them are very large. However, when it comes with models of 
society they have in mind, they introduce a diversity of 
images of society which range from models of two classes to 
models of five classes, with everything in between. 
(iii) Members from different class positions understand class 
differences in income, standard of living, being poor or rich, 
in two different ways. Firstly they may understand differences 
as created by God. Secondly they may understand them as 
created by social tensions and conflicts in society. This 
division between secular and religious explanation can be 
found across the social formation. 
(iv) In terms of the economic and political interests there 
is a division between and inside the same social class, in 
particular the three bourgeois classes, about the benefits 
they gained in the sixties and seventies. The working class 
are almost united in their view that they were better off in 
the sixties. 
These aspects of the cultural and ideological level of class 
formation reflect different perceptions and ideologies. This 
is expected according to the theoretical discussion, which 
highlighted the fact that people may have diverse ideologies 
and interests because of the complexity of their culture, 
where political, social and economic factors are working 
together. The following is an analysis of the cultural 
dynamics which stand behind these different perspectives and 
ideologies. 
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The aspects of cultural dynamics which will be analyzed are 
built on the theoretical framework of this research and 
include: 
a) State power and social class formation 
b) Economic and ideological changes in the seventies 
c) The dichotomy of the Egyptian culture between religious and 
secular thought. 
a) State power and social class formation: 
The weak class identity and the difficulty of the bourgeois 
classes in identifying who are the middle class and who are 
the poor, beside the division in their economic and political 
interests, can all be understood from two perspectives. The 
first one is a historical perspective of Egypt's integration 
in the world capitalist economy, which influenced the class 
formation of Egypt. The second is the state power and class 
relations. 
In historical perspective, Egypt as a peripheral society 
was integrated in the world capitalist system. The Egyptian 
bourgeoisie, in the first phase of the system, was allowed, 
according to the international division of labour, to invest 
mainly in agriculture not in industry. In the second phase of 
the system the bourgeoisie was allowed to invest in industry 
in the mode of import substitution. This situation created a 
weak bourgeoisie and divided the working class. So, the 
Egyptian class formation since the second world war is marked 
by a fragmentation and weakness in the formation of the two 
fundamental classes in society, which did not allow for the 
development of a clear identity for the bourgeoisie, nor for 
the working class who did not have the opportunity to work in 
large organised industry. 
In the recent history of Egypt, in particular since the 1952 
Revolution, the development of class power and consciousness 
can be understood in relation to state power. That is, from 
the theoretical analysis, it was seen that the state in the 
sixties enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy and the 
political society which include the state, the army and the 
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government has developed more than the civil society which 
includes political parties, schools and mass media. Under 
these circumstances the political power of social classes, in 
terms of developing political parties and corporate 
organisation, did not develop to a clear class identity for 
the bourgeoisie, nor for the working class who have no strong 
unions to defend their interests. 
b) Economic and ideological changes in the seventies: with the 
introduction of a multi-party system the power is still 
concentrated in the hands of the government party and gives 
very little room for the opposition parties to express 
different ideologies from those of the government. The 
policies of the seventies created fragmented class interests 
inside the same social class and did not allow for the 
development of coherent class interests. Besides that, the 
policies in the seventies created new social strata which 
gained economic power, such as, craftsmen and those who work 
in the parasitic activities, which changed the class formation 
of Egypt and made it difficult to identify in such a formation 
who became middle and who went down to the poor position. 
However some class alliances may occur in the future between 
these segments, as will be explained later. 
The diversity in the development of class consciousness which 
was referred to earlier, in the form of people being more 
conscious and having a class identity developed around 
educational issues more than political and economic one, can 
be explained in the context of the development of civil 
society. In the analysis it was mentioned that the civil 
society, which includes education institutions, did not 
develop at the same rate as the political society. However, 
education institutions in this system developed in a way which 
made their class nature and identity very clear, where modern 
education in Egypt started as an elite system which emphasized 
the class and cultural differences between the educated 
minority and the illiterate majority. In addition to that, the 
system has developed in part away from state control, in the 
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form of foreign and missionary schools which form upper class 
education institutions, added to the class nature of the 
system. So, an early middle and upper class identity clustered 
around education. At the same time working class and farmers' 
education was mainly confined to apprenticeship and Kuttab 
education. At the present time, the same class nature of 
education has continued, in spite of the mass education 
movement which started under Nasser. 
c) The dichotomy of the Egyptian culture between religious and 
secular thought is another factor which adds to the complexity 
of the cultural dynamics of Egypt. This appears in 
respondents' understandings of class differences and the 
images of the future which they have, which are strongly 
divided between secular and religious visions. The dichotomy 
between the two streams of thought exists inside any one 
social class, and between social classes. This may indicate 
tensions, conflicts and disagreements about the way to develop 
and modernize society, but it may also indicate novel ways in 
which alliances could form between segments of different 
social classes. There is a division in Egypt between the 
traditionalists who want to revive the old traditions of Islam 
and the modernists who believe tat Egypt must not be isolated 
from the developments in the Western World. 
IV. Class Based Perspectives of Education Present and Future 
The class based perspectives of education cover general and 
specific educational issues. The general issues are concerned 
with education and society, which includes the importance of 
education for society, policies of the sixties and seventies 
and the debate around free and fee paying education. 
The specific issues are concerned with people's own relation 
with the education system, i.e. education practices, which 
includes parents' relations with the school, their critique 
of school knowledge, provision of education, control and power 
over education. 
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The analysis of these issues raises some important theoretical 
points about the class formation, political power, cultures 
and ideologies in Egypt. 
(A) The Importance of Education for Society 
There is a consensus among members from different class 
positions that education is very important and essential for 
any society which seeks to develop and modernize itself. This 
is an important finding about the value of education because 
there have been speculations that, in the seventies and 
because of the new ideologies of the open door policy, 
education lost its value, where people could earn money from 
activities which needed no qualifications (black market). The 
result suggests the opposite, where there is a strong demand 
for education from different class positions, and those who 
are outside education are not there by choice. They are the 
children of the working class who are excluded from education 
because of the bias of the system against them. The seventies 
increased the marginalisation of the working class in 
education. Parents have to carry more financial burden to 
educate their children, and since they cannot afford it, they 
are more likely to withdraw their children. In fact the 
seventies increased demand for certain types of education, in 
particular foreign and private schools, which widened the 
education gap between classes. 
Another indication about the importance of education and other 
cultural factors, compared with the economic aspect, comes 
when people speak about social advance. Members from different 
class positions have indicated that economic factors are 
important in social advance. However, for the new petty and 
big bourgeoisie, economic factors did not exceed the cultural 
factors such as family background and education, where they 
considered that, economic capital alone is not enough for 
social advance, unless one also has cultural capital. The 
traditional petty bourgeoisie emphasized cultural aspects but 
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less than the new petty and big bourgeoisie while the working 
class stressed the economic factor, where they were influence 
by their severe economic problems and deprivation. 
(B) The Unequal Provision of Education and its Implications 
for Class Reproduction 
The distribution of education opportunities according to 
levels and kinds of education is reflecting social and 
cultural indications which go behind the simple quantitative 
distribution. 
The study of kinds and levels of education afforded to 
children from different class positions gives a clear 
indication of the unequal division of education opportunities, 
where the children of the new petty and big bourgeoisie are 
highly represented in all kinds of fee paying and foreign 
education and a substantial percentage of the new petty 
bourgeoisie children can reach the university. Working class 
children of the sample are excluded from university education; 
at maximum they reach technical secondary school and the rate 
of drop out, and joining the world of work after primary level 
is very high among them. The traditional petty bourgeoisie 
are in a middle position between the new petty bourgeoisie and 
the working class. That is, when they have the economic 
capital, they can afford fee paying education for their 
children. A substantial number of their children reach the 
university. At the same time they share with the working 
class, but to a smaller degree, sending their children to 
technical secondary school or they may join the world of work 
after primary level. 
The distribution of education opportunities among the sample 
provides an explicit example of the role of education in class 
reproduction. The children of the new petty and big 
bourgeoisie carry on to reach the highest level of education, 
and to graduate as professionals and reproduce the middle 
class position. The working class children who drop out or 
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leave school after primary level and participate in the world 
of work, fill the position of the working class. The 
traditional petty bourgeoisie in their middle position have 
better opportunities than the working class, where they can 
afford fee paying education and send their children to higher 
education, so they can move to the position of the middle 
class. 
(C) Educational Practices and their Implications for 
Political Power and Class Cultural Capital 
"Educational practices" mean three things. First: parents' 
immediate relations with the school. Second: parents' critique 
of school knowledge and different strategies they follow to 
allow more education opportunities for their children. Third: 
the level of system and policy of education where one can 
study which social groups have influence and control over 
education. 
Parents' immediate relations with the school highlight the 
importance of cultural capital in education practices. For 
example, parents' cultural capital is very important in 
appropriating more education opportunities for their children 
through the help hey can give to them in different subjects. 
The big bourgeoisie share with the new petty bourgeoisie the 
ability to teach their children by using their own cultural 
capital, and if they do not have it, they can buy private 
lessons using their economic power. The working class children 
are deprived of both opportunities of help through parents and 
private lessons. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie are in a middle position 
between the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class. Since 
they are not educated to the level of the new petty 
bourgeoisie, the help they can afford for their children is 
limited. At the same time they are not as deprived as the 
working class, so they can afford extra tuition organized by 
the school or private lessons. 
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The other aspect of education practice where the cultural 
capital shows up is the critique of the school knowledge. It 
is a direct and clear example of the importance of cultural 
capital where the working class are almost excluded from the 
issue. The critique of school knowledge goes behind the 
explicit cultural differences to the dynamics of practical 
ideology which are represented in the explicit transmission 
of knowledge at school, where it produces its ideological 
effect in parents' attitudes and beliefs about school 
knowledge. Parents still recognise school knowledge as being 
divided into two cultures: the culture which is presented in 
technical education for the less able students and the high 
culture of abstract knowledge for talented students. 
Education practices at the level of control and power over 
education are concerned with who should have authority and 
power to solve and deal with education problems and who can 
actually influence the policy of education. The discussion 
reveals two important points, one concerning the approach to 
reform in education and the other concerning class alliances 
over educational issues. 
In terms of the approach to reform in education the new petty 
and big bourgeoisie mainly stress that the government has 
responsibility, as the only competent authority which can 
solve and deal with education problems. The traditional petty 
bourgeoisie and the working class stressed co-operation 
between people and the government. These views can be analyzed 
on the light of how political power is distributed and how 
political organizations function in Egypt. The views of the 
new petty and big bourgeoisie reflect the nature of political 
practice in Egypt, where the state and the government have 
considerable control over decision making. At the same time, 
the role of political parties and other civil society 
organizations such as unions and syndicates is weak, and 
people may have little faith in their power and ability to 
achieve anything. 
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The view of the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working 
class, that there is a need for co-operation between people 
and government, may reflect the nature of life in alley (Hara) 
community where help and co-operation is part of their daily 
relations. 
The other important point which power and authority over 
education reflect concerns class alliance. People from 
different class positions have identified politicians, 
ministers of education and senior officials as having the real 
power and authority over the policy of education more than any 
other group. Only a minority has identified other groups, like 
businessmen and craftsmen, as having influence through their 
money. 
These views indicate that the identification of social groups 
which have the economic power and capital were not typically 
seen as having control over education. It is worth noting that 
control over education as seen by members of different class 
positions goes mainly to those elements of the new petty 
bourgeoisie represented in the state officials i.e. those who 
are related to the superstructure of the society. In this case 
the question of class alliance, and whether the new petty 
bourgeoisie would ally with the working class or with the big 
bourgeoisie, seems crucial in identifying policies of 
education and in deciding how educational opportunities will 
be divided, and in determining the openness of the system. 
(D) The Duality of the Education System and its Influence on 
Cultural Integration 
The division of the education system between free and fee 
paying schools, Arabic/foreign language schools and between 
technical/academic has its implications for cultural 
integration. The effect of these dichotomies goes beyond the 
economic differences between classes to afford fee paying 
education for their children to deeper cultural conflict. 
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The discussion of the choice of certain types of education and 
the rejection of other types reflects a cultural tension and 
conflict in particular among members of the new petty 
bourgeoisie who want foreign education for their children. At 
the same time they think about religious education and find 
themselves in conflict between what they think they should do 
as Muslims and what modern life demands in the way of secular 
education. 
The conflict does not appear in the case of the big 
bourgeoisie and traditional petty bourgeoisie who have their 
children in foreign education. However, when big and 
traditional petty bourgeoisie evaluate foreign language 
schools they agree with the new petty bourgeoisie that these 
schools neglect religious studies. They evaluate government 
language schools as positive in giving more care to Arabic and 
religion, but they evaluate them negatively in the standard 
of teaching foreign language. This situation leads this 
researcher to argue that the establishment of the model of 
government language school is not just to solve the economic 
problem of the new petty bourgeoisie, who cannot join foreign 
language schools, but also it is the model in which the new 
petty bourgeoisie try to solve the contradictions between 
their religious beliefs and their demand for foreign, secular 
education. 
Because government reforms have focused on the development of 
government language schools, the opportunities for other 
reforms have been minimized. This has harmed the interests of 
the majority of the working class and the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie, who cannot enter the government language schools. 
The divisive effect of foreign language and government 
language schools must, therefore, not be primarily assessed 
in terms of the ability of different groups to pay; rather it 
should be assessed in terms of the overall impact on cultural 
integration. 
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(E) Class Based Critique of Education Policies and its 
Underlying Class Conflict 
The critique of education policies addresses two kinds of 
points; general point about policies of education in the 
sixties and seventies and specific points of educational 
policy concerning the debate around spending on education and 
the free/fee paying debate. The analysis of these points 
illustrates the underlying class conflict and the class of 
class interests between and inside various social classes. 
When the subject of policies of education in the sixties and 
seventies was opened to discussion and critique, the idea was 
that the two policies had different views and ideologies for 
education. As the theoretical discussion illustrated, in the 
early revolutionary period of the fifties and sixties, 
socialist policies were applied in the economic and social 
domains. Education was opened for more lower class positions 
and the policies tended to give more equal opportunities in 
many ways including the big increase of students numbers, the 
unification of primary education and the control of private 
and foreign education. In the seventies policy worked to 
control educational opportunities and to enhance class 
differences in education opportunities by, for example, 
increasing private education and reducing the period of basic 
education. 
With these differences in mind, respondents' evaluation of the 
policies indicate divisions between and inside classes. The 
big and new petty bourgeoisie mainly attacked the sixties as 
having a negative effect on the quality of education because 
of the increasing numbers of students which resulted in the 
unemployment of graduates. Ideas of equal opportunity were 
criticized because they opened education to certain social 
groups who they felt should not be educated, such as workers 
and farmers. However this is not the dominant view among the 
new petty bourgeoisie, where the lower fractions of this class 
who benefited from free education in the sixties and could 
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send their children to the university, support the policies 
of the sixties. 
The view of the traditional petty bourgeoisie mainly supports 
the expansion of education in the sixties, but when they can 
afford fee paying education for their children they tend to 
criticize the sixties in the same manner as the new petty and 
big bourgeoisie. 
The working class mainly support the policies of the sixties, 
where in the seventies they had to bear a higher financial 
burden for the education of their children. 
The attack by the three bourgeois classes on the sixties 
policies concentrated on the ideologies of equal opportunities 
and mass education. This critique is crucial in determining 
how education opportunities are divided in society and which 
educational policies these social classes are going to adopt 
and support. 
Free and fee paying education: the arena of class conflict 
over education: 
This research argues that the most pronounced class 
differences and conflict in education in Egypt today centre 
around the issue of spending on education, and in particular 
the aspect of free and fee paying education. Spending on 
education is provoking a clash of class interests particularly 
on the aspect of free and fee paying education. 
The responses on the issues of fee paying and free education 
has shown different interests between and inside the same 
social class. The new petty bourgeoisie mainly supported fee 
paying education and introduced different models of education 
which divided the system into two parallel system of fee 
paying and free education, or restricted free education to 
certain levels such as primary or secondary level. The lower 
fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie supported free 
education at all levels since free education allowed them to 
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educate their children up to the university level. The big 
bourgeoisie has supported policies and models similar to those 
of the new petty bourgeoisie. The traditional petty 
bourgeoisie like the working class need and support free 
education, but when they can afford fee paying education, they 
support the division of the system between free and fee 
paying. 
At the level of financing education, the educational budget 
and whether the government should spend more or less on 
education, a diversity of views between classes can be 
identified. The new petty and big bourgeoisie supported more 
spending on education. Aspects of spending which they 
supported are different, however. The new petty bourgeoisie 
supported more spending on the primary level, while the big 
bourgeoisie supported more spending on university level and 
technical secondary education. The traditional petty 
bourgeoisie supported more spending in particular at the 
university level. 
The working class supported free education at all levels, but 
did not support more spending by the government. When they 
were asked on which level the government should concentrate 
its spending, they supported a wide range of spending, in 
particular at the university level. 
Preferred sources of revenue indicate the possibility of class 
alliance between the big and traditional petty bourgeoisie, 
who wish to defend their interests and prevent taxes from 
being the source of educational finance. The big bourgeoisie 
suggested that increasing production should be the source for 
finance, so that the burden of taxation is transferred to the 
workers who have to increase production, and hence increase 
surplus value. The traditional petty bourgeoisie suggested 
some restrictions on taxation, like following Islamic law in 
deciding the amount of tax which should be paid. 
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The new petty bourgeoisie and the working class, as wage 
earners, supported more taxes on the rich, in particular 
businessmen and merchants. 
In general, class ideologies on this issue of free and fee 
paying education, and which aspects of education should 
receive more funding, reflect part of the cultural crisis of 
society and presents an indicator of the revival of the old 
forces of thought in society and in education. First, it shows 
how education is used by the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie to divide society into two groups, the elite who 
should be highly educated and the public who should get only 
basic education to create for the big bourgeoisie skilled 
workers and at the same time to perpetuate the cultural 
superiority of the new petty bourgeoisie which they have 
clearly pronounced against other classes in society, such as 
farmers and workers. So, education is used as a means of 
cultural division and different types of education, in 
particular fee paying or free education, are indicators and 
signals of class distance. 
Second, the views of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big 
bourgeoisie reflect the old forces in Egyptian society and in 
education. That is, in the theoretical analysis it was shown 
how education under colonial rule worked to divide society 
between the educated elite and the illiterate masses, and it 
was further explained how policies of Lord Cromer mainly 
abolished free education and encouraged crafts education for 
the masses in the nineteenth century. These old forces are 
coming back in the form of the pressure of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie to abolish free education. 
This position represents the persistent dilemma of the 
Egyptian intellectuals who were divided at the beginning of 
this century over the same points of free and fee paying 
education, and who should be educated. 
The views of the traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect their 
contradictory class position where in many respects they are 
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similar to the working class positions and views, but when 
they have the economic capital they tend to take the 
ideologies of the petty and big bourgeoisie. 
The working class views on spending on education and their 
support for government restrictions on the education budget 
reflect the contradictions in their common sense, where they 
support policies which are expected to harm their interests 
and this shows how they submit to the dominant ideology 
disseminated by the state about Egypt's economic crisis. The 
working class seem to accept that the activities of the state 
are the only practicable solution to the economic crisis. They 
know that the policies harm their interests but acquiesce to 
the view that economic disorder and lose of a sense of 
community will harm them more. 
(F) Images of the Future 
Respondents were asked to look at three issues in futuristic 
terms. These are, the future of the whole society, their 
children's future and their expectations for educational 
future change. 
Two main important characteristics can be discerned. The first 
one is the common ground between people's image of their 
children's future and the whole future of society. This common 
ground appears in the influence of religious and economic 
factors in shaping people's images and visions of the future. 
The religious factor tends to stop people from giving 
predictions about the shape and possibilities of the future 
since it is in God's hands. The economic factor is represented 
in people's awareness of the economic crisis as a major factor 
which may influence society's future. From this vision it 
seems that the fractionalization in class economic interests 
and the incoherence of class interests caused by the open door 
policy, has not prevented people from being aware of the 
economic crisis and its impact on individual and society's 
future. 
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The second character is the tendency of the three bourgeois 
classes, in particular the new petty bourgeoisie, to think of 
the future in positive terms in thinking of solutions for 
society's problem, which gives a sense of concern as to what 
is going on around. This sense did not exist among the working 
class who seem very pessimistic about the future for the whole 
society and for their children. 
Educational future change divided respondents between those 
who believe there will be change and those who do not. The 
view of no change is expressed mainly by the new petty and big 
bourgeoisie. Their views connect education with other problems 
in society, i.e. education is seen as integrated and 
influenced by other problems such as the economic crisis, 
shortage of resources and the conflict to decide government 
priorities which may push education behind other issues. 
The view which anticipates changes in the future covered 
different areas of curriculum, teacher training, expansion of 
certain kinds of education and changes in the policy of 
education towards more fee paying schools. In this general 
picture certain points were emphasized by members from 
different class positions, which reflect class interests. The 
new petty bourgeoisie think of changes towards more science 
and technology which are important in forming the middle 
class. They also think of restricting education opportunities 
through increasing fee paying schools in the future. 
The big and traditional petty bourgeoisie expect the expansion 
of technical secondary schools to satisfy the needs of the 
market for trained labour power. The working class have 
different expectations coming from their problems with the 
system, where they expect private lessons to be suspended and 
that student numbers will increase. 
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(G) Class Alliances and Possibilities for Social Action and 
their Implications for the Class Formation 
In this final point of the conclusion, possible social actions 
and kinds of class alliances in the future will be suggested. 
In order to study that two points will have to be discussed: 
i) to explain how class alliances occur and their implications 
for the study of class formation, and 
ii) to give chosen examples from the field study in the areas 
of economics and educational ideologies in which class 
alliance may occur and 
iii) their implications for the class formation, in particular 
for the new petty bourgeoisie. 
i) Theoretical background for understanding how class 
alliances occur 
The study of class alliances as a move towards the 
transformation of society can be understood in relation to the 
subjects of class cultures and ideologies. That is, in the 
theoretical analysis of the study of social class, Poulantzas 
was aware of the problem of the place of social classes in the 
process of class transformation. From his analysis he tended 
to emphasize with others, such as Hindess, that social 
transformation does not only occur at the level of the mode 
of production, but also class consciousness, the education of 
the masses and organizing them for political action is part 
of the process of transformation. Transforming society is not 
absolutely influenced by powers outside people's control but 
also influenced by people's own ideologies and consciousness. 
So, the study of people's consciousness and ideologies on 
economic, political and educational issues might be helpful 
in giving some indications for class based action. 
However, it is not an easy task to discuss exactly what kind 
of social action different social classes may take in the 
future on social, economic, political and educational issues. 
This difficulty is analyzed by Erik Olin Wright, who explained 
499 
that class struggle does not occur between perfectly 
homogeneously organized classes. Rather in a typical situation 
in a specific class formation, class alliances are possible 
between classes, segments of classes or between contradictory 
class locations. This explains the difficulty of identifying 
precisely which class alliance will occur, where individuals, 
in particular those in contradictory position such as the new 
petty bourgeoisie, have to face the choice between different 
alternative alliances. They may try as individuals to move to 
the position of the exploiters by being owners. They may form 
an alliance with the exploiters in return for some privileges 
such as high salaries. Or they may ally with the popular 
exploited classes, although this is very difficult to achieve 
where the oppressed masses have very little to offer to them. 
In the following point, these possibilities will be discussed 
to show how they may occur in future class alliances in Egypt 
and their implications for class formation. 
ii) Areas of class alliance 
Some key issues in the economic, educational and ideological 
fields might be a subject for class alliance in the future. 
In the economic field, the main issue where class alliance may 
occur is around the open door policy and the market economy, 
where the big bourgeoisie are clear in their positive attitude 
towards these policies. The new petty bourgeoisie are divided 
where some segments of this class benefited and others were 
harmed. The traditional petty bourgeoisie are divided as well, 
where those who work in the service activities have benefited 
more than those who run small businesses, as the discussion 
of class power in Chapter Three has shown. The working class 
were clear in their attitude that they were harmed by the open 
door policies. 
Such a situation shows a division in class interest between 
and inside the same social class. However, class alliances as 
explained earlier may occur between segments from different 
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classes. In this case the secular big bourgeoisie may go into 
alliance with elements from the new petty and traditional 
petty bourgeoisie who benefited from the open door policy. In 
such an alliance the big bourgeoisie will be more united in 
their interests than other classes. The working class might 
be exploited by this coalition or they may unite with other 
oppressed elements. 
In the educational field one can see the main issues where 
class conflict or alliance may occur. If one speculates on 
what kind of educational policies will get the support of 
different classes, one may expect the new petty bourgeoisie 
to support more conservative policies of education working to 
control education opportunities in order not to threaten their 
privileged position and in order not to face the competition 
from the working class in urban and rural Egypt. The lower 
strata of this class are expected to support more 
opportunities and free education. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie from their contradictory 
position might be sceptical about the spread of education, but 
they still find in expanding education good opportunities for 
their children. So, they are the only class which needs to 
make their own calculations since their immediate interests 
conflict with their children's future interest, because 
education is threatening their crafts, but they know that 
education is important for the future generation. So, their 
position will be mainly decided in terms of the way they are 
going to solve that contradiction. In terms of free and fee 
paying education they are divided between those who support 
free education and those who can afford to pay and support 
fee paying education. 
The big bourgeoisie may support policies which open education 
to more people in order to satisfy their needs for qualified 
workers, but still in the form of a dual system of free and 
fee paying, private education. The working class are more 
inclined to support policies which allow for a general 
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increase in opportunities for their children, since education 
is seen by them as element of security. 
These different policies show that the big bourgeoisie are 
united in their support for fee paying education and private 
schools, while both the new petty and traditional petty 
bourgeoisie are divided in their support of fee paying and 
free education. The working class are united in their support 
of free education. In such a situation an alliance may occur 
between the big bourgeoisie and elements of new petty and 
traditional petty bourgeoisie to force the continuation of the 
policy of increasing fee paying schools. In such alliance, the 
big bourgeoisie would seem to be more united as a class than 
the two other parties to the alliance. The working class may 
either submit to that alliance and accept what is offered to 
them of free education or they may ally with the lower strata 
of the new petty bourgeoisie who want free education. 
In ideological and political terms, religion belief comes as 
a key issue for a possible political and ideological alliance 
or confrontation. The importance of religious belief comes 
from its influence upon respondents' perspectives of the 
future and of the solution for present problems. This 
influence can be found across the social formation with some 
differences, where the secular big bourgeoisie are the least 
likely to reply in religious terms. Even so, some religious 
responses are recorded. 
From the previous theoretical analysis it was expected that 
elements of working class and traditional petty bourgeoisie 
would be more likely to express themselves and their 
perspectives in religious terms, since they are less educated 
and more exposed to traditional ways of thinking. The big and 
the new petty bourgeoisie were expected to have more secular 
perspectives due to their exposure to more secular education. 
However, it seems that one must expect religious influence 
across the class formation. In such a situation ideological 
and political alliances may occur between the big bourgeoisie, 
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in particular the Islamic fraction, and segments from new 
petty traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class. 
iii) Implications of class alliances for the class formation: 
These possible class alliances and conflicts have their 
implications for the class formation of Egypt. If one looks 
at the big bourgeoisie who are in the sample of this research, 
and who represent the secular bourgeoisie, one may find a 
beginning of united class interest around economic and 
educational issues. This may be supported by indications from 
the theoretical analysis, that the secular bourgeoisie are 
moving towards more coherence through establishing their own 
organizations. However, the big bourgeoisie has recently 
become divided between secular and religious elements. Those 
religious elements may go into alliance with the religious 
fractions from other classes, and this development has taken 
place in practice in the 1984 and 1987 parliamentary 
elections. 
The traditional petty bourgeoisie represent, in some aspects, 
a typical contradictory class position, especially around 
education where, in some cases, they are in contradiction 
between the benefit of expanding modern education and 
protecting their traditional crafts. They are also divided in 
supporting free education, like the working class, and fee 
paying education, like the big and new petty bourgeoisie. So 
this class has the two possibilities, and might go either way. 
The winning of the support of this class is important for 
social transformation since they constitute a considerable 
number and play an important role in production. 
For the working class the theoretical analysis shows that the 
working class is divided between a group who work in the 
industry and organized sector and another group in the service 
sector. There is also a lumpen proletariat who are not 
organised under any unions, which means that more attention 
has to be given to these sections if the working class is to 
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be integrated in any national action. 
As a social class, this class consciousness is not well 
developed, where in some cases they may support policies which 
may harm their interests. That can be understood from the 
nature of their common sense, where from their life experience 
they know about class inequalities. But at another level their 
consciousness, due to the influence of the dominant culture, 
inclines them to accept it as normal, or to acquiesce by 
perceiving that there are no real alternatives. 
In terms of class alliance, they are a social power which is 
in a way united in their interests by the simple fact of their 
every day suffering not as a result of being politically 
organised. The crucial point in their class alliance and their 
role in social transformation is how they react to the 
hegemony of the dominant classes or the fractions of these 
classes. As Gramsci explained, hegemony is never complete. The 
working class do not give their complete support to the 
capitalists, since they have two consciousnesses; one 
determined by their life experience which may unite workers 
for social class transformation, and another formed in a 
traditional way of thinking, informed by the dominant culture 
which is uncritically absorbed. 
This contradiction in working class common sense gives two 
possibilities for their future social action. They may either 
accept and co-exist with the dominant classes, or they may 
reject and try to overthrow their hegemony. In Gramsci's terms 
poor are not yet well organized enough to directly counter the 
hegemony of the dominant classes. 
The new petty bourgeoisie has a special position in this 
analysis, since this class has grown in size and it has an 
important role in development and modernisation. In terms of 
the formation of this class, it is not homogeneous. It 
consists of groups who have different interests and ambitions, 
and these range from action, seeking authority and power, or 
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just seeking safe careers. Its formation gives some 
indications for internal divisions and conflicts. In Egypt 
this class was in a continuous struggle for power and 
authority from the time of Muhammad Aly (1805-1849) until 1952 
when the lower strata of this class gained power and control 
over the state apparatus and state power. In the view of some 
authors, like Manfred Halpern, this class seems to be the 
principal revolutionary and potentially stabilizing force 
which is more able to act as a separate and independent force 
for the following reasons: 
Culturally, it is free from traditional bonds and 
preconditions, well prepared and equipped for administration. 
It is numerically one of the largest groups within the modern 
sector of society. It is more obviously cohesive, more self-
conscious and better trained than other classes. Their 
political, economic and social action in social change are 
decisive in determining the role of other classes in the 
future and it has shown itself as capable of marshalling the 
masses' support. These features of the new class must be 
evaluated in two ways. On the one hand some of these 
characters are true for Egypt, such as the high standard of 
education of the new class, their better level of training, 
their large numbers in the modern sector and their power which 
they gain from controlling the state power. On the other hand, 
other characteristics which deal with cultural and ideological 
aspects must be taken more carefully, in particular the point 
of being free from traditional ideas and more self-conscious. 
That is, the analysis of the culture and ideologies of this 
class has shown that its class consciousness has developed 
clearly in areas of education, while at the economic and 
political level they are divided and less coherent. In terms 
of their ideologies it is difficult to argue that all members 
of this class are only influenced by and bearers of new, 
modern and secular ideas, where traditional religious thought 
exists as well. 
From this ideological and cultural background, some main 
questions about this class can be addressed, concerning their 
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ability to lead modernisation and the kind of class alliance 
they may go for. 
In terms of leading modernisation, this class is essential. 
Throughout the modern history of Egypt, it took the 
responsibility of leading social transformation. It is 
equipped with modern knowledge, obtained modern technical and 
administration skills. 
In order to fulfil its role in society, this class has to 
consider the challenges it may face from the growing power of 
other social classes, in particular the tendency of the big 
bourgeoisie to organise itself in coalitions and the growing 
militant activities which recruit the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie and lower strata of the new class itself. This 
will require this class to decide its alliance. It has two 
ways either to go; either with the growing power of the big 
bourgeoisie, as they did in the seventies, or with the 
oppressed working class and traditional petty bourgeoisie. 
All this imposes more challenges on this class. First, it must 
solve its internal conflicts and second it must determine its 
social allies. At this point, the role of the intellectuals 
of this class is essential and Gramsci's identification of the 
role of the organic intellectuals is relevant. They may ally 
themselves with the working class and the oppressed elements 
of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, where they may work, 
engage themselves and direct the ideas and ideologies of the 
dominated classes and help them to build counter hegemony. 
V. Suggestions for Further Future Studies  
This research tried to cover three areas: class formation, 
culture and education. Further studies can be suggested to 
cover some important areas which this research could not 
develop. 
In the area of class formation, more detailed studies of 
popular images of society are needed in comparative terms, 
between rural and urban Egypt, to see differences, 
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similarities and the degree of the development of class 
consciousness and class identity in the two areas. 
In the study of education and class formation certain groups 
in urban Egypt need more investigation of their class 
consciousness and perception of education, such as the Islamic 
bourgeoisie and the working class who are engaged in modern 
industries such as the steel industry. 
Certain aspects of class ideologies and consciousness need 
more investigation. These include the influence of religious 
belief in shaping people's perception of society, class 
relations and education, in particular a comparative study for 
Muslim/Christian differences. 
This has been an essentially exploratory study, and it 
requires extensive theoretical and empirical consolidation in 
both quantitative and qualitative terms. However, in terms of 
indicating the potential for class analysis on culture, 
education and class formation, it has been completely 















Appendix 1: Comparison between the 48 developing countries 
with annual per capita income below 500 dollars, and the 18 
western countries listed as industrialized 
Calories per day 
Literacy 
Secondary school enrolment 
Primary school enrolment 
Life expectancy at birth 














Source: Margaret Hardiman and James Midgley, (1962) The 
Social Dimensions of Development (John Wiley and Sons, 
Chichester) pp.12-13 
Appendix 2: Population Growth 
1955 22.99 40.3 17.6 2.27 
1965 29.40 41.5 14.6 2.75 
1975 36.95 36.1 12.1 2.40 
1985 48.59 37.4 9.1 2.97 
Source: Ali Abdallah and Michael Brown, "Economy", in 
Lillian Craig, Harris (ed.) Egypt: International  
Challenges and Regional Stability, (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul) p.45. The figures are gathered by the 
authors from different official sources and from 
their own estimates. 
Appendix 3: Components of GDP 
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Agriculture 16.3 19.1 
Industry and Mining 14.9 13.6 




Trade 12.2 12.4 
Finance and Insurance 7.1 7.1 
Suez Canal 2.3 3.3 
Services (Housing, Tourism, etc.) 19.7 19.7 
Total 100 100 
Source: Ali Abdallah and Michael Brown, "Economy", in 
Lillian Craig, Harris (ed.) Egypt: International  
Challenges and Regional Stability, (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London) p.48. 
Appendix 4: Election to the People's Assembly 1984 
Party 	 Votes (%) 	 Seats 
NDP 	 72.9 	 389 
NWP 	 15.1 	 59 
(including Muslim Brothers) 
SLP 	 7.1 
NDURP 	 4.2 
Sub-total 	 448 
Nominated by President 	 10 
Total 	 458 
Source: 	 Nazih N. Ayubi, Domestic Politics, in Lillian Craig 
Harris (ed.) Egypt: International Challenges and 
Regional Stability, (Routledge and Kegan Paul) p.77 
Appendix 5: Elections to the People's Assembly 1987 
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NDP 	 69.6 	 309 40 
SLP (Alliance) 	 17.0 	 56 
(including 	 (36) 
4 
Muslim Brothers) 
MVP 	 10.9 	 35 
SWAP 	 2.21 
Dims 	 0.91 
Independents*  4 
Sub-total 	 400 48 
Nominated by President 	 10 
Total 	 458 
Independents who were 	 successful 
sponsored by existing parties. 
were those who were 
Source: 	 Nazih N. Ayubi, "Domestic Politics", in Lillian 
Craig, Harris (ed.) Egypt: International Challenges  
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Appendix 7: Size composition of industrial establishments in 
the organised sector according to number of employed persons, 
1952-68 
1962 	 1967/8 
Size class 	 Number of 	 Number of 	 Number of 	 Number of 
(Workers per 	 establish- 	 employees 	 establish- 	 employees 
establishment) 	 Bents 	 5 
	 (000's) 	 5 	 manta 	 % 	 (000's)5 
10 - 49 	 2,734 	 79 	 53 	 20 	 4,130 	 80 	 771 	 3.5 
50 - 499 	 633 	 19 	 90 	 33 	 796 	 16 	 106 	 18.5 
500 or more 	 78 	 2 	 130 	 47 	 202 	 4 	 387 	 68.0 
Total 	 3,445 	 100 	 273 	 100 	 5,128 	 100 	 570 	 100 
a 	 Which employ ten workers or more 
Sources: For 1952: Central Statistics Committee, 
Collection of Basic Statistics (Cairo, 1962), 
p.92. For 1967/68: Industrial Census 1967/68  
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Appendix 8: Membership of Professional Syndicates 1962 - 1972 
Syndicate Year of foundation Membership 
June.1962 June 1972 
Physicians 	 1942 	 11,419 	 15,198 
Dentists 	 1942 	 923 	 2,373 
Veterinarians 1942 	 1,006 	 2,634 
Pharmacists 	 1942 	 2,815 	 5,520 
Teachers 	 1951 110,387 190,740 
Agronomists 	 1949 	 11,332 	 39,910 
Engineers 	 1946 	 16,770 	 44,771 
Accountants 	 1955 	 1,378 	 1,655 
Lawyers 	 1912 	 9,149 	 8,420 
Scientists 	 1955 	 1,086 	 6,156 
Journalists 	 1940 	 1,159 	 1,863 
Actors 	 1958 	 948 	 886 
Cinema 	 1958 	 466 	 612 
Musicians 	 1958 	 935 	 913 
Total 	 169,774 	 321,651 
Source:Central Statistical Committee, Collection of Basic  
Statistics (Cairo, May 1963) pp.228-9; CAPMS, Statistical  
Indicators for the Arab Republic of Egypt (Cairo, July 1974) 
p.189, quoted in Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, The Political Economy 
of Nasserism (Cambridge University Press) p.99 
Appendix 9: The Education Ladder ]953 
Apr.andi, 1: The [due...al...no.) Ladder 1951 
7 
	
9 	 10 	 11 	 12 	 13 	 la 	 15 	 16 	 17 	 le 
Fri...1.y Stag* 	 Preparatory Stag* 
3 	 a 	 5 	 R 	 1 	 2 	 3 
Vocational training 
cantr•• 
Eight year school 	 General 
and specialized 
2 	 3 	 a 	 S 	 6 	 7 	 e 	 secondary school 1 	 2 	 a 	 Onivarsity 
facultiea 
2 	 1 	 2 	 3 	 a 	 Mighoriretitutes 
1 	 Te/viiciare trianirq irstitaltsa 
Technical secondary (skilled work) 
1 	 2 	 3 
1 	 Further studies for workshop 
teachers 
Five year technical schools (technicians) 
1 
	
2 • 3 	 a 	 S 
Teacher training schools 
1 	 2 	 3 
Vocational training cantros 	 1 
	
T..a.2 	 tniinino schools 
(special education) 
1 	 2 	 3 
Primary stage 	 Preparatory Stage 	 Secondary stage 	 al-Athar 
Oniversity 
1 	 2 	 3 	 a 	 S 	 6 	 1 	 2 	 3 	 1 	 2 	 3 	 4 
Source: Ministry of Education, Cairo, quoted in Georgia Ilyda, (1976) Education in Modern Egvmtr Ideas and 
Realities (Routledge and Regan Paul, London). 
5 1 3 
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Appendix 10: The Growth in the Numbers of Pupils and Students 
per Thousand of Egypt's Population at all Educational Levels 
(1952 - 1972) 










Primary Education 47.0 110.0 234 
General Preparatory 16.0 31.0 194 
Education 
General Secondary 4.3 9.6 223 
Education 
Vocational Secondary 0.8 9.0 1,125 
Education 
Higher Education 2.4 7.8 325 
Source: 	 Yosef Khalil Yosef (1975) The Main Events in the 
Educational System of Egypt: 1952 - 1975 (National 
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Appendix 12: The condition of the Educational Buildings, both 
Official and Subsidized 
Educational 	 Number The suitability of 	 Number of schools without 
Level 	 of 	 the buildings 	 electricity potable sanitary 
schools Comp- Comp- Needs 	 water utilities 
lately lately Repair 
Suit- Unsuit- 
able able 
Primary 	 9,170 	 5,422 	 959 
Preparatory 2,254 	 1,538 	 72 
General 	 467 	 366 	 7 
Secondary 
Technical 	 148 	 106 	 8 
Secondary (3 year) 
Technical 	 14 	 13 	 1 
Secondary (5 year) 
Agricultural 	 62 	 49 	 1 
Secondary (3 year) 
Agricultural 	 2 	 2 
Secondary (5 year) 
Commercial 	 303 	 228 	 7 
Secondary (3 year) 
Commercial 
	
4 	 4 
Secondary (5 year) 
Teachers'. 	 91 	 59 	 8 
Schools 
TOTAL 	 12,515 7,786 1,063 
2,789 3,633 721 335 
644 324 83 60 




69 15 3 2 
24 1 
3,666 4,000 814 402 
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Appendix 14: Total Education Budget for 1981/82, 1982/83 and 







1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
562.2 	 726.4 	 816.7 
242.1 	 307.1 	 369.8 
804.3 	 1033.5 	 1186.5 
9794.8 	 12081.2 	 13372.4 
Percentage 	 8.21% 	 8.55% 	 8.87% 
The budget of Al-Azhar Education is excluded. 
Source: National Centre for Educational Research, The 
Development of Education in the Arab Republic of 
Egypt from 1981/82 to 1983/84 
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Appendix 15: Spending on the Biggest and Smallest Five Sectors 
in Egypt in 1980/81 
The Biggest Five Sectors 
Rank 	 Name of 




The Smallest Five Sectors 
Rank 	 Name of 	 Average of 
of 	 Sector 	 development 
Sector 
1 Defence and security 212.6 1 Electricity 	 63.4 
2 Insurance 162.1 2 Culture and mass media 67.8 
3 Industry 145.2 3 Tourism 	 113.1 
4 Food Supply and 142.1 4 Agriculture 	 116.0 
Commerce 
5 Presidential Service 140.3 5 Education, research 	 120.8 
and youth 
Source: 	 Adel Ghoneim, (1986) The Egyptian Model of Dependent  
State Capitalism (Dar Al Mostakbal Al Araby, Cairo) 
p.239 
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Appendix 16: The Number of Workers in the Age Range 6 to 12 
as a Percentage of the Labour Force: 1974 to 1984 
Year Workers Aged 
6 to 12 Years 
(hundreds) 
Total Labour 








1974 2,654 96,779 2.7 100.00 
1975 4,447 100,802 4.4 176.55 
1977 4,919 104,157 4.7 185.34 
1978 4,640 107,433 3.3 174.83 
1979 3,790 109,711 3.5 142.80 
1980 6,024 114,424 5.3 226.97 
1981 5,213 115,072 4.5 196.42 
1982 4,422 116,377 3.8 166.61 
1983 7,758 138,122 5.6 292.31 
1984 10,143 143,613 7.0 383.17 
Source: 	 CAPMS: Sample Labour Research 1974 - 1984, in The 
National Centre for Social and Criminological 
Research, Seminar on Child Labour in Egypt in 1988 
Appendix 17: The Results of Primary School Certificate 1977/78 
- 19778/79: 	 Percentage of Students Who Pass The Examination 




% 	 Girls % 
1978/79 
Boys % 	 Girls % 
Foreign language 
schools 
99.5 99.7 98.1 99.2 
Private (not 
subsidized) 
84.9 87.7 87.8 89.3 
Official and 
subsidized 
75.9 74.6 76.4 76.4 
Part-time schools 69.0 71.0 71.4 75.9 
Service schools 51.0 60.2 54.3 59.1 
Source: 	 The 	 National Council 	 for Education, Scientific 
Research and Technology (1983) Private and Official 
Language Schools (Department of General Education 










37.3 	 26.5 










40.2 	 38.4 









Appendix 18: The Results of Preparatory School Certificate 
1977/78 - 19778/79: Percentage of Students Who Pass The 
Examination from the Total Enroled in Each Kind of School 









Boys % 	 Girls % 
97.6 	 97.8 
72.4 	 77.2 
70.2 	 72.7 
52.4 	 49.5 
40.7 	 43.5 
Boys % 	 Girls % 
97.7 	 99.1 
75.6 	 77.5 
71.1 	 78.4 
54.6 	 52.2 
43.4 	 47.0 
Source: The National Council for Education, Scientific 
Research and Technology (1983) Private and Official  
Language Schools (Department of General Education 
and Training, Cairo) November, p.39 
Appendix 19: The Results of Secondary School Certificate 
1977/78 - 19778/79: Percentage of Students Who Pass The 
Examination from the Total Enroled in Each Kind of School 
Competent Authority 	 1977/78 	 1978/79 
Source: The National Council for Education, Scientific 
Research and Technology (1983) Private and Official 
Language Schools (Department of General Education 
and Training, Cairo) November, p.40 
Appendix 20: 	 Table Showing the Distribution of 
into the Registrar General's Class Categories 




1 Professional etc., occupations 48 3.7 
2 Intermediate occupations 327 24.9 
3N Skilled occupations, nonmanual 294 22.4 
3M Skilled occupations, manual 358 27.2 
4 Partly skilled occupations 212 16.1 
5 Unskilled occupations 67 5.1 
6 Armed forces 9 0.7 
1,315 100 
Source: 	 Gordon Marshall et al. (eds.) (1988) Social Class  
in Modern Britain (Hutchinson: London) 
Appendix 	 21: 	 Showing 	 the 	 Distribution 	 of 	 Respondents 




Service I Higher grade professional, 
administrators, and officials, 




II Lower grade professionals, 
administrators, and officials, 
higher grade technicians, 
managers in small business and 
industrial establishments; 





IIIa Routine nonmanual employees in 
administration and commerce 
198 15.1 
Ilib Personal service workers 58 4.4 
IVa Small proprietors, artisans 
etc., with employees 
45 3.4 
IVb Small proprietors, artisans 
etc., without employees 
59 4.5 
IVc Farmers and smallholders; self- 
employed fishermen 
11 0.8 
V Lower grade technicians, 
supervisors of manual workers 
107 8.1 
Working VI Skilled manual workers 165 12.5 
VIIa Semi-skilled and unskilled 
manual workers (not in 
agriculture) 
307 23.4 
VIIb Agricultural workers 7 0.5 
1,315 100 
Source: Gordon Marshall 	 et 	 al. 	 (eds.) 	 (1988) Social Class 
in Modern Britain (Hutchinson: London) 
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Appendix 22: 	 Detailed Discussion of the Methods and 
Procedures for the Field Study 
The Selection of the Samples for the Pilot Study and Main 
Study  
The Pilot Study 
The pilot study was designed to study people's perspectives 
and ideologies as based upon their class position. The people 
who were chosen for the sample were the parents of children 
in primary schools. The first step in creating the sample was 
to select three schools of different kinds, that is, one 
government free school, one government language school, and 
one foreign language school. Within the three schools, ten 
pupils were cosen at random from the list of children enrolled 
in the sixth grade of the schools. 
The researcher talked to the children and explained that the 
research would involve the researcher going to their homes and 
discussing some issues with their parents. The children were 
given a letter to their parents, asking them to agree to the 
interview, and asking them to make an appointment for the 
interview. Ten children were selected, so that by the time any 
parents who did not wish to be involved had been excluded, the 
desired sample of at leaast six would remain. The letter to 
parents is included in Appendix 23. 
The schools were slected in the area of north Cairo from among 
the 89 schools which are in that part of the city. Table 1 
shows the types of schools which are to be found in north 
Cairo. 
The pilot study was conducted in Egypt from January to April 
1986. The researcher chose the north Cairo area to work in and 
sampled from different types of schools in the area. 
In order to gain access to schools for research purposes it 
is necessary to get permission from the Security. Once this 
525 
Table 1: Numbers of Primary Schools of Different Types in 
North Cairo 
Type of school 	 Number 
Government Free Schools 	 75 
Government Language Schools 	 2 
Foreign Language Schools 	 4 
Private Schools Teaching Foreign 
	 8 
Languages and Owned by Individuals 
Total 	 89 
Source: 
	 Ministry of Education, North Cairo Department, The  
Statistical Guide 1986-1987  
was achieved, the researcher was allowed to contact the 
schools. 
The first step in the work inside the school was to make a 
survey of the parent's occupation, in order to know about the 
social background of the schools. Only the parents of children 
in the sixth grade of the schools were taken into account. In 
order to classify the occupations, the researcher grouped them 
as follows: 
- employees of the government or in the public sector, 
- military personnel, 
- professionals, such as doctors, lawyers and engineers, 
- bourgeois, including merchants and businessmen, and 
- workers. 
From the survey, as Table No.2 indicates, it is clear that the 
foreign language school and the government language school 
have high levels of profession groups, while there is no 
working class in the foreign language school and only one per 
cent in the government language school. In contrast, in the 
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Table 2: Occupations of the Parents of Sixth Grade Pupils in 
the Pilot Study Schools 
The Foreign Language School (St.Mary) 
Occupation 	 Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 42 	 43.4 
Employees 	 26 	 26.9 (Mostly managers) 
Military 	 8 	 8.3 (All officers) 
Bourgeois 	 12 	 12.4 (11 merchants, 1 
craftsman) 
Workers 
Undefined 	 9 	 9.3 
Total 	 97 
The Government Language School (Hafiz Ibrahim) 
Occupation 	 Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 45 	 45.5 
Employees 	 25 	 25.5 (6 managers) 
Military 	 16 	 16.0 (9 officers) 
Bourgeois 	 10 	 10.0 (7 merchants, 3 
craftsmen) 
Workers 	 1 	 1.0 
Undefined 	 2 	 2.0 
Total 	 98 
The Government Free School (Fatima Al Nabawiyah) 
Occupation 
	
Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 - 	 - 
Employees 	 12 	 26.0 (All small employees) 
Military 	 3 	 6.5 (No officers) 
Bourgeois 	 8 	 1 7 . 4 	 ( S m a 1 1 
merchants/craftsman) 
Workers 	 20 	 43.6 
Undefined 	 3 	 6.5 
Total 	 46 
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government free school 43.6 per cent are workers, and there 
are no professionals. It is also noticeable that the 
bourgeois, i.e. those who own the means of production, are 
more likely to be large merchants and businessmen in the 
foreign and government language schools, while in the 
government free school they are usually small merchants and 
craftsmen. 
The first result from the pilot study is that, as had been 
anticipated, the three kinds of schools represent different 
social backgrounds, and that a selection from these three 
types of schools in the main sample would ensure a broad 
representation of people from different social classes. These 
people are the parents of the children. 
The value of the pilot study was, as mentioned above, to 
examine the social background of the parents in the schools, 
and to explore the possibility of representing different 
social classes. In this sense it also cast some interesting 
light on the earlier, theoretical discussion of the class 
nature of different types of schools in Egypt. The pilot study 
was also a good opportunity for the researcher to develop her 
skills in the conduct of interviews. 
At a more specific level, the pilot study helped in 
readjusting the initial plan for the conducting of interviews. 
The first plan was to interview the two parents together, and 
to make a three way discussion between the parents and the 
interviewer. The first interview revealed that this was not 
going to be a successful way of conducting the interviews, as 
one parent talked most of the time, and the interviewer could 
only note the views of one parent. The plan was subsequently 
modified to allow for a separate interview for each parent. 
The pilot study also confirmed that the area of north Cairo 
has three different types of schools. The area includes houses 
many middle class families, who usually live in the area near 
the Nile, while the working class families usually live in the 
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inner city streets or alleyways (Hara). 
The Main Field Study 
The main field study was carried out in north Cairo from 
January to April 1987. Security permission was needed from the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, which 
allows the researcher to carry out the research in the primary 
schools of north Cairo. The permission was published in the 
Egyptian Official Gazette, Vol.84, 8th April 1987, and a copy 
is included in Appendix 24. 
The selection of the sample for the main study was similar to 
that for the pilot study. It involved sixty families from six 
schools. Fifteen pupils were selected from each of six 
schools, two government free schools, two government language 
schools and two froeign language schools. 
Description of the Schools 
The two government language schools in north Cairo were 
previously government free schools. The comparison between the 
buildings of the four government schools of the sample shows 
that, although the four schools are run by the government, the 
fee paying schools are getting more care in terms of 
maintenance and decoration. However, the government free 
schools have some facilities, including a library and a music 
room. 
The foreign language schools are in the buildings surrounding 
the old establishment of the Maison du Bon Pasteur, which was 
established in north Cairo in 1845. The buildings are in good 
condition, and the schools have facilities which include a 
library, music room, theatre and gymnasium. 
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The Social Background of the Pupils in the Schools 
The occupations of the fathers of the children selected in the 
sample are shown in detail in the tables which follow. 
The sample for the main study consists of sixty fathers and 
sixty mothers. In order to carry out the analysis, the sample 
was classified according to the class variable, and not 
according to the type of school. Using the criteria which were 
explained in detail in Chapter Five, the sample was classified 
mainly according to position in relation to the means of 
production, owner/non-owner, and the occupational state, and 
mental/manual work. The sample was classified into four 
classes, which were the new petty bourgeoisie, traditional 
petty bourgeoisie, big bourgeoisie and working class. 
Table 6 shows the occupational state of the sample. 
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Table 3: Father's Occupation in the Two Government 
Schools 
School No.1 (Shoubra Al-Khadima) 
In school No.1 there are three six grade classrooms, with 
about 38 pupils in each divided as follows: 
Boys 	 42 	 Muslim 	 100 
Girls 	 74 	 Christian 16 
Occupation 	 Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 3 	 2.5 
Employees 	 29 	 25.0 
Military 	 2 	 1.7 (Soldiers) 
Bourgeois 	 16 	 13.8 (Small merchants, 
craftsmen) 
Workers 	 38 	 32.8 
Undefined 	 28 	 24.1 
Total 	 116 	 100 
School No.2 (Gawad Husny) 
In school No.2 there is one six grade classrooms with 46 
pupils divided as follows: 
Boys 	 23 	 Muslim 	 42 
Girls 23 	 Christian 4 
Occupation 	 Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 - 	 - 
Employees 	 13 	 28.3 
Military 	 2 	 4.4 (Soldiers) 
Bourgeois 	 10 	 21.7 (Small merchants, 
craftsmen) 
Workers 	 15 	 32.6 
Undefined 	 6 	 13.0 
Total 	 46 	 100 
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Table 4: Father's Occupation in the Two Government 
Language Schools 
School No.1 (Tariq Ben Zyad) 
In school No.1 there are two six grade classrooms, with 
about 30 pupils in each divided as follows: 
Boys 	 34 	 Muslim 	 46 
Girls 	 25 	 Christian 13 
Occupation 	 Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 32 	 54.2 
Employees 	 15 	 25.4 
Military 	 7 	 11.9 (Officers) 
Bourgeois 	 3 	 5.1 (Merchants, and 
businessmen) 
Craftsmen 	 1 	 1.7 
Undefined 	 1 	 1.7 
Total 	 59 	 100 
School No.2 (Hafiz Ibrahim) 
In school No.2 there are three six grade classrooms with 
about 27 pupils in each, divided as follows: 
Boys 	 48 	 Muslim 	 66 
Girls 	 32 	 Christian 14 
Occupation 	 Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 35 	 43.8 
Employees 	 29 	 36.3 
Military 	 10 	 12.5 (Officers) 
Bourgeois 	 3 	 3.7 (Merchants, and 
businessmen) 
Craftsmen 	 2 	 1.3 
Undefined 	 1 	 1.3 
Total 	 80 	 100 
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Table 5: Father's Occupation in the Two Foreign Language 
Schools 
School No.1 (Bonpasteur) 
In school No.1 there are two six grade classrooms, with 
about 38 pupils in each divided as follows: 
Boys 	 0 	 Muslim 	 22 
Girls 	 77 	 Christian 45 
Occupation 	 Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 35 	 45.5 
Employees 	 22 	 28.6 
Military 	 2 	 2.6 (Officers) 
Bourgeois 	 15 	 19.5 (Merchants, and 
businessmen) 
Craftsmen 	 3 	 3.8 
Undefined 	 - 	 - 
Total 	 77 	 100 
School No.2 (St.Mary School) 
In school No.2 there are two six grade classrooms with 
about 42 pupils in each, divided as follows: 
Boys 	 0 	 Muslim 	 40 
Girls 	 85 	 Christian 45 
Occupation 	 Number 	 % 
Professionals 	 38 	 44.7 
Employees 
	 21 	 24.7 
Military 	 10 	 11.8 (Officers) 
Bourgeois 	 10 	 11.8 (Merchants, and 
businessmen) 
Craftsmen 
	 - 	 - 
Undefined 	 6 	 7.0 
Total 	 85 	 100 
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Table 6: The Occupational Distribution of the Sample 
Occupational New petty Traditional 
	 Big 	 Ong 
State 	 Bourgeoisie Bourgeoisie 	 Bourgeoisie 	 Class 
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother Father 
Mother 





Less than 5 
	
6 	 1 
10 people 	 7 
40 people 	 1 
50 people 	 1 
Wage earner 31 20 	 1 
	 1* 	 10 
Unemployed 	 1 	 1 
(was previously 
employed) 
These two wage earners are classified according to two 
different measures: the first one is to classify them as 
big or traditional petty bourgeoisie according to the 
husband's position, and the second is to classify them 
as wage earners, since they are both working women. 
In terms of the size of the sample, it can be noticed that the 
sample of sixty families is not in proportion to the general 
pattern of the population of Cairo. However, there are 
representatives from different class positions, with a clear 
majority among the new petty bourgeoisie, which was the 
intention in selecting the sample this way, in order to give 
the opportunity to focus on the ideologies of this class. This 
was refered to earlier in the Introduction, Chapter Three and 
Chapter Five, on account of the importance of this group, both 
in terms of numbers, and in terms of the leading position they 
occupy in modernization. According to this view, the new petty 
bourgeoisie is the main class in the analysis and is 
represented by 31 families. Members of the sample work as 
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managers, directors, engineers, teachers, university teachers, 
employees, and all of them work either in the government, 
public sector or in foreign companies. 
The sample of the traditional petty bourgeoisie consists of 
9 families, who work as small shop keepers who employ less 
than five workers. 
The 9 members of the big bourgeoisie consists of owners of 
factories, entrepreneurs, businessmen, and wholesale 
merchants. All of them employ more than ten workers. 
There are 11 members of the working class in the sample. They 
work in the marginal sector of services, and not in industry, 
since the sample includes a driver, a barber, a cleaner, a 
waiter and an upholsterer. 
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Appendix 23: Letter to Parents 
Letter to Parents 
Dear Parents, 
I would like to introduce myself. I am Mahra Dyab, 
assistant lecturer in the Faculty of Education, Zagazig 
University. I am doing some research into parents' views on 
the educational system. It is part of my study for a Ph.D. 
degree. 
Most research is concerned with the views of those in 
authority (government, teachers, etc.) but in this research 
I am concerned with your views, because your children are the 
customers of the system. So your views are important in order 
to understand and to solve the problems of this essential 
system. 
If you do not mind, I would like to meet both of you at 
home to discuss different points about educational, social and 
economic systems in Egypt. 
I will use one tool in my interview, which is a list of 
questions, and I will write down the answers myself. 
I would like to assure you that all information will be 
used for the purpose of the study, and will be kept secret and 
anonymous. 
The interview may extend for two hours. If you have no 
objection, would you please inform the school about a suitable 
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Appendix 25: 	 Parents' Perspectives on Education and Society: 
A Guide for Interview 
I 	 General Information  
1. Age 
2. Religion 
3. 	 Occupation: 	 details about the kind of work, whether 
they supervise other people manual / non-
manual work. 
4. 	 A brief discussion about the parents' family origins 
which includes: 
a. Rural - urban origin 
b. Father's occupation 
c. Why/how they moved to Cairo 
5. 	 Income 
6. 	 Standard of Education 
a. Illiterate 
b. Literate 
c. Primary level 
d. Less than middle level 
e. Secondary level 
f. More than middle less than university 
g. University level (first degree) 
7. 	 Number of the family (children) 
8. 	 Age of children 
9. 	 Education level and kind of school 
10. Occupation state 
Self employed (alone) 
Self employed (employing other people - how many) 
Wage earner 
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II 	 Social Advancement  
11. Do you believe that there are opportunities for your 
children to achieve social advancement? 
yes 	 no 
Note: I mean by social advancement: 




5. Better life 
12. If you compare your children with other children whom you 
meet at your children's school and in your residential 
area, do you believe that your children have: 
a. As much chances of social advancement as most other 
children, 
b. Less chances than most other children, 
c. More chances then most other children. 
13. If you compare your children with other children in the 
whole society, do you believe that your children have: 
a. As much chances of social advancement as most other 
children, 
b. Less chances than most other children, 
c. More chances than most other children. 
14 	 If answer (b) what kinds of children have more chance 
than your children and if there are any who have even 
less than your children what kind of people are they? 
15 	 If answer (c) what kinds of people have less chance than 
your children, and if there are any who have even more 
than your children what kind of people are they. 
16 	 Here is a list of factors believe to be important for 
social advancement. 






Follow up: what do you mean by each factor. 
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III Education  
17. Which kind of school would you prefer for your children 
in their first level? 
a. Government school 
b. Government language school 
c. Foreign language school 
d. Al-Azhar 
e. Private school 
Follow up: I get the respondent talk about: 
1. The main characteristic of each kind of school 
2. To identify the main differences and similarities 
3. Important aspects of each kind. 
18. What kind of school they are actually in? 
a. Government 
b. Government language school 
c. Foreign language school 
d. Al-Azhar 
e. Private school 
19. Why did you not send them to the kind which you would 
prefer? 
a. Very expensive 
b. Far from our place 
c. Any other. 
20. To which level do you want them to reach? 
a. Basic education 
b. General secondary 
c. Technical secondary 
d. University level. 
21. Why do you want this level? 
To find a good job ... like 
To give them good status.  
I can't finance them for a higher level. 
22. Why did you send your children to a government language, 
foreign language or private school? 
a. It is important to learn a foreign language 
b. To find a good job in the future 
c. They are better organised than government schools. 
23. Are there any differences between the government and the 
language schools in developing children's abilities? 
a. There is no difference 
b. The language schools develop their abilities more 
c. The government schools develop their abilities more. 
Note: I mean by abilities 
1. Intelligence in general 
2. School achievement 
3. Talents, like music and drawing. 
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IV The Role of Eduction in Society 
24. What is the usefulness of education for your children? 
a. To find a good job 
b. Permanent work 
c. For successful future 
d. Good social status 
e. To be polite 
f. To know their religion. 
25. What is the usefulness of the educated people to Egypt? 
To find specialists in all fields 
To be a developed country 
To use or natural resources. 
V 	 Equality and Inequality in Education 
26. Do you think all children should go to school 
irrespective of their class and wealth? 
yes 	 no 
27. If no, why not? 
a. The government can't finance all children 
b. Stupid children shouldn't go 
c. Poor people can't spend upon education 
28. What are the factors which you think influence children's 
continuation in education? 
a. It depends upon their aptitudes 
b. Basic education for all but not the university 
c. It depends upon their position in society. 
29. Education should be free 
a. In all levels up to university 
b. Only at the compulsory level 
c. Compulsory and secondary 
d. University should be fee-paying 
e. All levels should be fee-paying. 
30. Which kind of education is very important for our 
society? 
a. Technical secondary 
B. Academic secondary 
c. Religious education 
31. Do you agree to send your children to technical 
education? 
yes 	 no 
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VI 	 Evaluation of the Education System 
32. Are there any problems in education system? 
yes 	 no 
33. What are these problems? 
a. The big number of students 
b. Shortage in school buildings 
c. Shortage of teachers 
d. Weak curriculum 
e. Shortage of equipment. 
34. Who can solve these problems? 
a. The government 
b. The political parties 
c. People. 




36. On what aspects and parts of education should we spend 
more? 
a. Basic education 
b. General secondary education 
c. Technical education 
d. University. 
37. Where should the money came from? 
a. Shifting from military expenditure to education 
b. Increase taxes and changing tax system. If the latter, 
how? 
c. From foreign aid. 
38. Do you think that our education system has been changed 
after 1952 revolution? 
yes 
	 no 
39. If yes, in which aspects? 
a. Financial 
b. Increasing student numbers 
c. Free education at all levels 
d. Increasing University numbers 
e. New specialisations 
f. More equal opportunities 
g. New curricula. 
40. If no, why? 
Education is still for the upper class 
Still fee-paying in an indirect way. 
41. Do you expect any changes in the future? 
yes 	 no 
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42. If yes, in which aspects? 
a. Curriculum 
b. More spending on education 
c. Solve the private lessons problem 
d. New examination system. 
43. If no, why? 
a. Changes in education are very slow 
b. The government gives more care to other problems. 
VII Evaluation of the School  
You have your children in schools. I expect you to have some 
views about your children's school, for example: 
44. What do you like in your children's school? 
They have good teachers 
The discipline 
The school always contact home. 
45. What don't you like in your children's school? 
Not strict with the children 
Teachers are not well qualified 
The results are not good 
They don't contact home 
The buildings are in a bad condition. 
VIII Parents' relations with school  
46 	 What are you doing to solve your children's problems at 
school? 
Discuss with their teachers 
Discuss with headmaster/mistress 
I let the child face the situation 
I have nothing to do with it. 
47 	 How do you find the discussion with teachers? 
It's very easy 
I can't understand them 
Not all teachers are the same. 
48 Are you a member in the parents' committee? 
a. I am not a member but I can attend the meetings 
b. Yes, I am a member 
c. I am not a member and I do not go. 
49. If you don't go, why not? 
I don't believe in this system 
I have no time 
I have not been elected. 
50 	 If you go, why? 
It is our responsibility 
It is our children's future 
Any other 
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51. What kinds of problem do they discuss in the committee? 
a. Financial problems 
b. Teachers' and students' problems 
c. Students' achievements 
d. I don't know 
52. Do you think parents' committee has influence inside the 
school? 
yes 	 no 
53. If yes, in which aspects? 
a. Financial problems 
b. Students' results 
c. School services. 
54. If no, why not? 
a. It is a formal committee 
b. The school has all the power 
c. The headmaster/mistress dominates. 
55. How do parents become committee members? 
a. By election 
b. By personal relations 
c. I don't know. 
IX 	 Evaluation of the Curriculum 
56. At school children learn many different subjects. Which 
do you think are the most important subjects? 
a. Science and mathematics 
b. Human science 
c. Religion 
d. Arabic 
e. Foreign language 
f. Drawing and sport 
g. All subjects 
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X 	 Evaluation of Private Lessons  
57. Do you help your children in their study? 
yes 	 no 
58. If yes, what kind of help you give them? 
a. Read with them 
b. Help them in doing homework. 
59. If no, why not? 
I don't read and write 
I have no time 
I am not interested in doing that. 
60. Do your children have any extra tuition? 
yes 
	 no 
61. If yes, from whom? 
Teachers 
Organised lessons by the school 
At the mosque or church. 
62. Are the private lessons to help children? 
a. To remain equal with other children 
b. To move ahead of other children 
c. It depends upon the child's standard. 
63. What are the reasons for the private lessons problems? 
a. Teacher are not well qualified 
b. The big number of students in one classroom 
c. Students are not serious 
d. The competition. 
64. What is your opinion about the private lessons? 
a. It affects the equal opportunities to education 
b. It is fair 
c. It is unfair 
XI 	 Family Cultural Capital  
65. Do you have any books at home 
yes 	 no 





School books only 
67. Who chose the children's books? 
a. The father 
b. The mother 
c. The children 
d. We only help them. 
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68. How do your children spend their leisure time? 
a. At home, watching T.V. 
b. Go to the club 
c. Go to the cinema and children's theatre 
d. Play in the street. 
XII Political Consciousness and interests  
69. If we compare the political system during the sixties and 
the political system during the seventies, which one of 
these systems helped in: 
a. Developing our society? 
b. Developing your position in society? 
c. Developing the education system? 
Note: 	 Give examples of these developments and 
differences. 
XIII Class Position and Imaae of Society 
70. Do you think that all people in society are 
a. Equal? 
b. Unequal? 
71. If they are unequal, in which aspects? 
a. Power 
b. Wealth 
c. Social position 
d. Social opportunities 
e. Education 
f. Poor and Rich. 
72. What do you think about these differences? 
a. Very large differences 
b. Very small differences. 
73. You agree that there are differences and inequalities 
between people. Can you identify how many classes or 
different groups of people exist in Egypt now? 
Describe each class or group. 
74. What is the size of each class or group? 

























77. Can people change their position in society? 
yes 	 no 
78. If yes, how? 
a. Education 
b. Money 
c. Illegal ways. 
79. In which direction do people move? 
a. Upward mobility 
b. Downward mobility 
c. Both directions. 
80. If no, why people can't change their position? 
a. It is their fate 
b. Poor people can not improve their position. 
81 	 During the seventies many things have been changed in 
society. Some people went up and became very powerful and 
rich, some people went down and others remained the same. 











82. Which of these groups has the most influence upon the 
policy of education? 
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83. Teachers are one of many groups of professions in 
society. If you compare teachers with other professions 
in society in terms of status and social position, which 
position you give them compared with: 
Other Professions 	 Status 








84. What is your view of 
a. Society's future 
b. Children's future. 
85. Would you like to add any more questions or suggestions? 
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